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“The fact is that English is the international language of aviation.” 
 







“While the elimination of aircraft accidents and/or serious incidents remains the ultimate 
goal, it is recognized that the aviation system cannot be completely free of hazards and 
associated risks.” 
Safety Management Manual, ICAO Document 9859 






“In retrospect, this accident seems to illustrate how cultural characteristics within and 
between cultures can combine with tragic results.” 
 
An analysis of the Avianca Flight 052 accident 






Humans have long dreamed of being able to fly, as evidenced by the ancient myth 
of Daedalus and Icarus trying to escape from the island of Crete on wings made of feathers 
and wax. Their mythical attempt ended in the tragic death of Icarus, but the dream lived 
on. Finally, in 1903, the Wright brothers made their first brief flights at Kitty Hawk, North 
Carolina, ushering in the era of heavier-than-air aircraft that are powered and controllable. 
Technological advances continued throughout the 20th century, and flying has now become 
so commonplace that airlines carried 4.3 billion passengers in 2018. Nevertheless hazards 
still remain. Sidney Dekker, airline pilot and academic, has written cogently about the risks 
inherent in modern aviation and the “good people” around the world who strive to make 
the air transport system as safe as possible. This dissertation is dedicated to all those good 






I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor John 
Maher of International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, Japan, for his guidance, 
patience and wisdom. Like the ancient master technician Daedalus, he has enabled the 
transmission of knowledge to successive generations of students and I greatly appreciate 
all he has taught me. In addition, I would like to thank my other committee members, 
Professor Yamaguchi and Professor Jung, for their advice and support. 
As is often the way, this PhD became a lengthy project that took an inevitable toll 
on family life. I must thank my wife, Chihiro, and my daughters, Reina and Mirei, for their 
patience over the last few years. They have raised my awareness about language and 
cultural differences, and helped me understand some of the hidden aspects of the cultural 
iceberg. I owe a debt of gratitude to Chihiro for introducing me to Professor Maher. 
A lot of people from many countries and cultures have contributed time, ideas or 
support to this project. The list includes acquaintances, colleagues, friends and family 
members, from Colombia to Copenhagen, and Oxford to Osaka. I would especially like to 
thank Penny and Derek Cornthwaite, Roger Hills, Dan Jackson, Patrik Jonzon, Paul Joyce, 
Tim Marchand, Peter McDonald, Mark Rentz, Ben Rowlett and Julian Williamson. 
This PhD has been informed by conversations with many aviation professionals 
around the world: human factors researchers, accident investigators, regulators, air traffic 
controllers, as well as pilots who fly for airlines in Europe, Japan, the Middle East, South 
America and the United States. I am very grateful to everyone who participated in the 
survey, and I would especially like to thank the key informant, without whom the project 
would not have been possible. 
Finally, I am indebted to Professor Robin A. East and Professor Chris J. Harris, 
both formerly of the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the University of 
Southampton, for starting me on this journey many years ago. 
Flying is an everyday miracle but is still imbued with risk. Next time you board an 
airplane, take a moment to savour the awe. And thank all the good people who work to 










LIST OF TABLES viii 
LIST OF FIGURES x 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1 
1.1 Civil Aviation Worldwide in the 21st Century ............................................................. 2 
1.2 How Safe is Air Transportation? ................................................................................. 3 
1.3 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) .............................................. 6 
1.4 The ICAO Language Proficiency Programme ............................................................ 8 
1.5 Accidents Involving Language Factors ..................................................................... 11 
1.6 The Structure & Aims of the Dissertation ................................................................. 13 
CHAPTER 2: The Language Use of Airline Pilots 17 
2.1 The Language Use of NESs & NNSs ........................................................................ 18 
2.2 An Overview of Aviation Language ......................................................................... 25 
2.3 Intra-Cockpit Communication ................................................................................... 26 
2.4 Pilot-ATC Communication ........................................................................................ 29 
2.5 Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) ...................................................................... 43 
2.6 Conversation Analysis (CA) in Aviation ................................................................... 45 
2.7 English as “the international language of aviation” .................................................. 49 
CHAPTER 3: The Interplay of Risk & Communication 53 
3.1 Uncertainty & Risk .................................................................................................... 54 
3.2 Hazard, Threat & Risk ............................................................................................... 58 
3.3 Acceptable Risk ......................................................................................................... 60 
3.4 Safety Management Systems in Aviation .................................................................. 64 
3.5 Identifying Hazards ................................................................................................... 65 
3.6 Assessing Risks ......................................................................................................... 66 
 
 v 
3.7 Controlling Risks ....................................................................................................... 68 
3.8 “Findings as to Risk” in Aviation .............................................................................. 71 
CHAPTER 4: The Interplay of Culture & Communication 74 
4.1 Definitions of Culture ................................................................................................ 75 
4.2 The Culture of Groups ............................................................................................... 79 
4.3 Hall’s Intercultural Communication .......................................................................... 88 
4.4 Ethnography of Communication (EOC) .................................................................... 92 
4.5 Interdiscourse Communication .................................................................................. 98 
4.6 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions .............................................................................. 103 
4.7 Trompenaars’ Cultural Dimensions ......................................................................... 109 
4.8 Politeness & Face .................................................................................................... 113 
4.9 Intercultural Communication Studies in Aviation ................................................... 116 
CHAPTER 5: The Crash of Avianca Flight 052 125 
5.1 History of Avianca until 1990 ................................................................................. 126 
5.2 The Crew of Avianca Flight 052 ............................................................................. 129 
5.3 Synopsis of the Avianca 052 Accident .................................................................... 129 
5.4 History of Avianca since 1990 ................................................................................ 131 
5.5 Representations of the Avianca 052 Accident ......................................................... 131 
CHAPTER 6: Methodology 138 
6.1 STAGE ONE – Past Accidents Cited by ICAO ...................................................... 139 
6.1.1 Research Questions A-D .................................................................................. 140 
6.1.2 Survey of Pilots’ Attitudes to Past Accidents ................................................... 141 
6.1.3 Semi-Structured Pilot Interviews ...................................................................... 145 
6.2 STAGE TWO – Analysis of the Avianca 052 Accident ......................................... 148 
6.2.1 Research Questions E-H ................................................................................... 149 
6.2.2 An Aviation Communication Toolkit ............................................................... 150 
6.2.3 Analysis of Language Use in the Accident ...................................................... 152 
CHAPTER 7: Findings 157 
7.1 STAGE ONE – The Relevance of Past Accidents .................................................. 158 
7.1.1 RQ A – The Importance of Past Accidents ...................................................... 158 
7.1.2 RQ B – Pilots’ Awareness of Past Accidents ................................................... 159 
 
 vi 
7.1.3 RQ C – Sources of Information ........................................................................ 161 
7.1.4 RQ D – Insufficient English Proficiency .......................................................... 164 
7.2 STAGE TWO – Language Use in the Avianca 052 Accident ................................ 166 
7.2.1 The ACT Glossary ............................................................................................ 166 
7.2.2 RQs E-H & Communication Factors ................................................................ 172 
7.2.3 Recurring Phenomena in the Avianca 052 Accident ........................................ 173 
7.2.4 Critical Communications in the Avianca 052 Accident ................................... 190 
CHAPTER 8: Making Sense of Past Accidents 208 
8.1 STAGE ONE – Learning from Past Accidents ....................................................... 209 
8.1.1 RQ A – The Process of Learning from the Past ............................................... 209 
8.1.2 RQ B – Iconic Accidents .................................................................................. 210 
8.1.3 RQ C – TV Documentaries & Other Information Sources .............................. 212 
8.1.4 RQ D – English Proficiency & Language Attitudes ......................................... 213 
8.2 STAGE TWO – Making Sense of the Avianca 052 Accident ................................ 215 
8.2.1 Recurring Phenomena – Captain, First Officer & Controller ........................... 215 
8.2.2 Critical Communications – The Process of Breakdown ................................... 223 
8.2.3 RQs E-H – Factors that Contributed to the Accident ....................................... 230 
8.2.4 NTSB Report – Limitations of the Transcripts ................................................ 233 
CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 236 
9.1 Reassessing the Avianca 052 Accident ................................................................... 237 
9.2 Implications for Pilot Training & Accident Investigation ....................................... 240 
9.3 A Framework for Analysing Pilot Language Use in Accidents .............................. 242 
9.4 Limitations of the Study .......................................................................................... 244 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 246 
GLOSSARY OF AVIATION TERMS 251 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 254 
APPENDIX 1: ICAO Level 4 Descriptors 283 
APPENDIX 2: Accidents Cited by ICAO 286 
APPENDIX 3: Sample Database Record 288 
 
 vii 
APPENDIX 4: Features of Standard Phraseology 289 
APPENDIX 5: Accident/Error Models & Taxonomies 291 
APPENDIX 6: “Findings as to Risk” in TSB Reports 292 
APPENDIX 7: Survey Questionnaire 295 
APPENDIX 8: Sample Survey Response 298 
APPENDIX 9: Airline Pilot Interview Guide 300 
APPENDIX 10: Airline Pilot Interview Log 301 
APPENDIX 11: U.S. Code for CVR Data 304 
APPENDIX 12: Transcripts for Avianca 052 Accident 305 
APPENDIX 13: List of Communication Factors 306 
APPENDIX 14: ACT Glossary Entries 308 
APPENDIX 15: Air Traffic Controllers for Avianca 052 330 
APPENDIX 16: AVA052 Communication (21:02-21:04) 331 
APPENDIX 17: Translation of Spanish CVR Dialogue 335 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Fatalities by transportation mode in the United States     3 
Table 2: Accidents involving language factors cited by ICAO             11 
Table 3: Extract from ATC transcript of United Airlines 232             40 
Table 4: Mnemonics for identifying flight hazards               65 
Table 5: A grammar of context               100 
Table 6: Grammar of context description of pilot-ATC radiotelephony          103 
Table 7: Avianca accidents in the 1980s              128 
Table 8: Flight experience of the Avianca 052 crew             129 
Table 9: Key informant’s descriptions of four accidents cited by ICAO          160 
Table 10: Excerpt from AVA052 CVR recording (20:54-20:56)           174 
Table 11: Exchange 1 between AAL692 and FV controller (20:59)           180 
Table 12: Exchange 2 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:01)            181 
Table 13: Exchange 3 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:02)           182 
Table 14: Exchange 4 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:02)            182 
Table 15: Exchange 5 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:04)           183 
Table 16: Exchange 6 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:05)           183 
Table 17: Exchange 7 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:06)           184 
Table 18: Exchange 8 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:08)           184 
Table 19: Exchange 9 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:09)           185 
Table 20: Exchange 10 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:10)          185 
Table 21: Exchange 11 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:12)          186 
Table 22: Exchange 1 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:03)           187 
Table 23: Exchange 2 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:05)           188 
Table 24: Exchange 3 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:08)           188 
Table 25: Exchange 4 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:10)           189 
Table 26: Exchange 5 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:15)           190 
Table 27: Excerpt involving AVA052 and R67 controller (20:44-20:46)          193 
Table 28: Excerpt involving AVA052 and TWR controller (21:23-21:24)          196 
Table 29: Excerpt involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:24-21:25)          199 




Table 31: Excerpt involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:30)           203 
Table 32: Excerpt involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:32)           206  
 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Annual accident rates and fatalities in the worldwide commercial jet fleet 5 
Figure 2: Structure of the dissertation                14 
Figure 3: Research focus of the dissertation                15 
Figure 4: Pilot interactions during a flight                26 
Figure 5: Pilot interactions within the cockpit               27 
Figure 6: Pilot interactions with ATC                30 
Figure 7: Risk assessment matrix                 67 
Figure 8: Venn diagram of national, organizational & professional cultures           81 
Figure 9: Venn diagram of national, organizational, professional & safety cultures           86 
Figure 10: Hofstede’s cultural dimension scores for Colombia and the US          105 
Figure 11: 1929 route map of SCADTA              126 
Figure 12: Timeline of key events in the history of Avianca (1919-1990)          128 
Figure 13: Section of fuselage at the Avianca 052 crash site in Cove Neck, NY         130 
Figure 14: Most common themes in NYT articles about Avianca 052 (1990-2018)         132 
Figure 15: Outline of Methodology Stage One             139 
Figure 16: Outline of Methodology Stage Two             148 
Figure 17: Process for compiling the ACT glossary             150 
Figure 18: Process for analysing language use in the accident           153 
Figure 19: ACT glossary entry for “Call Sign Confusion”            168 
Figure 20: Timeline of Avianca Flight 052 on 25th January 1990           172 
Figure 21: Radar track of the final stage of Avianca Flight 052           191 
Figure 22: The Swiss cheese model of accident causation            211 






CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
In the opening chapter, I first outline the global scale of air transportation, before 
discussing safety in commercial aviation compared with other modes of transport. I present 
a brief overview of ICAO, which is the United Nations agency responsible for overseeing 
international civil aviation. Then I describe the ICAO language proficiency programme 
that came into full effect in 2011. The programme is intended to improve the language 
proficiency of commercial pilots and air traffic controllers around the world. A number of 
accidents involving language factors were cited by ICAO to justify this major undertaking. 
This dissertation offers a response to the language proficiency programme by presenting an 
analysis of one of the accidents cited by ICAO: the 1990 crash of Avianca Flight 052. The 






1.1 Civil Aviation Worldwide in the 21st Century 
The relentless development of civil aviation continued in the first two decades of 
the 21st century despite major external shocks. During this period the world was rocked by 
successive bouts of economic turbulence: the terrorist attacks of September 11 (2001), the 
SARS epidemic (2002-2003), and the global financial crisis (2007-2009). Civil aviation 
fully recovered from each of these shocks. Statistics reported by the Air Transport Action 
Group (ATAG, 2016) in 2014 reflected its tremendous scale: 
• 26,605 commercial aircraft were in service; 
• 51,554 airline routes were in operation; 
• 62.7 million jobs worldwide were supported by aviation; 
• the total economic impact was $2.7 trillion. 
Following forty years of deregulation in successive regional markets around the 
world, aviation operations have come to impact the lives of increasing numbers of people. 
In 2018, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), airlines carried 
4.3 billion passengers, more people than ever before. They also transported 64 million 
tonnes of cargo and linked almost 22,000 city pairs (IATA, 2019a). Long-term forecasts 
from Airbus and Boeing, the world’s largest manufacturers of airliners, anticipate that civil 
aviation will continue to grow. In a report published in 2018, Boeing (2019) noted that the 
number of passengers flying each year had increased from 100 million in 1960 to more 
than 4 billion in 2016. Similarly, Airbus (2018) stated that the volume of air traffic has 
continued to double every 15 years in terms of revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), 
despite regular external shocks. 
At the time of writing, the world is reeling from the Covid-19 pandemic, which has 
caused a huge reduction in air traffic. ICAO (2020) estimates a decrease of 53-60% in the 
total number of passengers for 2020 compared with 2019. It is not clear how long or what 
form the recovery from this crisis will take. However, the Asia-Pacific region is certain to 
be an important engine for the future growth of civil aviation. Airbus (2018) predicted that 
over the next 20 years this region will account for 42% of new passenger aircraft demand. 
Boeing (2019, p. 16) likewise declared that in the next two decades “Air travel growth 
within Asia is set to make it the world’s largest overall travel market, with rapid growth 
within China making its domestic market the largest of all.” 
In summary, despite the collapse in air traffic during 2020 due to the Covid-19 
pandemic, the long-term outlook is for the continued growth of civil aviation. Furthermore, 
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markets outside of North America and Europe will be increasingly prominent, especially 
those in the Asia-Pacific region. These markets have diverse languages and cultures, and 
their emergence underscores the importance of effective communication and intercultural 
understanding in ensuring safe and efficient flight operations. 
 
 
1.2 How Safe is Air Transportation? 
It is commonly said that flying is safer than other forms of transport (Scott, 2013; 
Smith, 2013). A cursory glance at accident statistics seems to support this view. Table 1 
lists the number of fatalities for various transport modes in the United States. The figures 
are shown at five-year intervals for the last three decades. These data are only for a single 
country, albeit a large and influential one, but they illustrate two important points. 
The first point is that aviation is responsible for a very low proportion of the total 
number of transportation fatalities. In 2015, the most recent year shown in Table 1, there 
were 404 fatalities due to air travel. This figure is two orders of magnitude lower than the 
35,092 deaths caused by road travel. Air travel fatalities accounted for just 1.09% of the 
total number of fatalities in all transportation accidents in the US in 2015. 
 
 
Table 1: Fatalities by transportation mode in the United States (BTS, 2017). 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Air 866 963 764 603 477 404 
Highway 44,599 41,817 41,945 43,510 32,999 35,092 
Railroad 1,297 1,146 937 884 735 749 
Transit 339 274 295 149 221 254 
Water 865 829 701 829 821 692 
Total fatalities
1




 For a given year, the total fatalities may be less than the sum of deaths in the modes because some 
accidents involve more than one mode (e.g., a car and train colliding at a railway crossing). 
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The second point is that the table indicates a significant downward trend in the 
number of air-transport-related deaths in the US. There were 404 fatalities in air accidents 
in 2015, which was 46.7% of the 1990 figure. This trend reflects major improvements in 
aviation safety that have taken place in many countries. Within commercial aviation the 
changes range from increasingly reliable jet engines to numerous initiatives for managing 
risk. Examples of the latter include: the Safety Management System (SMS), the Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance system (FOQA), the Fatigue Risk Management System 
(FRMS), the Alternative Training and Qualification Programme (ATQP), and the Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) (Scott, 2013). 
Statistics that contrast the huge scale of airline flight operations with low numbers 
of accidents and deaths are often cited as evidence of the relative safety of flying. Each 
year IATA produces a worldwide review of safety in the airline industry. In 2018, it stated 
that more than 4 billion people flew safely on 46.1 million flights. There were 11 accidents 
resulting in passenger deaths, with a total of 523 fatalities. This was a significant increase 
on the previous year, when there had only been six fatal accidents resulting in 19 deaths. 
For all accidents, not just those involving fatalities, IATA calculated that the accident rate 
in 2018 was just 1.35 accidents per million flights (IATA, 2019b, 2019c). 
On the surface, the IATA figures appear reassuringly low, but there are significant 
caveats. Firstly, the figures only include accidents involving turbine-powered aircraft that 
weigh 5,700kg or more. Secondly, acts of suicide or terrorism are excluded. This was 
starkly illustrated in 2015, when IATA statistics indicated four fatal accidents with 136 
fatalities. They did not include the Germanwings Flight 9525 (pilot suicide) and Metrojet 
Flight 9268 (terrorism) disasters in which a total of 374 lives were lost. IATA accident 
statistics clearly do not report all flights that have fatalities, and IATA’s definition of an 
accident may differ substantially from a layperson’s understanding. 
Similar statistics are produced by other aviation organizations including aircraft 
manufacturers (e.g., Airbus and Boeing) and regulatory agencies (e.g., ICAO). These 
statistics typically paint a historical picture of aviation safety that is characterized by two 
clear trends. On the one hand, they show a dramatic reduction in the rate of accidents per 
million flights from the turbulent start of the jet age until now. On the other hand, the 
number of accidents and fatalities continues to fluctuate widely each year. Both trends are 
illustrated in the Boeing graph shown in Figure 1. 
In summary, aviation safety statistics present a mixed picture. The annual accident 
rates indicate that air transportation has become safer, but the statistical metrics are subject 
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to significant qualifications. Fluctuating fatality figures have seen a significant number of 
lives being lost in some recent years (e.g., 2005, 2007 and 2010 in Figure 1). Furthermore, 
as Boeing’s chief engineer for safety and reliability noted, “The public is sensitive to the 
number of accidents, not the accident rate” (Lavin, 1990). 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual accident rates and fatalities in the worldwide commercial jet fleet. 
Reprinted from Statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents: Worldwide 
Operations 1959-2016 (p. 16), by Aviation Safety, 2017, Seattle, WA: Boeing Commercial 




















Despite evidence of improved safety, flying may feel more dangerous than other 
forms of transport, such as driving. Risk perception is based on diverse factors including 
emotion, intuition and heuristics (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011).The mass media exerts a 
significant influence on the public’s perception of flying. Aircraft carry large numbers of 
passengers at high speeds and high altitudes as a matter of routine. Their potential for 
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causing disasters is far greater than that of automobiles. As a consequence, newspapers and 
television give more attention to shocking (but infrequent) air accidents than to seemingly 
mundane (but daily) car crashes (Hawkins, 1993). This is despite the cumulative death tolls 
of road accidents being many times greater than those of aviation accidents. 
 
 
1.3 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
There has been a phenomenal increase in the scale and scope of international air 
transport since the middle of the 20th century. An important driver of this growth has been 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Based in Montreal, Canada, ICAO 
is a specialized agency of the United Nations that is tasked with overseeing the worldwide 
development of civil aviation. 
ICAO was conceived in the closing stages of World War Two. As the war entered 
its final phase in 1944, delegates from 52 nations drew up the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation in Chicago. The agreement has since come to be known as the “Chicago 
Convention”. This led to the official establishment of ICAO in 1946. The organization’s 
mission was framed as a clear and concise imperative: “Achieve the sustainable growth of 
the global civil aviation system.” There has been a remarkable expansion in international 
civil aviation since ICAO was established, to the point that aircraft now take off or land 
every few seconds in “one of the most complex systems of interaction between human 
beings and machines ever created” (ICAO, 2011). 
Concurrent with the growth of the civil air transport system, ICAO has developed 
into a global organization. There are currently 191 Contracting States and the organization 
is divided into nine regions: (1) Africa-Indian Ocean, (2) Asia, (3) Caribbean, (4) Europe, 
(5) Middle East, (6) North America, (7) North Atlantic, (8) Pacific and (9) South America. 
These regions differ considerably in terms of the typical flight operations that take place 
within them. In Europe, for instance, the main problem is coordinating trans-continental 
traffic with short-haul flights, while an essential feature of the North Atlantic region is 
long-range overseas navigation. 
ICAO is tasked with overseeing the safe, efficient and orderly development of 
international air transport. It is also responsible for systematically arranging the principles 
and techniques of international air navigation. So that operations may proceed smoothly, 
the agency works to standardize the ways in which flights are handled around the world. 
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The drive to standardize is a vital undertaking. As MacKenzie (2010, p. ix) noted in his 
history of the organization: “At the heart of ICAO’s mission is the goal of international 
standardization of civil aviation.” Examples of standardization include the ICAO code 
systems that are used to designate airlines and airports. Each airline has a unique 3-letter 
code (e.g., AVA for Avianca) and each airport has a unique 4-letter code (e.g., KJFK for 
John F. Kennedy International Airport). The ICAO codes are used for the purposes of 
airline flight planning and air traffic control (ATC).2 
To implement its policies, ICAO has a range of instruments. These vary in several 
ways: the level of detail that they specify; the regions in which they are applicable; and 
whether they are mandatory or not. The instruments are: 
• Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) – broadly formulated rules and 
recommended practices for worldwide application that are included in ICAO 
Annexes; 
• Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) – operating practices for worldwide 
application that are too detailed for SARPs; 
• Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPs) – similar to PANS but only applicable 
to certain regions; 
• Guidance Material – attachments, manuals and circulars that are designed to facilitate 
the implementation of SARPs and PANS. 
Individual member states are responsible for the actual implementation of the policies and 
for ensuring that service providers follow them. In terms of obligations, member states 
must notify the ICAO Council in the event that they are non-compliant with Standards. On 
the other hand, they are invited to notify ICAO of non-compliance with Recommended 
Practices and PANS (ICAO, 2011).3 
 
2
 IATA has separate systems of codes that are used for airline timetables, reservations and 
ticketing. IATA uses 2-letter codes for airlines (e.g., AV for Avianca) and 3-letter codes for 
airports (e.g., JFK for John F. Kennedy International Airport). 
3
 The process sometimes breaks down, as in the 2015 crash of a Jazz Aviation DHC-8-102 aircraft 
in Ontario, Canada (TSB, 2017c). Several years before the crash, the airline implemented a safety 
management system (SMS) approved by Transport Canada, in accordance with ICAO SARPs. Due 
to cost pressures and uncertainty about the future, some aircraft types were not included in the SMS 
flight data monitoring. As a result, data about unstable approaches for DHC-8-102 aircraft were not 
collected. Such data might have prevented the 2015 accident. 
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In practice, ICAO has limited powers with which to enforce its standards and 
procedures. This is a legacy of disagreements between the United States and Great Britain 
dating back to the early days of the organization. The United States championed a laissez 
faire approach towards international civil aviation so that its airlines could access world 
markets. Britain, by contrast, wanted an agency with powers strong enough to regulate 
international aviation. The United States prevailed. As a result, ICAO became essentially 
an advisory organization which “has the ability to influence, cajole, and, on the odd 
occasion, threaten, but it cannot force any member to act against its national interest” 
(MacKenzie, 2010, p. 195). There are, however, two significant penalties that ICAO may 
invoke, as detailed in Articles 87 and 88 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
Firstly, if a particular airline refuses to comply with a decision, member states may be 
asked to deny that airline access to their airspace. Secondly, if a state does not comply, its 
voting rights may be suspended (ICAO, 2006). 
ICAO uses instruments such as SARPs and PANs to improve air navigation, 
prevent unlawful interference, and facilitate border-crossing procedures for international 
flights. The organization also defines air accident investigation protocols for member 
states. In recent years, ICAO has increasingly addressed environmental issues to reduce the 
noise and engine emissions of civil aircraft. In addition, following a series of catastrophic 
accidents, it established a language proficiency programme to improve communications 
between aircraft flight crew and ground stations. 
 
 
1.4 The ICAO Language Proficiency Programme 
Between 1976 and 1996, five tragic accidents occurred that involved breakdowns 
in communication between pilots and ATC. More than 1,000 people lost their lives. In 
response to the accidents, ICAO initiated a programme in 1998 to improve the language 
proficiency of commercial pilots and air traffic controllers worldwide. The Proficiency 
Requirements in Common English Study Group (PRICESG) was set up to review all 
aspects of air-ground and ground-ground voice communications. Subsequently two more 
accidents involving language factors took place in 2000 and 2001. 
The PRICE Study Group reported its findings, and in 2003 the ICAO Council 
adopted amendments relating to language proficiency for the Air Traffic Management 
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PANS and Annexes 1, 6, 10 and 11 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.4 A 
set of Language Proficiency Requirements (LPRs) was drawn up, which describe the 
minimum acceptable language proficiency level for pilots and air traffic controllers. The 
intention was that all member states would comply with these requirements by 2008. 
However, the programme could not be implemented within this timescale, and a three-year 
transition period was adopted. As a result, the ICAO programme finally came into full 
effect on 5th March 2011. 
The language proficiency programme is a huge and unprecedented undertaking. It 
is embedded in a complex web of documentation, including Annexes, PANS and guidance 
material. In essence its complexity can be boiled down to one simple requirement: pilots 
and air traffic controllers around the world must demonstrate a certain level of language 
proficiency before they can carry out international flight operations. 
ICAO has not developed a standardized test for evaluating the language proficiency 
of pilots and controllers. Instead, different countries are permitted to use different tests, but 
they must all conform to descriptors set out in the LPR rating scale. This scale is a matrix 
that consists of six assessment criteria and six proficiency levels. The assessment criteria 
are: (a) pronunciation, (b) grammatical structure, (c) vocabulary, (d) fluency, (e) listening 
comprehension, and (f) interactions. In other words, the construct of language proficiency 
is broken down into six assessment criteria within the LPR rating scale. 
For each of the criteria, individuals are assessed as being at one of six proficiency 
levels, from Level 1 (“Pre-elementary”) to Level 6 (“Expert”). Pilots and controllers who 
are involved in international flight operations must demonstrate proficiency at Level 4 
(“Operational”) or higher for all the criteria. If they do so, their licence is endorsed for a 
certain period of time. For personnel evaluated at Level 4, this period is no more than three 
years. Before the end of the period they are evaluated again. The Level 4 descriptors for 
the assessment criteria are reproduced in Appendix 1. As an example of the requirements 
for Level 4, the pronunciation descriptor states that: “Pronunciation, stress, rhythm and 
intonation are influenced by the first language or regional variation, but only sometimes 
interfere with ease of understanding.” (ICAO, 2010, p. 4-9) 
 
4
 The Chicago Convention has 19 Technical Annexes. Annex 1 covers “Personnel Licensing”; 
Annex 6 is titled “Operation of Aircraft”; Annex 10 is “Aeronautical Telecommunications”; and 
Annex 11 is “Air Traffic Services”. 
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Estival, Farris and Molesworth (2016) pointed out the importance of distinguishing 
between ICAO guidance material and ICAO requirements. In practice this may be difficult 
because the content overlaps. ICAO Document 9835, “The Manual on the Implementation 
of ICAO Language Proficiency Requirements”, is a guidebook to the language proficiency 
programme. It was first published in 2004 and then in revised form in 2010. This document 
serves as guidance material to facilitate implementation of the programme. Confusingly, 
some parts of Document 9835 are also included in ICAO Annexes, which means they are 
requirements that member states must comply with. For example, the LPR rating scale 
appears in both Document 9835 and Annex 1.5 Since the scale is in Annex 1, it must be 
complied with. By contrast, elements such as “specific recommended practices for native 
English or expert-level speakers in English as lingua franca (ELF) interactions” appear in 
Document 9835 but not in the Annexes (Estival et al., 2016, p. 57). Hence such elements 
are only guidance material. 
The aim of improving the language proficiency of pilots and air traffic controllers 
is laudable. It goes without saying that clear communication is essential for the smooth and 
safe operation of the international air transport system. Nevertheless, the ICAO language 
proficiency programme has been criticized on a range of issues. One contentious area is 
testing. Alderson (2009, p. 180) questioned whether language tests are an appropriate way 
of assessing language use in flight operations, asking: “What is the value of a language test 
for ensuring flight safety: Is it not more important to observe how language is used under 
stressful conditions?” 
Another aspect of the language proficiency programme to have attracted criticism 
is the LPR rating scale, part of which is shown in Appendix 1. Estival et al. (2016) noted 
that ICAO had not explained the theoretical and empirical underpinning of the assessment 
criteria. Additionally, Farris and Turner (as cited in Estival et al., 2016, p. 185) called for 
“careful, evidence-based consideration of the assumptions that underlie the ICAO LPRs”. 
Problematic issues include the distinctions, in the context of civil aviation, between the 
following pairs of items: standard phraseology and plain language, English and other 
languages, and native speakers and non-native speakers. These issues are addressed in 





 The LPR rating scale is in Attachment A to Appendix 1 of Annex 1. 
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1.5 Accidents Involving Language Factors 
The ICAO language proficiency programme is a complex undertaking on a global 
scale. It was initiated in response to a series of tragic accidents, each of which was caused 
(at least partly) by language factors. During the implementation stage of the programme, 
ICAO cited seven accidents in official documents and regional workshops. The accidents 
are summarised in Table 2. (Further details are provided in Appendix 2.) 
 
 
Table 2: Accidents involving language factors cited by ICAO (Lamy, 2008; ICAO, 2010). 
 
 DATE LOCATION ACCIDENT TYPE FATALITIES 
1 10
th
 Sep 1976 Zagreb, former Yugoslavia Mid-air collision 176 
2 * 27
th
 Mar 1977 
Tenerife, Canary Islands, 
Spain 
Runway collision 583 
3 * 25
th
 Jan 1990 
Cove Neck, New York, 
USA 
Fuel exhaustion 73 
4 * 20
th
 Dec 1995 
Buga, Valle del Cauca, near 
Cali, Colombia 





 Nov 1996 
Charkhi Dadri, near New 
Delhi, India 
Mid-air collision 349 
6 25
th
 May 2000 
Charles de Gaulle Airport, 
Paris, France 
Runway collision 1 
7 8
th
 Oct 2001 
Milano Linate Airport, 
Milan, Italy 
Runway collision 118 
 
* Accidents referred to in ICAO Document 9835. 
 
 
The opening chapter of ICAO Document 9835 refers to four of the accidents shown 
in Table 2. Curiously the accidents are not identified. The document simply mentions the 
numbers of fatalities and type of accident, as well as, in one case, the year of occurrence 
(ICAO, 2010). From this information it may be inferred that the accidents referred to in 
Document 9835 were: the 1977 runway collision at Tenerife; the 1990 fuel exhaustion 
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crash at Cove Neck, New York; the 1995 controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) near Cali, 
Colombia; and the 1996 mid-air collision near New Delhi, India. These are accidents 2, 3, 
4 and 5 in Table 2. 
More explicit information about the accidents was provided at regional workshops 
held by ICAO to facilitate the launch of the language proficiency programme. In a 2008 
workshop at the ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, the Acting Deputy Director of the ICAO 
Air Navigation Bureau listed all the accidents shown in Table 2 and made the point that 
they had resulted in the deaths of 1,460 people (Lamy, 2008). 
The accidents shown in Table 2 took place over a period of 25 years at different 
locations in Europe, North America, South America and Asia. They involved various types 
of accident, although it is striking that five out of seven were collisions (two mid-air and 
three on runways). The pilots and air traffic controllers spoke an assortment of native 
languages; no single airline was involved in more than one accident; and the number of 
fatalities ranged from 1 to 583. In short, the accidents were diverse and the only obvious 
common feature is that language factors contributed to all of them. 
ICAO has not provided or cited any analysis of the language factors involved in the 
accidents. Document 9835 simply notes that “insufficient English language proficiency on 
the part of the flight crew or a controller” was a contributory factor (ICAO, 2010, p. 1-1). 
The literature review for this dissertation indicates that limited research has been carried 
out on the communication problems in the accidents, with no systematic analysis of the 
language use in all seven events. This is surprising, given the prominence of the accidents 
when cited by ICAO during implementation of the language proficiency programme. 
Previously, I have examined the communication problems in three of the accidents: 
the 1976 Zagreb mid-air collision, the 1977 Tenerife runway collision, and the 1990 crash 
of Avianca Flight 052 at Cove Neck (Cookson, 2009, 2011). These analyses highlighted 
several commonalities between the three events. In each case: 
• the accident was complex and resulted from multiple causal factors; 
• a combination of linguistic factors and non-linguistic factors was involved; 
• the linguistic factors were exacerbated by high workload, stress and fatigue; 
• the pilots and air traffic controllers were a mixture of native English speakers (NESs) 
and non-native speakers (NNSs). 
Almost a decade has passed since ICAO’s language proficiency programme came 
into effect. There has not yet been a comprehensive analysis of the language factors that 
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contributed to the seven accidents listed in Table 2. Such an analysis would improve our 
understanding of the processes that led to the accidents. It would also contribute to aviation 
safety by reducing the risks of similar accidents happening again in the future. 
 
 
1.6 The Structure & Aims of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is a response to the ICAO language proficiency programme. It 
addresses the concerns raised by Alderson (2009) and Estival et al. (2016) by investigating 
the language used by pilots during actual flight operations. The overall aim is to provide a 
framework for analysing the language use of pilots in airline accidents. The framework is 
intended to be applicable to the accidents cited by ICAO, and other accidents or incidents 
from the past or future that involve communication breakdowns. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the structure of the dissertation. Following the 
introduction, the three areas of the literature review are reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
Chapter 5 contains a description of the context for one of the accidents cited by ICAO. The 
methodology and findings of the analysis are in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Chapter 8 
presents a discussion of the findings, and the conclusion is in Chapter 9. 
The analysis in this study is divided into two sections: Stages One and Two (shown 
in Chapters 6-8 in Figure 2). Stage One investigates the relevance of the accidents cited by 
ICAO for current airline operations. Stage Two examines how communication problems 
contributed to one accident: the 1990 crash at Cove Neck, New York. Multiple methods 
are used including a survey of current airline pilots, semi-structured interviews with one 
pilot, and linguistic analysis of pilot and ATC communications. 
Stage One of the analysis asks: How relevant are the accidents cited by ICAO to 
current airline operations? The language proficiency programme has become an integral 
part of international air transport since it came into effect in 2011. However, the accidents 
cited by ICAO date back to the 1970s, which raises the question of their relevance to 
contemporary aviation. To explore this question, I conducted a survey of the attitudes of 
current airline pilots towards the accidents mentioned in Document 9835. The survey was 
followed up by interviews with one pilot to probe the results in detail. 
Stage Two focuses on one of the accidents cited by ICAO: the 1990 crash of 
Avianca Flight 052 near New York. This stage asks: How did the language use of pilots 
and controllers contribute to the Avianca 052 accident? After the official report for this 
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accident was released in 1991 several issues relating to pilot-ATC communication were 
unresolved, as noted in dissenting comments from the investigating team (NTSB, 1991). 
Other analyses were subsequently published, most notably by Duke (1992) and Helmreich 
(1994). However, the 1990 Avianca accident has not been examined as thoroughly as the 
1977 Tenerife collision (CIAIAC, 1978; Roitsch, Babcock & Edmunds, 1978; Weick, 
1990) or the 1995 Cali crash (CAD,1996a; Simmon, 1998). This dissertation provides new 
insights into the communication problems involved in the crash of Avianca 052. 
 
 



























The research focus of this study is illustrated in Figure 3. The blue outer circle 
represents the seven accidents cited by ICAO, which are listed in Table 2. The green circle 
stands for the four accidents mentioned in Document 9835, which are the subject of the 
pilot survey in Stage One. The red inner circle is the focus of the analysis in Stage Two: 
the crash of Avianca Flight 052. 
 
 
Figure 3: Research focus of the dissertation. The photograph is a public domain image of the 


















Through the analysis of the Avianca 052 accident, a framework is developed for 
analysing the language use of pilots in emergency situations. The framework allows for the 
analysis of both verbal and non-verbal language, as well as cultural factors. Its purpose is 
twofold: (1) to provide a better understanding of the processes that lead to communication 
breakdowns in accidents; and (2) to identify specific communication factors involved in 
accidents so that this information may be fed back into pilot training. A key element in the 
framework is the Aviation Communication Toolkit (ACT), a glossary of factors which 
contribute to communication breakdowns between pilots and air traffic controllers. 
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This dissertation provides a reassessment of the crash of Avianca 052 that attempts 
to make sense of how communication broke down between the pilots and controllers. In 
addition, it presents a framework for analysing the language use of pilots in accidents. This 
will facilitate a long overdue, systematic analysis of all the accidents cited by ICAO. The 
framework is robust enough to be applicable to other accidents or incidents, past or future, 
which involve communication breakdowns. The ultimate aim is to publish a guide to good 






CHAPTER 2: The Language Use of Airline Pilots 
 
This chapter, which is the first section of the literature review, describes different 
aspects of the language use of airline pilots. Chapters 3 and 4 contain the remainder of the 
literature review, and address risk and culture. These three chapters together provide 
complementary perspectives on communication problems that pilots may encounter during 
international flights. The differing perspectives offer a multi-layered view of the issues 
involved in the language use of airline pilots, especially in communication with air traffic 
controllers. 
In this chapter I first present key concepts that provide a foundation for discussing 
the language use of NES and NNS pilots. The second section defines aviation language 
and outlines contexts in which it is used. The third section offers a brief description of the 
communication of pilots inside a cockpit, known as intra-cockpit communication. Next I 
address pilot-ATC communication, also known as pilot-ATC radiotelephony, which 
consists of two language varieties: standard phraseology and plain language. The following 
sections look at the influence of language for specific purposes (LSP) on aviation language 
training, and the application of conversation analysis (CA) to the communication of pilots. 
Finally, I discuss the role of English within ICAO’s language proficiency programme, as 
well as the tension between language proficiency and English proficiency. 
To catalogue the literature review, and to facilitate the analysis stage of the project, 
I set up a database using the FileMaker Pro database management system. This database 
contains more than 600 records that catalogue documents, technical manuals, accident and 
incident reports, journal papers and books. References for a significant proportion of the 






2.1 The Language Use of NESs & NNSs 
This section introduces key concepts from applied linguistics, English as a second 
language (ESL), second language acquisition (SLA) and sociolinguistics. These concepts 
provide a foundation for analysing pilot-pilot and pilot-ATC communication involving 
native English speakers (NESs) and non-native speakers (NNSs). 
 
2.1.1 Communication & Communicative Competence 
The word communication is commonly defined in terms of the exchange of 
information. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, for example, defines communication as “a 
process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common system 
of symbols, signs, or behavior” (Communication, 2018). This dissertation adopts a broader 
definition: communication is a dynamic process of mutual exchange in which two or more 
people negotiate meaning using a common language (Oxford, 1990). 
Communication includes both spoken and written language, and therefore involves 
the language skills of listening, speaking, reading and writing. In addition, it encompasses 
paralinguistic features (e.g., intonation) and various forms of non-verbal communication 
such as kinesics (i.e., body language), proxemics (i.e., the use of space), eye contact, 
kinesthetics (i.e., touching) and artifacts (e.g., jewelry). 
In simple terms, the construct of communicative competence relates to the ability to 
communicate. Hymes (1972a) proposed the concept of communicative competence in 
response to Chomsky’s concept of linguistic competence. Chomsky had distinguished 
between a speaker-listener’s linguistic competence (i.e., knowledge of language) and 
performance (i.e., use of language in real situations). This was similar to the fundamental 
linguistic distinction made by Saussure between langue and parole. The concept of 
communicative competence proposed by Hymes accounted for speakers not only acquiring 
grammatical knowledge of a language but also learning how to use language appropriately 
in specific social contexts. 
Several models of communicative competence have been developed. The model of 
Canale and Swain (1980), later developed by Canale (1983), has had a strong influence on 
second language teaching (Brown, 2000; Oxford, 1990). This model is broken down into 
four competences: 
• Grammatical competence – the extent to which someone has mastered the linguistic 
code, including vocabulary, phonology, morphology and sentence-level grammar; 
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• Discourse competence – the ability to combine ideas coherently and cohesively 
beyond the level of a single sentence; 
• Sociolinguistic competence – knowing the sociocultural rules which determine 
whether an utterance is appropriate in a particular social context; 
• Strategic competence – the ability of a person to overcome limitations in their 
language knowledge, to make repairs and sustain communication. 
A more comprehensive model of communicative competence, or language 
competence, was developed by Bachman (1990) and Bachman and Palmer (1996). There 
are two major components in this model: 
• Organizational competence – consisting of grammatical competence and textual 
competence (which is equivalent to discourse competence); 
• Pragmatic competence – consisting of sociolinguistic competence (relating to 
politeness, formality, metaphor, register, dialect, etc) and illocutionary competence 
(relating to functional aspects of language). 
In this model, compared to that of Canale and Swain, sociolinguistic competence has been 
re-defined, and strategic competence has become a separate element within the overall 
construct of communicative language ability (Brown, 2000). 
Finally, the Common European Framework of Reference for languages (CEFR) 
was developed to facilitate language teaching and the assessment of foreign language 
proficiency (Council of Europe, 2001). This framework includes a model with three major 
communicative language competences: 
• Linguistic competence – including knowledge and skills of lexical, phonological and 
grammatical aspects of language; 
• Sociolinguistic competence – including linguistic markers of social relations, 
politeness conventions, register differences, dialect and accent; 
• Pragmatic competence – the principles of language use, including discourse 
competence, functional competence and design competence. 
Document 9835, the guidebook to the ICAO language proficiency programme, 
includes an overview of communicative competence with the same components as the 
CEFR framework (ICAO, 2010). One difference is that Document 9835 places strategic 
competence within the construct of pragmatic competence. In the CEFR framework, 




2.1.2 Varieties, Styles & Registers 
A language variety (or lect) is a flexible linguistic concept that may have a wide 
range of referents. Trudgill (1992, p. 77) defined it as: “A neutral term used to refer to any 
kind of language - a dialect, accent, sociolect, style or register - that a linguist happens to 
want to discuss as a separate entity for some particular purpose.” Examples of language 
varieties spoken in the United States include American English, African American 
Vernacular English and New York Latino English. 
A language style can be simply defined as “a variety of language used for a specific 
purpose” (Brown, 2000, p. 260). Adult native speakers have access to a range of language 
styles within their idiolects, or their individual patterns of language use. This allows them 
to choose appropriate styles for particular communicative contexts, depending on factors 
such as the audience, amount of shared experience, and purpose of communication. 
Language styles are often associated with degrees of formality. Joos (1962) 
developed a widely-used classification of styles with five levels of formality: 
• Frozen or oratorical – the most formal level, in which a text that has been carefully 
planned in advance is delivered to a large public audience; 
• Formal or deliberative – a text presented to an audience that is too large for effective 
interaction, for example in a university lecture; 
• Consultative – a dialogue between strangers, for instance a doctor-patient consultation 
or a business transaction; 
• Casual – a dialogue between friends or acquaintances in which social barriers are low 
and there is shared knowledge; 
• Intimate – communication between family members or very close friends in which 
there are no social barriers. 
Classifications of style apply not only to spoken discourse, but also to written discourse. 
Aircraft manuals may be written in a deliberative style, whereas text messages between 
family members are usually casual or intimate. 
Style is manifested through verbal and nonverbal features. Verbal manifestations 
include lexical and grammatical variation. Trudgill (1992) suggested that in English 
stylistic differentiation is mainly signalled by differences in lexis. The following words, for 
example, may all refer to aircraft: aeroplane, airliner, bird, bus, crate, flying machine, heap, 
jet, kite, plane, ship and taxi. In many languages, including English, one grammatical 
feature of casual or intimate styles is the use of contractions or deletions. Variations in 
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style can also be conveyed non-verbally through paralinguistic features such as intonation 
and facial expressions.  
Style shifting occurs when a person switches to a different language style due to a 
change in the communicative context. During an airline flight, a captain may use a 
deliberative style when making an announcement to passengers then switch to a casual 
style for a conversation with a first officer. 
Communication accommodation theory (CAT) offers an explanation for some 
instances of style shifting in terms of convergence and divergence. Accommodation is the 
process of adjusting one’s language use (e.g., accent, rate of speech, vocabulary selection) 
according to the language style of an interlocutor. Convergence occurs when a speaker 
makes adjustments to suit the style of a speech partner, which may reduce the social 
distance between them. Divergence is the use of speech patterns accentuating linguistic 
differences between a speaker and interlocutor, which may increase social distance and 
strengthen the speaker’s identity as a member of a separate social group. Giles (2009, p. 3) 
made the observation that “effective accommodation is really an integral component of 
communicative competence”. 
One form of accommodation encountered in intercultural contexts is foreigner talk 
(or xenolect), which is defined as “a variety of a language employed [when speaking] to a 
person identified as a foreigner, usually in order to ease communication” (Clyne, 1998, p. 
303). Foreigner talk often involves a simplification of grammar and lexis. In addition, it 
may be informed by attitudes, as when a speaker slows his or her speech rate and increases 
the volume because a foreign interlocutor is assumed to have low second language (L2) 
proficiency.  
For non-native speakers, acquiring stylistic adaptability is an important aspect of 
learning a language. NNSs have to acquire a repertoire of language styles so that they can 
appropriately encode and correctly decode discourse in their second (or third) language. 
This is complicated by cross-cultural variation in what are considered appropriate styles 
for particular contexts. It is not uncommon for foreign students learning English in the 
United States, for example, to be surprised by the level of informality of American 
professors. As Brown (2000, p. 262) noted, “the acquisition of both styles and registers 
thus combines a linguistic and culture-learning process”. 
Related to stylistic variation are registers, which are varieties of language typically 
associated with particular activities (e.g., football and flower arranging) or professions 
(e.g., medicine and aviation). They are commonly identified by distinctive lexis (including 
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idioms) connected to activities or occupations, but grammatical and phonological features 
may also be involved. The use of a register by members of a particular group may be 
labelled (in a non-technical sense) as jargon by outsiders who do not participate in the 
activity or occupation. Registers are sometimes associated with socioeconomic groups, 
making it difficult to differentiate them from dialects. 
 
2.1.3 Interlanguage & Error Analysis 
In the field of SLA, interlanguage is a concept developed by Selinker (1972) which 
refers to the linguistic system that an individual constructs when learning a second (or 
third) language. An interlanguage is an intermediate system between a learner’s native 
language and the target language as used by native speakers. Referring to the same 
phenomenon, Nemser (1971) used the term approximative system to emphasise how 
learners make successive approximations to a target language. 
The most straightforward way to analyse interlanguage is to study the spoken and 
written language produced by learners. Comprehension cannot be directly observed and is 
therefore more difficult to examine. The study of learners’ production errors provides 
insights into their interlanguage and is called error analysis.6 
A distinction is made between errors and mistakes. As Brown (2000, p. 217) noted, 
an error is “a noticeable deviation from the adult grammar of a native speaker” of the 
target language, and is thus a reflection of the learner’s competence. A mistake, on the 
other hand, is “not the result of a deficiency in competence but the result of some sort of 
temporary breakdown or imperfection in the process of producing speech”. All language 
users make mistakes, in both native and non-native contexts. 
The errors that second language learners make when producing a target language 
may come from various sources. These sources include: 
• Interlingual transfer – interference, or negative interlingual transfer from the native 
language (e.g., “ship” pronounced as “sheep”); 
• Intralingual transfer – transfer within the target language, such as when learners of 
English overgeneralize regular past tense endings (e.g., “flied” instead of “flew”); 
 
6
 SLA error analysis should be differentiated from the techniques used to analyse errors in accident 
or incident investigations (e.g., human error analysis or cognitive error analysis). 
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• Context of learning – misleading explanations provided by teachers, textbooks or 
instruction manuals. 
The concept of interlanguage is relevant to all speakers of other languages who 
have not yet achieved mastery. In the field of aviation, it may offer valuable insights when 
analysing the language use, in particular the errors, of NNS pilots and controllers. 
 
2.1.4 Communication Strategies 
Communication strategies are mechanisms that individuals employ (consciously or 
subconsciously) to solve problems in order to achieve their communicative goals. These 
strategies constitute elements of the overall strategic competence that language users are 
able to draw on. Brown (2000) presented a taxonomy adapted from Dörnyei (1995) that 
divides communication strategies into two broad categories: 
• Avoidance strategies – message abandonment and topic avoidance; 
• Compensatory strategies – circumlocution, approximation, using all-purpose words, 
word coinage, prefabricated patterns, nonlinguistic signals, literal translation, 
foreignizing, code switching, appealing for help, and stalling or time-gaining 
strategies. 
While not exhaustive, this listing indicates the range of strategies available to 
second (or third) language users. Avoidance strategies operate at the level of phonology, 
lexis, syntax or topic, or a combination of these. Avoidance of grammatical structures may 
occur when particular structures in the L2 are very different from those in the L1. Topic 
avoidance can result from speakers either lacking requisite cultural knowledge or judging 
that a particular topic requires grammar or vocabulary they have not mastered (Macaro, 
Vanderplank & Murphy, 2013). Topic avoidance appears to have been a factor in the 1995 
American Airlines crash in Cali, Colombia, one of the accidents cited in Chapter 1.7 
Two of the compensatory strategies listed above are based on phenomena that are 
explored in detail in subsequent sections of this dissertation. Using prefabricated patterns 
as a communication strategy involves the rote memorization of stock phrases or sentences 
 
7
 According to the Colombian accident report, a request made by the crew of American Airlines 
Flight 965 did not make sense to the approach controller. However, the controller did not articulate 
his misgivings “because of limitations in his command of English” (original Spanish: “debido a sus 
limitaciones en el dominio de Inglés”) (CAD, 1996a, p. 29). 
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without internalizing their grammatical and lexical components. Prefabricated lexical 
patterns, or chunks, are the subject of Section 2.1.5 below. The use of code switching as a 
communication strategy involves an individual reverting from L2 to L1 in order fill in a 
gap in knowledge. Code switching is discussed in Sections 2.7 and 4.4.1. 
 
2.1.5 Prefabricated Patterns & Skehan’s Dual-Mode System 
In the traditional, structural view of linguistics, lexis and grammar were considered 
to be separate entities. According to that view, speakers produce language by matching 
items of vocabulary to appropriate grammatical slots, while listeners decode language by 
applying structural rules. However, there is now widespread acknowledgment, in both 
linguistics and second language acquisition, that lexis and grammar are not separate but 
instead exist on a continuum (Cowie, 1998; Ellis, 2001; Ellis, 2003; Lewis, 1996; Skehan, 
1996; Widdowson, 1990). 
In the new view, the lexico-grammatical continuum has words at one end and 
grammatical structures at the other. In between lie a range of lexical items: idioms, 
phrases, fixed expressions, polywords, routine formulae, composites, sentence heads, 
lexicalized sentence stems, sentence frames and collocations. In the context of English 
language teaching, Willis (2003) suggested that lexical items could be grouped into four 
main categories: polywords, frames, sentences and sentence heads, and patterns. A 
polyword is defined as a phrase made up of a string of words that act as if they were a 
single word. Examples include phrasal verbs and adverbials such as “in fact” and “over 
there”. Polywords have little room for variation and are thus found near the word end of 
the continuum. Other lexical items vary in the degree of flexibility allowed in their form. 
Some, such as frames, may be altered considerably and resemble grammatical structures. 
It is now recognised that a considerable amount of everyday conversation makes 
use of prefabricated lexical phrases, or chunks. This offers a clear benefit in that a chunk 
may be recalled from memory as a single lexical item, in the same way a word is. Thus the 
cognitive load required to produce stretches of language is reduced. Similarly, a chunk 
may be decoded as a single lexical item, without recourse to grammatical rules. Using such 
prefabricated forms therefore allow native speakers to produce and decode language in real 
time without undue cognitive load (Ellis, 2003; Skehan, 1996). 
There are occasions when novel messages need to be produced (or decoded) and 
prefabricated chunks will not suffice. At such times, the speaker (or listener) makes use of 
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grammatical rules to generate (or decode) language. Accordingly, Skehan (1996) proposed 
a dual-mode system in which native speakers are able to call upon both a lexical mode and 
a structural mode, depending on the context and their needs. 
The extent to which non-native speakers are able to make use of the lexical mode 
depends on their language proficiency and the amount of prefabricated phrases they have 
internalized. It follows that one of the aims of language training should be to help learners 
develop automacity with prefabricated phrases in order to reduce their dependence on 
grammatical rules and the cognitive burden this imposes. 
 
2.2 An Overview of Aviation Language 
Aviation language encompasses the language used by a wide range of personnel 
working in all manner of aviation contexts. These personnel include aircraft mechanics, 
airport staff, air traffic controllers, cabin crew, cargo staff, dispatchers, engineers, flight 
crew, ground handlers, industry officials and management. In their work they draw upon 
numerous lexical domains, from aerodynamics and computer-aided design to VIP flights 
and weather conditions. In addition to oral communication skills, they may also need 
proficiency in reading and writing. Aircraft engineers, for example, have to read technical 
manuals and documents, and read or write emails, letters, reports and other professional 
communications (Lin, Wang & Zhang, 2014). 
In the case of commercial pilots, a typical flight consists of a number of phases: 
preflight, taxi, takeoff, departure, climb, en route (or cruise), descent, approach, landing, 
taxi and arrival.8 During these phases, pilots communicate with other personnel including 
air traffic controllers, dispatchers, gate agents, ground crew, flight attendants, maintenance 
technicians and other pilots, as shown in Figure 4. 
The interactions that pilots take part in necessitate the use of various registers and 
language skill areas. Some tasks require pilots to read (e.g., completing checklists) or write 
(e.g., filling out weight and balance sheets) whereas others, such as communicating by 
radio with ATC, “require speaking and listening skills, but not reading and writing” 
(ICAO, 2010, p. 3-2). This dissertation is primarily concerned with two varieties of 
 
8
 This is a simple listing of flight phases. More sophisticated taxonomies have been developed, 
especially for use in accident and incident reporting systems. See, for example, the taxonomy 
drawn up by the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (ICAO, 2013a). 
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aviation language that pilots use during flight: (1) intra-cockpit communication between 
pilots on the flight deck; and (2) radio communication between pilots and ATC, also 
known as radiotelephony or RT. While the main focus is on the communication of pilots, it 
is important to recognise the role that their interlocutors, especially air traffic controllers, 
play in shaping the communication. 
 
 


















2.3 Intra-Cockpit Communication 
In the 1950s, at the start of the jet age, a flight crew of four or five members was 
required to deal with all the tasks involved in flying an aircraft: handling flight controls, 
controlling the engines, operating the radio and navigating. Advances in technology since 
that time, especially in cockpit automation, have seen successive reductions in flight crew 
size. By 1990, when the Avianca 052 accident occurred, airliners typically had a flight 
crew consisting of three people: a captain, a first officer and a flight engineer. Nowadays 
passenger aircraft are usually operated by just two pilots, a captain and first officer, as 
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shown in Figure 5. The pilots sit side by side, facing forward, with domains of attention 
that overlap but are significantly different. This seating configuration allows some use of 
non-verbal gestures such as pointing, but makes it difficult for them to see each other’s 
facial expressions clearly. 
 
 

















Speech is an important element that enables pilots to coordinate their actions inside 
the cockpit. The language used depends on the airline and crew composition. For airlines 
based in English-speaking countries, intra-cockpit communication is naturally in English, 
as it is for multicultural airlines with a high proportion of NES pilots (e.g., Emirates). In 
other airlines, a national or regional language may be used, or a mixture of languages. By 
way of example, Hutchins, Nomura and Holder (2006, p. 3) reported on the languages used 
by Japanese flight crews: 
In Japanese airlines, most utterances in the flight deck (revenue 
flights) are produced in Japanese. English is used only for 
communication with ATC, reading text that arrives in the flight deck 
in English (for example, the text of electronic checklists displays, 
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ACARS messages, and dispatch paperwork), and some technical 
call-outs such as ‘V one,’ ‘Flaps five,’ and ‘Push Autopilot’. All 
other utterances, for example conversations about how to fly an 
approach, where traffic or weather are located, how the airplane is 
performing, as well as informal conversations, public address 
messages to the cabin (on domestic routes), communication with 
cabin crew, and communications with company personnel, are 
conducted in Japanese. 
The working hypothesis developed by Hutchins, Nomura and Holder is that constraints in 
the environment (e.g., linguistic representations in the cockpit, such as labels, or ATC 
communications in English) affect the choice of language for non-native speakers of 
English. When not constrained, NNS pilots revert to their native language (L1) since it is 
cognitively easier than communicating in English, which is for them a second language 
(L2). This is especially true for tasks that involve complex processing. 
Considering whether NNS pilots should be required to use English for flight deck 
communication, the German linguist Rainer Dietrich (2004, p. 193) noted that “even very 
professional speakers of a foreign language have a slower word recognition in the non-
native language, showing that understanding, and certainly speaking, in a foreign language 
takes it toll on the speaker.” He recommended against mandating the use of English for 
pilots sharing a common L1, reasoning that its use would involve an extra cognitive burden 
that could be critical in high workload flight phases, such as final approach and landing. 
Intra-cockpit communication does not feature prescribed language to the extent that 
pilot-ATC communication does, but some communicative tasks – notably the reading of 
checklists – must be carried out in a particular way. Pilots otherwise have more freedom to 
communicate using so-called plain language. One significant constraint, though, is the 
sterile cockpit rule, which prohibits non-essential speech in operations below 10,000 feet. 
This rule was introduced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United 
States following accidents such as the 1974 crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 212 in North 
Carolina. In that accident, the pilots were found to have been distracted by “conversations 
not pertinent to the operation of the aircraft” (NTSB, 1975a, p. 15; for further details see 




2.4 Pilot-ATC Communication 
Pilot-ATC communication is described in Document 9835 as “a specialized 
subcategory of aviation language corresponding to a limited portion of the language uses 
of only two aviation professions – controllers and flight crews” (ICAO, 2010, p. 3-2). 
Pilots and controllers communicate orally using a radio system known as radiotelephony 
(RT). This allows the transmission of signals in both directions but not simultaneously. 
As Shawcross (2009) observed, pilot-ATC communication takes place under 
challenging conditions. It is conducted largely without visual contact in environments that 
are often time-pressured and stressful. The medium of communication is a VHF radio link 
that can be noisy and is subject to problems such as microphone clipping and interference. 
Clipping occurs when an operator either starts speaking before activating the microphone 
or deactivates it before finishing speaking. Interference happens when simultaneous radio 
transmissions are made on the same frequency, with the result that transmissions are 
degraded or blocked. This was a causal factor in the 1977 Tenerife collision, one of the 
accidents cited in Chapter 1.9 
Given these constraints, one might expect miscommunications to occur more 
frequently than they actually do. Mell (1993) cited several important characteristics of 
radiotelephony to explain why problems are in fact quite rare. Firstly, the communications 
have a “predictable and repetitive nature”. Secondly, they make use of “an internationally 
recognised phraseology”. Thirdly, there are “a restricted number of topics... associated 
with a restricted terminology”. 
As indicated in Figure 6, one controller is responsible for multiple aircraft within a 
particular sector. As planes progress through the airspace, the controller contacts one pilot 
at a time. All aircraft in a sector can hear the controller speak to other planes on a common 
radio frequency. When aircraft leave the sector, they are assigned a new radio frequency 
and handed over to the next controller. Drawing on the work of the sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1981), Sullivan and Girginer (2002) characterized this as “successive one-to-one 




 There was interference between transmissions from the tower and one of the aircraft involved in 
the 1977 Tenerife collision (Pan Am Flight 1736). Either message could have alerted the other 
aircraft (KLM Flight 4805) before the collision. However, neither message could be heard clearly 
because of the near-simultaneous transmission (CIAIAC, 1978; Roitsch et al., 1978). 
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Howard (2008, p. 372) highlighted four socio-environmental features of pilot-ATC 
discourse: “It is completely mediated, it is highly regulated, it is an intense environment, 
and the primary actors (flight crews and ATCs) emerge from different organizational 
structures and cultures.” Discussing the latter point, Garzone et al. (2010) noted that pilots 
and controllers must work as a team to coordinate their actions, especially during takeoff 
and landing, despite having different backgrounds and possibly different nationalities. 
Furthermore, there are significant cognitive differences between the two groups: 
The ATCs are resident in the sites where operations take place and 
know the local environment very well. This profound knowledge has 
its linguistic counterpart in their familiarity with local contextual 
elements, for which there are often shared denominations and 
conventional Community-of-Practice (cf. Wenger 1999) forms - 
often shorthands - used to refer to them. On the other hand, pilots 
have to operate in settings of which in many cases they have never 
had any first-hand experience. So, they use direct visual input 
(whenever possible), also counting on a degree of standardization in 
airport design, and - above all - they rely on maps and on the 
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recognition of landmarks (natural or artificial, e.g. signs on the 
ground). (Garzone et al., 2010, pp. 224-225) 
Pilot-ATC communication is generally considered to be made up of two varieties 
of language: standard phraseology and plain language (ICAO, 2007c, 2010). Standard 
phraseology is designed for routine flight operations. Plain English is meant to be used for 
non-routine operations. These two language varieties are described in Sections 2.4.1 and 
2.4.2 below. Their use within pilot-ATC communication may be considered an example of 
diglossia, when two languages or language varieties are used under different conditions 
within a single linguistic community (Maher, 2017, 2019). 
 
2.4.1 Standard Phraseology 
To facilitate effective and efficient communication, pilots and air traffic controllers 
are required to use standard phraseology, which is also called standardized phraseology, 
RT phraseology or airspeak. An outline of ICAO standard phraseology is provided in 
Chapter 3 of Document 9835, and detailed descriptions of the requirements are given in the 
following publications: 
• Volume II of Annex 10 (ICAO, 2007a); 
• Chapter 12 of Document 4444 (ICAO, 2007b); 
• Document 9432 (ICAO, 2007c). 
The last of these publications, Document 9432, is the ICAO “Manual of Radiotelephony”. 
It is available in English, French, Spanish and Russian versions. However, the main 
emphasis of the ICAO language proficiency programme is on the use of English, so the 
following paragraphs focus on English standard phraseology. The relationship of English 
to other languages in the civil aviation context is discussed in Section 2.7. 
 
2.4.1.1 Features of Standard Phraseology 
Standard phraseology may be differentiated from general language by a number of 
distinct features, examples of which are listed in Appendix 4. The main features include 
the following: 




• Limited lexicon – the vocabulary consists of less than a thousand words, each of 
which is assigned a single, precise meaning;10 
• Modified syntax – compared with general language, many grammatical words are 
deleted and frequent use is made of nominalizations, imperatives and the passive 
voice; 
• Standardized message structures – the elements of a message (identifying the sender, 
addressee and message content) should be spoken in a particular order; 
• Specific exchange patterns – exchanges of messages typically follow specific 
patterns, such as three turns initiated by ATC, with repetition conventions such as 
read-back, whereby a pilot repeats a message to confirm correct reception. 
In an oft-cited study of ICAO standard phraseology, Philps (1991) documented 
differences from natural English on all of the main linguistic levels: phonology, lexis, 
semantics, discourse and syntax. Using a transformational-generative framework to 
analyse the syntax, Philps listed sentence-level and phrase-level transformations. His 
analysis highlighted “a pronounced tendency towards ellipsis” in standard phraseology 
(Philps, 1991, p. 123). To give one simple phrase-level example, the preposition of 
direction is deleted from the natural language phrase “climb to [flight level]” to produce 
the phrase “climb Ø [flight level]”. This modification has two effects. Firstly it makes the 
phrase shorter so it can be spoken more quickly. Secondly, it removes the potentially 
dangerous possibility of listener confusion between two homonyms: the preposition “to” 
and the number “two”.11 
Estival et al. (2016) provided a comprehensive linguistic description of the aviation 
English used by pilots and ATC, including discussions of grammatical and lexical word 
categories that feature in standard phraseology. In terms of grammatical words, some 
pronouns and determiners are used, but the most prominent category is that of prepositions, 
as in these examples: “cleared from [location] to [location]” and “commence approach at 
 
10
 According to Document 9835, the vocabulary of standard phraseology is “around 400 words” 
(ICAO, 2010, p. 3-4). Lopez, Condamines, Josselin-Leray, O’Donoghue and Salmon (2013) 
reported that it was “less than 1000 different words”. 
11
 Confusion between homonyms was a causal factor in the 1989 crash of Flying Tiger Flight 66 at 
Kuala Lumpur. The controller said, “Tiger 66, descend two four zero zero [i.e., 2,400 feet]”, which 
the captain read back as, “Okay, four zero zero”. The captain apparently interpreted the instruction 
as “descend to four zero zero [i.e., 400 feet]” (Cushing, 1994; McMillan, 1998; NTSB, 1989a). 
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[time]”. The content words include a limited number of adjectives and adverbs, with many 
more verbs and nouns. One of the few adjectives is “clear(ed)”, which, as pointed out by 
Estival et al., is used with two distinct meanings: “sky clear” (i.e., weather information) 
and “cleared to land” (i.e., authorization). The lexis includes special categories for proper 
names, call signs, time expressions, units of measurement, and the clock code (e.g., “traffic 
11 o’clock” to indicate the direction of other aircraft). Estival et al. (2016, p. 45) also noted 
that phraseology is regularly updated to improve safety: “When a possibility for confusion 
has been recognized, ICAO and other bodies may recommend changes which then become 
part of the regulations”. 
Standard phraseology has been categorized in a variety of ways. Varantola (1989) 
labelled it a “semi-artificial code”, while Breul (2013) used the term “semi-artificial 
sublanguage”. The use of the word “artificial” by these researchers was presumably 
intended to contrast a code developed for a special purpose (i.e., standard phraseology) 
with natural language (e.g., English). However, the distinction between artificial and 
natural is problematic when applied to languages (or sublanguages or codes) that have all 
been developed, in one way or another, by humans. Since standard phraseology was 
intentionally devised for the purpose of human communication, it may alternatively be 
thought of as a constructed language or a posteriori language. 
As noted above, standard phraseology has a grammar and lexis patterned on a 
simplification of existing language. In Document 9835 it is referred to as a “restricted 
sublanguage” and defined as “the formulaic code made up of specific words that in the 
context of aviation operations have a precise and singular operational significance” (ICAO, 
2010, p. 6-6). Ragan (2007), coming into aviation from a background in ESL teaching, 
described standard phraseology as both a “restricted register” and a “singularly context 
bound special language”. 
Others have simply labelled standard phraseology as a “restricted code” (Hall, 
1976; Varantola, 1989; Estival et al., 2016). The concepts of restricted code and elaborated 
code were developed by Bernstein (1964) to account for differences in the speech systems 
of children from different social backgrounds. Characteristics of restricted codes applicable 
to standard phraseology include: rapid and fluent speech; interlocutors’ shared knowledge 
and expectations; and a low level of vocabulary and syntactic selection. The latter is 
important because it facilitates prediction, allowing high levels of listening comprehension 
even under conditions of time pressure. As McMillan (1998, p. 17) noted in a study of 
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ATC miscommunications: “Listeners are able to discriminate more effectively among a 
small number of possibilities than among a large number.” 
 
2.4.1.2 The Purpose of Standard Phraseology 
According to Document 9835, standard phraseology has a twofold purpose: “to 
reduce the possibility for ambiguity and to facilitate efficiency” (ICAO, 2010, p. 5-5). 
With the implicit assumption that efficiency requires short communications, this twofold 
purpose is expressed in different ways in ICAO documents, which variously call for “clear, 
concise, unambiguous language”, “clarity, conciseness and correctness” and “maximum 
clarity, brevity, and unambiguity” (ICAO, 2010, pp. 1-1 & 5-5; ICAO, 2007c, p. 3-2). The 
words clear and clarity are not defined in the documents, and it is therefore not evident 
whether they refer to language coherence, intelligibility, pronunciation, or a combination 
of these. For some researchers, clarity seems to take on the meaning of a lack of ambiguity. 
For example, Varantola (1989) and McMillan (1998) simply described the purpose of 
phraseology as “brevity and clarity”. Similarly, the Radiotelephony Manual published by 
the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority noted the need for “clear, concise, standardised 
phraseology” (CAA, 2015).12 
There is, however, a conflict between the need for concise communications and the 
requirement to minimize ambiguity because, generally speaking, ambiguity is minimized 
by the use of elaborate communications. In a pioneering work on aviation human factors, 
Hawkins (1993, p. 169) noted this problem: “In other fields, such as law and government, 
messages are lengthened to ensure they are unambiguous. In aviation, phrases are being 
shortened, due to time pressures, but they still need to be unambiguous.” 
Hall (1976, p. 133) observed that the tension in pilot-ATC radiotelephony between 
the simultaneous needs for “great parsimony” and “low ambiguity” was resolved by using 
a restricted code in which “everything is condensed: grammar, vocabulary, intonation”. 
From this perspective, standard phraseology is a form of high-context communication that 
is fast and efficient because pre-programmed information is in the receiver and setting, 
with minimal information in transmitted messages (Hall, 1976). For such a system to work 
effectively, pilots and controllers require extensive training, and they must necessarily all 
 
12
 The need for language that reduces ambiguity and increases efficiency is not new. One of the 
recommendations in the report for the 1977 Tenerife runway accident was: “Use of standard, 
concise and unequivocal aeronautical language” (CIAIAC, 1978, p. 60). 
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learn the same set of information. An idea of the degree to which language is condensed in 
this restricted code may be gleaned from the amount of information contained in training 
materials: the ICAO Manual of Radiotelephony (Document 9432) contains 102 pages and 
the UK’s CAA Radiotelephony Manual (CAP 413) runs to 358 pages. 
 
2.4.1.3 Problems with Standard Phraseology 
One problem associated with phraseology is that the standard varies from country 
to country. In the UK, 6 pages of significant differences from ICAO phraseology are listed 
in the Radiotelephony Manual (CAA, 2015). The differences reflect characteristics of the 
UK national airspace, such as large numbers of trainee pilots flying solo, as well as items 
of phraseology that the national authority thinks might lead to misunderstandings. As a 
consequence, pilots who fly between the UK and other countries must switch between 
different phraseologies. 
A further complication is that there may be different standards within a country. 
For the UK, the Radiotelephony Manual lists 6 pages of significant differences between 
civil and military phraseology (CAA, 2015). These inconsistencies can cause problems 
when civilian planes land at military aerodromes. Differences in phraseology were 
identified as one of the causal factors that led to the 1996 crash of a Spanish Learjet at 
Royal Air Force Station Northolt in the UK (AAIB, 1997). 
Another problem occurs when pilots and controllers do not adhere to standard 
phraseology. As stated in Annex 10, “ICAO standardized phraseology shall be used in all 
situations for which it has been specified” (ICAO, 2007a, p. 5-1). However, one study 
highlighted by ICAO found that “70 per cent of all speech acts uttered by native and non-
native speakers, and for which a phraseology is prescribed, are not compliant with the 
recognized standards” (Mell, 1992, as cited in ICAO, 2010, p. 1-1). Document 9835 
suggests that non-compliance may be due to various factors, including “respectable 
reasons such as pressure of work, and less respectable reasons such as carelessness and 
insensitivity” (ICAO, 2010, p. 3-5). It continues with an illustration of the risks of not 
using phraseology accurately, in this case the protocol for numbers: 
One example of such failure would be to identify a runway by saying 
‘Runway ten left’ instead of ‘Runway one zero left’. The word ‘ten’ 
could very easily be heard as ‘turn’, with obvious risks for the safety 
of ground movements. (ICAO, 2010, p. 3-5) 
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Instances of non-adherence to standard phraseology have been widely recorded in 
the research literature. In a review of 43 papers addressing pilot-ATC radiotelephony, 
Prinzo and Britton (1993) found that pilots and controllers used qualitatively different 
communication techniques, and they noted a tendency for pilots to use non-standard 
phraseology. Cushing (1994) suggested that a contributory factor to the 1981 accident at 
John Wayne Orange County Airport, California, was pilots switching codes from standard 
phraseology to plain language. Orasanu, Fischer and Davison (1997, p. 9) cited examples 
of American controllers using “local jargon, colloquialisms, or non-standard phraseology” 
such as the idiomatic expression, “keep your eyes peeled”. Using the ASRS database, 
Cardosi, Falzarano and Han (1998) analysed 386 reports of pilot-ATC miscommunication, 
which they classified into three types of exchange pattern errors.13 Prinzo, Hendrix and 
Hendrix (2006) investigated pilot-ATC communication errors using 50 hours of ATC 
recordings from American airports, and – noting that pilots and controllers have been 
encouraged to send shorter and less complex messages – identified a tendency for some 
pilots to use non-standard contractions for altitude and speed. Howard (2008) analysed 
over 15 hours of pilot-ATC dialogue recorded at US airports and found that deviations 
from ATC protocol increased the likelihood of problematic communication. 
Concern about non-adherence to ICAO standard phraseology was also reported in a 
worldwide survey conducted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in 
collaboration with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) 
and the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA). 
Analysis of responses from 2,070 pilots and 568 controllers indicated that “non standard 
phraseology” and “use of general aviation English in lieu of standard phraseology” were 
two operational factors that increased the likelihood of communication errors. The study 
concluded that the use of non-standard phraseology was “a major obstacle” to effective 
communications between ATC and pilots (IATA, 2011, p. 53). 
Anecdotal evidence that I gathered during the implementation of ICAO’s language 
proficiency programme indicated significant variations in the use of standard phraseology 
by region. At an ICAO regional workshop in Bangkok, controllers from Indonesia and 
 
13
 Identifying and classifying errors in pilot-ATC communications is not straightforward. Citing a 
study by Hollnagel and Amalberti (2001) which used data from the Human Error in Air Traffic 
Management (HERA) project, Dekker (2005) noted significant differences in the errors identified 
by trained observers when evaluating the same ATC session with the same taxonomy. 
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Brunei said that 80-90% of their communication was standard phraseology versus 10-20% 
plain English. These numbers were echoed by the Director of the Air Traffic Services 
Department of the Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau. By contrast, a tower supervisor at Juan 
Santamaria International Airport in Costa Rica stated during a plenary session at the 2007 
ICAEA Forum that over 50% of pilot-ATC communication in the Central American region 
was in plain English. The difference in the figures may be partly due to wishful thinking. 
The Asian controllers were keen to show adherence to ICAO phraseology whereas the 
Costa Rican controller wanted to stress the importance of plain English. Nevertheless, the 
figures are suggestive of significant regional differences in language use and may reflect 
differences in practice resulting from different national culture characteristics. 
In addition to the problems outlined above, standard phraseology is characterized 
by one fundamental limitation: as a consequence of the limited vocabulary and syntax, it is 
not sufficient to cover all possible situations that arise during flight operations. It has been 
designed to deal with most normal operations and some non-normal ones (e.g., emergency 
descents). However, if an unexpected event happens for which there is no phraseology, 
pilots and controllers must resort to plain language. 
 
2.4.2 Plain Language 
In contrast to standard phraseology, plain language is not clearly defined in ICAO 
regulations. Document 9835 describes it as “the spontaneous, creative and non-coded use 
of a given natural language” (ICAO, 2010, p. 6-6). One way of describing plain language 
is to define it as any language used by pilots or controllers that is not standard phraseology. 
An important aspect of plain language is that is used for resolving situations not covered 
by phraseology. As a result, plain language necessarily includes all of the lexicogrammar 
that individuals may draw on to handle a range of non-routine situations which cannot be 
exactly specified. Consequently it is not feasible to compile a directory of plain language, 
as is possible with the restricted code of standard phraseology. 
In practical terms, some pilots consider plain language to be synonymous with 
general language or natural language. Estival et al. (2016) acknowledged that plain English 
is sometimes referred to as “Standard English” or “conversational English”, but stressed 
that it is not the same as natural conversation. In terms of regulations, ICAO documents 
specify constraints on the use of plain language that serve to differentiate it from natural 
language. These constraints are outlined in the next section. Since they are only defined in 
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broad terms, the exact nature of plain language and its relation to natural language are “still 
a source of debate and discussions” (Estival et al., 2016, p. 23).14 
 
2.4.2.1 Constraints affecting Plain Language 
The first constraint specified by ICAO relates to when plain language may be used. 
As stated in Annex 10, the use of plain language in radiotelephony is permitted “only when 
standardized phraseology cannot serve an intended transmission” (ICAO, 2007a, p. 5-1). 
Document 9835 outlines several example situations in which plain language may be used, 
including emergencies when pilots need to inform ATC about equipment failure or 
medical problems. More mundane situations are also mentioned, such as when a pilot 
makes a request to continue flying at high speed. 
The second constraint concerns how plain language should be used. Echoing the 
need for clarity, brevity and unambiguity noted earlier in the discussion of phraseology, 
individuals are similarly “required to be fluent, clear, concise and unambiguous” when 
using plain language (ICAO, 2010, p. 3-6). While this requirement may be appropriate and 
realistic for the restricted code of phraseology, plain language is not as simple. Pilots and 
controllers habitually use natural language in non-aviation contexts where they do not face 
stringent requirements for conciseness or unambiguity. Their habitual use of natural 
language in daily life may interfere with their use of plain language in operational contexts, 
making it difficult for them to comply with the ICAO requirement. Kim (2013, pp. 107) 
provided an illustration of this problem in a study of communications between Korean air 
traffic controllers and foreign pilots: 
All three NES pilots were observed to use general English habitually 
and in an unnecessarily wordy manner. Their lack of sensitivity in 
using general colloquial English when plain English was required 
was emphasised along with their unduly fast rate of speech and 
choice of words whose meanings were unlikely to be shared. 
In addition to the ICAO requirements, there are other constraints affecting plain 
language that relate to the pilot-ATC radiotelephony system. Non-verbal communication is 
not possible between pilots and controllers, and prosody is of limited utility due to radio 
bandwidth limitations. Both of these features are available for pilot-pilot communication 
 
14
 There is no connection between aviation plain language and the Plain English movement that 
campaigns for more comprehensible official documents in English-speaking countries. 
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inside the cockpit, although only to a limited degree due to constraints imposed by seating 
arrangements and noise levels on the flight deck. 
 
2.4.2.2 Features of Plain Language 
The essential benefit of plain language is that it allows pilots and controllers to deal 
with unexpected situations not covered by standard phraseology. These may be situations 
that the individuals have not faced before or, in extreme cases, situations that no person has 
ever encountered. Innovative use of language is required in order to negotiate unexpected 
or even unprecedented situations. Chomsky (1975) noted that, despite being exposed to 
only a limited set of utterances, a typical language user can produce an indefinite number 
of novel utterances that are acceptable to members of the same speech community. In the 
context of aviation, the creative aspect of language, which allows novel utterances to be 
generated, is a vital tool for dealing with situations not covered by phraseology. 
The importance of innovative language use was illustrated in the crash landing of 
United Airlines Flight 232 in Iowa in 1989. The aircraft was flying at 37,000 feet when it 
suffered a catastrophic failure of one engine that disabled the hydraulic system. This 
“billion to 1” situation was an unprecedented emergency and yet the crew, despite losing 
all control surfaces, managed to control the aircraft with differential thrust from the 
remaining two engines and fly to Sioux Gateway Airport (Haynes, 1991). The pilots and 
controllers involved in the accident were American, so communication was entirely in 
English. In the extract shown in Table 3, the captain uses plain language to describe the 
status of the flight controls to a controller. Some characteristic features of spoken English 
are illustrated in this brief extract, especially in the captain’s first utterance. Drawing on 
the lexico-grammar work of Willis (2003), the features are as follows: 
• Additive discourse – the captain starts by establishing a topic (i.e., “we have almost 
no controllability”) and then adds a series of short statements giving extra information 
about the topic (e.g., “very little elevator”, “almost no ailerons”, and so on); 
• Ellipsis – elements that can be easily retrieved from context are omitted (e.g., “we 
have very little elevator and we have almost no ailerons” is shortened to “Ø very 
little elevator, and Ø almost no ailerons”); 
• Fillers – working out what to say at the same time as producing language can be 
difficult, especially in a stressful situation; both the captain and controller use “ah” to 
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provide time to compose the next section of discourse; some of these fillers occur at 
possible turn completion points, signalling the speaker wants to continue talking; 
• Untidiness – spoken words do not always express what a speaker means but the 
interlocutor may be able to retrieve the intended meaning; in this extract, the captain 
makes contradictory statements about left and right turns but the controller correctly 
understands that they “can only make right turns”. 
 
 
Table 3: Extract from ATC transcript of United Airlines 232.15 
 
SPEAKER CONTENT 
Captain (UAL232) So you know we have almost no controllability. Ah very little elevator, 
and almost no ailerons. Ah, we’re controlling the turns by power. I 
don’t think we can turn right. I think we can only make left turns. 
We’re starting a little bit of a left turn right now. Maybe we can only 
turn right. We can’t turn left. 
Controller (Sioux City) United two thirty-two heavy, ah, understand, sir, you can only make 
right turns. 
Captain (UAL232) That’s affirmative. 
 
 
The extract in Table 3 also highlights several points that distinguish plain language 
from standard phraseology. As noted in Appendix 4, phraseology features the deletion of 
subject pronouns, auxiliary verbs and determiners, as well as frequent use of the passive 
voice. By contrast, the captain’s first utterance includes: 9 occurrences of the first-person 
pronouns “I” and “we”; two occurrences of the auxiliary verb “are”; the determiners “a” 
and “the”; and only the active voice. 
In addition, the captain’s first utterance has instances of vague language, which is 
characteristic of spoken English (Cutting, 2012). Using quantifiers such as “almost no”, 
“very little” and “a little bit of” allows the captain to give essential details about a difficult 
 
15
 This extract is a composite based on one transcript listed by Haynes (1991), which omits fillers 
and some words, and another from ASN (2003), which includes fillers but not the start of the first 
utterance. The accident report does not contain any audio transcripts (NTSB, 1990). 
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situation despite having limited information available and being under high levels of 
workload pressure and stress. This use of vague language is appropriate in the context of 
the accident, but at odds with the standard phraseology mantra that communications should 
have “maximum clarity, brevity, and unambiguity”. 
 
2.4.2.3 Problems with Plain Language 
Using plain language for non-routine situations, including emergencies, provides 
the flexibility of natural language, which standard phraseology lacks, and allows the 
innovative use of language to deal with unexpected problems. There is an inherent risk, 
though, of increased complexity and ambiguity in the language used. Garzone et al. (2010, 
p. 219) noted that this can lead to miscommunication: 
But what really lies at the heart of miscommunication is, as Cushing 
pointed out in an early article (1989: 4), the complexity and 
flexibility of language [...], because of the confusion and 
misunderstandings that can result as a result of ambiguity, unclear 
reference, intonation peculiarities, implicit inference and 
presupposition. 
Some of the problems of plain language are illustrated in another real-life example. 
Mell (1993) analysed an emergency transmission from an English-speaking pilot whose 
plane ran low on fuel in French airspace. The pilot did not use the standard procedure for 
distress signals, but instead used plain language. Several features of his transmission made 
it more difficult to understand: the use of colloquial expressions, the placing of message 
elements in non-standard order, a high density of information in a single message, and the 
use of complex grammatical structures. As a result, the main element of the message was 
masked, and it was difficult for French air traffic controllers to understand that the pilot 
needed assistance. 
ICAO requires plain language to be “clear, concise and unambiguous”, but this can 
be very challenging for both native and non-native speakers in the highly stressful and 
time-constrained context of an emergency situation. As noted in Document 9835, the 
features of plain language “can be far from plain and [they] present a challenge to listening 




2.4.3 Intermixing of Standard Phraseology & Plain Language 
As we have seen, pilot-ATC communication consists of two language varieties: 
standard phraseology and plain language. The separation of these varieties is a key tenet of 
ICAO’s language proficiency programme, which stipulates that language tests for pilots 
and controllers should only assess plain language, not standard phraseology. The reasoning 
is that standard phraseology is a technical aspect of the work of pilots and controllers, 
which is already assessed in training, and should not be assessed by language experts who 
may not be familiar with flight operations. Estival et al. (2016, p. 85) acknowledged this 
concern, but pointed out a fundamental problem in the argument: standard phraseology and 
plain language “are intertwined in the real life context”. Given that ICAO’s goal is to 
improve language proficiency so that pilots and controllers can cope with unexpected 
situations, the authors questioned whether “the assessment of standard phraseology can or 
should be disregarded in the assessment of language proficiency”. 
A related issue is that the ICAO language proficiency programme associates 
phraseology with routine situations and plain language with non-routine situations. This 
division does not reflect actual language use, since plain language is found in both routine 
and non-routine situations. To give a commonplace example, pilots and controllers often 
add phatic expressions such as “Good morning” and “Thanks” (or equivalents in other 
languages) to routine messages which otherwise adhere to standard phraseology. Estival et 
al. (2016, p. 85) observed that: 
…one of the difficulties in developing tests in response to the ICAO 
LPRs is that tests are to be developed in response to policy and to 
largely theoretical notions of language use in the aviation context, as 
opposed to being developed in response to empirical studies of the 
way language is actually used in this context. 
Standard phraseology and plain language have different characteristics. One 
challenge facing pilots and controllers is that they regularly have to switch between the 
two, or combine them. Another challenge is that the two varieties require different skills. 
To become proficient at standard phraseology, both NESs and NNSs need to practise until 
production and comprehension of the limited vocabulary and syntax become automatic. By 
contrast, plain language requires both a sufficient level of language proficiency and the 




2.4.4 Data Link Technology 
The discussion in the preceding sections has concentrated on spoken language 
because pilot-ATC communication is mostly oral communication. This is a fundamental 
premise of ICAO’s language proficiency programme: the rating scale includes listening 
and speaking skills but does not address reading or writing. However, communication 
between pilots and ATC is changing with the increasing use of data link technology, which 
allows text messages to be transmitted. Known as controller-pilot data link (CPDL) or 
controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC), this technology is already being used 
to send flight clearances from ATC towers and centres in the United States and Europe 
(Baumgartner, 2017; Karp, 2016). The aim is to make communications more efficient, 
thereby reducing delays and increasing airport capacity. 
Data link systems allow air traffic controllers to transmit routine messages to 
aircraft, with messages shown on a visual display in the cockpit. Controllers can send 
various types of message: ATC clearances (e.g., level and speed assignments), radio 
frequency assignments, and requests for information. Pilots can respond to ATC messages, 
request and receive clearances and information, and report information. There is also a free 
text function for exchanging information that does not conform to defined formats. 
In the future, these systems will play an increasingly important role in pilot-ATC 
communication. As noted by Baumgartner (2017), this raises a number of questions: 
• Do pilots and controllers trust a human voice more than an electronic text message? 
• How will the new technology affect the distribution of attention in the cockpit? 
• Will data link systems eventually replace oral communication altogether? 
In addition to these questions, a significant limitation of data link systems is the possible 
degrading of pilot situational awareness due to the loss of party line information, which 
comes from listening to the radio communications of other aircraft (Estival et al., 2016; 
Midkiff & Hansman, 1992). Another important issue is the vulnerability of data link 
systems to cyber attack (Gurtov, Polishchuk & Wernberg, 2018). 
 
2.5 Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) 
There is widespread acceptance of the binary model of pilot-ATC communication 
discussed above, which features the two language varieties of phraseology and plain 
language. Alternative models have, however, been proposed. In the early days of ICAO’s 
language proficiency programme, Mitsutomi and O’Brien (2003) outlined a framework 
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that divided aviation language into three critical components: (1) ATC phraseology, 
corresponding to standard phraseology; (2) English for General Purposes, corresponding to 
plain language; and (3) English for Specific Purposes. 
Implicit in the Mitsutomi and O’Brien model was the assumption that English is the 
language of international civil aviation. Hence the model referred to English for General 
Purposes (EGP) and English for Specific Purposes (ESP) rather than the more inclusive 
Language for General Purposes (LGP) and Language for Specific Purposes (LSP). Within 
the model, ESP was described as a subset of EGP consisting “mostly of aviation-specific 
topics and vocabulary” (Mitsutomi & O’Brien, 2003, p. 125). 
The Mitsutomi and O’Brien model appears to have been informed by the work of 
the PRICESG study group, which laid the groundwork for ICAO’s language proficiency 
programme by reviewing pilot and controller communications. During the course of the 
PRICESG meetings in 2000-2001, there was discussion of the need to balance “common 
English” proficiency with “aviation specific English” training (PRICESG, 2001, p. 2-2). 
References to specific-purpose language teaching subsequently appeared in Document 
9835, first published in 2004 and revised in 2010. However, the core concept of the ICAO 
language proficiency programme is the binary model of phraseology and plain language. 
The notion of aviation specific English has disappeared, partly subsumed within standard 
phraseology and partly within the nebulous concept of plain language. 
The Mitsutomi and O’Brien three-part model of aviation language failed to gain 
wide currency, possibly because the distinction between phraseology, ESP and EGP does 
not map smoothly onto the world of flight operations, unlike the straightforward distinction 
between phraseology and plain language. There is little or no mention of ESP or LSP in 
language textbooks for pilots and controllers. The textbooks either focus on phraseology 
(Robertson, 2008) or plain English for non-routine situations (Cookson & Kelly, 2012; 
Ellis & Gerighty, 2008; Emery & Roberts, 2008). Nevertheless, curriculum design theory 
from the domain of LSP, especially ESP, plays an important role in informing the language 
training of aviation professionals (Cutting, 2012; Lin, Wang & Zhang, 2014; Sullivan & 
Girginer, 2002; Tajima, 2004; Wang, 2008). 
Two LSP studies in particular demonstrate valuable contributions from this field. 
Firstly, in a frequently cited paper, Sullivan & Girginer (2002) reported on a project to 
design ESP courses for pilots and air traffic controllers in Turkey. Data collection included 
observations in a control tower, audio recordings of pilot-ATC communications, and 
questionnaires and interviews with pilots and controllers. In addition to providing a model 
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for prospective ESP course designers, this study identified deviations from standard 
phraseology in the language use of pilots and controllers. These included the non-standard 
pronunciation of numbers (e.g., “triple six” in place of “six six six”) and the use of 
greetings and closings (e.g., “good afternoon” or “iyi gunler”). The authors also identified 
a notable use of Turkish instead of English, especially during approach and landing. 
In the second study, Cutting (2012) reported on an ESP project to develop materials 
for NNS staff working in a variety of jobs at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. The aim 
was to produce “realistic dialogues that could serve as models for pseudo-beginners to 
emulate, with the features of effective service encounters, such as clarity, informativeness 
and politeness” (Cutting, 2012, p. 5). Although data collection was limited to observations 
at the airport, the paper highlighted significant differences in the English language use of 
four trades: security guards, ground handlers, catering staff and bus drivers. The author 
suggested that a future research project might construct a corpus of real interactions. This 
could include features of spoken language such as code switching and incomplete or 
incoherent utterances, as well as possibly even body language. 
 
2.6 Conversation Analysis (CA) in Aviation 
Conversation analysis (CA) has been defined as the “analysis of real-world, 
situated, contextualised talk” (Liddicoat, 2007, p. 8). It is an area of microsociolinguistics 
that examines the organization of naturally occurring conversation during face-to-face 
interaction. The origins of CA date back to the 1960s when Harvey Sacks, Emanuel 
Schegloff and David Sudnow were graduate students in the Sociology Department at the 
University of California, Berkeley. One early influence on CA was Erving Goffman’s 
work investigating the social organization of interactions. Another influence was the 
ethnomethodology approach established by Harold Garfinkel to study the practical 
methods that people use to make sense of everyday interactions. 
Some CA analysts prefer to use the term talk-in-interaction because this makes 
clear that the talk is not studied in isolation but instead as an integral part of real-world 
interaction. For example, the interaction of pilots has been studied as they sit in a cockpit 
and operate an aircraft. During the course of their interaction, participants may draw upon 
a range of resources including physical objects, features of the setting, body movement and 




2.6.1 Key Concepts in CA 
A key part of CA is the meticulous transcribing of audio or video recordings of 
naturally occurring talk using conventions that have been developed over several decades. 
The transcriptions include a large amount of detail: tokens such as “ah” and “um”; periods 
of silence; overlapping talk; laughter, applause or other responses; and prosodic features of 
speech such as changes in pitch or speed, or the lengthening of sounds. These features are 
all included because they may be significant. Detailed transcribing is time-consuming, but 
repeatedly listening to the same recordings allows analysts to discover patterns in the data 
without imposing preformulated theories. This process is known as unmotivated looking 
(Liddicoat, 2007; Have, 2007). 
One of the claims made for CA is that it is an objective methodology that does not 
make assumptions about the intentions of participants, unlike other forms of discourse 
analysis such as speech act theory. Nevile (2006, p.3) commented that CA “is data driven 
and does not start with pre-determined and analyst driven categories”. He went on to state 
that it “does not guess at what people are thinking, or at the motivations of their actions, 
but looks for evidence in the transcription data themselves”. Krifka, Martens and Schwarz 
(2004, p. 77) acknowledged this point of difference, but noted that “arguably, insightful 
analysis of communication must also refer to speakers’ intentions”. 
A fundamental principle of CA is that conversation, in contrast to monologue, is an 
organised social phenomenon based on turn-taking: one speaker speaks at a time; changes 
of speaker occur; and patterns of turns can be identified. Turns may consist of simple 
sounds, words, phrases or complete sentences. CA emphasises that they are sequentially 
ordered and collaboratively produced by participants, with successive turns building on 
each other. When looking at transcribed talk, it is important to remember that the speakers’ 
understanding was developing moment to moment during the course of the interaction. 
Turn-taking therefore “works at the level of each next bit, not at the level of the whole 
conversation because speakers in a conversation only have access to the conversation as it 
unfolds” (Liddicoat, 2007, p.54). 
A basic building block from which sequences of conversation are built up is the 
adjacency pair, which is a sequence of two ordered turns. There are many types of 
adjacency pair: question-answer, greeting-greeting, terminal-terminal, summons-answer, 
telling-accept, invitation-accept/decline, request-accept/decline, offer-accept/decline and 
assessment-agreement/disagreement (Schegloff, 2007; Liddicoat, 2007). Adjacency pairs 
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contribute to the organization of talk by creating expectations about how a conversation 
will proceed as it unfolds. Talk is considered problematic if expectations are not met. 
Another key concept is recipient design, defined as the “idea that a speaker builds 
an utterance in such a way that it fits its recipient” (Have, 2007, p. 136). Based on the 
knowledge that participants in a conversation are assumed to share, there are various ways 
in which speakers design talk so it is understood by interlocutors. Recipient design may, 
for instance, take the form of word selection, topic selection or sequence organization. 
Liddicoat (2007, p. 6) made the salient observation that recipient design is a resource not 
just for speakers but also for listeners, because “listeners are motivated to hear a turn that is 
designed for them, and participants track the trajectory of the talk to hear a turn if a turn is 
designed for them”.16 
 
2.6.2 CA Studies in Aviation 
Using data from audio and video recordings, and drawing on ethnomethodology 
and conversational analysis, Nevile (2004) investigated talk-in-interaction in the cockpit 
during a series of airline flights in Australia. This research investigated routine pilot 
communications. Although the primary focus was intracockpit dialogue, the study also 
looked at how the pilots integrated “talk within the cockpit” with ATC communications 
“beyond the cockpit”. In addition, the use of video data allowed Nevile to analyse how 
pilots coordinated talk and non-talk activities as they carried out the tasks involved in 
flying the plane. 
One of the main findings was that pilots made pronominal choices related to their 
cockpit identities. Nevile (2004, p. 198) noted occasions when crew members invoked an 
individual identity (e.g., as a captain or as the pilot flying) through the use of singular first 
person or second person pronouns (e.g., “I/my/me” or “you/your”). These were contrasted 
with occasions when they used plural first person pronouns (e.g., “we/us”) to invoke “a 
 
16
 Listeners may fail to hear a turn that is not clearly designed. In an analysis of the 1977 Tenerife 
collision, Roitsch et al. (1978 p. 22) identified several missed opportunities to prevent the accident. 
One was a transmission in which the controller “for the first and only time that day” addressed the 
Pan Am aircraft using the phonetic alphabet, “Papa Alpha”, instead of the familiar term “Clipper”. 
The suggestion is that the crew of the other aircraft involved in the collision did not perceive this 
message because of the unfamiliar address. 
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shared identity of crew member, and present some action, circumstance or understanding 
as experienced by both pilots together”. 
The study also examined the ways in which pilots modified officially prescribed 
wordings found in manuals of standard operating procedures and checklists. Nevile (2004, 
p. 200) noted that pilots “occasionally substituted spontaneous wording for prescribed 
wordings, and very frequently embellished officially prescribed wordings”. Examples of 
embellishment included the addition of pronouns or phrases such as “thank you”. The 
modifications were coordinated with non-talk activities and did important interactional 
work, for instance allowing crew members to show their understanding of the current 
situation. The study highlighted the need of pilots to invoke their identities as active human 
participants in a highly automated workplace. For these reasons, Nevile (2004, p. 202) 
recommended that the “commercial aviation industry should not necessarily treat such 
local changes to ‘what’s in the book’ as a matter of concern”. He suggested that allowing 
pilots leeway to improvise linguistically during routine operations could be beneficial in 
terms of helping them to develop a resource for dealing with non-routine or emergency 
situations for which there are no prescribed wordings. 
In a separate study, Nevile and Walker (2005) used CA to analyse intracockpit 
communications in the 1995 crash of a business jet near Alice Springs, Australia. The 
analysis highlighted: a significant amount of overlapping talk between the pilots; many 
instances when an expected response was replaced by silence; and lots of repair by the 
pilot in command (PIC) of the copilot’s talk. The analysts concluded that “such aspects of 
interaction contribute to a working relationship that can be conducive to an error occurring 
and not being identified”. This process was labelled collaborative construction of error 
(Nevile & Walker, 2005, p. 16). The study noted that the proximal cause of the accident, 
an incorrectly set descent altitude, was not the sole responsibility of either pilot, but was at 
least partly due to the communication between them. 
Building on these studies, Nevile (2006) developed a CA tool that can be used in 
investigations of aviation or other transport accidents. The tool includes protocols for 
transcribing and analysing voice data. It enables an analyst to identify both recurring 
communication phenomena of special interest and also key periods of interaction that 




2.7 English as “the international language of aviation” 
The ICAO language proficiency programme is intended to improve the language 
proficiency of pilots and controllers worldwide. As noted in Chapter 1, several aspects of 
the ICAO programme have been criticised. One of the most controversial issues is the 
degree to which English is being promoted as the language of international civil aviation. 
The question may be framed succinctly: is the aim to improve language proficiency or 
English proficiency? 
ICAO has faced language problems before, as disputes over language have been 
part of the organization’s history since its inception at the Chicago Convention in 1944. 
MacKenzie (2010) recorded how English was the dominant working language within 
ICAO during its early years, despite the efforts of other nations to promote French or 
Spanish as a counterbalance. As he observed: “Language was a problem that never went 
away” (MacKenzie, 2010, p. 87). 
Since ICAO’s founding there has been a phenomenal increase in airline passenger 
numbers. These were boosted by the start of the jet age in the 1950s, the introduction of 
wide-body jets in the 1970s, and the deregulation of regional markets starting with the 
United States in 1978. Advances in aircraft technology have been instrumental in the 
growth of civil aviation. When ICAO was established in the 1940s, a typical airliner such 
as the Douglas DC-3 could carry its maximum payload of a few dozen passengers less than 
1,000 kilometres. Nowadays, Boeing 777s routinely fly trips in excess of 11,000 km with a 
load of several hundred passengers, crossing entire regions en route. Air transportation is 
now truly global and there is a strong common-sense argument that it requires a common 
language to operate smoothly and safely. 
The case for English to be adopted as the official language of international aviation 
may be expressed as two propositions. Firstly, communication would be simpler and safer 
if all pilots and controllers spoke the same language. Secondly, English is the obvious 
choice as it is already in widespread use in aviation, as well as being the de facto language 
of international business. 
The reasoning put forward to support the first proposition is as follows. When all 
pilots and controllers in a particular airspace communicate using a common language, 
everyone can understand all the radio transmissions. In this situation, pilots listening to 
messages between ATC and other aircraft (on the party line) can maintain situational 
awareness about their location and potential hazards in their vicinity, including other 
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planes.17 However, if code switching occurs and one speaker changes to a different 
language, other pilots in the airspace might not understand the communication. As a result 
an important source of information may be lost with significant implications for safety 
(Borins, 1983; Estival et al., 2016; IATA, 2011; Orasanu et al., 1997).18 
The opposite position was outlined by Borins (1983) in a detailed study of the 
bilingual ATC conflict that took place in Quebec in the mid-1970s. He reported two 
arguments in favour of using more than one language for pilot-ATC communications. 
Firstly, when controllers use another language instead of English (e.g., French in Quebec), 
safety is enhanced for local pilots (who may be unilingual francophones). Secondly, this 
reduces the workload and anxiety of controllers as they can simply issue an instruction 
once in the other language rather than repeating it several times in English to ensure 
comprehension. It is probable that air traffic controllers have in the past averted accidents 
by switching languages to help pilots who could not understand English instructions, but 
there does not appear to be any research evidence to support this hypothesis. 
The second proposition is that English is the obvious candidate to be the official 
language of international aviation. Kachru and Nelson (1996, p. 96) labelled English “the 
cross-cultural medium of choice”. They noted it “has become – or at least is perceived as – 
indispensable in many areas of international business and for such special purposes as air 
and sea traffic control”. Many English-speaking pilots regard English as “the universal 
language” of aviation (Estival et al., 2016, p. 5). The Acting Deputy Director of ICAO’s 
Air Navigation Bureau addressed this issue at a regional workshop held in Bangkok. Other 
languages – such as Spanish, Russian or French – are used in certain regions of the world, 
but he noted that English allows pilots to fly further and with more route flexibility. He 
stated that English is the only language used throughout the aviation world and concluded: 
“The fact is that English is the international language of aviation” (Lamy, 2008).19 
 
17
 This argument may be undermined in the future if data link technology significantly reduces the 
importance of party line information (see Section 2.4.4). 
18
 Code switching was a factor in the 1976 mid-air collision near Zagreb (AAIB, 1977, 1982), the 
2000 runway collision in Paris (BEA, 2001) and the 2001 runway collision in Milan (ANSV, 2004). 
19
 During the implementation phase of ICAO’s language proficiency programme, some pilots and 
language instructors objected to the new requirements. At the ICAO workshop, the Acting Deputy 
Director mentioned French pilots being told by airline management that if they resisted they might 
be reassigned to smaller and less prestigious aircraft (Lamy, 2008). 
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A strong case can be made for English as the international language of aviation, but 
it is not the universal language of aviation. English is not widely spoken in China or South 
America, which both represent significant aviation markets. The lack of trained personnel 
with the necessary language skills seems to preclude the worldwide imposition of a single 
language policy based on English. This was acknowledged in Document 9835, which 
noted “there are significant national, cultural, economic and organizational impediments 
that make such a move impractical” (ICAO, 2010, p. 4-3). 
Furthermore, the implication that there is a single English language is misleading. 
Kachru and Nelson (1996) listed 45 countries in which English had official status. In many 
of these countries there are distinctive varieties of English, such as Indian English or New 
Zealand English. Mutual intelligibility between speakers of different varieties of world 
Englishes is a critical issue in international aviation. Seiler (2009, p. 47) discussed the 
phonological distinctions between these varieties in the aviation context, making the 
salient point that mutual intelligibility requires a certain amount of mutual exposure and 
time before speakers can tune into “unfamiliar dialects or accents/pronunciations”. 
The issues surrounding aviation language and aviation English are complex, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly ICAO has adopted a compromise position. As stated in Annex 10: 
“air-ground radiotelephony communications shall be conducted in the language normally 
used by the station on the ground or in the English language” (ICAO, 2007a, p. 5-3). The 
language used by a ground station may be the national language or a regional language 
(e.g., Spanish in the Central American region or large parts of South America). There is an 
important additional requirement: “The English language shall be available, on request 
from any aircraft station, at all stations on the ground serving designated airports and 
routes used by international air services” (ICAO, 2007a, p. 5-3). In other words, pilot-ATC 
communications can be conducted in national or regional languages, but English must be 
available at all ground stations that serve international air routes. 
The actual position of ICAO, as reflected in official documents, is subtly different. 
English plays a dominant role in the language proficiency programme. Document 9835 
states that “proficiency in English will be the major preoccupation in the implementation 
of the requirements” (ICAO, 2010, p. viii). The document, which is the official guidebook 
for the programme, refers in general terms to language proficiency but contains multiple 
specific references to English proficiency (ICAO, 2010): 
• Assembly Resolution A32-16 was formulated in 1998 “to consider, with a high level 
of priority, the matter of English language proficiency” (p. vii); 
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• the Proficiency Requirements in Common English Study Group (PRICESG) was set 
up to review all aspects of pilot-ATC communications (p. vii); 
• Assembly Resolution A36-11, “Proficiency in the English language used for 
radiotelephony communications”, was adopted in 2007 to initiate implementation of 
the proficiency programme (p. vii); 
• all four accidents cited in the document to justify the programme were caused in part 
by “insufficient English language proficiency” (p. 1-1); 
• all examples of pilot-ATC exchanges cited in the document are in English (pp. 3-4, 3-
6, 3-9, 3-10, etc); 
• the Glossary of Basic and Complex Structures in Appendix B contains only English 
grammatical structures (pp. B-13 – B-16). 
This dissertation recognizes the importance of English in international aviation. 
However, it also acknowledges that aviation language encompasses a complex web of 
languages, language varieties and codes. These are used by a variety of operators in the 
global air transportation system. This study focuses on one particular aspect of aviation 
language: communication between airline pilots and ATC involving NESs and NNSs. 
Modern flight operations take place in a transportation system of tremendous scale and 
technological complexity. The fundamental problem is not new. It may be traced back to 
the story of Babel from the Book of Genesis in the Old Testament. The essential question 
is this: How to overcome language and cultural barriers so that teams of workers can 






CHAPTER 3: The Interplay of Risk & Communication 
 
This chapter, which is the second section of the literature review, addresses risk 
factors that may adversely affect pilot communication. The start of the chapter reviews 
fundamental concepts of uncertainty and risk, including risk perception, bounded 
rationality and the contrast between external risk and manufactured risk. In the second 
section I give definitions and examples of hazards, and distinguish hazards from risks. 
Then I define the concept of acceptable risk and review two important case studies: the 
Binghampton chemical fire and Challenger space shuttle accident. The following section 
briefly introduces safety management systems (SMS) in aviation. I then describe some 
techniques used in aviation for identifying hazards, assessing risks and controlling risks. 
The final section discusses risk factors that may affect pilot communication and outlines 
the format adopted in Canadian TSB accident reports to express “findings as to risk” in the 





3.1 Uncertainty & Risk 
Renn (2008) provided an overview of risk concepts across a variety of disciplines. 
He observed that risk has been a key topic in multiple areas of academic and professional 
activity, ranging from “natural hazards, technological threats, working conditions, ambient 
health impacts, crime, terrorism, and pollution to leisure activities” (Renn, 2008, p. 50). In 
his overview, approaches to risk are grouped into the following broad categories: 
• risk concepts of the natural and technical sciences (including actuarial analysis and 
probabilistic risk assessment); 
• economic approaches (including revealed preferences and expressed preferences);  
• the psychology of risk perception (including the heuristics that individuals use to 
process risk information); 
• social and cultural concepts of risk (including the “Risk Society” concept and the 
cultural theory of risk). 
Approaches from each of the categories are described in this chapter. In the first section, I 
start by distinguishing between risk and uncertainty. Then I discuss risk perception and 
bounded rationality. The final part of this section addresses the concepts of external risk 
and manufactured risk. 
 
3.1.1 Distinguishing Uncertainty from Risk 
There is often confusion between the terms uncertainty and risk. In a study of 
decision-making, Klein (1998, p. 277) pointed out that the word “uncertainty” embraces a 
range of meanings: “A review of the literature shows that people discuss uncertainty in 
terms of risks, probabilities, confidence, ambiguity, inconsistency, instability, confusions, 
and complexity”. In an attempt to define the concept more clearly, Klein stated that 
uncertainty may arise because information is missing, unreliable, ambiguous or complex, 
and that there may be uncertainty at the level of data, knowledge or understanding. 
Other commentators have highlighted a lack of preciseness in the way the terms 
“uncertainty” and “risk” are used. The economist Frank Knight, writing in 1921, proposed 
that “uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk, 
from which it has never been properly separated” (as cited in Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011, 
p. 10). He stated that a distinction should be made between risks, which are measurable, 
and uncertainties, which are not. 
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Clarke (1999) acknowledged Frank Knight’s concerns and argued the usefulness of 
his distinction, while pointing out that economic theories of choice under uncertainty have 
led to probabilities being incorporated in later conceptions of uncertainty. Clarke also 
noted that the economists James March and Herbert Simon had similarly distinguished 
between risk and uncertainty in their seminal book “Organizations”. Clarke (1999, p. 11) 
summed up the difference between the two concepts as follows: 
Risk in its general form is when it is possible, at least in principle, to 
estimate the likelihood that an event (or set of events) will occur; the 
specific forms of those estimates are the probabilities of adverse 
consequences. Uncertainty is when such estimations are not possible. 
To illustrate the distinction, Clarke said that it was possible to estimate the risk of 
divorce for first-time marriages, but whether any particular marriage would end in divorce 
was uncertain. Similarly, in the aviation context, we can estimate the overall risk of airline 
accidents happening each year (e.g., by extrapolating historical accident rates per million 
flights), but whether any given flight will suffer an accident is uncertain. 
 
3.1.2 Risk Perception & Bounded Rationality 
Renn (2008, p. 56) made the fundamental observation that “risk perceptions vary 
among individuals and groups”. All people face choices involving risks, but they judge the 
level of risks differently. Within the psychological domain of risk studies, Slovic and 
Weber (2002) cited research showing differences in risk perception between technical 
experts and the general public, men and women, and individuals from different cultures. 
Experts, for instance, might have access to data enabling them to examine specific risks in 
detail. Lay people, on the other hand, may rely on intuitions to make decisions. 
Decision-making often takes place under conditions in which knowledge and 
awareness is limited, and multiple goals may be competing for an individual’s attention. 
The economist Herbert Simon developed the concept of bounded rationality to account for 
these conditions. In place of the classical theory of omniscient rationality, the concept of 
bounded rationality recognised “the limits of man’s abilities to comprehend and compute 
in the face of complexity and uncertainty” (Simon, 1978, p. 354). One of the key ideas in 
this framework is satisficing: the suggestion is that people do not search for optimal 
solutions to problems, but instead stop searching once a satisfactory solution has been 
found. The concept of bounded rationality has had a profound influence on research into 
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human error. In the context of accident investigations, it underscores the importance of 
trying to understand retrospectively how individuals perceived their situation as events 
were unfolding, rather than simply assuming they had perfect knowledge of the risks they 
faced (Dekker, 2001; Meadows & Wright, 2009). 
Fischhoff and Kadvany (2011) outlined a number of factors that influence risk 
perception. They highlighted the work of psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman in identifying heuristics that guide intuition. These simple mental strategies 
allow solutions for complex problems to be found quickly. One example is the availability 
heuristic, which holds that an event is judged to be probable if instances of the event come 
to mind readily. Another example is the affect heuristic proposed by psychologist Paul 
Slovic and his colleagues, by which an individual’s emotional response to a situation is 
thought to influence his or her perception of risk. In conditions of limited information, 
heuristics are useful shortcuts that allow people to judge risks, but they may lead to poor 
choices (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011). 
Within the cultural domain of risk studies, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argued 
that public perception of risks is often at odds with scientific assessments. They suggested 
that “public perception of risk and its acceptable levels are collective constructs, a bit like 
language and a bit like aesthetic judgment” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 186). In other 
words, people have different levels of awareness of the hazards around them, and their 
awareness is informed by the societies or social groups to which they belong. 
Stokes and Kite (1994) listed a number of cultural and societal factors that affect 
the ways in which individuals perceive risk. These include people’s faith and confidence in 
society, organizations, government, leadership and colleagues, as well as their training and 
ability. Stokes and Kite (1994, p. 224) posited that these factors allow normal people to 
negotiate their way through life “systematically overestimating the control that they have 
over events and unconsciously downplaying the risks”. The behaviour of normal people is 
contrasted with that of depressed individuals who, clinical studies suggest, “suffer from 
‘depressive realism’, a pessimistic but, in probabilistic terms, all too accurate assessment 
of the real risks of everyday life” (Stokes & Kite, 1994, p. 215). 
 
3.1.3 External Risk & Manufactured Risk 
From a social approach to risk research, Giddens, Duneier and Appelbaum (2005) 
noted that risk is part of the human condition. People have always had to endure natural 
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disasters such as typhoons, hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes, famines and drought. These 
are examples of external risk, so-called because they arise from the natural world and are 
outside human control. In the modern world, though, people are increasingly faced with 
various kinds of manufactured risk that arise from human knowledge and technology. 
Examples of manufactured risk include adverse health effects from pesticides, radiation 
leaks from nuclear power plants, and aviation accidents. 
Ulrich Beck’s influential book, “Risk Society”, was published following the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. The book documented the transition of a world 
threatened by external risks to one characterized by relentless change and the fear of 
manufactured risks. The personal risks faced by explorers such as Christopher Columbus 
were contrasted with the global dangers that toxins, pollutants or radioactive waste pose to 
modern humanity. Beck (1992, p. 22) argued that the dangers resulting from the global 
spread of high-risk industries are such that “the unknown and unintended consequences 
come to be a dominant force in history and society.” An important aspect of the concept of 
risk society is that hazards are not confined to a single time, place or social group. People 
in modern societies face risks that are characterized by transboundary effects, globalizing 
impacts, increased penetrating power, incalculable nature, and lack of accountability. The 
result is “social dependency upon institutions and actors who may well be - and arguably 
are increasingly - alien, obscure and inaccessible to most people affected by the risks in 
question” (Beck, 1992, p. 4). 
Beck’s thesis has attracted criticism for its abstract and conceptual nature (Jarvis, 
2007). However, the notion of hazards propagating beyond the boundaries of time, place or 
social group is undeniably a defining characteristic of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
accident and other large-scale disasters. In the case of the 1984 Bhopal chemical leak, 
organizational decisions made in the Union Carbide headquarters in Connecticut, USA, 
had a catastrophic impact on the lives of thousands of villagers in central India. Within 
aviation, on a smaller but no less tragic scale, accidents have occurred in which decisions 
taken at company head offices generated risks that impacted the lives of people hundreds 
or thousands of kilometres away. Each of the following plane crashes led to the deaths of 
dozens of people on the ground who had no connection to the flights: 
• El Al Flight 1862, Holland, 1992 – an Israeli cargo flight carrying toxic chemicals 
from New York to Tel Aviv, with a scheduled stopover at Schiphol Airport, crashed 
in the Bijlmermeer suburb of Amsterdam causing 43 deaths including 39 on the 
ground (NASB, 1994); 
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• Mandala Airlines Flight 91, Indonesia, 2005 – a passenger flight from North Sumatra 
to Jakarta crashed shortly after takeoff from Polonia International Airport in Medan 
causing 149 deaths including 49 on the ground (KNKT, 2009); 
• Turkish Airlines Flight 6491, Kyrgyzstan, 2017 – a cargo flight operated by Turkish 
carrier ACT Airlines from Hong Kong to Istanbul crashed while attempting to make a 
scheduled landing at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, causing 39 deaths including 35 on the 
ground (AAIC, 2017). 
 
3.2 Hazard, Threat & Risk 
In this section I define the term hazard, and note that hazard and threat may be 
used interchangeably in aviation. I give examples of typical aviation hazards, and also 
outline how hazards are distinguished from risks.  
 
3.2.1 Definitions of Hazards & Threats 
The ICAO Safety Management Manual (Document 9859) contains an overview of 
the fundamentals of safety management in aviation and guidance for implementing a safety 
culture.20 It defines a hazard as “a condition or an object with the potential to cause death, 
injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of 
the ability to perform a prescribed function” (ICAO, 2013b, p. 2-24). The FAA Risk 
Management Handbook provides a similar definition: “a hazard is a present condition, 
event, object, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired 
event such as an accident” (FAA, 2009, p. 1-2). Both of these definitions express the idea 
that hazards have the potential to cause undesired events such as accidents or incidents. 
Hazards are often confused with consequences or outcomes. To illustrate the 
difference, Document 9859 gives the example of a 15-knot wind. If the wind blows in the 
direction along which a runway lies, it is beneficial because it improves the takeoff or 
landing performance of an aircraft. By contrast, if the wind blows perpendicular to the 
runway as a crosswind, it is a hazard since it may lead to a runway excursion (i.e., the 
aircraft departs from the side of the runway). In this example, a 15-knot crosswind is a 
hazard and a runway excursion is a possible consequence or outcome. 
 
20
 Safety culture is discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
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Within aviation, the terms “threat” and “hazard” are often used interchangeably 
(ICAO, 2013b). The former term has gained widespread use in the last two decades with 
the development of the Threat and Error Management (TEM) safety taxonomy. (TEM is 
one of the models and taxonomies outlined in Appendix 5.) 
 
3.2.2 Hazards in Aviation 
While stating that “the elimination of aircraft accidents and/or serious incidents 
remains the ultimate goal”, Document 9859 acknowledges that hazards are an inevitable 
aspect of aviation (ICAO, 2013b, p. 2-1). One reason for this is simply the great number of 
hazards associated with flying. 
Many aviation hazards are related to meteorology: rain, snow, ice, wind shear, 
turbulence, thunderstorms, precipitation static, white out and volcanic ash. The FAA 
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) contains a large amount of information about 
weather hazards. The section about thunderstorms alone contains 35 paragraphs. This short 
excerpt has advice about flying in the vicinity of thunderstorms: 
a. Thunderstorm Avoidance. Never regard any thunderstorm lightly, 
even when radar echoes are of light intensity. Avoiding 
thunderstorms is the best policy. Following are some Do’s and 
Don’ts of thunderstorm avoidance: 
1. Don’t land or takeoff in the face of an approaching thunderstorm. 
A sudden gust front of low level turbulence could cause loss of control. 
2. Don’t attempt to fly under a thunderstorm even if you can see 
through to the other side. Turbulence and wind shear under the storm 
could be hazardous. (FAA, 2015, p. 7-1-59) 
Other hazards described in the FAA AIM include antenna towers, smoke stacks, cooling 
towers, unmanned balloons, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), overhead wires, bird 
activity, lasers, mountainous terrain and wake turbulence. Hazards in restricted airspace 
include the firing of artillery or guided missiles in military areas (FAA, 2015). 
 
3.2.3 Distinguishing Risks from Hazards 
Renn (2008) stressed the importance of distinguishing risks from hazards. Citing 
the example of a chemical substance, he noted that the substance’s toxicity is a hazard, 
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which has the potential “to cause harm to what people value”. However, it only becomes a 
risk if “a person may be exposed to this substance and suffer the toxic effects” (Renn, 
2008, p. 50). If there is no possibility of exposure, there is no risk. 
The distinction between risks and hazards is captured succinctly by the FAA Risk 
Management Handbook: “Risk is the future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or 
eliminated” (FAA, 2009, p. 1-2). This idea is elaborated in Document 9859, which breaks 
“the future impact of a hazard” down into two elements: “the predicted probability” and 
the “severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard” (ICAO, 2013b, p. xii). 
Kern (1998) discussed risk in the context of airmanship and pilot decision-making. 
Drawing on notions of actuarial analysis from the insurance industry, he defined risk in 
terms of a simple mathematical equation: 
Risk  =  probability of loss  x  cost of loss  x  length of exposure 
(Kern, 1998, p. 297) 
This equation underscores the importance of the length of time that someone is exposed to 
a hazard. The risk is increased if the exposure time is high. On the other hand, as noted 
above, there is zero risk if the exposure time is zero. It follows that one of the basic tenets 
of risk management is to minimize the length of time that individuals are exposed to 
hazards (Kern, 1998). 
 
3.3 Acceptable Risk 
Just as individuals and groups differ in terms of risk perception, so they may differ 
in what they judge to be an acceptable risk. This section reviews various perspectives of 
acceptable risk for individuals and organizations. It also describes two case studies which 
analysed the construct of acceptable risk in environmental and technological disasters: the 
1981 Binghampton chemical fire and 1986 Challenger space shuttle accident. 
 
3.3.1 Definitions of Acceptable Risk 
Early studies by the nuclear engineer Chauncey Starr used a revealed preferences 
approach to investigate what kind of risks were acceptable to society. He concluded that 
people accept greater risks from hazards that are deemed to provide greater benefits. They 
also accept greater risks from voluntary hazards (e.g., general aviation flying) compared 
with involuntary ones (e.g., flying on commercial aviation). Starr’s work was influential, 
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but a number of his underlying assumptions were subsequently questioned, such as the 
reliance on a rational decision-making model. 
Later studies, including the work of bioethicist William Lowrance, investigated the 
ways in which people define risks by identifying risk attributes and dimensions of risk. It is 
now understood that individuals differ in how they define risks and benefits. Therefore 
something that is considered an acceptable risk by one person may not be acceptable to 
another (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011). 
Anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky contended 
that “there is no single all-purpose number that expresses ‘acceptable risk’ for a society” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 4). Any decision-making under conditions of risk is 
dependent upon the alternatives that are considered as well as the values and beliefs that 
are brought into play. In other words, the search for an objective method is a search for a 
chimera. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 4) cited a study of acceptable risk by Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic, which concluded that “acceptability is always a political issue”. 
This theme is developed in the following section with the case study of the Binghampton 
chemical fire. 
Regarding levels of acceptable risk in organizational contexts, Reason (2008, pp. 
126-127) highlighted the tension that exists in many organizations between the conflicting 
goals of safety and production: “Every company must obey both the ALARP principle 
(keep the risks as low as reasonably practicable) and the ASSIB principle (and still stay in 
business)”. He added that for certain high risk organizations, such as in the oil exploration 
and production industry, the levels of risk and profitability are closely related. As a result 
companies sometimes face pressure to operate at levels of high risk in order to boost their 
return on investment. 
Within aviation, the ICAO Safety Management Manual (Document 9859) outlines 
three levels of safety risk that are key elements in the risk assessment process: acceptable, 
tolerable and intolerable risks. Acceptable risks are “acceptable as they currently stand and 
require no action to bring or keep the probability and/or severity of the consequences of 
hazards under organizational control” (ICAO, 2013b, p. 2-30). By contrast, tolerable risks 
require the organization to implement risk mitigation strategies, while intolerable risks are 
of such a probability and/or severity that immediate action must be taken to mitigate them. 




3.3.2 The 1981 Binghampton Chemical Fire 
At 05:33 on 5th February 1981, the failure of an electrical protection system led to a 
fire in a government office building in Binghampton, New York State. The fire vaporized 
the coolant of an electrical transformer, causing the building to be covered with oily soot. 
The soot was contaminated with dioxin, which was released into the atmosphere. So severe 
was the contamination that six months after the accident, during which time the building 
had been left undisturbed, scientists from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
were amazed to find no evidence of infestation by rodents or insects. 
Clarke (1989) conducted a case study which analysed the processes by which risk 
was defined in the aftermath of the Binghampton fire. He found that the response to the 
accident was not driven by rationality. Instead it was “decisively shaped by organizational 
interests, the bounded rationality of decision makers, and the social environment of their 
organizations” (Clarke, 1989, p. 138). Clarke contended that, if the decision-making 
process had been completely rational, state officials and organizations would have taken 
different steps. They would have: clearly defined the problem; drawn up a full set of 
options; evaluated each option on a range of dimensions; and selected the option with 
maximal value. In reality, he found that “no alternative other than decontamination was 
seriously considered by the state, even though there were very good reasons to demolish 
the building” (Clarke, 1989, pp. 137-138). 
The study analysed the process by which the contaminated garage in the building 
was deemed safe enough to be re-opened. The decision turned on the question of whether 
the level of toxic chemicals was low or high. An apparently simple question, but Clarke 
found that the definitions of “low” and “high” were constructed through a complicated 
process involving political and organizational forces. One of the factors was a shortage of 
downtown parking space. This echoes the earlier comments by Reason about the tension 
that often exists in organizations between safety goals and production goals. 
After examining this accident and other similar cases, Clarke (1989, p. 84) came to 
the conclusion that “assessment and acceptability of risk are, at bottom, the results of 
bargaining among organizations”. He declared the most important implication of his study 
to be that, when investigating disasters such as the Binghampton fire, it is essential to 
understand the political and organizational context in which decisions regarding acceptable 




3.3.3 The 1986 Challenger Space Shuttle Accident 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle 
Challenger was launched from the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 
11:38 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on 28th January 1986. An O-ring seal in one of the 
solid rocket boosters failed at liftoff. This allowed burning gas to escape which led to the 
structural failure of the external fuel tank. After just 73 seconds of flight, the shuttle was 
engulfed in a fireball and disintegrated. All 7 crewmembers died. 
Vaughan (1996) conducted a case study of this disaster. She described how NASA, 
an organization rich in resources and expertise, had drifted towards reduced safety margins 
and increased risk for a number of years prior to the accident. Vaughan’s study focused on 
two aspects of deviance: 
(1) the statistical deviation of booster technology from expected 
performance, and how it was normalized, and (2) the contrast 
between outsider interpretations of NASA actions as deviant after 
the disaster and insider definitions of these same actions as normal 
and acceptable at the time they occurred. (Vaughan, 1996, p. 72) 
Since the start of the space shuttle flight programme in 1981, NASA had been 
using a formal Acceptable Risk Process which detailed the actions to be taken whenever an 
anomaly or questionable condition arose. As Vaughan (1996, p. 81) noted: “The shuttle 
could not fly unless the hazard was eliminated or controlled by some corrective action 
and/or engineering calculations and tests establishing that the condition was not a threat to 
flight safety.” This procedure was followed despite ongoing problems with the O-rings 
including damage sustained during two shuttle missions in 1985. 
There is a sense in which NASA’s decision to classify the O-ring hazard as an 
acceptable risk mirrored the decision after the Binghampton fire to declare the level of 
toxic chemicals in the building’s garage as low. There were, however, two significant 
differences in the decision-making contexts for the two disasters. Firstly, NASA engineers 
and managers were not dealing with a one-off decision, but a procedure that had to be 
followed every time an anomaly was identified. Secondly, they made their decisions prior 
to the accident, without any knowledge that it would take place. 
Vaughan observed that from 1977 to 1985 NASA continued classifying a flawed 
design as an acceptable risk. To explain how this happened, she outlined a “nascent theory 
of the normalization of deviance in organizations” which had three elements: production of 
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culture, a culture of production and structural secrecy (Vaughan, 1996, p. 396). The case 
study concluded it was these cultural drivers that eroded safety margins and increased the 
risk, not “‘immorally calculating managers’ who pushed the production goal in the face of 
obvious safety flaws” (Dekker, 2001, p. 257). Vaughan’s (1996, p. xiv) conclusion was an 
indictment of the organization: 
No extraordinary actions by individuals explain what happened: no 
intentional managerial wrongdoing, no rule violations, no 
conspiracy. The cause of disaster was a mistake embedded in the 
banality of organizational life and facilitated by an environment of 
scarcity and competition, elite bargaining, uncertain technology, 
incrementalism, patterns of information, routinization, organizational 
and interorganizational structures, and a complex culture. 
As with the Binghampton chemical fire, in order to make sense of the Challenger 
space shuttle disaster it is necessary to understand the organizational context in which 
decisions were made regarding acceptable risk. 
 
3.4 Safety Management Systems in Aviation 
Over the last two decades, there has been widespread implementation of safety 
management systems (SMS) in civil aviation. The aim is to manage aviation safety by 
providing organizations with a systematic means of continuously identifying hazards and 
controlling risks. Similar systems are employed in other high-risk domains such as the 
petroleum, chemical, electricity generation, maritime and rail transport industries. For civil 
aviation, a range of SMS frameworks have been developed by national and international 
regulatory bodies. These draw heavily on risk concepts from the natural and technical 
sciences. Stolzer, Halford and Goglia (2008) compared the frameworks implemented by 
the FAA and ICAO. Although they use different terminology and emphasise different 
components, both frameworks essentially consist of a three-step process: 
1. identifying hazards; 
2. assessing risks; 
3. controlling risks. 
The following sections describe some of the techniques that are used within civil aviation 




3.5 Identifying Hazards 
As noted previously, there are many hazards associated with flying. One simple 
way for a pilot to identify hazards (or threats) is by talking to other pilots and asking 
questions about hypothetical situations, so-called “hangar flying” (Kern, 1998, p. 297). 
When informal discussions include the sharing of “war stories”, they can be an effective 
method of training less experienced individuals. Cognitive psychologist Gary Klein (1998) 
has documented the value of this approach in studies of pilots, firefighters, nuclear power 
plant operators and other experts working in high-risk workplaces. Using ethnographic 
studies of crew interactions on the flight deck and in training, Hutchins, Holder and Pérez 
(2002) similarly reported how airline pilots used storytelling to warn other pilots about 
hazards associated with automation and in-flight fires. 
Mnemonics are widely used throughout civil and military aviation. Because they 
are easy to memorize and recall, they are a useful tool for helping pilots to remember 
safety checklists. Table 4 shows two mnemonics discussed in the FAA Risk Management 
Handbook which help pilots to identify threats (FAA, 2009). 
 
 
Table 4: Mnemonics for identifying flight hazards (FAA, 2009). 
 











Competency, health condition, level of fatigue, mental & emotional state 
Performance, equipment & airworthiness 
Weather, ATC, navigational aids, takeoff & landing areas, terrain & 
surrounding obstacles 

















Q. Am I sick? 
Q. Am I taking any medicines that might affect my judgment or make 
me drowsy? 
Q. Am I under psychological pressure from the job? Do I have money, 
health, or family problems? 
Q. Have I been drinking within 8 hours? Within 24 hours? 
Q. Am I tired and not adequately rested? 





The first mnemonic in Table 4, PAVE, is a simple aid to remind pilots to check 
critical categories for risk before a flight. “P”, for example, stands for pilot. This is a 
prompt for a pilot to ask, “Am I ready for this trip?” in terms of flight experience and 
currency, or physical and emotional condition (FAA, 2009, p. 3-3). The second mnemonic, 
IMSAFE, helps pilots to identify hazards relating to their physical and mental health. “I” 
stands for illness and is a reminder for pilots to check whether they are currently suffering 
from any sickness which might affect their ability to fly. (See Abbe, 1998, for a fuller list 
of mnemonics and other memory aids commonly used by pilots.) 
A more formal tool, called SHEL, is a conceptual human factors (HF) model that 
may be used to identify areas of risk. The SHEL model has the following components: 
• Software (S) – operating manuals, checklists and policies; 
• Hardware (H) – the airplane, instrument panel and avionics equipment; 
• Environment (E) – the weather, atmosphere and ATC system; 
• Liveware (L) – pilots, cabin crew and air traffic controllers. 
This model is useful for identifying hazards arising from interactions between components. 
For instance, if pilots neglect to use a checklist because they are familiar with a procedure 
then that corresponds to a Liveware-Software (L-S) interaction. Excessive temperature, 
noise or vibration in the cockpit is a Liveware-Environment (L-E) interaction (Fallucco, 
2002). The SHEL model has been used in accident investigations to provide a framework 
for analysing complex interactions between people and systems (AAIB, 2003). It is also 
referred to as SHELL, in acknowledgement that Liveware, the central element, can interact 
with Software, Hardware, the Environment or other Liveware. (The SHEL model is 
outlined in Appendix 5. See also CAA, 2002; Stolzer et al., 2008.) 
 
3.6 Assessing Risks 
Risk assessment is the process of quantifying or characterizing risk. It may take 
place at a range of levels. Within aviation it may range from a private pilot preparing for a 
flight to a sophisticated computer simulation of runway collisions at a major airport. This 
section describes several tools and techniques that allow risks to be estimated. 
The CFIT checklist is a tool used by pilots to evaluate risk before a flight. It was 
designed by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) in response to a significant category of 
accidents called controlled flight into terrain, or CFIT. In a CFIT accident an airworthy 
plane is unintentionally flown into the ground or sea. In the first part of the checklist there 
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are risk factors such as “no ATC service” at the destination or “airport located in or near 
mountainous terrain”. Each factor has a numerical score. Three factors are related to 
communication: “controllers and pilots speak different primary languages”; “controllers’ 
spoken English or phraseology poor”; and “pilots’ spoken English poor”. There are also 
risk multipliers whereby, for example, flights to South America are considered five times 
more risky than the United States or Canada. The second part of the checklist includes 
risk-reduction factors relating to safety culture, the pilot’s training and aircraft equipment. 
Pilots calculate the total score before flying. A negative score “indicates a significant 
threat”, and the pilot is urged to review the risk-reduction factors and “determine what 
changes can be made to reduce CFIT risk” (FAA, 2009; Kern, 1998). 
Another general-purpose tool for evaluating risk within organizations is the risk 
matrix. This consists of a chart and accompanying tables. The chart is typically (though not 
always) a 5x5 matrix with risk probability levels shown on one axis and risk severity levels 
on the other. In the ICAO risk matrix shown in Figure 7, the risk probability ranges from 
“frequent” to “extremely improbable” (on the vertical axis), while the risk severity runs 
from “catastrophic” to “negligible” (on the horizontal axis). 
 
 
Figure 7: Risk assessment matrix. Reprinted from Safety management manual (3rd edition)  
(p. 2-29), by ICAO, 2013, Montreal, Canada: International Civil Aviation Organization. 

















The chart shown in Figure 7 is accompanied by tables with definitions for the 
levels of risk probability and risk severity. For example, a “Remote” probability means 
“Unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely)”, and a “Catastrophic” severity level 
indicates “Equipment destroyed” and “Multiple deaths” (ICAO, 2013b, pp. 2-28–2-29). 
The risk matrix is used by first calculating the probability and severity of a particular 
outcome, and then plotting it in the appropriate matrix cell. If the cell is green, the risk is 
acceptable; if it is yellow, the risk is tolerable and mitigation may be required; if red, the 
risk is intolerable and immediate mitigating action is necessary. Depending on the result, a 
cost-benefit analysis may be carried out to determine what action should be taken (ICAO, 
2013b; Stolzer et al., 2008). 
A more sophisticated tool developed from risk studies in the natural and technical 
sciences is probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This is a methodology for evaluating risks 
in complex systems such as nuclear power plants or modern jet airliners. PRA and the 
techniques of event tree analysis and fault tree analysis were developed from the 1974 
Reactor Safety Study (Wash-1400) led by American physicist Norman Rasmussen. This 
was an early and widely-criticised investigation of nuclear power plant safety (Fischhoff & 
Kadvany, 2011). The PRA process seeks to identify an undesired top event and then map 
out all of the hazards leading to that event. Fault trees are used with probabilities assigned 
to the basic events. From these the probability of the undesired top event can be calculated. 
PRA methodology was adopted by NASA following the 1986 Challenger space shuttle 
disaster (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
The final methodology, Monte Carlo analysis, uses computer simulation with a risk 
equation incorporating multiple probability distributions. Risk probabilities are calculated 
by running the simulation for a particular scenario thousands or even millions of times 
(Stolzer et al., 2008). Stroeve (2016) reported on the use of Monte Carlo simulations to 
analyse airport runway collisions and thereby evaluate the effectiveness of runway 
incursion alerting systems. 
 
3.7 Controlling Risks 
The following sections review two categories of methods for controlling risks: risk 
mitigation techniques used by individual pilots to minimize risks, and risk communication 




3.7.1 Risk Mitigation 
There are several basic techniques that pilots can use to mitigate risk. Firstly, as 
noted previously, it is important to minimize the time of exposure to risk as well as the 
severity of risks that are faced. For instance, a pilot can mitigate risks associated with a 
thunderstorm (e.g., due to turbulence, wind shear or icing) by making a request to ATC to 
be rerouted around bad weather. For airline crews, another way to mitigate risk is to share 
the workload to prevent individual crew members from becoming overloaded. In adverse 
weather conditions, for example, a captain may decide to reduce risk by making a landing 
that he or she initially intended to give to the first officer (Fallucco, 2002). 
The FAA Risk Management Handbook, in a section about the aforementioned 
PAVE mnemonic, includes specific items of advice for mitigating risks. In order to cope 
with external pressures, for instance, it suggests that pilots use personal standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) such as the following: “Allow time on a trip for an extra fuel stop or to 
make an unexpected landing because of the weather” (FAA, 2009, p. 3-9). 
A more formal method that can be used for risk mitigation is the Threat and Error 
Management (TEM) model, as described in Appendix 5. TEM was developed following 
flight deck observations of regular airline flights in the United States made by Robert 
Helmreich’s human factors team at the University of Texas (Grote et al., 2004). The main 
components of the model are threats, errors and undesired aircraft states. If undesired 
aircraft states are not managed effectively, they may result in unsafe outcomes. For 
example, an aircraft on an unstabilised approach (i.e., undesired aircraft state) may end up 
overrunning the runway in a runway excursion (i.e., unsafe outcome). A key assumption 
underlying TEM is the acknowledgement that threats and errors are a normal part of flight 
operations. In terms of risk mitigation, Maurino (2005) gave examples of countermeasures 
that pilots use to prevent safety margins from being reduced: SOP briefing, stating plans, 
workload assignment, contingency management, monitoring the other pilot, workload 
management, automation management, evaluation and modification of plans, inquiry and 
assertiveness. The TEM model has proved influential in airline training, providing the 
framework for sixth-generation crew resource management (CRM) airline training 
(Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001; Stolzer et al., 2008). As a taxonomy, it has 
been observed that “TEM accurately describes what pilots ‘do’ under that intangible 




3.7.2 Risk Communication 
Effective communication within flight crews, and between them and other 
personnel such as cabin crew, air traffic controllers and ground crew, is essential for 
maintaining safety. Airline CRM programmes train pilots to assertively communicate 
problems, including threats and errors that pose a risk to the safe completion of a flight. 
Outside of the cockpit, there are a number of channels through which individuals may 
report hazards, safety problems or incidents. These include internal safety reporting 
systems set up by airlines, airport operators, air navigation service providers and 
maintenance organizations. 
At the organizational level, if a risk assessment identifies a hazard that requires 
immediate action, it is important to notify all relevant personnel. Stolzer et al. (2008) gave 
the hypothetical example of an audit at an airport fixed-base operator (FBO) that revealed 
a widespread problem of fuel contamination. In this example, a risk matrix was used to 
evaluate the risk level, which was found to be unacceptably high. Stolzer et al. (2008, pp. 
141-142) concluded that in such a case: 
…there should be clear mechanisms for the entire management chain 
responsible for the fuel quality – that is, from the depot manager all 
the way up to the CEO – to be aware of the results of the study, to 
know that corrective and preventive action is a requirement, and that 
such action must be accomplished within a predetermined period. 
Several industry-wide safety reporting systems have been established to which 
pilots may confidentially submit concerns about hazards or reports of incidents. Safety 
information is published in newsletters and reports, and may also be made available via 
online databases. These confidential systems are essential mechanisms for disseminating 
safety information so that accidents are not repeated.21 One well-known example is the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), operated by NASA on behalf of the FAA 
(Stolzer et al., 2008). ASRS produces a monthly safety newsletter, named CALLBACK, 





 December 1974, TWA Flight 514 crashed into Mount Weather about 50 km from Dulles 
International Airport, Washington DC, with the loss of 92 lives. Less than two months previously a 
United Airlines flight had narrowly avoided crashing on the same approach at the same location, 
but news of that incident was not shared with other airlines (NTSB, 1975b; Stolzer et al., 2008). If 
it had been, the crash of TWA Flight 514 might have been prevented. 
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by the general public (see Appendix 5). Similar systems have been established in other 
countries, such as the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme 
(CHIRP) in the UK (Flin, O’Connor & Crichton, 2008). There are also commercial 
systems, including the British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS), which was 
developed in the 1990s and has evolved through several generations into the Sentinel 
system. This system is now operated by the Emirates Group and used by airlines in 
Europe, Asia and Africa (GAIN, 2003). 
Other bodies that publish information about risks and hazards include national 
regulators (e.g., FAA in the United States and CAA in the UK), accident investigation 
agencies (e.g., NTSB in the US) and international organizations (e.g., ICAO and IATA). 
These organizations disseminate safety information through reports, documents, manuals 
and videos. A number of their documents are cited in this dissertation, including the FAA 
Risk Management Handbook (FAA, 2009), the ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO, 
2013b) and the IATA Safety Report (IATA, 2019c). 
 
3.8 “Findings as to Risk” in Aviation 
In the final section of this review of risk literature, I address findings from accident 
and incident investigations about factors that increase risk during flight operations. Firstly, 
I describe two recording devices that are essential sources of data for accident and incident 
investigations: the CVR and FDR. Secondly, I discuss the approach taken in investigations 
by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada, which explicitly communicates risk 
through a category of “findings as to risk”. Examples are given of some of the findings 
from TSB investigations that involved pilot communication. 
 
3.8.1 CVR & FDR Data Recording Devices 
Large commercial aircraft are required to carry two “black boxes” to facilitate the 
investigation of accidents and incidents. One is the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), whose 
purpose is to record sounds on the flight deck, and the other is the flight data recorder 
(FDR), which records performance data from engines and other aircraft systems. Both 
devices are located at the rear of an aircraft to improve their survivability in the event of a 
crash (Bibel, 2008). 
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The CVR uses microphones located in pilots’ headsets and overhead in the cockpit. 
It records crew conversations as well as other sounds such as radio transmissions, warning 
alarms, engine noise, and the extension or retraction of the landing gear and flight controls. 
Aircraft used to have CVRs with magnetic tape recorders that recorded approximately 30 
minutes of sound on a continuous loop. Modern aircraft use digital devices that record two 
hours of audio. The devices record continuously, so that data recorded more than two 
hours previously are overwritten. If a safety event occurs during a long flight, or pilots fly 
another leg before submitting a report, the relevant data are liable to be lost.22 
 
3.8.2 Findings from Accident & Incident Investigations 
Dismukes, Berman and Loukopoulos (2007) pointed out that the type of findings 
included in accident and incident reports varies depending on the country that conducts the 
investigation. In the United States, reports issued by the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) list a number of findings followed by a single probable cause. Other 
countries, such as Australia, the UK and Canada, deliberately refrain from stating a single 
primary cause. Instead they provide lists of causal factors, contributing factors or other 
factors that increased risk. 
In Canada, accident and incident reports compiled by the TSB are characterised by 
the explicit way in which they communicate risk. Investigation findings are divided into 
two categories: (1) findings as to causes and contributing factors, and (2) findings as to 
risk. The latter relate to risks identified during the course of the investigation, which are 
expressed as factual conditional sentences. As an example, an investigation was conducted 
following a 2014 runway incursion in Ottawa that almost led to a collision between a 
medical helicopter and a cargo plane. One of the risk findings was: “If air traffic control 
uses non-standard phraseology, there is a risk of inconsistencies and miscommunication 
between air traffic control and the pilot.” (TSB, 2015b, p. 11) 
Examples from other reports of findings that are related to communication are 
listed in Appendix 6. These examples do not represent an exhaustive survey of TSB 
 
22
 In recent years there have been numerous accidents and incidents for which investigators were 
unable to retrieve pertinent CVR data. As a result, ICAO and the European Union are introducing 
requirements from 2021 for newly-manufactured transport aircraft over 27,000 kg to be equipped 
with 25-hour CVRs (Cookson, 2019a). 
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reports, but they serve to illustrate the format of the findings as to risk. They also give a 
taste of the range of communication issues that have arisen in recent years. Some themes 
that emerge related to communication issues are as follows: 
• Risk communication – reports A12Q0216 and A15O0015 both stated risks arising 
when flight crews fail to report non-compliant practices; 
• Standard phraseology & plain language – reports A14H0002 and A16O0016 noted 
risks associated with not adhering to standard phraseology and with the use of 
inappropriate plain language; 
• Cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) – reports A14O0165 and A15H0002 both involved 
the problem of not being able to retrieve CVR data after an accident or incident; 
• Passenger announcements – reports A15H0002 and A15F0165 contained findings 
related to inadequate or ineffective safety announcements and safety briefings; 
• Declaring an emergency – finally, report A16O0066 warned of the risks of flight 
crews failing to declare an emergency, which was one of the key issues in the crash of 







CHAPTER 4: The Interplay of Culture & Communication 
 
This chapter looks at ways in which culture impacts on communication. It is the 
final area of the literature review. In the first part of the chapter, I cover key terms and 
general definitions of culture. This includes material and non-material culture, as well as 
culture as a means for groups to deal with problems. Then I consider the culture of social 
groups, especially national, organizational, professional and safety cultures. The first part 
concludes with a discussion of how culture changes over time. 
The second part of the chapter provides an overview of approaches in intercultural 
communication that are relevant to international civil aviation: key concepts identified by 
anthropologist Edward T. Hall; the ethnography of communication (EOC) approach 
established by linguistic anthropologist Dell Hymes and the interdiscourse communication 
framework developed by Scollon, Scollon and Jones; the studies of cultural dimensions 
carried out by social psychologist Geert Hofstede and management consultant Fons 
Trompenaars; and important concepts in Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory and 
Ting-Toomey’s face negotiation theory. 
Intercultural interactions are an essential element of international airline operations. 
The chapter concludes with an overview of studies of intercultural communication in the 
aviation context (Section 4.9). These studies draw on much of the research described in the 






4.1 Definitions of Culture 
Culture is all around us, pervading our lives and informing all our thoughts, words 
and actions. As a consequence, it is inherently difficult to define (Friedman et al., 2013). 
Williams (1985, p. 87) described the origins of the word culture in several European 
languages and its subsequent development within different intellectual disciplines. He 
found it to be “one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language”. 
The difficulty in defining culture has not stopped a large number of people from trying. As 
Hall (1990, p. 20) wryly observed: “Culture is a word that has so many meanings already 
that one more can do it no harm”. 
In this section I review the following: the concepts of values, norms and attitudes; 
general definitions of culture; the distinction between material and non-material culture; 
and culture as a means by which social groups deal with the problems they face. 
 
4.1.1 Values, Norms & Attitudes 
4.1.1.1 Values 
Values are “collective ideas about what is right or wrong, good or bad, and 
desirable or undesirable in a particular culture” (Williams, 1970, as cited in Kendall, 2007, 
p. 85). Values incorporate ideas or beliefs about behaviour, but they do not explicitly tell 
people how to act. They may be held consciously or unconsciously. 
Values vary widely across cultures. To illustrate their influence on behaviour in 
business, Adler and Gundersen (2008) contrasted managers in Latin America with their 
counterparts in the United States. They suggested that Latin American managers hire 
competent members of their own family because they value family loyalty, while those in 
the United States emphasize the achievements and performance of individual candidates. 
 
4.1.1.2 Norms 
Norms may be simply defined as “established rules of behavior or standards of 
conduct” (Kendall, 2007, p. 87).23 There are several categories of norms. Prescriptive 
 
23
 Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey and Chua (1988, pp. 61-62) distinguished between norms and rules: 
“While norms are culturally ingrained principles that are imparted systematically to children 
through the socialization process, cultural rules are situationally and interpersonally negotiable”. 
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norms state the kinds of behaviour that are appropriate or acceptable (e.g., how much tax 
citizens should pay). They are differentiated from proscriptive norms, which tell people 
what is inappropriate or unacceptable (e.g., speed limit laws). Formal norms are written 
down and may be enforced by sanctions (e.g., laws), whereas informal norms are unwritten 
but commonly understood by the members of a social group. 
Norms may also be classified according to their social importance. Folkways are 
informal norms that direct everyday behaviour (e.g., whether to kiss or shake hands when 
greeting another person). Mores are strongly held norms that embody a culture’s morals 
and ethical principles (e.g., rules against plagiarism). Violators of mores face sanctions 
ranging from ridicule to shunning or expulsion from a social group. In some cases, if the 
mores are protected by laws, the punishment may be imprisonment. 
As with values, there is wide variation in norms across cultures, which may lead to 
misunderstandings. Giddens, Duneier and Appelbaum (2005) observed that there are 
different norms for eye contact between the Navajo and most Americans. Avoiding eye 
contact is a sign of respect for the Navajo, but averting eye contact indicates weakness or 
rudeness for most Americans. A misunderstanding may result when a Navajo and an 
American tourist meet for the first time: “The Navajo may see the tourist as rude and 
vulgar, while the tourist may see the Navajo as disrespectful or deceptive” (Giddens et al., 
2005, p. 52). 
 
4.1.1.3 Attitudes 
An attitude is “a favorable or unfavorable evaluative reaction toward something or 
someone, exhibited in one’s beliefs, feelings, or intended behavior” (Myers, 1998, p. 130). 
Similar to values and norms, there is considerable diversity in attitudes across cultures. 
Adler and Gundersen (2008, p. 20) gave an example of market research in Canada which 
indicated differences in attitudes towards deodorants: “French Canadians have a positive 
attitude toward pleasant or sweet smells, whereas English Canadians prefer smells with 
efficient or clean connotations”. 
 
4.1.2 General Definitions of Culture 
Many commentators have noted the profusion of definitions of culture (Adler & 
Gundersen, 2008; Chávez, 2009; Gudykunst et al., 1988). Some general definitions are 
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provided below. Each of the definitions highlights one aspect of the complex web of ideas 
that constitutes culture. These aspects are developed in the following sections. 
 From his perspective as an anthropologist, Hall (1990, p. 20) stated that “culture 
has long stood for the way of life of a people, for the sum of their learned behavior 
patterns, attitudes, and material things.” This definition points to the existence of both 
material and non-material dimensions of culture. The distinction is elaborated in the 
following definition by Giddens et al. (2005, p. 52), which also expresses the notion that 
social groups may have their own cultures: “Culture consists of the values the members of 
a given group hold, the languages they speak, the symbols they revere, the norms they 
follow, and the material goods they create, from tools to clothing.”  
In order to participate in a social group, it is necessary for individuals to learn about 
the group’s culture, which provides “the common denominator that makes the actions of 
individuals intelligible to other members of their society” (Haviland, Prins, McBride & 
Walrath, 2016, p. 31). As a corollary, the actions of individuals from one group may not be 
readily intelligible to the members of other groups. This may lead to misunderstandings 
between different social groups. 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, p. 13) observed that culture provides 
people with a common way of interpreting the world: “Culture is a shared system of 
meanings. It dictates what we pay attention to, how we act and what we value.” By noting 
the influence of culture on what people “pay attention to”, this definition carries the 
important implication that people in different cultures pay attention to different things. 
Similarly but more succinctly, Pennycook (1994, p. 61) defined culture as “an 
active process by which people make sense of their lives”. In describing culture as a 
process, Pennycook evoked the origins of the word. As Williams (1985, p. 87) noted, 
“Culture in all its early uses was a noun of process: the tending of something, basically 
crops or animals.” The agricultural sense of tending or growing something persists through 
to the present day in related words such as “cultivate”. 
The FAA (1996, p. 117), in its role as the regulator of civil aviation in the United 
States, provided a straightforward definition of culture as “the norms, attitudes, values, and 
practices that members of a nation, organization, profession, or other group of people 
share”. This definition highlights important social groups whose members share a common 





4.1.3 Material & Non-Material Culture 
A fundamental distinction may be made between material culture and non-material 
culture. Material culture refers to the physical things that humans create and use, such as 
clothing, houses, cars and aircraft. Non-material culture refers to things not embodied in 
physical objects, such as social roles, language, rules, norms and beliefs (Little, 2014). 
These two aspects interact with each other, for instance when a physical object symbolizes 
a cultural idea or when people have a belief in a physical object. Kendall (2007, p. 78) 
cited the example of travelling by plane: “we believe [i.e., non-material aspect] that it is 
possible to fly at 33,000 feet and to arrive at our destination even though we know that we 
could not do this without the airplane [i.e., material aspect] itself.” 
Williams (1985) contrasted two differing views of culture: on the one hand, as the 
production of materials, which is common in archaeology or cultural anthropology; and on 
the other hand, as the production of symbols, more commonly found in history or cultural 
studies. In aviation, it is important to recognise the value of both of these aspects. Material 
culture includes the uniforms of pilots and the aircraft they fly, while non-material culture 
includes the phraseology that pilots and ATC use to communicate. 
 
4.1.4 Dealing with Problems 
Another perspective regards culture as a defensive adaptation for dealing with the 
problems of life. In order to do this, Csikszentmihalyi (1990, p. 81) posited that cultures 
direct attention towards a limited set of goals and solutions: 
Cultures are defensive constructions against chaos, designed to 
reduce the impact of randomness on experience. They are adaptive 
responses, just as feathers are for birds and fur is for mammals. 
Cultures prescribe norms, evolve goals, build beliefs that help us 
tackle the challenges of existence. In so doing they must rule out 
many alternative goals and beliefs, and thereby limit possibilities; 
but this channeling of attention to a limited set of goals and means is 
what allows effortless action within self-created boundaries. 
Similarly, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, p. 6) described culture as “the 
way in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas”. Drawing on 
the work of anthropologists Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, they suggested that 
humans face certain universal problems. These problems arise from the relationships that 
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people have with other people, time, activities and nature. The central idea proposed by 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, p. 27) is that “all cultures are similar in the 
dilemmas they confront, yet different in the solutions they find”. Starting from categories 
of universal problems, they derived seven intercultural dimensions, which are discussed in 
Section 4.7. 
 
4.2 The Culture of Groups 
A key aspect of culture is that it is something shared by the members of a group. 
For Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, p. 3), “the essence of culture … is the 
shared ways groups of people understand and interpret the world.” In this section I review 
definitions of culture that relate to social groups. Then I discuss distinctive forms of culture 
that manifest themselves in different social groups, especially national, organizational and 
professional cultures. I also describe safety culture, which in recent decades has become 
increasingly important in high risk industries such as nuclear power generation and civil 
aviation. Finally, I consider processes by which cultures change over time. 
 
4.2.1 Definitions of Group Culture 
One view of culture holds that it forms an inextricable part of the identity of certain 
social groups. Merritt, for example, defined culture as “the values and practices that we 
share with others that help define us as a group, especially in relation to other groups” (as 
cited in Engle, 2000, p. 109). Likewise, after noting multiple ways in which the word 
“culture” has been defined, Scollon, Scollon and Jones (2012, p. 3) suggested that it is best 
thought of as “a way of dividing people up into groups according to some feature of these 
people which helps us to understand something about them and how they are different 
from or similar to other people.” 
Hofstede (1983, p. 76) labelled culture as “collective mental programming” and 
indicated that it operates at a range of social levels: “it is that part of our conditioning that 
we share with other members of our nation, region, or group but not with members of other 
nations, regions, or groups”. Echoing the aforementioned view of culture as a means of 
coping with problems, Usunier (1998, p. 16) defined it in terms of “pre-set and agreed 
upon solutions” that allow people to effectively communicate and coordinate their actions 
with other members of their group. Adler and Gundersen (2008) observed that culture is 
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transmitted from older to younger group members and is shared by all, or nearly all, 
members of a social group. 
There are two qualifications to these definitions of culture as it pertains to social 
groups. Firstly, Maznevski and Peterson (1997, p. 66) cautioned that “individual members 
of a culture do not always reflect the norms of the culture, either in values or behavior”. 
Section 4.6.2 discusses this in the context of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Secondly, 
Usunier (1998, p. 17) pointed out that individuals may belong to several social groups and 
switch between different operational cultures depending on the situation: 
Culture can be viewed as a set of beliefs or standards, shared by a 
group of people, which help the individual to decide what is, what 
can be, how one feels about it, what to do, and how to go about 
doing it.… Consequently, individuals may share different cultures 
with several different groups - a corporate culture with colleagues at 
work, an educational culture with other MBA graduates, an ethnic 
culture with people of the same ethnic origin. When in a particular 
situation, they will switch into the culture that is operational. 
In other words, an individual may be informed by multiple cultural influences, and the 
dominant influence may vary depending on the situation or context. 
 
4.2.2 National, Organizational & Professional Cultures 
Numerous social groups have been identified as possessing a distinctive culture. 
Hofstede’s research concentrated mainly on national culture. However, he also noted that a 
range of other social groups, or categories of people, may be distinguished by their culture, 
or their “collective programming of the mind”: 
The ‘category of people’ may be a nation, a region or an ethnic 
group, women or men (gender culture), old or young (age group and 
generation culture), a social class, a profession or occupation 
(occupational culture), a type of business, a work organization or 
part of it (organizational culture), or even a family. (Hofstede, 1994, 
p. 8) 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, p. 7) narrowed their focus to three 
important social levels on which culture is exhibited: 
• “the culture of a national or regional society”; 
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• “the way in which attitudes are expressed within a specific organisation”; 
• “the culture of particular functions within organisations” where people “tend to share 
certain professional and ethical orientations”. 
For aviation studies, a similar approach has been adopted. Initially, research on 
culture was largely concentrated on the national level, but subsequently the organizational 
and professional levels were also embraced. This approach was codified in a seminal study 
of the effects of culture in aviation and medicine by Helmreich and Merritt (1998). Culture 
was divided into the overlapping constructs of national, organizational and professional 
cultures, as illustrated in Figure 8. Such an approach has continued to inform research in 
aviation and other areas such as international business (Dahlstrom & Heemstra, 2009; 
Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect & Merritt, 2001; Sirmon & Lane, 2004). 
 
 














4.2.2.1 National Culture 
Helmreich and Merritt (1998, p. 103) stated that national cultures embody unique 
characteristics derived from multiple sources: “National culture is a product of heritage. 
Religion, history, language, climate, population density, availability of raw materials and 
resources, political movements and wealth all play a role in the development of unique 
national characteristics.” The idea that national cultures may be differentiated by unique 










economic, political and educational systems (Sirmon & Lane, 2004). A large amount of 
research has been carried out to identify dimensions along which national cultures may be 
differentiated, most notably by Hofstede (2001) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
(1997). Their studies and frameworks are discussed in Sections 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. 
One significant limitation of the construct of national culture is that it ignores 
variations between the regions or peoples making up a particular nation (Dahlstrom & 
Heemstra, 2009). The regions of a nation may, for instance, have significant differences in 
their religion, history, language or climate. Macdonald (1995) examined this issue, citing 
the examples of Japan and Australia. She argued that national culture, as a product of the 
nationalism which created modern nation states, prevents the expression of intra-national 
cultural diversity. 
 
4.2.2.2 Organizational Culture 
There are numerous definitions of organizational culture. One of the simplest 
describes it figuratively as “social or normative glue that holds an organization together” 
(Smircich, 1983, p. 344). This metaphor imparts the idea that organizational culture 
provides some kind of control over the behaviour and attitudes of an organization’s 
members (Sirmon & Lane, 2004). 
Another way of defining organizational culture is to think of it “as the shared 
assumptions, values, beliefs, language, symbols, and meanings systems in an organization” 
(S. J. Tracy, 2009, p. 713). Using a similar definition, Helmreich and Merritt (1998, pp. 
109-110) outlined two separate layers of organizational culture: 
• an outer layer consisting of “observable behaviors and recognizable physical 
manifestations such as members’ uniforms, symbols and logos, organizational 
routines and rituals, and printed documents”; 
• an inner layer made up of values, beliefs and assumptions “which underlie the surface 
structure and provide the logic which guides the members’ behaviors”. 
There may be considerable variation within the organizational culture of a single 
company. In terms of Helmreich and Merritt’s outer layer, an organization’s symbols and 
rituals are not necessarily shared by all of its members. In an airline, cabin crew and pilots 
wear different uniforms and are guided in their work by different operating procedures. 
Furthermore, distinct subcultures may exist within a large company. In an airline, these 
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subcultures may lead to differences in, for example, attitudes towards automation or CRM 
training in different airplane fleets (FAA, 1996). 
Adopting the problem-solving perspective, Schein (1985, p. 9) provided an 
alternative definition of organizational culture: 
…a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or 
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems. 
This definition encompasses the processes of formal training and informal learning that 
take place in organizations in order to sustain common assumptions and approaches to 
problems. 
Organizational culture is sometimes referred to as company culture or corporate 
culture (Strauch, 2010; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). Strictly speaking these 
alternative terms are more restrictive as they only apply to organizations whose purpose is 
to make a profit (Dahlstrom & Heemstra, 2009). 
 
4.2.2.3 Professional Culture 
Sirmon and Lane (2004, p. 311) observed that a professional culture “exists when a 
group of people who are employed in a functionally similar occupation share a set of 
norms, values and beliefs related to that occupation”. Professional culture, also referred to 
as occupational culture, transcends individual organizations. It develops through a process 
of socialization that occurs during occupational education, personnel selection, training 
and on-the-job experience. As a result, individuals learn professional culture (and also 
organizational culture) at a later age than national culture, which is acquired from birth 
(Hofstede, 1994). 
The boundaries between organizational and professional cultures are fuzzy. Sirmon 
and Lane (2004) distinguished the professional cultures that exist within certain functional 
areas of an organization (e.g., accounting, sales or marketing) from the organizational 
subcultures in the same company that link people with common backgrounds (e.g., ethnic, 
educational or regional). Guirdham (2005, p. 65) reasoned that occupational social groups 
“do not meet the full criteria for cultures”. She argued that occupational groups (as well as 
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other social categories such as gender or social class groups) should instead be considered 
subcultures because they typically conform to some norms and values of the dominant 
culture while deviating from others.24 
The construct of professional culture would appear to be more relevant to some 
occupations than others. A case study by Stewart highlighted considerable differences in 
the decision making styles of engineers and nontechnical managers (as cited in Kume, 
2009). Within aviation, Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996) investigated differences between 
the “two cultures” of pilots and flight attendants. They examined factors that impacted 
crew communication and flight safety, including differences in operational knowledge and 
attitudes to work. 
In the context of aviation and medicine, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) stated that 
the characteristics of a professional culture include a sense of belonging to a community 
and the passing on of norms and values by senior to junior members. They noted that, for 
both doctors and pilots, “professional membership can provide a much stronger bond than 
company loyalty or national identity” (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998, p. 30). 
 
4.2.2.4 Interplay of National, Organizational & Professional Cultures 
A member of an organization may also be a member of a profession, a country, a 
religion and various other social groups, all of which influence the individual’s behaviour 
and, by extension, the values and norms he or she introduces into the organization (Grote 
et al., 2004). It is difficult to distinguish between these influences and in some cases the 
constructs overlap. Hutchins et al. (2002, p. 36) noted that even in the analysis of routine 
radio exchanges between pilots and ATC “where the authors…are well versed in the 
national, organizational and professional cultures surrounding the activity, it is difficult to 
identify the boundaries of the different sorts of culture”. 
Within a single organization, the relative influence of the three constructs may vary 
markedly depending on individuals’ working contexts. Dahlstrom and Heemstra (2009) 
described the impact of culture on operations at a large multicultural airline. They stated 
that professional culture is much more important than organizational culture for pilots at 
 
24
 A subculture is defined as “a category of people who share distinguishing attributes, beliefs, 
values, and/or norms that set them apart in some significant manner from the dominant culture” 
(Kendall, 2007, p. 90). Guirdham (2005) noted that the alternative term co-culture is sometimes 
used to avoid connotations of superiority and inferiority. 
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the airline, in contrast to cabin crew and ground staff. Reasons for the relative importance 
of pilot professional culture include: the similarity of uniforms and procedures across the 
profession, international regulations and worldwide standards for pilot training, and the 
limited amount of contact with other members of the organization. The airline in question 
has approximately 100 nationalities amongst its flight crew but no dominant national 
group. Therefore, the influence of national culture is also diminished when compared with 
flag carriers such as British Airways (in the UK) or Avianca (in Colombia). 
 
4.2.3 Safety Culture 
The term safety culture was coined in a series of reports published after the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. The reports were published by the International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), an advisory group to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Report No. 75-INSAG-4 outlined roles that organizations and 
individuals should play in a safety culture, and also provided assessment guidelines. The 
report included the following definition: “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics 
and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” 
(INSAG,1991, p. 1) 
In the decades following the Chernobyl disaster, the safety culture concept has 
spread beyond nuclear power generation to other high-risk domains including aviation, 
mining, construction, hospital operating rooms, and offshore oil and gas extraction. 
Definitions of safety culture have proliferated (Cole, Stevens-Adams & Wenner, 2013; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Martinussen & Hunter, 2010; Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma 
& Gibbons, 2004). In a literature review listing 13 definitions, Wiegmann et al. (2004, p. 
123) derived a set of common features which included: 
• a concern with “formal safety issues in an organization”; 
• an emphasis on “the contribution from everyone at every level of an organization”; 
• a “willingness to develop and learn from errors, incidents, and accidents”; 
• a culture that “is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to change”. 
Either explicitly or implicitly, these definitions typically situate safety culture within 
organizational culture, as shown in Figure 9. 
Safety culture, as originally conceived by INSAG, was a prescriptive construct, 
which dictated how organizations and their members should operate in order to ensure 
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safety. By contrast, national, organizational and professional cultures are descriptive 
constructs. Tension between prescriptive and descriptive approaches may account for some 
of the differences in definitions of safety culture. The review conducted by Wiegmann et 
al. (2004) cited several prescriptive definitions, such as: “A safety culture exists within an 
organization in which each individual employee, regardless of their position, assumes an 
active role in error prevention, and that role is supported by the organization” (Eiff, 1999). 
In contrast, other definitions were descriptive: “Safety culture is defined as the attitudes, 
values, norms, and beliefs that a particular group of people share with respect to risk and 
safety” (Mearns, Flin, Gordon & Fleming, 1998). 
 
 














According to the ICAO Safety Management Manual, a safety culture should be an 
integral part of an organizational culture: “A safety culture cannot be effective unless it is 
embedded within an organization’s own culture” (ICAO, 2013b, p. 2-10). However, as 
Dahlstrom and Heemstra (2009) pointed out, there may be difficulties in implementation. 
Effective reporting of accidents and incidents requires openness. This can, however, 
conflict with an organization’s desire to limit the disclosure of sensitive information. 
Furthermore, tension may exist between the flexibility demanded by a safety culture, so 












adherence to procedures, which is a fundamental tenet of safety in high-risk industries such 
as civil aviation. 
The related concept of safety climate likewise has numerous definitions, and the 
distinction from safety culture is “an ongoing subject for debate” (Noort, Reader, Shorrock 
& Kirwan, 2016, p. 517). Safety culture is generally held to consist of “the deeper and 
historically derived aspects of safety within an organization”, which may be investigated 
using ethnographic techniques. On the other hand, safety climate refers to “surface features 
of safety culture”, typically assessed by surveys of employee attitudes and perceptions at a 
given time (Grote et al., 2004, p. 122). 
 
4.2.4 Changes in Cultures over Time 
Cultures change over time as new ideas or ways of doing things are introduced. 
One process of change is the discovery of something previously unknown. For instance, 
although its existence was postulated in 1807, aluminium was not isolated until 1825. This 
discovery was to later play an important role in the development of aviation, as foretold by 
J. W. Richards in the 1880s: “It has been well said that if the problem of aerial flight is 
ever to be solved, aluminium will be the chief agent in its solution” (as cited in Budd, 
1999, p. 6). Aluminium alloys began to be used for aircraft skins following the First World 
War. Due to its lightness and strength, aluminium later became an essential material in the 
manufacture of aircraft. 
A second process of cultural change is invention, when existing items of material or 
non-material culture are reconfigured into new forms. Drawing on their knowledge of 
bicycle technology and observations of bird flight, the Wright brothers made the first 
powered flight by a heavier-than-air aircraft in 1903.25 This invention has subsequently 
transformed the spheres of transportation, trade and warfare, with consequences that have 
touched every corner of the world. 
Cultures also change by diffusion, when items or practices are transmitted from one 
social group to another. Air transportation has facilitated cultural diffusion by allowing 
ever increasing numbers of people to travel. The effects are not always positive, as when 
 
25
 The primacy of the Wright brothers is contested. The foreword to the 100
th
 edition of “Jane’s All 
the World’s Aircraft” argued that Gustave Whitehead made controlled flights in Connecticut in 
1901. If true, these flights predated the Wright brothers by more than two years (Jackson, 2013). 
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air travel inadvertently helps spread infectious diseases such as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) or avian influenza (Pavia, 2007). At the time or writing, the risk posed 
by the Covid-19 pandemic has led to a huge reduction in air traffic. 
Empirical evidence exists to support the notion that changes occur over time in 
national, organizational and professional cultures. Regarding national culture, studies were 
conducted in the same countries at different times by Trompenaars. Commenting on these 
studies, Hodgetts, Luthans and Doh (2005, p. 113) highlighted a marked increase over time 
in scores for the individualism dimension for Thailand, “possibly indicating an increasing 
entrepreneurial spirit/cultural value”. 
Vaughan (1996) carried out a comprehensive analysis of the organizational culture 
of NASA in the years leading up to the Challenger space shuttle disaster. She documented 
changes over time in the organizational culture that enabled the deviant performance of a 
critical component to be normalized, a process she labelled normalization of deviance. 
Concerning professional culture, Hutchins et al. (2002) conducted ethnographic 
studies of the effects of culture on airline flight decks. The authors observed that iconic 
accidents led to changes in pilot professional culture. Changes came about through the 
mechanism of pilots retelling stories of the accidents and the lessons to be learned. The 
accidents and lessons taught were as follows: 
• crashes of early Airbus A320 aircraft that led to “a deep-seated mistrust of 
automation”; 
• the accidents involving Aloha Airlines Flight 243 (in 1988) and United Airlines Flight 
232 (in 1989) which “highlight the value of pilot decision making and CRM”; 
• the 1996 ValuJet Flight 592 and 1998 Swissair Flight 111 disasters which “drive 
home the lesson that one must land ASAP when there is a fire in flight” (Hutchins et 
al., 2002, p. 22). 
 
4.3 Hall’s Intercultural Communication 
During a career that spanned most of the twentieth century, anthropologist Edward 
T. Hall identified numerous ways in which culture informs human behaviour. Collier 
(2009, p. 280) observed that Hall’s work was “noteworthy because he brought attention to 
face-to-face interaction between members of different cultural groups and also introduced 
the importance of nonverbal forms of communication”. Hall focused on intercultural 
communication, when members of different cultural groups are interacting with each other. 
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By contrast, previous anthropological research had either investigated one cultural group at 
a time, or made cross-cultural comparisons of communication patterns in one cultural 
group with those in another group. In this section I discuss three of the intercultural 
communication concepts that Hall identified, some of the criticisms levelled at his work, 
and implications of his research for airline operations and training. 
 
4.3.1 Hall’s Hidden Culture 
Hall (1990, p. 32) investigated “what people do and the hidden rules that govern 
people”. He suggested that people remain largely unaware of this hidden culture because it 
operates below the level of consciousness. Hall’s cultural framework is complex, but may 
be distilled down to four basic components relating to communication style, relationship 
context, time context and space context (Adair, Buchan & Chen, 2009). The following 
paragraphs describe three sets of concepts identified by Hall that are relevant to cockpit 
interactions and pilot-ATC communication: high-context and low-context, monochronic 
and polychronic time, and action chains. 
 
4.3.1.1 High-Context & Low-Context 
Hall (1976) contrasted high-context cultures with low-context cultures. People in 
high-context cultures have deep relationships and share information using messages that 
are superficially simple but actually rich in meaning. People in low-context cultures are not 
bonded tightly and make less distinction between insiders and outsiders. The United States 
is an example of a low-context culture, while Colombia is a high-context culture.26 
Hall cautioned that interactions between individuals from high- and low-context 
cultures could present problems. Difficulties may arise due to differences in expectations 
or the norms for acceptable ambiguity: 
People raised in high-context systems expect more of others than do 
the participants in low-context systems. When talking about 
something that they have on their minds, a high-context individual 
will expect his interlocutor to know what’s bothering him, so that he 
doesn’t have to be specific. The result is that he will talk around and 
 
26
 Hall did not discuss Colombia, but other authors have cited it as an example of a high-context 
culture (Costalas, 2009; Gudykunst et al., 1988). 
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around the point, in effect putting all the pieces in place except the 
crucial one. Placing it properly – this keystone – is the role of his 
interlocutor. (Hall 1976, p. 113) 
Applying these concepts to communications, Hall stated that high-context systems 
are fast and efficient because pre-programmed information is contained in receivers and 
settings, with minimal information in messages. Low-context communications, by contrast, 
encode most of the information in messages, with very little in the internal or external 
contexts. The standard phraseology used by pilots and controllers in aviation is an example 
of a high-context communication system (Hall, 1976). It is essentially just a collection of 
pre-fabricated phrases used for typical flight situations. Considerable time must be spent 
training operators to use the system, but the payoff is that information can be exchanged 
quickly and efficiently. It is possible that individuals with a predisposition for low-context 
communications will require more training to master this kind of system than those already 
familiar with high-context communications. 
The constructs of high-context and low-context cultures are problematic. With 
specific reference to French and Japanese people, Hall (1976) stated that an individual may 
exhibit both high-context and low-context aspects depending on the situation (Hall, 1976). 
Scollon et al. (2012) resolved this dilemma by proposing that the constructs of high- and 
low-context be applied to particular speech events or situations, but not used to describe 
entire national groups. 
 
4.3.1.2 Monochronic & Polychronic Time 
A second cultural scale described by Hall (1983) differentiates between mono-
chronic people, who like to do one thing at a time, and polychronic people, who prefer 
doing several different activities at once. Interactions between the categories may again 
lead to problems, with polychronic behaviour liable to disorientate monochronic people. 
This has implications for flight crew composition. For example, a monochronic American 
captain and a polychronic Latin American first officer may adopt different approaches to 
the same task. In the context of international business interactions, Hall (1969) suggested 
that judicious office design could ameliorate such problems. In aviation this is currently 
not a viable option on the confined flight decks of passenger aircraft. 
Hisam and Hampton (1996) noted that monochronic people are vulnerable to 
interruptions. In airline operations it is commonplace for disturbances, such as unexpected 
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calls from ATC, to put task completion at risk. Loukopoulos, Dismukes and Barshi (2009) 
studied dozens of incidents in which American flight crews experienced disturbances. 
They stressed the importance of CRM training in techniques for managing workload 
effectively. As part of this training, techniques for dealing with interruptions would seem 
to be especially important for monochronic personnel. There does not appear to have been 
any aviation-related research conducted on the effects of interruptions on monochronic 
versus polychronic people. However, instruments for measuring polychronicity have been 
applied to other organizational contexts (Bluedorn, 2002). 
 
4.3.1.3 Action Chains 
An action chain is a sequence of actions that two or more individuals carry out in 
order to complete a task. Action chains play a vital role in the work of airline pilots. One 
example is found in the formulaic exchanges that characterize RT communication between 
pilots and ATC. Another example is in the standard operating procedures (SOPs) which 
describe tasks that pilots have to complete in each phase of flight. Hall (1976) noted that 
monochronic people tend to focus on completing tasks, whereas polychronic people place 
more emphasis on maintaining good human relations. 
Misunderstandings may occur when monochronic and polychronic people work 
together on the same action chain. An illustration of such a misunderstanding is provided 
by the transcripts of the Avianca Flight 052 accident. Shortly before the crash, one of the 
Colombian flight crew commented that an American air traffic controller was angry. In his 
analysis of the accident, Helmreich (1994) interpreted this comment as indicating a failure 
of the flight crew to focus on the task of safely landing the plane. However, a polychronic 
interpretation suggests the crew member was not neglecting the task of landing, but was 
instead expressing concern about the human relations involved in the situation. 
 
4.3.2 Criticism of Hall’s Concepts 
As mentioned previously, Scollon et al. (2012, p. 40) were “reluctant to label 
cultures or discourse systems as high context or low context”. They pointed out that the 
degree to which individuals rely on context for meaning varies depending on the situation. 
They proposed that these constructs should not be applied to cultures, but should instead be 
used to analyse “high context and low context situations”. 
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Hutchins et al. (2002, p. 26) were more outspoken in their criticism of Hall’s work. 
They stated that much of it was “based on rather dated and over-simplified models of the 
role of cultural and linguistic knowledge in thought”. Additionally, they warned against 
regarding culture as a set of traits exhibited by all members of a group, and they stressed 
the importance of cultural variability within social groups. This charge, while important, 
may be equally directed at many other studies of national culture. 
Nakata (2009) commended Hall’s concept of high- and low-context for being more 
nuanced than Hofstede’s dimensions. She also suggested one reason for Hall’s concepts 
not being applied more widely was the lack of quantitative instruments. The standardized 
scores and survey tools produced by Hofstede lend themselves to quantitative research 
studies in a manner not yet possible for Hall’s concepts. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, researchers in aviation, organizational studies 
and intercultural communication continue to make use of Hall’s concepts (Dahlstrom & 
Heemstra, 2009; Hisam & Hampton, 1996; Scollon et al., 2012). 
 
4.3.3 Implications for Aviation 
Dahlstrom and Heemstra (2009, p. 83) reported on the training of pilots at a large 
multicultural airline. They emphasised the value of facilitated discussions about cultural 
factors in providing newly recruited pilots “with an awareness of this new environment and 
advise [sic] on how to navigate it safely”. For this purpose, they noted that Hall’s concepts 
(e.g., high- and low-context, monochronic and polychronic time) may be used as an 
alternative to Hofstede’s dimensions. 
In a paper about airline training, Hisam and Hampton (1996) commented that the 
concepts of high- and low-context had implications for several aspects of flight operations 
including briefings, conflict resolution, communications and teamwork. They added that, 
although existing CRM training was appropriate for communication in the United States, it 
might not be appropriate for other cultures as it did not “take into account the additional 
variables created by high-context communications” (Hisam & Hampton, 1996, p. 11). 
 
4.4 Ethnography of Communication (EOC) 
Ethnography of communication (EOC) is a field of study linking linguistics and 
anthropology that was established by linguistic anthropologist Dell Hymes. It was initially 
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called ethnography of speaking, but Hymes (1972b) broadened the scope to include 
nonvocal communication (e.g., whistling) and nonverbal communication (e.g., silence and 
gestures). EOC is a framework for analysing naturally occurring speech and interaction in 
the context in which it emerges. A key principle is that culture and communication are 
inseparable.27 When the members of a community communicate, they express cultural 
elements specific to their community. At the same time, they also create value systems that 
organize the community through their communication (Covarrubias Baillet, 2009a). 
Drawing on EOC and also on Basil Bernstein’s concept of communication codes, 
Gerry Philipsen developed speech codes theory (SCT). SCT is a framework for analysing 
communication that allows the analyst to uncover the precepts or rules within a given 
community that help people to live their lives and interact with others (Covarrubias Baillet, 
2009b). Central to this framework is the concept of a speech code, defined by Philipsen 
(2002, p. 56) as “a historically enacted, socially constructed system of terms, meanings, 
premises and rules pertaining to communicative conduct”. 
 
4.4.1 Key Concepts in EOC 
The following paragraphs describe fundamental concepts in EOC which are 
relevant to the analysis of interactions within the cockpit and pilot-ATC communications: 
speech acts, speech events and speech situations; the SPEAKING framework; personal 
address and silence; communicative competence; speech community and community of 
practice; and code switching. 
 
4.4.1.1 Speech Acts, Speech Events & Speech Situations 
Three basic social units that are used for the study of communication practices are 
the speech act, speech event and speech situation. A speech act is the minimal unit for 
analysing conversational interaction, for example, a greeting, request or command; a 
speech event is made up of a number of speech acts; and a speech situation is the general 
context of the communication (Hymes, 2001). Thus each request or command spoken by a 
pilot or air traffic controller is a speech act; an exchange between a controller and a pilot is 
 
27
 Hall (1990, p. 186) expressed a similar sentiment when he wrote that “culture is communication 
and communication is culture”. 
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a speech event; and an air traffic controller communicating with a series of aircraft is a 
speech situation. 
Hymes (2001, p. 53) observed that the process of interpreting a speech act goes 
beyond mere syntactic analysis: “much of the knowledge that speakers share about the 
status of utterances as [speech] acts is immediate and abstract, and having to do with 
features of interaction and context as well as of grammar”. In other words, the meaning of 
a speech act is conveyed by a combination of factors. These include paralinguistic features 
such as intonation, as well as the position of the speech act in an exchange and the social 
relationship of the interlocutors. 
 
4.4.1.2 SPEAKING Framework 
Hymes developed an etic (i.e., universal, not culture-specific) framework to guide 
the analysis of communicative patterns in a culture. The framework has eight components 
denoted by the mnemonic term SPEAKING: 
• S – the setting; 
• P – the participants; 
• E – the end purpose of an event; 
• A – the acts that make up an event; 
• K – the key, or tone, in which communication is enacted; 
• I – the instrumentalities, or channels of communication; 
• N – the norms of interaction and interpretation; 
• G – the genre. 
Duranti and Goodwin (1992) observed that, compared with speech act theory, this 
framework allows a fuller analysis of the context of communication. It explicitly deals 
with the setting (both spatial and temporal) and the various roles that participants may 
adopt (i.e., addressor, speaker, addressee or hearer/audience). As noted by Coulthard 
(1985), it is not uncommon for participants to make frequent and rapid role changes. In 
pilot-ATC radiotelephony, a typical speech situation involves a controller (in the role of 
speaker) transmitting a message to a particular flight crew (addressee) while other crews 
(audience) listen on the same radio frequency. Then the flight crew (as a speaker) responds 
to the message while the controller (addressee) and other crews (audience) listen. And so 
the communication continues with other aircraft. Additionally, a controller may sometimes 
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change role from speaker to addressor in the middle of a transmission in order to read out a 
pre-scripted message such as a weather warning. 
 
4.4.1.3 Personal Address & Silence 
Other important concepts in EOC include personal address and silence, both of 
which are subject to rules that vary depending on culture and context. Personal address 
denotes the expressions used by speakers to refer to self and other. These include first 
names versus family names, nicknames, honorifics and occupational titles such as 
“Captain”. Silence, or the absence of speech, is particularly relevant to the sterile cockpit 
rule in commercial aviation. As mentioned in Section 2.3, this rule prohibits crews from 
engaging in non-essential speech when flying below 10,000 feet. Hisam and Hampton 
(1996) suggested that there may be differing interpretations of the sterile cockpit rule in 
different cultures. 
 
4.4.1.4 Communicative Competence 
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, Hymes proposed the concept of communicative 
competence as a response to Chomsky’s notion of linguistic competence (which is similar 
to Saussure’s concept of langue). Native speaker-listeners acquire not only grammatical 
knowledge of a language but also learn how to use the language appropriately in their 
society so that “a child becomes able to accomplish a repertoire of speech acts, to take part 
in speech events, and to evaluate their accomplishment by others” (Hymes 1972a, p. 277). 
Likewise, non-native speakers must gain communicative competence in a foreign 
language, in order to be able to use the language effectively and appropriately. 
 
4.4.1.5 Speech Community & Community of Practice 
A fundamental notion within EOC is the speech community, defined by Coulthard 
(1985, p. 35) as “any group which shares both linguistic resources and rules for interaction 
and interpretation”. While noting the usefulness of this concept, Coulthard stressed that it 
is an idealized notion due to the inherent difficulty in separating speakers into categories. 
Montgomery (1986) listed some attributes that members of a speech community share: a 
common language, ways of using language, reactions and attitudes to language, and social 
bonds. Montgomery noted that it is difficult to find actual communities meeting all these 
conditions. He suggested considering a speech community as including “not only the 
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notion of verbal practices held in common, but also of tension and conflict between them” 
(Montgomery, 1986, p. 135). 
Another concept that has been widely used in recent years is that of a community of 
practice, referring to “a set of people who share a purpose and pursue that purpose jointly 
in shared practices” (K. Tracy, 2009, p. 145). In the context of airline operations, Clark 
(2007, p. 8) identified the communities of practice of pilots and flight attendants as sets of 
people who work in close proximity but have “different discursive practices and speaking 
styles”. Each of these communities can in turn be broken down into smaller communities 
of practice based on nationality, ethnic or regional culture, airline, and so on. Contrasting 
the community of practice paradigm with that of speech community, Clark (2007, p. 7) 
observed that social identity in a community of practice is not fixed “but is fluid, and 
constructed through shared practices, including discourse practices”. 
 
4.4.1.6 Code Switching 
The members of a speech community or a community of practice may use multiple 
linguistic codes (i.e., languages, dialects, registers or styles) for communication. Code 
switching takes place when speakers alternate between different linguistic codes during a 
single interaction. This often occurs when members of different language communities 
interact. For example, an American pilot who contacts ATC in Colombia may use English 
interspersed with a few Spanish words such as “gracias” or “buenos noches”. Another 
form of code switching takes place within a single speech community when the members 
switch between the different codes they share, such as dialects and registers. For example, 
a pilot may use standard phraseology in a transmission to ATC, then switch to plain 
English for intra-cockpit dialogue with other crew members. 
Some researchers differentiate language shifting, or the switching between different 
languages, from style shifting, or the monolingual switching between different linguistic 
registers and dialects (Bullock & Toribio, 2009). There is further discussion of code 
switching in Section 2.7. 
 
4.4.2 Limitations of Ethnography 
The ethnographic method can provide insights into culture not captured by other 
research methods. It does this through a variety of data collection methods including 
participant observation, field notes, interviews and surveys. However, as Strauch (2010, p. 
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259) pointed out, this kind of study “is resource intensive, requires considerable expertise, 
and may be subject to observer variability”. In aviation the resource requirements include 
the need to gain access to flight decks, which for security reasons has been very difficult 
since the terrorist attacks of 2001. In addition, expertise is required in a variety of fields 
including piloting, human factors, anthropology, language and culture (Hutchins et al., 
2002; Hutchins et al., 2006). 
 
4.4.3 Applications to Aviation 
Widespread use has been made of the technique of observing pilots at work during 
routine flights. However, this is rarely done within an ethnographic framework. Different 
flight crews participate in each observation, which typically lasts a few hours, and the aim 
is usually to collect quantitative data describing the performance of pilots. Sometimes 
flight deck observations are used to complement other data collection methods, such as 
large-scale surveys (see, for example, Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). In other cases, such as 
the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) programme, flight deck observations are the 
only data collection method used. LOSA involves observers recording how pilots deal with 
threats and errors during actual flights. The LOSA programme is linked with CRM training 
and draws on the TEM safety taxonomy developed by Robert Helmreich’s human factors 
team at the University of Texas (ICAO, 2002). 
One reason for ethnography not being widely used in aviation is that considerable 
resources are required, as mentioned above. Another reason is that aviation research has 
traditionally been dominated by quantitative methods, especially in the United States. In 
one notable study that utilised the ethnographic approach, Hutchins et al. (2006) examined 
the impact of culture on cockpit interaction at airlines in the Asia-Pacific region. Their 
study included observations of cockpit operations and simulator training as well as airline 
staff interviews. It identified specific differences in cockpit practice between airlines in 
different countries, illustrating a point made by Strauch (2010) that the ethnographic 
method can provide insights into culture not captured by other research methods. Section 
4.9.5 has more information about this study. 
Clark (2007) used ethnographic methods to investigate attitudes towards pilot-cabin 
crew communication in a study of flight attendant identity construction. Data collection 
included a survey, industry forum postings, and participant observation at an American 
airline. Clark used communication accommodation theory (CAT) to explain interactions 
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between pilot and flight attendant communities of practice. She noted that some cabin crew 
accept the chain of command hierarchy that places them below pilots, but others exhibit 
non-accommodation by calling pilots “motorcoach drivers”. Referring to the studies of 
Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996), she emphasised differences between the professional 
cultures of pilots and cabin crew: “The two groups have different histories, work rules, and 
unions; they are grouped in different departments in most airlines, and have different 
training programmes” (Clark, 2007, p. 24). The differences are compounded by a gender 
divide in many airlines, with pilots generally being male and flight attendants female. 
 
4.5 Interdiscourse Communication 
Interdiscourse communication is an approach to intercultural communication that 
was developed by the linguists Ron Scollon, Suzanne Wong Scollon and Rodney Jones, 
drawing heavily on Hymes’s EOC. Two key concepts of interdiscourse communication are 
that people participate in discourse systems, and language is inherently ambiguous. The 
grammar of context framework was developed to facilitate the analysis of interdiscourse 
communication. 
 
4.5.1 Key Concepts in Interdiscourse Communication 
4.5.1.1 Discourse Systems 
While acknowledging that the word discourse has numerous meanings, Scollon et 
al. (2012, p. 8) chose to define it in general terms as “the broad range of everything which 
can be said or talked about or symbolized within a particular, recognizable domain”. Based 
on this definition, they explained the concept of a discourse system in terms of groups of 
people using different discourses: “Any group that has particular ways of thinking, treating 
other people, communicating and learning can be said to be participating in a particular 
discourse system.” Such groups can be extremely large, as with the discourse system of 
international capitalism, or quite small, in the case of a family. Scollon et al. (2012, p. 9) 
contrasted this concept of a discourse system with that of a discourse community or a 
community of practice by emphasising that the former refers to “broader systems of 
communication in which members of communities participate”. More emphasis is placed 




A key assumption is that individuals may simultaneously participate in multiple 
discourse systems related to their nationality, region, ethnicity, gender, age, social class, 
profession, organization, and so on. As a result, social interaction between participants in 
different discourse systems, which is termed interdiscourse communication by Scollon et 
al. (2012), is a fundamental part of almost all communication. This allows for a more 
flexible and nuanced approach to intercultural communication than was taken in previous 
studies that, for example, focused solely on the effects of national culture. The discourse 
system approach may be applied to the analysis of communication patterns in small 
groups. In a discourse analysis study of small-group decision-making meetings, Aritz and 
Walker (2010, p. 25) noted that differences in discourse systems can “affect group 
performance and lead to different levels of leadership, team identity, relational conflict, 
and satisfaction among members of multinational teams”. 
 
4.5.1.2 The Ambiguity of Language 
A further important assumption underlying this framework is that language is 
inherently ambiguous in that speakers and writers are never able to completely control how 
their words will be interpreted by listeners and readers. In other words, “meaning in 
language is jointly constructed by the participants in communication” (Scollon et al., 2012, 
p. 11). Ambiguity may exist at word-level, sentence-level or discourse-level. Participants 
in the same discourse system communicate on the basis of shared assumptions and 
knowledge. This allows them to deal with ambiguity by making inferences about what 
their interlocutors mean. In cases of interdiscourse communication, however, it may not be 
possible for participants to use inferences to cope with ambiguity because they do not have 
shared histories, backgrounds or experiences. Scollon et al. (2012, p. 16) summed up this 
line of reasoning as follows: “Two people from the same village and the same family are 
likely to make fewer mistakes in drawing inferences about what the other means than two 
people from different cities on different sides of the earth.” 
International civil aviation has developed into a global business with hundreds of 
thousands of operators from a large number of different countries and cultures. As a result, 
it is commonplace for pilots and air traffic controllers to be communicating with people 
who do not share the same assumptions and knowledge. This underscores the importance 




4.5.2 Grammar of Context 
As a tool to facilitate the analysis of interdiscourse communication, Scollon et al. 
(2012) proposed the grammar of context framework shown in Table 5. This framework is 
intended to provide a “common vocabulary” capable of embracing multiple aspects of 
context or culture. It was adapted from the EOC framework developed by Hymes. 
 
 
Table 5: A grammar of context (Scollon et al., 2012, pp. 30-31). 
 
SEVEN MAIN COMPONENTS FOR A GRAMMAR OF CONTEXT 
1. Scene (a) setting (time, place, location, use of space), (b) purpose 
(function), (c) topic, (d) genre 
2. Key tone or mood 
3. Participants (a) who they are, (b) roles they take 
4. Message form (a) speaking, (b) writing, (c) silence, (d) other media (video, digital 
images, etc) 
5. Sequence (a) set agenda, (b) open agenda 
6. Co-occurrence patterns (a) marked, (b) unmarked 
7. Manifestation (a) tacit, (b) explicit 
 
 
In their commentary on the grammar of context, Scollon et al. (2012) discussed 
concepts that may be incorporated from other strands of intercultural research. Within the 
“scene” component, for instance, the “setting” of an interaction includes the aspect of how 
participants view time, and may therefore be informed by the concepts of chronos and 
kairos time, drawing on the work of Hall (1990). Similarly, the different ways in which 
participants make use of space may draw on Hall’s (1969) work on proxemics. In addition, 
Hall’s (1969, 1990) concepts of monochronic versus polychronic time may inform the 
“purpose”, “topic” and “genre” of the scene insofar as some participants prefer to work on 
one thing at a time while others prefer to engage in multiple activities. Significantly, 
Scollon et al. (2012) stressed that these concepts should not be considered characteristics 
of an entire group of people from a particular culture, but rather as characteristics of the 
particular events or situations in which people participate. 
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Other concepts discussed by Scollon et al. (2012) include face systems, kinship, 
and ingroups and outgroups. All of these may inform the identities, roles and relationships 
of participants. In this framework it is understood that the importance of the components 
shown in Table 5 varies depending on the speech situation. Different components are 
salient in different speech situations. For example, participant roles and the use of space 
may be more important in a courtroom than at a cocktail party. 
 
4.5.3 Applications to Business Communication 
The grammar of context framework does not appear to have been previously 
applied to aviation communications, but Pan, Scollon & Scollon (2002) described how it 
has been used to analyse professional communication in four typical business contexts. 
One study focused on business telephone calls and analysed three calls made by a Hong 
Kong IBM representative. The researchers concluded that the structure of the calls was 
influenced by many factors including: telephone technology, the nature of the situation, the 
relationship between the caller and his clients, and the monetary significance of the 
business they were discussing. 
The telephone calls in this study were mainly in Cantonese but featured code 
mixing with English expressions. Pan et al. (2002, p. 47) related how focus group 
discussions were conducted with participants from Beijing who reacted strongly to the 
code switching. These participants thought that switching between Cantonese and English 
was acceptable for calls between Hong Kong people (i.e., an ingroup relationship), but not 
for calls involving mainland Chinese as it was annoying and might “create distance in 
interpersonal relationships” (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup). The researchers noted that 
practices acceptable in one context may create problems in another. 
In their analysis of the phone calls, Pan et al. (2002, p. 49) mentioned politeness 
markers such as “please” and “thank you”. They observed that in Chinese these markers 
would be replaced by “prosodic factors such as tone of voice, intonation, or rate of speech, 
with appropriate pauses and other discursive features”. Another point of difference was 
self-identification. The authors noted two completely different situations in which Chinese 
people do not identify themselves on the telephone: firstly, when the callers are intimates; 
and secondly, when there is a low trust situation. That the same signal may be sent in two 




4.5.4 Implications for Pilot-ATC Communication 
There are parallels between the analysis of business telephone calls and pilot-ATC 
radiotelephony. Firstly, the participants in both contexts are in different locations using 
two-way mediated communication. However, multiple speakers are sharing the same radio 
frequency in the case of pilot-ATC communication. Each participant may send a message 
(in the role of a speaker), which can be heard not only by the intended recipient (addressee) 
but also by other participants (audience). 
The message form in both cases is speaking through an electrical channel that only 
permits oral communication: telephone for the business calls and VHF radio for aviation. 
The absence of a visual channel means that gesture, posture and gaze information is not 
available. Since participants cannot see each other, there is a need for self-identification. 
For pilot-ATC radiotelephony this is realised through the use of designators identifying 
ATC facilities (e.g., “New York Approach” and “Kennedy Tower”) and call signs for 
individual aircraft (e.g., “Avianca zero five two”). 
One significant difference between business calls and pilot-ATC radiotelephony 
relates to participant relationships. When an airliner enters a new sector of airspace, a pilot 
contacts the air traffic controller. It is likely that the pilot and controller have never spoken 
before, or at least they are unaware of having done so. This limits the amount of shared 
information available to them and further emphasises the importance of standardized 
procedures. 
A second difference is that in pilot-ATC communication the sequence of speech 
acts is prescribed, as noted in the discussion of standard phraseology in Section 2.4.1. 
Furthermore, one radio frequency is often shared by many aircraft so there is pressure to 
keep messages short to avoid frequency congestion. As a result, pilot-ATC exchanges 
typically consist of only two or three turns. The time pressure in commercial aviation is 
echoed in the oft-repeated mantra that the goals of pilot-ATC radiotelephony are “clarity, 
conciseness and correctness” (e.g., ICAO, 2010, p. 5-5). 
A further idiosyncrasy of radiotelephony communication is that only one speaker 
can transmit at a time. In the event of simultaneous transmissions, part or all of a message 
is liable to be blocked. However, the sender of the message may not be aware that blocking 
has occurred. 
Table 6 uses the grammar of context framework to summarise key features of 
radiotelephony communication between airline flight crews and air traffic controllers. In 
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Chapter 7, this framework is applied to the analysis of pilot and controller language use in 
the crash of Avianca Flight 052. The analysis also makes use of components not included 
in Table 6, such as co-occurrence patterns that are marked. An example is a controller 
using an idiomatic expression instead of standard phraseology to request information about 
aircraft status. The framework may be applied to other aviation contexts, if appropriate 
adjustments are made to the components. For instance, in the case of a private pilot flying 
a light aircraft, there would be a single pilot participant rather than the captain and first 
officer shown in the table. Alternatively, a modern airline flight using datalink technology 
would include communications with a written message form. 
 
 
Table 6: Grammar of context description of pilot-ATC radiotelephony. 
 
COMPONENTS OF AIRLINE PILOT-ATC RADIOTELEPHONY 
1. Scene (setting) • Pilots: seated in the cockpit of an aircraft moving through the air or 
taxiing/stationary on the ground 
• Controllers: stationary in ATC facilities on the ground 
3. Participants • One pilot (captain or first officer) communicates with a series of 
controllers while the other pilot controls the aircraft 
• Controllers are responsible for a sector of airspace and communicate 
with a series of aircraft flying through the sector 
4. Message form • Speaking through an electrical channel 
5. Sequence • Message sequence and format are prescribed by standard phraseology 




4.6 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
Social psychologist Geert Hofstede investigated differences in national culture in a 
research programme starting in the 1960s. He applied factor analysis to data aggregated 
from surveys of 88,000 workers in more than 70 countries. Four cultural dimensions were 
identified and numerical values calculated for all countries on each dimension (Hofstede, 
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1983). The dimensions were: power distance, individualism versus collectivism, 
masculinity versus femininity, and uncertainty avoidance. Later studies identified two 
more dimensions: long-term orientation versus short-term normative orientation, and 
indulgence versus restraint (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). Hofstede’s research has 
concentrated on national cultural differences, although there was a study of organizational 
culture in Denmark and the Netherlands (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv & Sanders, 1990). 
 
4.6.1 Hofstede’s Dimensions 
Hofstede’s cultural framework has been very influential in many fields. Nakata 
(2009) listed four reasons for its success: 
• the statistical analysis of a huge amount of survey data from a wide range of countries 
provided unprecedented insights into national culture; 
• the cultural dimensions allow all national cultures to be described, not just some, 
which makes the framework suitable for a variety of research purposes; 
• the framework has theoretical grounding in the work of anthropologists Florence 
Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck as well as sociologist Talcott Parsons; 
• the survey instruments generate standardized cultural scores, making them ideal for 
quantitative research in a way not possible for some other cultural frameworks. 
Within aviation, Hofstede’s tools and methodology were championed by the human factors 
team at the University of Texas and incorporated into airline CRM training. The following 
paragraphs discuss three of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions that are especially relevant to 
commercial flight operations: power distance, individualism-collectivism, and uncertainty 
avoidance. 
 
4.6.1.1 Power Distance 
The dimension of power distance reflects the degree to which people in a society 
accept unequal power relationships. Subordinates in high power-distance cultures tend to 
accept autocratic power relations. By contrast, subordinates in low power-distance cultures 
tend to be more comfortable challenging the decision-making of those in power. Adler and 
Gundersen (2008, p. 55) suggested that employees in a low power-distance country may be 
afforded leeway “to bypass their bosses frequently in order to get their work done” but in a 
high power-distance country such behaviour is considered insubordination. Gudykunst et 
al. (1988, p. 47) commented that in a high power-distance society “superiors consider their 
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subordinates to be different from themselves and vice versa”. According to Hofstede’s 
data, as shown in Figure 10, Colombia (with a score of 67) has a higher power distance 
than the United States (40). 
 
 


















The individualism-collectivism dimension is a measure of the degree to which 
people in a society act as individuals rather than as members of cohesive groups. Adler and 
Gundersen (2008, p. 51) suggested that individualism is characterized by people who 
“focus primarily on taking care of themselves and their immediate families”. Collectivism, 
by contrast, features “tight social networks” in which people “expect members of their 
particular in-groups to look after them, protect them, and give them security in exchange 
for their loyalty to the group”. Hofstede’s data showed a striking difference between the 
scores of the United States (91), ranked as one of the most individualistic countries in the 





















































Gudykunst et al. (1988, p. 44) posited that Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism 
dimension is isomorphic with Hall’s concepts of low- and high-context. They inferred that 
“low- and high-context communication are the predominant forms of communication in 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures, respectively”. 
 
4.6.1.3 Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance denotes the extent to which the members of a society feel 
threatened by uncertainty or ambiguity. In countries with a high uncertainty-avoidance 
score, people are less tolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity, and there is a corresponding 
need for formal rules as well as a rejection of deviant ideas and behaviour (Adler & 
Gundersen, 2008; Gudykunst et al., 1988). According to Hofstede, Colombia (80) has a 
significantly higher score for uncertainty-avoidance than the United States (46). 
 
4.6.1.4 Hofstede’s Country Clusters 
Hofstede did some preliminary work on plotting the positions of countries on 
graphs combining pairs of cultural dimensions. For example, when power distance was 
plotted against individualism-collectivism, Hofstede (1983) derived five country clusters 
and one outlier. In this analysis, Colombia was in a large group of countries (including 
Peru, Salvador, Singapore and Indonesia) characterized by high power distance and low 
individualism. On the other hand, the United States was grouped with countries featuring 
low power distance and high individualism (e.g., Great Britain and Australia). This basic 
analysis of country clusters was later developed by other researchers such as Ronen and 
Shenkar, and also in the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) research project (Hodgetts et al., 2005). 
 
4.6.2 Criticism of Hofstede’s Model 
The limitations of Hofstede’s research have been widely documented outside of 
aviation. McSweeney (2002) challenged several of the underlying assumptions, such as 
using limited sets of survey respondents to represent national populations, and identifying 
cultural dimensions through the analysis of questionnaire responses. Analysing the 
political subtext of Hofstede’s methodology, Ailon (2008) cautioned against an uncritical 
application of the dimensions to other cultures. Writing from a postcolonialist perspective, 
Fougere and Moulettes (2007, p. 2) argued that the discursive world constructed by 
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Hofstede is “characterized by a division between a ‘developed and modern’ side (mostly 
‘Anglo-Germanic’ countries) and a ‘traditional and backward’ side (the rest)”. 
In a study of multicultural work teams, Aritz and Walker (2010) raised further 
questions about Hofstede’s approach: whether his data may be reliably applied to countries 
not covered by the initial surveys (such as China); whether the data are applicable to other 
workforces or national populations, given that the participants were sales managers and 
engineers; and what insights the dimensions offer into everyday intercultural interactions, 
such as team decision-making. 
Guirdham (2005) reported two main criticisms of Hofstede’s framework: it is static 
and it omits important values. She cited a comment by Tayeb as typical: “A country’s 
culture is too vibrant and complex an entity to be simplified and described only in terms of 
these dimensions” (Guirdham, 2005, p. 59). Similarly, Nakata (2009) and Brannen (2009) 
pointed out that static representations of culture, such as Hofstede’s value-based model, are 
not appropriate for describing a globalized world that is characterized by “the increasingly 
fluid nature of culture” (Nakata, 2009, p. 4). 
Within aviation, Hofstede’s model was criticized by Hutchins et al. (2002) on 
numerous counts, which included: the absence of data regarding intra-country variability in 
the dimensions; the methodology used to determine the probes; the problem of translation 
effects in cross-cultural surveys; and the fundamental issue of how survey responses relate 
to cockpit operations. 
Hofstede (1983, p. 78) responded to the charge that his studies did not capture 
variation within national populations: 
The national culture found is a kind of average pattern of beliefs and 
values, around which individuals in the country vary... In describing 
national cultures we refer to common elements within each nation, 
but we should not generalize to every individual within that nation.28 
This note of caution has seemingly been overlooked by many aviation researchers. It is 
important to consider, though, when applying the results of Hofstede’s large-scale data 
collection to airline interactions that involve dyads, triads or small groups. Hofstede 
 
28
 See also Hofstede (1994, p. 12): “All statements [about national culture] in this article should be 
seen as only ‘statistically’ true: they are common trends, but individuals may differ from them. 
Within each country there is a wide range of individuals, and this fact too should be taken into 
account in order to manage successfully.” 
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responded to other criticism with further surveys that included East Asian participants, and 
with investigations of organizational culture and cultural differences within a single 
country. Two new cultural dimensions were identified, but the underlying methodology 
remained unchanged (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
 
4.6.3 Applications to Aviation 
Hofstede’s work has been very influential in aviation and has been described as the 
third leg of the “three-legged stool upon which broad, systematic-oriented aviation safety 
and efficiency endeavors rest” (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998, p. xvii).29 In a series of studies 
using materials and methodology adapted from Hofstede, a team led by Robert Helmreich 
at the University of Texas conducted attitude surveys of airline crew in over 20 countries. 
Section 4.9.1 provides more details about this project, and Sections 4.9.2-4.9.4 describe 
other studies that used surveys based on Hofstede’s work. 
Helmreich (1994) also used Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to analyse the actions 
of the Colombian flight crew in the Avianca Flight 052 accident. As noted previously, 
Colombia has a high power distance score. Helmreich posited that this made the first 
officer and flight engineer reluctant to suggest alternative courses of action to the captain. 
Furthermore, since Colombia is strongly collectivist, he suggested the Avianca crew were 
reluctant to declare an emergency and push ahead of other crews they perceived to also be 
in difficulty. Finally, Colombia scores highly in uncertainty avoidance and so Helmreich 
reasoned that the crew preferred to continue with the initial flight plan, rather than face the 
ambiguity of discussing possible alternate airports to which they could divert. 
Hofstede’s framework has been applied to numerous areas of aviation research, in 
testament to the appeal of its quantitative approach. Examples include: a comparison of 
accident rates in NATO air forces (Soeters & Boer, 2000); post-accident responses by 
Japanese and American airlines (Haruta & Hallahan, 2003); and cultural differences in risk 
mitigation in ATC operations (Surakitbanharn & Landry, 2017). 
Finally, as mentioned in the discussion of Hall’s concepts, Hofstede’s framework 
has been used to raise pilot awareness about cultural issues. Dahlstrom and Heemstra 
(2009) reported on the use of Hofstede’s dimensions during facilitated discussions for 
recently joined pilots at a large multi-cultural airline. This application, if not all of the 
 
29
 The other legs of the stool were the SHELL model and Reason’s accident causation model. 
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previous ones, is in line with the advice of Johnston (1993, p. 380), who said: “It would 
certainly appear reasonable to use Hofstede’s data as a point of departure, though a healthy 
regard as to its possible limitations would be prudent.” 
 
4.7 Trompenaars’ Cultural Dimensions 
During the 1980s and 1990s management consultant Fons Trompenaars conducted 
large-scale surveys of cultural diversity in companies operating in 50 countries. From these 
data, and drawing on the work of sociologist Talcott Parsons and anthropologists Florence 
Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, he developed a framework of seven cultural dimensions. 
This framework describes the relationships that people have with other people, time and 
the environment (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). 
Like Hofstede’s work, Trompenaars’ research for the main part focused on 
differences in national culture. However, it did also address regional differences within a 
national culture, albeit in a limited way. One study investigated regional differences in 
South Africa, generating average scores for eight language/ethnic groups on six cultural 
dimensions. The results indicated significant cultural variations within the nation: for 
instance, English South Africans scored 72% on the individualism-communitarianism 
dimension compared with 22% for the Tsonga. In addition, a separate strand of the 
research described different kinds of organizational (or corporate) cultures: the family 
type, the Eiffel Tower type, the guided missile type, and the incubator type (Trompenaars 
& Hampden-Turner, 1997). 
 
4.7.1 Trompenaars’ Dimensions 
The seven cultural dimensions in Trompenaars’ framework are: universalism 
versus particularism, individualism versus communitarianism, neutral versus affective, 
specific versus diffuse, achievement versus ascription, sequential versus synchronic time, 
and inner- versus outer-directed. The following paragraphs discuss two of the dimensions 
that are relevant to airline operations. 
 
4.7.1.1 Individualism-Communitarianism 
Trompenaars’ individualism-communitarianism dimension is similar to (but not 
exactly the same as) Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism, with both measuring the extent 
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to which people regard themselves as individuals or part of groups. Hodgetts et al., (2005) 
highlighted differences in the findings of the two researchers. In Hofstede’s data, for 
example, Mexico and Argentina scored more highly for collectivism, but Trompenaars 
found them to be high in individualism. Given that Hofstede’s data were collected much 
earlier, Hodgetts et al. (2005, p. 112) suggested that countries like Mexico and Argentina 
may have over time “moved from dominant collectivistic or communitarianistic cultural 
values to more individualist values”. 
To illustrate national differences in this dimension, Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (1997) related the story of a “critical incident” in a factory run by an American 
multinational and staffed by Japanese workers. A serious error by a Japanese worker led to 
the loss of a production batch. After the work group accepted responsibility, the factory 
director – to the surprise of a Western investigator – did not try to punish or even identify 
the worker who caused the loss. The reason was that in Japanese culture the shame of 
letting the group down was considered punishment enough. 
The above anecdote illustrates a reluctance of individuals in communitarian 
cultures to openly accept responsibility for errors, which impacts on two aspects of airline 
operations. Firstly, as part of airline CRM training, individual members of a flight crew are 
trained to assertively communicate problems, including errors. Secondly, as part of an 
effective safety culture, it is essential for employees to report errors in their organization. It 
is clear that attitudes to error vary significantly between cultures, which should be taken 
into account during training. This is of particular significance for multicultural airlines, 
where a range of nationalities interact on a daily basis. 
 
4.7.1.2 Achievement-Ascription 
The achievement-ascription dimension relates to the status of an individual within 
society. In achievement cultures (e.g. the United States) people are accorded status based 
on their work performance and recent accomplishments. By contrast, in ascription cultures 
(e.g. Japan or China) status is accorded based on age, kinship, gender, connections and 
educational record. Status is thus perceived differently in different cultures, which may 
affect leadership and communication on the flight deck. 
The achievement-ascription dimension is especially relevant to CRM training, 
which makes the assumption that captains can learn how to establish an appropriate level 
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of authority. Ginnett (1993) described three techniques that captains can use to set up 
effective teams on the flight deck: 
• establish competence in the pre-flight briefing; 
• disavow perfection in order to allow other crew members to take responsibility; 
• engage the crew during the briefing and group formation process. 
These techniques are based on NASA research with American flight crews. They may 
prove effective in achievement cultures but less so in ascription cultures where status, 
which is integral to a person’s authority, is not related to work performance. 
Another problem arises when there is a large difference between the status of the 
captain and junior officers. In this situation, a steep authority gradient may exist in the 
cockpit (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). This can hinder communication and decision 
making, and has been identified as a causal factor in accidents such as the 1977 runway 
collision at Tenerife. CRM programmes teach polite assertiveness techniques to help junior 
officers overcome the problem, but these may not be effective in ascription cultures where 
status derives from intrinsic characteristics such as age and gender. 
 
4.7.1.3 Trompenaars’ Country Clusters 
As with Hofstede’s results, Trompenaars’ data may be readily analysed into 
country clusters. Hodgetts et al. (2005, p. 117) observed that there was “a great deal of 
similarity between the Trompenaars and the Ronen and Shenkar clusters”. However, they 
also noted inconsistencies which might indicate that earlier cluster analyses (such as those 
of Ronen and Shenkar) were in need of revision. 
 
4.7.2 Criticism of Trompenaars’ Model 
Trompenaars’ use of survey data to identify cultural differences is open to similar 
criticisms to those levelled at Hofstede’s work, but one point of difference is that business 
anecdotes were used by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) to contextualize the 
dimensions in interpersonal interactions. Guirdham (2005) observed that while each of 
Trompenaars’ dimensions is described as a continuum, in practice they are treated as 
dichotomies. Furthermore, the dimensions are not conceptually distinct, and Hofstede 
(1996) claimed that only two of them could be confirmed statistically. Furthermore, there 
is overlap between this and other cultural frameworks. As noted previously, Trompenaars’ 
dimension of individualism-communitarianism is similar to individualism-collectivism in 
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Hofstede’s system. Also, Trompenaars’ specific-diffuse dimension corresponds closely to 
Hall’s concept of high- and low-context. 
 
4.7.3 Applications to Aviation 
In contrast to Hofstede’s research, there has only been a limited application of 
Trompenaar’s dimensions to aviation. Nevertheless, the following studies are relevant to 
airline training and operations. 
Firstly, Jing, Lu and Peng (2001) used Trompenaars’ data in a correlational study 
of airline accident rates and attitudes to authority. The authors stated that no direct causal 
relation could be inferred between culture and accidents, but concluded that culture is “an 
indirect essential contributory factor in aircraft accidents” (Jing et al., 2001, p. 341). They 
found authoritarianism to be the most significant cultural variable. Strauch (2010, p. 254) 
cautioned that this and other studies of accident rates “are only suggestive of cultural 
effects on aviation” due to limitations in the generalizability of the initial survey data. 
Secondly, Glover and Friedman (2014) outlined the application of Trompenaars’ 
cultural dimensions to projects dealing with changes in organizational culture. One project 
involved the merger of a government-owned bank with a financial services company in the 
South Pacific. The researchers used a scenario-based method based on cultural dilemmas 
elicited during focus groups and interviews “to anticipate potential merger problems and to 
create appropriate change initiatives to smooth the transformation” (Glover & Friedman, 
2014, p.89). This methodology could potentially be applied to the airline industry, which is 
characterized by regular mergers.30 As noted by Sharma and Thomas (2015, p. 20), airline 
mergers and acquisitions are “loaded with difficulties”, one of which is “the need of 
forming one coherent organisational culture”. 
Finally, Friedman et al. (2013) described a scenario-based programme for training 
military ground forces to deal with socio-cultural encounters (SCEs), or interactions 
between people with different cultural orientations. Each scenario presented a dilemma and 
four possible responses related to one of Trompenaars’ dimensions. Although designed for 
 
30
 Between 2000 and 2016 there were 17 mergers and acquisitions in the US airline industry alone. 
These included the takeovers of TWA and US Airways by American Airlines in 2001 and 2013 
respectively, Northwest by Delta Air Lines in 2009, Continental by United Airlines in 2010, and 
AirTran Airways by Southwest Airlines in 2011 (Airlines for America, 2018). 
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military personnel, Friedman et al. (2013, p. 18) claimed that this approach is “applicable 
to any organizational and professional setting.” One possibility for airline training would 
be to apply the methodology to flight scenarios such as those developed by Fischer and 
Orasanu (1999), which are described in Section 4.9.8. 
 
4.8 Politeness & Face 
Proponents of politeness theory, which dates back to the late 1970s, and face 
negotiation theory, which was introduced in the mid 1980s, contend they are universal 
theories that account for the role of politeness in social interactions. This section outlines 
the two theories and some criticisms levelled against them. It also discusses two research 
projects that applied politeness theory to the aviation context. 
 
4.8.1 Politeness Theory & Face Negotiation Theory 
The following paragraphs review key concepts in Brown and Levinson’s influential 
politeness theory and Ting-Toomey’s face negotiation theory. 
 
4.8.1.1 Politeness Theory 
Politeness theory was first formulated in 1978 by Penelope Brown and Stephen 
Levinson and presented as a set of universal concepts. A central concept is face, defined as 
“the projected image of one’s self in a relational situation” (Ting-Toomey, 2012, p. 407). 
Brown and Levinson (1987) divided face into two components. Positive face relates to a 
person’s desire that his or her self-image be appreciated and approved by others. Negative 
face is the desire for freedom to act and freedom from being imposed upon. 
The theory describes acts that threaten a person’s positive face or negative face. 
Examples of positive face threatening acts are expressions of disapproval, contradictions, 
disagreements and challenges. All of these may damage a listener’s positive face. Negative 
face-threatening acts include orders, requests, suggestions, advice, reminders, threats and 
warnings. They may obstruct a listener’s freedom of action. Brown and Levinson compiled 
a typology of face threatening acts that threaten the positive or negative face of speakers or 
hearers. The level of threat is also related to status relations between interlocutors and how 
well they know each other (Guirdham, 2005). 
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Politeness in communication is “the attempt by the speaker to minimise or reduce 
the threat to the hearer’s face” (Guirdham, 2005, p. 101). Four main types of politeness 
strategy have been identified: 
• Bald on-record – making no attempt to reduce the threat; 
• Positive redress – minimizing the threat to a listener’s positive face by, for instance, 
expressing approval or solidarity; 
• Negative redress – minimizing the threat to the listener’s negative face by expressing 
deference or a reluctance to impose; 
• Off-record – using indirect strategies to mask the threat (Goldsmith, 2009). 
To avoid good and bad connotations of the labels “positive” and “negative”, and 
noting the range of terminology used in the sociolinguistic literature, Scollon et al. (2012) 
proposed alternative terms: involvement instead of positive redress/politeness, and 
independence in place of negative redress/politeness. By using these terms, Scollon et al. 
(2012, p. 49) wished to emphasise that “both aspects of face must be projected 
simultaneously in any communication”. They also made the salient observation that 
miscommunications are liable to take place across the boundaries of discourse systems 
because members of one social group may not be familiar with the different face values of 
another group. 
 
4.8.1.2 Face Negotiation Theory 
Face negotiation theory, developed by Stella Ting-Toomey, draws on multiple 
sources: Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory; Erving Goffman’s study of facework; 
research by Harry Triandis on the distinction between collectivism and individualism; and 
Chinese concepts of face (Ting-Toomey, 2009, 2012). A key concept is facework, which 
Ting-Toomey (2012, p. 408) defined as “specific verbal and non-verbal messages that help 
to maintain and restore face loss, and to uphold and honor face gain”. 
Since it first appeared in the mid-1980s, Ting-Toomey has developed several 
versions of face negotiation theory with adjustments to the core assumptions and 
propositions. The theory’s claim to be universal is reflected in the first core assumption: 
“people in all cultures try to maintain and negotiate face in all communication situations” 
(Ting-Toomey, 2009, p. 371). One of the fundamental ideas of face negotiation theory 
makes a connection to the frameworks of Hall, Hofstede and Trompenaars. It states that 
“people from collectivistic/high-context cultures are noticeably different in the way they 
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manage face and conflict situations than people from individualistic/low-context cultures” 
(Ting-Toomey, 2012, p. 410). 
 
4.8.2 Criticism of Politeness Theory & Face Negotiation Theory 
While noting that a lot of research has supported politeness theory, Goldsmith 
(2009) also listed several criticisms. One concern is the lack of attention the theory pays to 
nonverbal communication. Another issue is that threats to a listener’s face are emphasised 
at the expense of threats to a speaker’s face. The main criticism, however, concerns the 
cross-cultural validity of the theory, with scholars pointing out there are national, ethnic 
and gender differences in the politeness strategies that people use (Guirdham, 2005). 
Face negotiation theory, as originally conceived, was founded on the differing 
perceptions held by people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Ting-Toomey 
(2012) has, however, acknowledged deficiencies in the concepts of individualism and 
collectivism. Consequently, as a work in progress, face negotiation theory has in recent 
years switched its focus to the concept of self-construal, which is defined as: “self-image; 
the degree to which people conceive of themselves as relatively autonomous from, or 
connected to, others” (Ting-Toomey, 2012, p. 410). 
 
4.8.3 Applications to Aviation 
Concepts of politeness and face have not been widely applied in aviation, but two 
notable research projects have incorporated politeness theory. Firstly, Linde (1985) used 
transcripts from accident reports to investigate the role of mitigated speech in intra-cockpit 
communication at US airlines. Secondly, Fischer and Orasanu (1999) conducted studies of 
intra-cockpit communication strategies used by pilots to mitigate errors made by fellow 
pilots. These projects are described in Sections 4.9.7 and 4.9.8 respectively. 
Additionally, it has been suggested that face was a causal factor in the 1977 crash 
of Japan Airlines Flight 8054 in Anchorage, Alaska. Strauch (2010) hypothesized that the 
first officer and flight engineer (who were both Japanese) were unwilling to threaten the 
face of the captain (who was American). Prior to takeoff, the Japanese crew members did 
not challenge the captain about his intoxicated condition or about icing on the airframe. 
The plane crashed shortly after takeoff with the loss of all five people on board. 
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The role of face in airline accidents and incidents would seem to have important 
explanatory potential, but so far this is an under-researched field. What is clear, though, is 
that misunderstandings are liable to occur when people from different cultures cannot 
interpret each others’ face signals and behaviour. 
 
4.9 Intercultural Communication Studies in Aviation 
The final part of the literature review presents ten intercultural communication 
studies that have investigated the communication of pilots and ATC. These empirical 
studies draw on research described in all three areas of the literature review: language, risk 
and culture. As studies of intercultural communication, they owe a particular debt to 
research in the areas of language and culture. Within the latter there is a strong emphasis 
on Hofstede’s work: four of the studies conducted large-scale surveys based at least partly 
on his methodology and test items. The rest of the studies used a range of methodologies 
including mixed methods (surveys, interviews and focus groups), ethnography, speech act 
coding and scenario-based analysis. Risk is implicit in any research into flight operations, 
but is not mentioned explicitly in most of these studies. One notable exception is the 
investigation by Fischer and Orasanu (1999) of intra-cockpit communication strategies in 
Section 4.9.8, which included the level of risk as one of the variables. Also, the IATA 
survey in Section 4.9.10 elicited responses about communication practices that are 
perceived as threats. 
 
4.9.1 Attitudes of Airline Crews in Multiple Countries 
Using test items and methodology adapted from Hofstede, a team led by Robert 
Helmreich at the University of Texas conducted a series of surveys of the attitudes of 
airline crew. The surveys involved more than 15,000 airline pilots and cabin attendants in 
over 20 countries, and were supplemented by observations and interviews (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998; Merritt, 2000). Two instruments were used for the surveys: the Cockpit 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) and the Flight Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (FMAQ). The CMAQ included questions about briefings, communication 
styles, decision making, crew coordination, authority, monitoring, fatigue and crew 
experience. Merritt and Helmreich (1996, p. 23) noted that this tool, having been “designed 
by American researchers and psychometrically refined for American pilots”, was not 
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suitable for detecting differences in national culture. In order to remedy this deficiency, 
they developed the FMAQ, which incorporated items from Hofstede’s Work Values 
Survey and the CMAQ, as well as other questions designed to “capture Hofstede’s 
dimensions within the aviation environment” (Merritt, 2000, p. 285). 
This large-scale research project generated a range of findings. Using the FMAQ 
survey data, the researchers were able to replicate two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions: 
power distance and individualism-collectivism. There was also a weak correlation with 
uncertainty avoidance, but the masculinity-femininity dimension failed to replicate 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). The research team concluded that “national culture exerts an 
influence on cockpit behavior over and above the professional culture of pilots” (Merritt, 
2000, p. 283). It is important to note, though, that the replication study was based on a 
restricted set of responses: only airlines with a dominant national culture were used and all 
of the participants were male pilots of the same nationality as their airline. 
Another notable finding from this project was that, for almost all countries studied, 
the pilot scores were higher for the power distance and individualism dimensions than the 
country scores originally reported by Hofstede (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). In addition, 
hierarchical cluster analyses were conducted to discover which countries formed clusters. 
One of these analyses revealed a tight cluster of “Anglo countries” (including the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand) that were characterized by low scores for power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance combined with high individualism. A looser cluster 
included several countries in South America and Asia (such as Argentina, Taiwan, Brazil 
and Malaysia) that shared high power distance scores (Merritt, 2000).31 
The main focus of the project was national culture, but the studies also provided 
insight into organizational and professional cultures. Illustrating how organizational 
culture varies between companies in the same industry and country, Helmreich and Merritt 
(1998) presented survey data from pilots at two US airlines. For one organizational climate 
item, 87% of pilots at one airline agreed that “Pilot morale is high”, compared with only 
3% at the second airline. Regarding perceptions of management, 84% of respondents at the 
first airline agreed that “Management never compromises safety for profit”, compared with 
12% at the other carrier. The data provided fewer insights into professional culture, but one 
 
31
 Colombia was not included in these analyses. However, by way of comparison, Hofstede’s 
original power distance scores for these countries were as follows: Argentina, 49; Taiwan, 58; 
Colombia, 67; Brazil, 69; and Malaysia, 104 (Hofstede, 2001). 
 
 118 
noteworthy conclusion was that pilots (and also doctors) have unrealistic attitudes towards 
stressors. For example, a majority of pilots said that their decision making was as good in 
emergencies as in routine situations, and that personal problems did not affect their 
performance (Helmreich, 2000). 
Many aviation researchers have been influenced by the studies conducted by the 
University of Texas Human Factors Research Project and by their use of Hofstede’s tools 
and techniques. The project findings fed directly into airline CRM training programmes in 
the 1990s (Maurino & Murray, 2010). 
 
4.9.2 Attitudes of Airline Pilots & Managers in Taiwan 
In the 1990s, Professor Hung-Sying Jing surveyed approximately 1,000 pilots and 
managers at airlines in Taiwan, including a significant number of foreign pilots. He used a 
modified version of the FMAQ instrument developed by Helmreich (which was based in 
turn on Hofstede’s dimensions). The results highlighted differences between Chinese and 
foreign pilots in attitudes to interpersonal relations and authority. Jing believed that these 
differences could not be adequately explained by uni-dimensional concepts such as power 
distance, and he therefore developed a framework to account for interpersonal relations 
and authority in Chinese culture (Jing & Batteau, 2015). 
Drawing on research by the scholar Fei Xiao-Tung, Jing created a “differentiated 
order model” with four levels of intimacy: kin, acquaintance, fellow and alien. According 
to this model, Chinese pilots consider that: close family are kin; other Chinese pilots are 
acquaintances; other Chinese workers in the same company are fellows; and foreign 
workers in the same company are aliens. The structure is not fixed and individuals can 
change level, for example by marriage or a serious falling out. Jing added a description of 
the Chinese concept of authoritarianism, which is dominated by the father-son relationship, 
to this model of interpersonal relations. 
The differentiated order model has been used to analyse accidents involving Asian 
airlines, such as the 1995 crash of a TransAsia Airways ATR72 aircraft in Taiwan. At the 
time of the accident, the first officer was pilot flying (PF) and the captain was pilot not 
flying (PNF). Immediately before the crash, the captain was talking to a cabin attendant in 
the cockpit, which distracted him from his duties of monitoring the aircraft status and 
communicating with ATC. In their analysis, Jing and Batteau (2015, p. 30) suggested that 
the captain regarded the cabin attendant as an acquaintance but considered the air traffic 
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controller to be a stranger, adding that “Every Chinese person would be inclined by instinct 
to attend to a friend first, not the stranger”.32 
Western pilots may consider such behaviour to be a blatant dereliction of duty, but 
Jing’s work highlights the impact that cultural factors can have on cockpit interactions and 
flight crew communications. Interestingly, it echoes Hall’s description of the emphasis 
placed by polychronic people on personal relations. Jing and Batteau also commented on 
ways in which cultural differences impact flight procedures. Chinese pilots are conditioned 
by the non-linear ideographic Chinese language and therefore have difficulty following 
sequential SOPs. The researchers see this as one manifestation of a systematic problem 
whereby Chinese pilots are not culturally programmed to use commercial aircraft or an air 
transport system that have both been largely designed by Westerners. 
 
4.9.3 Attitudes of Airline Pilots in Norway 
In Norway Mjøs (2004) conducted a survey of pilots at three airlines and received 
242 usable responses. The variables included cultural indices (based on Hofstede’s four 
original dimensions), social climate, barriers to communication, and operational problems 
experienced in the previous year. This survey identified differences between the airlines. 
The pilots of one company, who were almost all from a military background, were more 
experienced and scored higher on power distance and masculinity. Furthermore, the pilots 
of all three airlines had higher mean scores for individuality and masculinity than the 
national scores reported by Hofstede, indicating that cultural dimensions for a professional 
group within a country may differ from national characteristics. This led Mjøs to caution 
against applying national cultural dimension data to research comparing aviation safety 
records in different countries. 
 
4.9.4 Pilot Decision-Making in a Large Multicultural Airline 
Scott (2013) conducted a mixed methods investigation of the influence of national 
culture on pilot decision-making on the flight deck. The study was conducted at a major 
 
32
 The context of the accident was unusual: it occurred on New Year’s Eve; the plane was not 
carrying passengers; and the captain was junior to the first officer in terms of previous air force 
service. It underlines the importance, even in unusual circumstances, of following regulations such 
as the sterile cockpit rule, which prohibits non-essential speech below 10,000 feet. 
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airline in the Middle East that has a large, multicultural workforce. It included individual 
interviews, focus group interviews and a survey of pilot attitudes. A 40-item questionnaire 
was used for the survey, covering decision-making, culture, language and behaviour. Some 
questions were taken from previous studies by Hofstede (2001) and Helmreich and Merritt 
(2000). The survey of pilot attitudes produced 613 usable responses and 66 countries were 
represented. 
Some of the survey findings related to specific aspects of language use on the flight 
deck. Approximately 60% of participants thought that communication problems occur as a 
result of culture, with pronunciation cited as an example. More than 70% of respondents 
reported that, when starting conversations with individuals from other countries, it 
sometimes took time to understand their English pronunciation. Scott (2013, p. 261) 
concluded that communication was a “major factor on the flight deck, especially if pilots 
were from different cultures”. In addition, the interview data indicated that “pilots from 
non-English speaking cultures often struggled with communications in an English-driven 
aviation world”, and it suggested that “pilots from Asia, the Far East, parts of Europe and 
South America sometimes did not have sufficient command of the English language” 
(Scott, 2013, p. 262). 
In another interesting survey finding, echoing Dahlstrom and Heemstra (2009), 
more than 80% of participants said that pilot professional culture was for them a stronger 
influence on the flight deck than national culture. Just 18.5% of participants said that their 
national culture was not overridden by professional culture. Scott (2013, p. 259) noted that 
these pilots were “from areas that were of mostly of Islamic religion”, such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
 
4.9.5 Cockpit Communication in Airlines in the Asia-Pacific Region 
Hutchins et al. (2006) carried out an ethnographic study that examined the impact 
of culture on cockpit communication and interaction at three airlines in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The study included flight deck and simulator observations, as well as interviews 
with airline personnel. An interesting aspect of this research is that it identified specific 
differences in cockpit practice between airlines in different countries. These differences 
included how checklists and charts were actually used. However, since only a limited 
number of airlines were studied it is not clear to what extent the variation was due to 
national culture as opposed to organizational culture. For instance, Japanese pilots in the 
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study annotated their charts whereas pilots from New Zealand were not allowed to do so, 
but it is possible that other New Zealand airlines permit chart annotation. As mentioned 
before, difficulties posed by this form of research include the need to gain access to flight 
decks and the requirement for expertise in a range of fields such as piloting, human factors, 
anthropology, language and culture. 
 
4.9.6 Communication between Korean ATC & Foreign Pilots 
Kim and Elder (2009, 2015) reported on a mixed methods research project that 
examined the construct of radiotelephony communication in the Korean aviation context. 
Data collection took place between 2007 and 2009. Data were collected using a variety of 
methods: observations of ATC centres, audio recordings of radio communications between 
Korean ATC and foreign pilots, surveys of Korean pilots and controllers, and interviews 
and focus groups with Korean pilots and controllers. 
Although not explicitly addressing national culture, this research project has 
significant implications for intercultural communication between pilots and controllers 
from different countries. One clear finding was that participants did not accept that limited 
English proficiency of non-native speakers was a main contributing factor to accidents. 
Instead they believed it was “one of a complex array of factors contributing to problems in 
radiotelephony communication” (Kim & Elder, 2009, p. 23.2). The authors also described 
communication problems exhibited by native and non-native English speakers. Problems 
of NESs included: non-adherence to standard phraseology, excessive use of plain English, 
a range of accents and expressions, and a fast rate of speech. The main problem for NNSs 
was first language (L1) interference with accents, although there was a tendency for some 
proficient English speakers to overuse plain English (Kim, 2013; Kim & Elder, 2009). 
Kim and Elder (2009, p. 23.14) concluded that “communication in the aviation 
context is a complex matter and that responsibilities for its success (or failure) are shared 
across participants, regardless of their language background”. In order to promote greater 
communicative responsibility by all pilots and controllers, they advocated thinking of 
aviation English in terms of a lingua franca. Drawing on English as a lingua franca (ELF) 
research, they recommended training for both NESs and NNSs in specific communicative 





4.9.7 Use of Mitigated Speech by Airline Crews in the USA 
Linde (1985) drew on Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory to investigate the 
use of mitigated speech in intra-cockpit communications. This was part of a larger study 
that used speech act coding to analyse transcript data from eight accidents involving 
American airlines in the 1970s and 1980s (Goguen, Linde & Murphy, 1986). A mitigated 
form of speech was defined by Linde (1985, p. 4) as “one which expresses a given 
propositional content in such a way as to avoid giving offense”. The main thrust of the 
research concerned how the use of mitigated speech varied with social status (e.g., captain 
versus first officer) or operational context (e.g., emergencies or other in-flight problems). 
Linde developed a scale for quantifying mitigation, which a group of airline pilots and 
non-aviation analysts applied to the transcripts. 
Some of the findings related to national and professional cultures. Firstly, the 
results suggested that regional dialects within the United States might be associated with 
significant differences in the use of mitigated speech. In other words, there was empirical 
evidence, albeit limited, for variation within a national culture. Secondly, there were 
systematic differences in the rhetorical conventions of pilots compared with non-aviation 
analysts. Linde (1985, pp. 9-10) cited examples of indirect requests using “want”, such as 
“You want me to fly it Bob?” Such expressions were considered less mitigated by the 
pilots than by the non-aviation analysts. Linde inferred that within pilot professional 
culture this strategy had become conventionalized to the point that its social force was 
direct, while it was interpreted as indirect and mitigated within the academic professional 
culture of the analysts. 
Linde (1985, p. 8) concluded that “the use of indirect speech acts for mitigation is 
extremely complex”, and she emphasised the importance of understanding the context in 
which communications are situated. 
 
4.9.8 Intra-Cockpit Communication Strategies in the USA & Europe 
Fischer and Orasanu (1999) reported on a series of studies of the intra-cockpit 
communication strategies that are used by pilots to mitigate errors made by other pilots. 
Participants were given different flight scenarios in which either the captain or first officer 
had made an error. They were asked what request they would make to resolve the problem. 
The studies examined the effect of two variables on the communications: (1) the level of 
risk inherent in the scenario, and (2) the level of face-threat involved in resolving the error. 
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One study investigated the influence of national culture on communication strategies by 
comparing pilots from the USA and three European countries. The number of participants 
was 533, of whom 249 were captains and the remainder first officers. 
The findings indicated that for captains, both American and European, the preferred 
communication strategy was to give a command, while first officers preferred using hints. 
The status difference between captains and first officers in the US was more pronounced. 
Compared with their American counterparts, European captains were more likely to give 
hints and European first officers were more likely to issue commands. This finding was 
unexpected and at odds with previous research on attitudes towards leadership. The authors 
suggested it was due to differences in methodology between their scenario-based studies 
and earlier research, such as that reported by Merritt (2000), which used surveys to elicit 
pilot attitudes (Fischer, 2000; Fischer & Orasanu, 1999). 
 
4.9.9 Characteristics of ATC Radiotelephony in Malaysia 
Mohd (2007) carried out a study of ATC radiotelephony in Malaysia. Two methods 
were used for data collection: (1) a survey of air traffic controllers with 188 respondents, 
and (2) recording of 73 hours of ATC audio. This study is valuable for the information it 
provided about RT communication in a location where air traffic controllers are not native 
speakers of English. 
The survey of controllers collected extensive demographic data. This included 
information about: English language proficiency test results, aviation English and ATC 
communication training, problems in RT practices, and communication-related safety 
occurrences. One interesting finding was that the use of English varied depending on the 
ATC working environment. Among terminal approach radar controllers, 70% reported that 
English was their most frequently used daily language. For tower controllers, the figure 
was only 28%. 
The ATC audio data were transcribed and then coded using the Aviation Topic and 
Speech Act Taxonomy (ATSAT). Analysis of the ATC recordings revealed a very low 
level of code switching from English to other languages. Overall, about 0.2% of the total 
number of words were non-English. These words were all greetings and courtesies, such as 




4.9.10 Use of Phraseology by Pilots & Air Traffic Controllers 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) conducted a worldwide survey 
to investigate safety threats related to communication with a narrow focus on the use of 
standard phraseology. Separate questionnaires were devised for pilots and air traffic 
controllers. A total of 2,070 responses were collected from pilots (86% of whom operated 
international flights) and 568 from controllers. Since there was a lack of responses from 
countries in which English is not the main language, Russian and Chinese versions of the 
pilot questionnaire were also distributed. The survey was carried out in collaboration with 
the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) and International 
Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA). 
The findings were published as a report in 2011. The study concluded that the use 
of non-standard phraseology was “a major obstacle” to effective communications between 
ATC and pilots (IATA, 2011, p. 53). A high rate of speech and lack of harmonization were 
other factors that increased the risk of communication errors. One problem with the survey 
was ambiguity in the expression “non-standard phraseology”. For example, question 9 in 
the pilot survey asked, “Is there an airport(s) where ICAO standard phraseology is not 
used? If yes, please specify airport code(s)”. The report noted that Paris Charles de Gaulle 
Airport was the most common response “but in almost all cases it was because of the use 
of both English and a local language in Pilot communication and not specifically for non-
standard phraseology” (IATA, 2011, pp. 17-18). 
Although the focus of the study was on phraseology, respondents made numerous 
comments about plain language. The following factors were reported as contributing to 
pilot-ATC communication errors: use of plain English instead of phraseology, use of slang, 
and ambiguity in plain language. These findings reinforce the discussion in Section 2.4.3 
about the difficulty of separating standard phraseology from plain language. Other factors 
found to “compromise human communication” included pronunciation problems of NNSs, 
accents, and NNS-NNS communication (i.e., code switching between English and other 
languages) (IATA, 2011, p. 53). 
The IATA phraseology study provides a useful model for the construction and 
delivery of an online survey of pilots. It was designed to be completed in a short time (10 
minutes) but allowed respondents to enter detailed information about specific procedures 





CHAPTER 5: The Crash of Avianca Flight 052 
 
This chapter lays out the context of Avianca Flight 052, which crashed near Cove 
Neck, New York, on 25th January 1990. The Avianca 052 crash was one of the accidents 
cited by ICAO to justify the language proficiency programme. It is the focus of the Stage 
Two analysis in Chapters 6-8. This chapter presents multiple layers of context for the 
crash. It draws on information from 25 books and documents included in the literature 
review database, as well as a search of New York Times newspaper articles. First, I outline 
significant events in the history of Avianca that informed its organizational culture prior to 
the accident. Certain key events are highlighted in a timeline of the history of the airline. 
Second, I present details of the Avianca 052 flight crew and a synopsis of the flight. Then I 
list significant events in the history of the airline that have taken place since the accident. 
Finally, I outline representations of the Avianca 052 crash that have been made in various 





5.1 History of Avianca until 1990 
Avianca is the national airline of Colombia. It claims to be the oldest airline in the 
Americas and, after KLM, the second oldest airline in the world. Its lineage traces back to 
1919 when Sociedad Colombo Alemana de Transporte Aéreo, SCADTA, was founded 
with aircraft and technical support from Germany. In 1940, SCADTA merged with another 
Colombian airline, SACO, to form Aerovías Nacionales de Colombia S.A., otherwise 
known as AVIANCA (see Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11: 1929 route map of SCADTA. Reprinted from Airlines of the jet age: A history (p. 
5), by R. E. G. Davies, 2011, Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press. 


















Following the Second World War, steps were taken to consolidate the position of 
Avianca as the dominant airline in Colombia and later as the dominant airline in South 
America (Davies, 2011; Avianca, 2020): 
• international services were launched to the United States and Europe in 1946; 
• a regular service to New York started in 1949; 
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• Avianca transported the Colombian delegation to the Melbourne Olympics in 1956; 
• jet aircraft (including the Boeing 707) were introduced in 1960; 
• domestic rival Sociedad Aeronautica de Medellin, SAM, was acquired in 1963; 
• Avianca became the first Latin American airline to operate the Boeing 747 wide body 
jet in 1976. 
The ambition of Avianca is encapsulated in a long-running slogan that proclaims it 
to be “first airline of the Americas”. The slogan is ambiguous: it may denote the popularity 
of the airline (i.e., first choice of passengers), the high quality of service (i.e., first class), 
best on-time performance (i.e., first arriving aircraft) or the pioneering spirit of Avianca 
(e.g., first South American airline to use the B747). It may also refer to the company’s long 
history, as with the catchline of an advertisement posted in New York Magazine: “First 
airline of the Americas...second oldest in the world” (Avianca, 1981, p. 25). 
Although initially set up with German aircraft and support, Avianca has had strong 
financial and operational ties with the United States for most of its history. One example is 
the substantial shareholding that Pan American Airways held in the company for several 
decades after World War Two. Another is the mainly American fleet of aircraft operated 
by Avianca from its merger in 1940 until the end of the century. The close relationship was 
epitomized by the airline’s inaugural jet service, which flew from Bogota to New York in 
1960 using a Boeing 707 leased from Pan American Airways.33 
At the start of the 1980s, Avianca opened the Puente Aéreo Terminal (Air Bridge 
Terminal) at El Dorado International Airport in Bogota to handle domestic traffic and 
international flights to the United States. As shown in Table 7, the rest of that decade was 
tragically marked by three major accidents in which more than 400 people died. The first 
accident was the controlled flight into terrain of Flight 011 near Madrid, Spain, in 1983 
(CIAIAC, n.d.). The second was the controlled flight into terrain of Flight 410 shortly after 
takeoff at Cúcuta, Colombia, in 1988 (CAD, 1996b). The third was the mid-air explosion 
of Flight 203 while climbing away from El Dorado International Airport in Bogota, 





 Three decades later Avianca Flight 052 flew the same route using the same type of aircraft. 
34
 No accident report is available for the Avianca Flight 203 accident, but it is referred to in the 
NTSB report for the crash of TWA Flight 800 (NTSB, 2000a). 
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Avianca was still recovering from the three accidents that it suffered in the 1980s 























5.2 The Crew of Avianca Flight 052 
The flight crew of Avianca 052 consisted of the captain, first officer and flight 
engineer. The 51-year-old captain was a very experienced pilot, with no record of previous 
accidents, and was also a pilot in the Columbian Air Force Reserve. The 45-year-old flight 
engineer was likewise very experienced, and had accumulated more than 3,000 flight hours 
in Boeing 707 aircraft. By contrast, as Helmreich (1994, p. 280) noted, the young first 
officer was “inexperienced overall and particularly in the B-707”. He was 28 years old and 
had a total flight time of 1,837 hours, with just 64 hours in this aircraft type. Table 8 gives 
details of the flight experience of the crew members. 
The Avianca captain had previously flown on international flights with the first 
officer, and also with the flight engineer, but this was the first time that all three flew 
together as a crew. Citing NTSB research, Helmreich and Merritt (1998, p. 12) observed 
that “a disproportionate percentage of accidents happen to crews who are flying together 
for the first time”. 
 
 
Table 8: Flight experience of the Avianca 052 crew (NTSB, 1991). 
 




Age 51 28 45 
Flight hours (total) 16,787 1,837 10,134 
Flight hours (B707) 1,534 64 3,077 
Flight hours (night flying) 2,435 408 2,986 
Flight hours (B707 night flying) 478 13 1,062 
Flights to NY 1989-1990 (total) 14 13 7 
Flights to NY 1989-1990 (B707) 14 5 5 
 
 
5.3 Synopsis of the Avianca 052 Accident 
On 25th January 1990, Avianca Flight 052 was scheduled to fly from El Dorado 
International Airport in Bogota, Colombia, to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) 
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in New York. The crew departed from Bogota at 13:10 EST on the first leg, which was a 
54-minute flight to Medellin. After a brief refuelling stop, the aircraft took off at 15:08 
bound for New York. As the plane reached the north-eastern United States it encountered 
adverse weather conditions. Air traffic controllers instructed the plane to enter holding 
patterns on three separate occasions. The holding delays lasted a total of 77 minutes, which 
meant the flight time from Medellin to New York was much longer than the planned time 
of 4 hours 40 minutes.35 
The Avianca first officer was responsible for communication with ATC. At 20:46, 
during the third holding period, he notified ATC they could only hold for about five more 
minutes and could not reach their alternate airport in Boston because they were running out 
of fuel. The aircraft finally descended towards JFK and attempted to land. However, the 
pilots encountered wind shear and executed a missed approach at 21:23. They attempted to 
return for a second approach, but lost power in all four engines due to fuel exhaustion. 
 
 
Figure 13: Section of fuselage at the Avianca 052 crash site in Cove Neck, New York. Public 


















 According to an Avianca captain interviewed after the crash, holding delays for JFK were 
normally “a maximum of 20 to 30 minutes” (Cushman, 1990). 
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At approximately 21:34 Avianca Flight 052 crashed at Cove Neck, Long Island 
(see Figure 13). Of 158 passengers and crew on board the plane, 73 died as a result of the 
crash. The fatalities included all the crew with the exception of one flight attendant. 
 
5.4 History of Avianca since 1990 
Avianca launched a fleet renewal at the start of the 1990s to replace its ageing 
Boeing 707, 727 and 747 jets. These aircraft types had been involved in the four accidents 
that occurred between 1983 and 1990. The airline continued to suffer problems as the 
decade unfolded. With airline deregulation in Colombia in 1991, Avianca’s share of the 
domestic market fell from 61% in 1990 to 41% in 1997 (Davies, 2011). After the 2001 
terrorist attacks in New York, the company faced further struggles due to the collapse of 
international tourism. It filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2004. 
The company relaunched itself in 2005 under a new name which reflected its desire 
to be the preeminent airline on the continent: Aerovías del Continente Americano S.A. It 
began another fleet renewal in 2007 by ordering Airbus A320 and A330 jets. A merger 
with TACA, the national airline of El Salvador, was completed in 2013. New direct routes 
to Europe were opened with the launching of Bogota-London and Bogota-Munich services 
in 2014 and 2018 respectively. Avianca was named the Best Airline in South America in 
the Skytrax World Airline Awards for 2017 and 2018. The 2019 annual report celebrated 
the company’s 100th anniversary by proclaiming it would “continue connecting the world 
with Latin America for 100 more years” (Avianca, 2020, p. 2). 
The expansion of the relaunched company had come at a cost. By 2019 Avianca 
had built up a debt of $7.3 billion. The following year the airline was hit heavily by the 
worldwide reduction in air traffic resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, and it again filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2020 (Rochabrun, Kumar & Bocanegra, 2020). 
 
5.5 Representations of the Avianca 052 Accident 
Since the crash of Avianca Flight 052, many analyses and representations have 
appeared in diverse media. Newspaper articles appeared in the days following the crash. 
The NTSB accident report was released in 1991, and further analyses were published in 
subsequent years by the Flight Safety Foundation and Robert Helmreich at the University 
of Texas. A TV documentary about the Avianca 052 accident was broadcast in 2005 and 
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journalist Malcolm Gladwell wrote about it in a 2008 book titled “Outliers: The Story of 
Success”. The following paragraphs report key points and limitations of each of these 
representations of the accident. 
 
5.5.1 Articles in the New York Times 
During the 1980s, only ten New York Times articles mentioned the three Avianca 
accidents that took place in 1983, 1988 and 1989. In the week after the crash of Avianca 
Flight 052, there were 25 reports about the accident. By 2018, the New York Times had 
published 82 articles about Avianca Flight 052. Amongst these, 51 items focused on the 
Avianca 052 crash while the others mentioned it briefly in the context of other accidents. 
Figure 14 shows the most common themes in the articles that focused on Avianca 052. The 
great majority of these articles (over 90%) were published in 1990. 
 
 

















Communication involving pilots and air traffic controllers was the most common 
theme. There were many stories about passengers and relatives, including lawsuits filed 
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against the FAA and Avianca, and compensation paid by the airline. Drug smuggling was 
discussed in a significant number of articles, especially after two of the passengers were 
found to have been transporting cocaine. The response of the emergency services was 
widely covered, particularly communication problems and the difficulty in accessing the 
crash site. Finally, five articles covered problems in the ATC system: the increased risk 
caused by holding delays and the shortage of air traffic controllers.36 
 
5.5.2 NTSB Accident Report 
The National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the Avianca 
accident and published its report in April 1991. The investigation was complex and the 
report ran to 295 pages. It contained a detailed description of fuel calculations for the flight 
and extensive listings of flight crew and ATC communication. The probable cause of the 
accident was found to be “the failure of the flightcrew to adequately manage the airplane’s 
fuel load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control 
before fuel exhaustion occurred” (NTSB, 1991, p. 76). The following contributory factors 
were also listed: 
• the flight crew failed to use an airline operational control dispatch system; 
• the FAA traffic flow management was inadequate; 
• there was a lack of standardized, understandable terminology for minimum and 
emergency fuel states; 
• the first approach to JFK was hindered by wind shear, crew fatigue and crew stress. 
The NTSB report did not include several sets of potentially significant information. 
Firstly, the aircraft’s flight data recorder (FDR) was inoperative because the recording foil 
had been taped down. Therefore airspeed data, which could have shed light on the severity 
of wind shear encountered in the first approach, was not available. Secondly, there were no 
toxicological test results for the air traffic controllers. The remains of the flight crew were 
tested (and found to be negative) for alcohol and drugs. The controllers who handled the 
final stages of Flight 052 were also tested, but the FAA did not provide the results to the 
NTSB investigation, nor did it permit separate testing of the controllers. Thirdly, the FAA 
Central Flow Control Facility (CFCF) ran traffic management programs to control the flow 
 
36
 The controller shortage was a legacy of President Reagan firing more than 11,000 air traffic 
controllers following the 1981 ATC strike. 
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of aircraft. At the end of each traffic management shift a Verification and Analysis Report 
was usually available, but on 25th January 1990 “a report for the JFK program was not 
retrievable because of computer problems” (NTSB 1991, p. 45). 
There was disagreement about the contents of the report amongst the NTSB staff 
responsible for compiling it. Two members added dissenting comments: 
• Jim Burnett criticised the report for not adequately addressing the “substandard 
service” provided by the ATC system; 
• Christopher Hart objected to the finding about a “lack of standardized understandable 
terminology” and stated the Avianca flight crew should have used the existing terms 
“Mayday” or “Emergency” (NTSB 1991, p. 79). 
The Administrative Department of Civil Aeronautics (DAAC) in Colombia challenged the 
report’s findings. Noting the lack of time they had to respond, the DAAC said the actions 
of the ATC system should have been more rigorously examined, especially with regard to 
information provided to the crew and the way that delays were handled. 
 
5.5.3 Flight Safety Foundation Analysis 
In 1992, the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) published an analysis of the Avianca 
052 accident by Captain Thomas Duke, an experienced ex-airline and military pilot who 
had worked for the NTSB. The FSF report noted evidence from the CVR transcript that the 
aircraft was being flown manually and the Avianca captain was fatigued. The analysis 
included a reconstruction of the flight detailing the fuel situation for each stage between 
Medellin, in Colombia, and JFK Airport, in New York. The reconstruction ended with the 
following comments: 
This accident reflects the combination of multiple events that 
eventually become overwhelming and result in a disaster. There was 
a long string of air-ground miscommunications and unverified 
misunderstandings, poor flight planning decisions, poor crew 
coordination, poor company dispatch and avionics support 
procedures and rules, worse than forecast weather and an unexpected 
number of delays. The result was extreme crew stress and fatigue 
that led to inadequate communications and a poorly executed 
approach and missed approach circuit ... and ultimately fuel 
exhaustion. (Duke, 1992, p. 6) 
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The FSF report stated that, because the Avianca flight crew did not survive the accident, 
the events that took place in the cockpit and at ATC facilities on the ground may never be 
completely understood. 
 
5.5.4 “Anatomy of a System Accident” Analysis 
Psychologist Robert Helmreich produced a widely-cited analysis incorporating 
information from post-crash litigation between Avianca and the US government. The 
analysis utilised several methodologies including Reason’s (1990) concepts of active and 
latent failures, and the crew performance model developed by Helmreich and Foushee 
(1993). It did not explicitly mention corporate culture or organizational culture, but found 
that “latent failures in the organization – including training, operational procedures and 
manuals, crew pairing, dispatch, and maintenance – created a window of opportunity for 
an accident to occur” (Helmreich, 1994, p. 281). This was therefore a system accident. 
Helmreich hypothesised that the actions of the Avianca crew could be explained 
using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance 
and power distance. He acknowledged that the hypothesis was unprovable, but concluded 
cultural factors probably played a significant role in the accident: 
It seems likely that national culture may have contributed to 
inflexible decision making, that weak leadership may have been 
exacerbated by a normative reluctance to question that leadership, 
and that the need to maintain group harmony may have inhibited 
crewmembers from presenting their concerns and suggestions. 
Finally, mistaken cultural assumptions arising from the interaction of 
two vastly different national cultures may have prevented effective 
use of the air traffic system. (Helmreich, 1994, pp. 282-283)  
Strauch (2010, p. 255), in a paper about accidents in sociotechnical systems, was 
critical of Helmreich’s hypothesis. He posited that alternative explanations, which did not 
involve cultural factors, could have accounted for the actions of the Avianca crew: 
Although the pilots’ communication errors may have been 
influenced by cultural influences, other explanations, such as the 
crew’s unfamiliarity with U.S. dispatch offices, a reluctance to divert 
to an airport with which the airline did not have prearranged fueling 
and passenger handling procedures, and poor “airmanship” skills in 
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their inability to relate expected holding times to anticipated fuel 
needs, could also account for their performance errors. 
Ragan (2007, p. 59), by contrast, maintained that the communication of the 
Avianca first officer was affected by cultural factors. He suggested two reasons why 
controllers did not realise the severity of the Avianca fuel problem: the first officer did not 
use the word “emergency” in his communications; and he continued “speaking indirectly, 
non-aggressively, and politely despite the desperate urgency of the situation”. 
 
5.5.5 “Missing over New York” TV Documentary 
A 47-minute TV documentary recounting the story of Avianca 052 was broadcast 
on 27th February 2005 in Season 2 of the “Mayday” series.37 The opening sequence states: 
“This is a true story. The reconstruction contains certain composite characters, and the 
dialogue has been adapted from actual recordings.” (Jorgensen, 2005). The documentary 
gives no details about the changes that have been made. These changes include: 
• Language change – the Avianca flight crew talked to each other in Spanish, but in the 
documentary they use English; 
• Omniscient narrator – the actual crew did not know an accident was going to happen, 
but the documentary narrator gives a commentary explaining what will happen as the 
drama unfolds (e.g., “Flight 52 is about to crash somewhere over New York”); 
• Omission of utterances – many utterances in the CVR transcript are omitted in the 
documentary dialogue (e.g., dialogue lasting 4 minutes 20 seconds in the transcript is 
reduced to a 20-second sequence in the documentary); 
• Re-ordering of utterances – some utterances have been cut and pasted from different 
points in the CVR transcript to make a new dialogue in the documentary; 
• Paralinguistics – the CVR transcript gives no indication of anger or rapid speech, but 
the captain in the documentary speaks rapidly in an angry, raised voice; 
• Paraphrase – key messages from the CVR transcript are reproduced using different 
words in the documentary (e.g., the original ATC message “I'm gunna have to spin 




 “Mayday” is a Canadian documentary series produced by Cineflix. In other countries it is known 
as “Air Crash Investigation”, “Air Emergency” or “Air Disasters”. 
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5.5.6 “Outliers” Bestselling Book 
The book “Outliers: The Story of Success” by popular journalist Malcolm Gladwell 
contained a lengthy account of the Avianca 052 accident. The discussion touched on pilot 
workload, mitigated speech and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, especially power distance. 
Drawing on the analysis by Helmreich (1994), Gladwell’s main argument was that cultural 
factors prevented the Colombian first officer from clearly informing American air traffic 
controllers about the aircraft’s fuel problem. 
The book presented a dramatic and oversimplified version of the dialogue that took 
place within the Avianca cockpit. The author’s argument is weakened by the following 
mistakes and omissions: 
• Condition of the plane – Gladwell (2008, p. 186) stated, “There was nothing wrong 
with the aircraft.” As Helmreich (1994, p. 271) pointed out, the autopilot system was 
not working (which necessitated hand flying), the FDR was inoperative and there was 
“a decaying cardboard box inside one of the fuel tanks”. 
• Silence in the cockpit – The book noted repeated periods of silence in the Avianca 
cockpit, and claimed no one said anything for five minutes before engine number four 
flamed out. The CVR transcript shows there were 40 utterances by the Avianca crew 
during this period. 
• First officer’s feelings – Gladwell (2008, p. 208) repeated a mistake from Helmreich’s 
paper by attributing the utterance “The guy is angry” to the first officer in order to 
strengthen his argument about cultural influences. The CVR transcript indicates that 







CHAPTER 6: Methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology for the dissertation, which is divided into 
two parts: Stage One and Stage Two. In Stage One, I investigate the relevance of past 
accidents to contemporary civil aviation, focusing on the four accidents cited by ICAO in 
Document 9835. In Stage Two, I examine the communication problems that contributed to 
one of these accidents: the 1990 fuel exhaustion crash of Avianca Flight 052. Each of the 
stages has four research questions (RQs). Multiple methods are employed in the study, 
including a survey of current airline pilots, a series of semi-structured interviews with a 
key informant (KI), and linguistic analysis of pilot-ATC communications. In addition, this 
chapter introduces the Aviation Communication Toolkit (ACT), a glossary that I have 
created to facilitate the analysis of language use in accidents. The structure of the chapter 
is shown below. 
 
6.1 STAGE ONE: Past Accidents Cited by ICAO 
6.1.1 Research Questions A-D 
6.1.2 Survey of Pilots’ Attitudes to Past Accidents 
6.1.3 Semi-Structured Pilot Interviews 
 
6.2 STAGE TWO: Analysis of the Avianca 052 Accident 
6.2.1 Research Questions E-H 
6.2.2 An Aviation Communication Toolkit 





6.1 STAGE ONE – Past Accidents Cited by ICAO 
The first stage of the analysis investigates the relevance of past accidents to current 
airline operations. I adopted a mixed methods approach using a sequential explanatory 
design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). In the first phase, a survey was conducted to 
gather quantitative data about the attitudes of airline pilots. In the second phase, follow-up 
interviews were held with one participant to examine the survey results in detail and 
collect qualitative data. The methodology is outlined in Figure 15. Stage One is framed by 
the question: How relevant are the accidents cited by ICAO to current airline operations? 
 
 






















As discussed in Chapter 1, a number of airline accidents have been cited by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as canonical cases that triggered radical 
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changes in civil aviation operations and training. Specifically, these cases led to ICAO 
launching its language proficiency programme, which was developed in the early 2000s 
and finally implemented in 2011. 
During the course of this project, I spoke with a number of experienced pilots and 
researchers who questioned the relevance of past accidents to current airline operations. 
One observation was that accidents which happened several decades ago are no longer 
relevant due to the amount of time that has passed. Another comment was that measures 
had been taken after specific accidents to ensure that similar events would not happen 
again. Following the 1977 Tenerife runway collision, for example, ICAO made changes to 
standard phraseology and procedures (ICAO, 2010).  
In order to address this question and investigate the relevance of past accidents, I 
conducted a survey of current airline pilots with follow-up interviews. The methodology 
for this stage is described in the sections that follow. 
 
6.1.1 Research Questions A-D  
Four accidents are referred to in Document 9835, which is the official guide to the 
ICAO language proficiency programme. In each case it is noted that “insufficient English 
language proficiency on the part of the flight crew or a controller” was a contributory 
factor (ICAO, 2010, p. 1-1). The four accidents were: 
• 1977 Tenerife – runway collision in the Canary Islands, Spain; 
• 1990 Cove Neck – fuel exhaustion crash at Cove Neck, New York, USA; 
• 1995 Cali – controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) near Cali, Colombia; 
• 1996 New Delhi – mid-air collision over Charkhi Dadri, near New Delhi, India. 
I drew up four research questions to investigate airline pilots’ awareness of, and 
attitudes towards, these accidents. The research questions were used to design the survey 
and guide the interviews. The questions were: 
• RQ A – Is studying past airline accidents important for improving airline safety? 
• RQ B – Which of the accidents cited by ICAO have pilots heard of? 
• RQ C – What are pilots’ sources of information about these accidents? 
• RQ D – Did insufficient English proficiency of pilots and/or air traffic controllers 




6.1.2 Survey of Pilots’ Attitudes to Past Accidents 
This section outlines the survey that I conducted to investigate the attitudes of 
current airline pilots to past accidents. The survey explored: respondents’ awareness of, 
and attitudes towards, the four accidents cited in ICAO Document 9835; their sources of 
information about the accidents; and the role played by the English proficiency of pilots 
and air traffic controllers in the accidents. 
 
6.1.2.1 Data Collection 
Using the SurveyMonkey online survey tool, I created a 31-item questionnaire 
based on the research questions. Human factors (HF) experts and training captains at a 
major Middle East airline were consulted during the design process. On their advice, the 
survey was designed to be completed in a short time (i.e., 10-15 minutes). Three applied 
linguists were also consulted to ensure that the question items were rigorous. Appendix 7 
contains a full listing of the questionnaire items. 
The questionnaire is divided into three sections: introduction, questions about each 
of the four accidents in turn, and background questions. It contains a mixture of question 
types: 5-scale Likert items, yes/no closed items, and multiple choice questions. There is 
only one item in the first section: 
• Q1 – Studying past airline accidents is important for improving current airline safety. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
The second section has five items that are repeated for each of the four accidents. 
The questionnaire design uses page skip logic so that, if respondents answer “No” to the 
first question about an accident, they are not asked further questions about that accident. 
The items for one accident (1977 Tenerife) are as follows: 
• Q2 – On 27th March 1977, there was a runway collision between KLM Flight 4805 
and Pan Am Flight 1736 at Los Rodeos Airport on the island of Tenerife. Have you 
heard of the 1977 Tenerife accident? 
[Yes / No] 
• Q3 – Where did you hear about the 1977 Tenerife accident? (You can select more 
than one answer.) 
[Accident report / Another pilot / Book / Company training / IATA publication / 
ICAO publication / Internet / Magazine or newspaper article / TV documentary / TV 
or radio news / Other (please specify)] 
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• Q4 – The 1977 Tenerife accident is relevant to current airline operations. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
• Q5 – Insufficient English proficiency of pilots played a contributing role in the 1977 
Tenerife accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
• Q6 – Insufficient English proficiency of air traffic controllers played a contributing 
role in the 1977 Tenerife accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
The final section includes ten questions relating to demographics. These questions 
ask respondents about their: rank, training appointments, flight hours, age, gender, airline, 
nationality (or nationalities), native language(s), other languages known and ICAO 
language proficiency level. 
The questionnaire was distributed via the internet to UK-based pilots through two 
discussion forums operated by the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA). One of the 
forums is for all BALPA members and the other is for British Airways pilots only. These 
are closed forums where members (i.e., airline pilots) discuss professional issues. 
 
6.1.2.2 Survey Demographics 
The survey was open on the BALPA discussion forums for two months (April-May 
2018) and there were 92 respondents. Four outlier respondents spent less than one minute 
on the survey and only completed two questions. The remaining respondents answered 
questions about the four accidents, and 74 participants completed all sections including the 
demographic questions. A sample survey response from one de-identified participant 
(respondent #23) is reproduced in Appendix 8. 
All of the respondents were airline pilots. A majority were captains and most had a 
large number of flight hours. In terms of gender and nationality, there was a narrow range 
of backgrounds: almost all participants were male and the great majority were British. 
Nearly all the respondents were native English speakers, with a handful of native speakers 
of other European languages. There were five maximal bilinguals (English-Danish, 
English-Dutch, English-German, English-Irish and English-Welsh). Below is a summary 
of the demographic information: 
• Rank – 60.8% of respondents were captains and 39.2% were first officers (n=74); 
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• Training appointments – 23.0% were technical trainers and 2.7% were human factors 
trainers (n=74);38 
• Flight hours – 59.5% had 10,000+ flight hours and 18.9% had less than 5,000 flight 
hours (n=74); 
• Age – 21.6% were older than 55, 25.7% were 46-55, 31.1% were 36-45, and 21.6% 
were 35 or younger (n=74); 
• Gender – 97.3% were male and 2.7% were female (n=74); 
• Airline – a significant number of respondents worked at British Airways (32 pilots); 
the other airlines were Thomson Airways (17), Virgin Atlantic (5), easyJet (4), 
Norwegian (2), Air Berlin (1), Qatar (1), flybe (1) and Jet2.com (1) (n=64);39 
• Nationality – 87.8% of respondents were British; other nationalities were Dutch 
(4.1%), Irish (2.7%), Danish (1.4%), German (1.4%), Scottish (1.4%) and Welsh 
(1.4%) (n=74); 
• Native languages – 97.3% of respondents were native English speakers; there were 
also native speakers of Dutch (4.1%), Danish (1.4%), German (1.4%), Irish (1.4%) 
and Welsh (1.4%) (n=74); 
• Other languages – the most common other languages were French (24 pilots), German 
(16 pilots) and Spanish (4 pilots) (n=39). 
 
6.1.2.3 Data Processing 
After the survey had been open for two months, I downloaded the data from the 
SurveyMonkey account as a single Excel file. This file contained all the responses as well 
as metadata including the dates and times at which participants started and completed the 
survey. In addition to the downloaded data, the SurveyMonkey system allows results to be 
displayed as: a summary for each item; trends in the responses for items by day, week or 
month; and responses of individual participants. I exported summaries for several items in 
the form of bar charts and tables. The summaries indicated the number of participants who 
answered or skipped each question. 
 
38
 Technical training involves the skills and knowledge required to fly an aircraft. Human factors 
training covers domains such as communication, decision making and stress management.  
39
 On the advice of airline captains that I consulted while creating the questionnaire, this question 
was made optional due to the reluctance of some pilots to disclose their company. 
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I checked the data for outlier respondents who had: completed the survey too 
quickly, given the same response repeatedly, or entered nonsensical responses. Then the 
data were coded in preparation for the statistical analysis. Data cells in the Excel file were 
colour-coded so that survey items matched the four research questions: items relating to 
RQ A were coloured yellow; RQ B items were green; RQ C were blue; and RQ D were 
grey. Numerical coding of the responses for the yes/no closed items and the 5-scale Likert 
items was done as follows: 
• Yes/no items – Yes / No    =>   1 / 0 
• 5-scale Likert items – Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly 
disagree   =>   5 / 4 / 3 / 2 / 1 
Most of the questionnaire items were closed questions, but several multiple choice 
questions included an open-ended “Other (please specify)” option. I manually checked the 
responses for these items using the question summaries and adjusted the data as necessary. 
For example, Q22 asked respondents whether their rank was “Captain”, “First officer” or 
“Other”. One participant had used the “Other” option to enter “Senior First Officer”, which 
I coded as “First officer”. 
 
6.1.2.4 Data Analysis 
The survey of airline pilots generated quantitative data which were analysed using 
descriptive statistics. The four research questions (RQs A-D) were used to structure the 
analysis. The correspondence between RQs A-D and the items on the survey questionnaire 
was as follows: 
• RQ A: learning from past accidents – this question was addressed by Q1 and also, for 
each individual accident, by Q4, Q9, Q14 and Q19 (all 5-scale Likert items); 
• RQ B: pilots’ awareness of past accidents – this question was addressed by Q2, Q7, 
Q12 and Q17 (all yes/no closed items); 
• RQ C: sources of information – this question was addressed by Q3, Q8, Q13 and Q18 
(multiple choice items with one free response “Other” option); 
• RQ D: insufficient English proficiency – Q5, Q10, Q15 and Q20 addressed the 
English proficiency of pilots, while Q6, Q11, Q16 and Q21 addressed that of air 




6.1.3 Semi-Structured Pilot Interviews 
In accordance with the sequential explanatory mixed methods design, after the 
online survey had been completed I conducted a series of interviews with one of the survey 
participants. The purpose of the interviews was to discuss the survey results in detail and 
collect qualitative data that might offer an explanation for any significant or surprising 
results from the survey. 
 
6.1.3.1 Data Collection 
One of the pilots who participated in the survey was selected as a key informant 
(KI) for the interviews. The KI has been an airline captain since 2006. There were several 
reasons for selecting this participant: 
• his considerable experience of international airline flying; 
• his interest in communication problems on the flight deck; 
• an ability to articulate his experiences and observations; 
• a willingness to participate in an extended series of interviews; 
• his availability for interview on a regular basis. 
This captain met the criteria that were laid out by the anthropologist Marc-Adélard 
Tremblay for an “ideal informant” in terms of his role in the community, knowledge, 
willingness, communicability and impartiality. Moreover, his close interest in the 
professional behaviour of other pilots and aviation workers, and his ability to observe 
critically and make inferences about their behaviour mark him out as a “natural observer” 
(Tremblay, 1989). 
I adopted a semi-structured approach for the interviews because this provided 
flexibility and allowed for extended probing of the survey results. For instance, it offered 
an opportunity to explore how the KI characterized the four accidents, and to discuss 
related experiences from his own flying career. I was also able to probe the sources of 
information that airline pilots use to learn about accidents. Drawbacks of semi-structured 
interviews include the significant amount of time and effort they take, and the requirement 
for interviewer sophistication (Adams, 2015). These disadvantages were outweighed by 
the increased depth that the qualitative interview data added to the quantitative data from 
the survey. 
When the captain’s flying schedule allowed, some of the interviews took place 
face-to-face during layovers in Tokyo. Others were conducted online using the FaceTime 
 
 146 
and Zoom video call systems. All of the interviews were recorded with the KI’s consent. A 
mixture of closed- and open-ended questions were used to guide the interviews, as shown 
in Appendix 9. Additional questions were asked in response to topics that came up in the 
course of the discussions. The questions used to guide the interviews were divided into the 
following two sections: 
• Past accidents – RQs A-D plus follow-up questions to elicit more information about 
the reasons for the KI’s responses, his attitudes to the accidents, and related personal 
experiences; 
• Background questions – the same demographic questions that were used in the airline 
pilot survey. 
 
6.1.3.2 Biographical Data for Key Informant (KI) 
The KI is a native English speaker and his nationality is British. He has been a 
captain at a major European airline since 2006. He was 51 years old at the start of the 
interviews, and had accrued approximately 15,000 flight hours.  
A series of 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the KI between 
August 2019 and June 2020. We discussed the survey questions and results in five of the 
interviews (#5-9). In the remaining interviews we discussed the ACT glossary, which is 
outlined in Section 6.2. Appendix 10 has details of the interviews including a summary of 
their content. 
 
6.1.3.3 Data Processing 
A MacBook Pro laptop computer was used to record each of the interviews in an 
audio M4A format. Following each interview, I listened to the recording and logged the 
following metadata: the interview date, format (face-to-face or online), recording length, 
questions asked, and points to follow up on in subsequent interviews. The audio quality 
was poor for some of the face-to-face meetings. I used Audacity audio editing software to 
remove background noise from these recordings. In addition, I transcribed excerpts of the 
audio that were especially pertinent to the analysis. 
 
6.1.3.4 Data Analysis 
The interviews gathered qualitative data relating to the four research questions 
(RQs A-D), as indicated in Appendix 9. I listened to each interview recording several 
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times and conducted manual content analysis, coding the data within the framework of the 
research questions. The correspondence between RQs A-D and the interview questions 
was as follows: 
• RQ A: learning from past accidents – this question was addressed by Q1-2; 
• RQ B: pilots’ awareness of past accidents – this question was addressed by Q3-6; 
• RQ C: sources of information – this question was addressed by Q7-9; 





6.2 STAGE TWO – Analysis of the Avianca 052 Accident 
The second stage of the analysis examines the communication problems which 
occurred in one of the accidents that was featured in the survey and cited by ICAO. The 
accident is the 1990 crash of Avianca Flight 052 at Cove Neck, New York. To facilitate 
the analysis, I used the literature review database to create a glossary of communication 
factors: the Aviation Communication Toolkit (ACT). The methodology for Stage Two is 
outlined in Figure 16. This stage is framed by the question: How did the language use of 
pilots and controllers contribute to the Avianca 052 accident? 
 
 


























As discussed in Section 1.6, there were two main reasons for selecting the Avianca 
Flight 052 accident. Firstly, several issues relating to the communication of pilots and ATC 
were left unresolved following publication of the official report by the NTSB. Secondly, 
the Avianca 052 crash has not been analysed as thoroughly as some of the other accidents 
cited by ICAO (i.e., the 1977 Tenerife and 1995 Cali accidents). 
 
6.2.1 Research Questions E-H 
I formulated four research questions to guide the analysis of language use in the 
accident. The questions were derived from Document 9835, the official guide to the ICAO 
language proficiency programme. As noted previously, Document 9835 indirectly refers to 
four accidents that involved communication problems: Tenerife, 1977; Cove Neck, 1990; 
Cali, 1995; and New Delhi, 1996. The document states that in each case “insufficient 
English language proficiency on the part of the flight crew or a controller had played a 
contributing role in the chain of events leading to the accident” (ICAO, 2010). 
Document 9835 does not include any analysis of the four accidents. It simply states 
three ways in which language use can contribute to accidents and incidents: 
1. “incorrect use of standardized phraseologies”; 
2. “lack of plain language proficiency”; 
3. “the use of more than one language in the same airspace” (ICAO 2010, p. 1-1). 
The document also notes that the language performance of individuals may be affected by 
other factors such as “levels of attention, mood, stress, verbal working memory and verbal 
processing abilities” (ICAO 2010, p. 2-3). 
Based on the propositions put forward in Document 9835, I framed the following 
research questions to guide the analysis of the Avianca 052 accident: 
• RQ E – Did the incorrect use of standard phraseology by pilots and/or air traffic 
controllers contribute to the accident? 
• RQ F – Did a lack of plain language proficiency of pilots and/or air traffic controllers 
contribute to the accident? 
• RQ G – Did the use of more than one language in the same airspace by pilots and/or 
air traffic controllers contribute to the accident? 
• RQ H – Did the influence of other factors on the language use of pilots and/or air 




6.2.2 An Aviation Communication Toolkit 
In order to facilitate the analysis of language use in the accident, I first compiled a 
glossary of communication factors: the Aviation Communication Toolkit (ACT). The ACT 
glossary lists core terms relating to the communication of pilots and controllers. The terms 
are defined and explained using examples taken from accident and incident reports. The 
glossary is essentially a communication toolkit that provides specialist information for the 
analysis of communication breakdowns. Figure 17 shows the 3-part cyclical process used 
to construct the glossary. The process drew on the literature review database and involved 
another set of semi-structured interviews with the KI. 
 
 

















6.2.2.1 List of Factors 
ICAO Document 9835 contains multiple references to the risk of “communication 
breakdown”. This catch-all phrase is used in aviation to cover a myriad of communication 
problems. Illustrating its ubiquity, NASA’s ASRS incident database lists more than 18,700 
incidents which involved communication breakdowns (ASRS, n.d.). Although valuable as 
a general construct, communication breakdown does not explain specific communication 
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processes (Cookson, 2017a). In the ACT glossary, this construct is broken into discrete 
communication factors. The factors can then be used to analyse the processes by which 
communication broke down in specific accidents and incidents. 
The first step in compiling the ACT glossary was to draw up an initial list of 
communication factors using the literature review database. This list was progressively 
modified based on feedback from the KI interviews, and the factors were divided into 
categories (e.g., the workplace, the radio, and ways of speaking). Some of the factors are 
small-scale features of speech (e.g., repetition). Others are larger-scale phenomena that 
impact not only communication but also other aspects of flight operations (e.g., fatigue and 
startle effect). 
 
6.2.2.2 Glossary Entries 
In the second part of the process shown in Figure 17, I designed a template for the 
glossary entries. I then used the literature review database to create entries for individual 
communication factors. The entries draw on information from a range of fields including 
applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, cognitive psychology, social psychology, aviation 
human factors and accident investigation. Each entry describes one factor associated with 
communication problems that pilots and air traffic controllers may experience. The entries 
include the following elements: 
• Meaning – a concise definition of the factor; 
• Communication risk – the risk posed by the factor expressed as a factual conditional 
sentence based on the “findings as to risk” format described in Section 3.8; 
• Language indicator – specific instances of language symptomatic of the factor; 
• Accidents & incidents – events in which this was a contributory factor; 
• Further reading – sources with more detailed information. 
In addition, most entries have a short dialogue illustrating the factor. The dialogues are 
authentic interactions, taken from accident and incident reports, which show the actual 
language use of pilots and controllers. Some dialogues feature an exchange that was a 
critical communication in an accident or incident. 
 
6.2.2.3 Pilot Interviews 
The third part of the process involved further semi-structured interviews with the 
KI. The purpose of the interviews was to collect feedback on: (1) the list of factors, (2) the 
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glossary entry template, and (3) individual glossary entries. The procedure used for data 
collection, processing and analysis was the same as outlined in Section 6.1.3. Once again 
the interviews were recorded with the KI’s consent. The following questions guided the 
discussion in the interviews, with additional questions being asked as necessary: 
• Q1 – What do you think about the template for glossary entries? 
(Comment on its usefulness, usability, format and content.) 
• Q2 – What do you think about the list of communication factors? 
(Suggest changes you think should be made to the list, such as additions, deletions 
and revisions. Also, indicate the factors most relevant to your work.) 
• Q3 – What do you think about the individual glossary entries? 
(Suggest any changes you think should be made, for example, to improve the 
readability of an entry or to rectify omissions. Also, describe any experiences you 
have had related to an entry.) 
The cycle shown in Figure 17 was repeated after each interview. I revised both the 
list of factors and the glossary entries based on the interview feedback, and then conducted 
another interview. The process continued until the ACT glossary was robust enough for the 
analysis of the Avianca 052 accident. 
 
6.2.3 Analysis of Language Use in the Accident 
The aim of this study is to analyse the language use of pilots in the context in which 
it occurs. The aim follows the principles of ethnography of communication (EOC) and 
interdiscourse communication for analysing speech and interaction in the context in which 
it emerges, as outlined in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Furthermore, the study recognises that the 
context is not limited to the setting of an interaction and the roles of participants. It also 
includes other layers, for example organizational influences, which may be spatially or 
temporally distant from an accident. The two case studies that were described in Section 
3.3, the 1981 Binghampton chemical fire and the 1986 Challenger space shuttle explosion, 
highlight the importance of understanding the organizational context in which decisions 
are made. 
This study is in line with contemporary approaches to the analysis of accidents in 
high-risk complex systems, such as Reason’s Swiss Cheese model, the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), and the Man-Technology-Organisation 
(MTO) model. These approaches acknowledge that accidents are invariably the result of 
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the co-incidence of multiple factors that are operating at various levels, from the acts of 
individuals to the influence of organizational culture or regulations (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003; Reason, Hollnagel & Paries, 2006). 
The following paragraphs describe the methodology for analysing the language use 
of pilots in the Avianca 052 accident. Figure 18 depicts the 3-part iterative process that 
was followed. This process allowed timelines to be constructed for the accident. Then I 
was able to identify and analyse the recurring communication phenomena of interest and 
the critical communications. 
 
 

















6.2.3.1 Data Collection 
Two sets of data were collected about the Avianca 052 accident: data relating to the 
accident context, and data relating to the communication of pilots and air traffic controllers 
during the flight. 
The first set of data relates to the accident context. These data are multi-layered. 
They include the airline history, details of its organizational culture, the aircraft condition, 
the condition of the pilots and controllers, and the history of the Avianca 052 flight. Data 
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were obtained from the NTSB accident report and from other documents in the literature 
review database. In addition, I conducted a search of articles in the New York Times. This 
newspaper was selected because the crash site was in New York and the articles are readily 
accessible online. ProQuest databases were searched for the period 1950 to 2018 with the 
search term “Avianca AND accident”, source type “newspaper” and publication title “New 
York Times”. 
The second set of data concerns communication between the pilots and controllers. 
As is standard procedure after an accident, the NTSB investigation into the Avianca 052 
crash examined two types of audio recordings: (1) cockpit communications recorded by 
the Avianca CVR, and (2) pilot-controller communications recorded at relevant ATC 
facilities. The NTSB is prohibited from releasing CVR recordings under US law, but can 
publish excerpts of transcripts considered relevant to an investigation (see Appendix 11). I 
submitted requests for information to the NTSB in an attempt to gain access to all or part 
of the audio recordings, but these requests were not successful.40 
For the analysis of language use I used the eight transcripts of CVR and ATC audio 
recordings in the accident report.41 Appendix 12 has a summary of the transcripts, which 
total 184 pages. The transcripts are a written representation of oral communications that 
took place on the day of the accident. They include communications between ATC units on 
the ground, between controllers and multiple aircraft, and amongst the Avianca flight crew. 
They cover different periods of time, some of which overlap. As a result, certain exchanges 
are in two transcripts. For instance, many transmissions between the Avianca crew and the 
controllers are recorded in both the CVR and ATC transcripts. 
 
6.2.3.2 Data Processing 
For the context data, the newspaper search of articles about Avianca accidents in 
the New York Times yielded 100 results. Irrelevant articles were removed manually, 
which left 92 items. A summary of these was downloaded as an Excel file. To code the 
 
40
 I sent a request via the NTSB Request for Information Product website on 16
th
 April 2017 but 
received no reply. I subsequently made multiple attempts to submit Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests via the NTSB website between 2017 and 2020. These attempts were unsuccessful 
due to repeated technical issues (e.g., “Secure Connection Failed” errors). 
41
 Previous studies have analysed pilot and controller communication using CVR transcript data 
from accident reports. See, for example, Driscoll (2002) and Nitayaphorn (2009). 
 
 155 
articles, I used the ProQuest database subject codes as a base and made manual revisions 
as necessary. Since the ProQuest codes are broad categories (e.g., “accidents and safety”), 
many revisions involved adding detail (e.g., specifying whether the article was about the 
“emergency response” or “interviews with survivors”). Also, the ProQuest coding was not 
always thorough, for instance it identified some, but not all, of the articles about drug 
smuggling. 
For the communication data, I downloaded the Avianca 052 accident report as a 
PDF file from the NTSB website. I then transferred the transcript data to Word and Excel 
files to facilitate the analysis. Two problems emerged during this process. Firstly, the PDF 
file transcripts contained numerous typographical errors: for example, “naintain” instead of 
“maintain”, and “Xvianca” for “Avianca”. I made corrections to obvious mistakes, which 
are indicated by footnotes in Chapter 7. Errors may have been introduced in the initial 
typing of the accident report. Or they might have occurred when the report was scanned 
using optical character recognition (OCR) software to make a PDF version. I contacted the 
NTSB about the errors and asked if a hard copy of the report was available. Unfortunately 
I was unable to obtain any further information.42 The second problem that emerged relates 
to pilot-controller exchanges that are in both the CVR and ATC transcripts. There are 
many discrepancies between the different versions of these exchanges. Where relevant, 
footnotes in Chapter 7 detail the discrepancies. 
 
6.2.3.3 Data Analysis 
As indicated in Figure 18, the data analysis consists of the following elements: 
constructing timelines for the accident, identifying the recurring phenomena of interest and 
the critical communications, and then analysing the recurring phenomena and critical 
communications. 
A timeline is a representation of the key events, processes and communications that 
are relevant to an accident. Two timelines were constructed for the Avianca 052 accident 
based on the context data and the communication data. Together they covered a period 
from years to seconds preceding the crash. The construction of the timelines was informed 
by two principles outlined by Dekker (2006). Firstly, the air transport system is complex 
 
42
 I contacted the NTSB Request for Information Product website on 28
th
 April 2017. They sent the 
following response: “What do you mean by ‘scanning errors’? We do not have any hard copies of 
this publication.” I then sent details of the errors, but did not receive a reply. 
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and nonlinear. Events or decisions may have unforeseen consequences years after they take 
place. Secondly, it is recognized that the CVR and ATC recordings are only “partial data 
traces” which represent the human behaviour that occurred as the accident unfolded. The 
data traces should not be mistaken for actual human behavior. 
To investigate the communication data I drew on the conversation analysis (CA) 
tool developed by Nevile (2006) for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) (see 
Section 2.6.2). The method that was adopted for this study was novel in several regards: 
Nevile’s CA methodology was applied to pilot-ATC communications, not intracockpit 
communications; it was applied to written transcripts, not audio data; and it was used in 
conjunction with the grammar of context and the ACT glossary. 
The communication data were first examined using the technique of unmotivated 
looking, in which there is no specific focus or intention. Then the data were examined 
using motivated looking, which is informed by knowledge about the context, such as the 
conclusions and dissenting statements in the NTSB accident report. These two techniques 
were used to identify the following features: 
• Recurring phenomena – “communication phenomena of special interest that recur 
over the whole recording”; 
• Critical communications – “key periods of interaction for close analysis”, which are 
considered to be contributory to the accident (Nevile, 2006, pp. 19-20). 
The linguistic analysis of both the recurring communication phenomena and the 
critical communications was based on a tripod of methodologies: (1) the CA techniques 
outlined in Section 2.6, (2) the grammar of context framework described in Section 4.5, 
and (3) the ACT glossary introduced in Section 6.2.2. The rationale for using multiple 
approaches was that by examining the same event from different angles it is possible to 
clarify both expected and unexpected findings. The layering of information provides a 
richer explanation of the causal processes at work during the accident. 
After the first round of analysis was complete, I repeated the cycle depicted in 
Figure 18. Additional data were collected as necessary, the timelines were revised, and 
further analysis carried out on the recurring phenomena and critical communications. The 
cycle was continued until the analysis produced a comprehensive account of the language 






CHAPTER 7: Findings 
 
In this chapter, the results of the study are presented in two parts: Stage One and 
Stage Two. Stage One examines the relevance of past airline accidents to current flight 
operations and addresses RQs A-D. In this section, I report the results from: (1) the survey 
of pilots’ attitudes to past accidents cited by ICAO, and (2) the follow-up interviews with 
the KI. Stage Two focuses on one accident, the crash of Avianca Flight 052, and addresses 
RQs E-H. This section starts with a report on the Aviation Communication Toolkit (ACT) 
glossary. Then I present the findings of the analysis of language use in the Avianca 052 
accident, which identified three recurring communication phenomena of interest and six 
critical communications. The structure of the chapter is shown below. 
 
7.1 STAGE ONE – The Relevance of Past Accidents 
7.1.1 RQ A – The Importance of Past Accidents 
7.1.2 RQ B – Pilots’ Awareness of Past Accidents 
7.1.3 RQ C – Sources of Information 
7.1.4 RQ D – Insufficient English Proficiency 
 
7.2 STAGE TWO – Language Use in the Avianca 052 Accident 
7.2.1 The ACT Glossary 
7.2.2 RQs E-H & Communication Factors 
7.2.3 Recurring Phenomena in the Avianca 052 Accident 




7.1 STAGE ONE – The Relevance of Past Accidents 
In Stage One, I report the findings from the online survey of pilot attitudes and the 
KI interviews. The survey and interviews examined the relevance of past accidents cited 
by ICAO to current airline operations. They specifically addressed the four accidents that 
were referenced in Document 9835:  
• the 1977 runway collision at Tenerife in the Canary Islands; 
• the 1990 fuel exhaustion crash at Cove Neck, near New York; 
• the 1995 controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) near Cali, Colombia; 
• the 1996 mid-air collision near New Delhi. 
The survey and interview findings are presented for each of the four research questions 
(RQ A-D) in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
7.1.1 RQ A – The Importance of Past Accidents 
7.1.1.1 Survey Results 
The first survey item asked whether studying past airline accidents is important for 
improving current airline safety. The respondents overwhelmingly think that studying past 
accidents is important: 
• Past accidents – 91.3% of respondents strongly agree, and 98.9% agree or strongly 
agree (n=92). 
The respondents were also asked whether each of the four accidents cited by ICAO 
is relevant to current airline operations. For three of the accidents, more than 95% believe 
they are still relevant. For the 1996 New Delhi crash, the figure is slightly under 80%: 
• 1977 Tenerife – 96.6% of respondents agree/strongly agree (n=88); 
• 1990 Cove Neck – 96.5% of respondents agree/strongly agree (n=57); 
• 1995 Cali – 95.2% of respondents agree/strongly agree (n=63); 
• 1996 New Delhi – 79.2% of respondents agree/strongly agree (n=24). 
 
7.1.1.2 Interview Results 
For the KI, studying past accidents is “very important” and is part of an ongoing 
process of reflection and self-awareness. This process helps him to recognise mistakes that 
he has made in the past, and how they potentially might have led to an incident or accident. 
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It also allows him to identify what caused the mistakes, and how he can preventing them 
happening again in future: 
I think when you’re able to sit and read someone’s report on an 
accident or an incident and say to yourself, you know I’ve actually 
done that, I’ve made that mistake myself and it hasn’t led to deaths, 
but it does make you reflect on perhaps why you personally had 
made that mistake and what you might do to avoid repeating it. But 
you don’t even have an awareness of the potential of your own error 
until you read about how the same error or a similar error has led to 
an accident. (Interview 5) 
During the interviews, he cited other airline accidents that he had learned specific 
lessons from. These included the 1972 Staines, 1989 Kegworth, 2009 Colgan Air and 2016 
Dubai accidents. He noted the value of such accidents being referenced in human factors 
courses to illustrate specific hazards and training points. 
 
7.1.2 RQ B – Pilots’ Awareness of Past Accidents 
7.1.2.1 Survey Results 
Respondents were asked if they have heard of the four accidents referred to in 
Document 9835. All participants know of the 1977 Tenerife collision. A substantial 
majority have heard of the 1990 Cove Neck and 1995 Cali crashes. However, less than 
one-third of the pilots surveyed have heard of the 1996 New Delhi accident: 
• 1977 Tenerife – 100% have heard of the accident (n=92); 
• 1990 Cove Neck – 70.1% have heard of the accident (n=87); 
• 1995 Cali – 78.1% have heard of the accident (n=82); 
• 1996 New Delhi – 32.1% have heard of the accident (n=78). 
 
7.1.2.2 Interview Results 
The KI has heard of all four of the accidents. He provided descriptions in his own 
words of key features of the accidents, as shown in Table 9. The KI remarked several times 
that the accidents involved multiple causal factors. Nevertheless, each description focuses 




Table 9: Key informant’s descriptions of four accidents cited by ICAO. 
 
ACCIDENT KEY FEATURES OF ACCIDENT 
(ALL QUOTES FROM INTERVIEW 5; EMPHASIS ADDED) 
1977 Tenerife “In my head it’s primarily a command gradient issue… There are all sorts of 
things going on. I suppose operating in an unfamiliar airfield in bad weather 
is part of it, and then the communication difficulties between ATC and the 
Dutch crew, but… it’s always struck me that one as a command gradient 
thing primarily.” 
1990 Cove Neck “It would never have happened... if they were all using English as their first 
language and therefore able to not have to code switch, I suspect that the 
message would have got across better, or it would have been recognized that 
it hadn’t got across from the aircraft to the ground controller. That seems a 
much more clear-cut language barrier based accident.” 
1995 Cali “That to me looks like a breakdown of procedures on the flight deck coupled 
with becoming too focused with your FMC [flight management computer] 
and programming that and insufficient situational awareness of where you 
are in terms of the surrounding terrain and the MSA [minimum safe 
altitude]… looks like a failure to follow procedures accident.” 
1996 New Delhi “They were cleared to 15 [thousand feet] and they descended to 14, well you 
can do that in your first language quite easily… Even in English, where 
everyone’s speaking English, it’s possible to do it. So again I don’t see 
language as being the main [issue]. If I had to put that [accident] in a box I’d 
say that’s a procedural error.” 
 
 
The KI also described various experiences from his career that the four accidents 
reminded him of. The recollections were triggered by one aspect of an accident, which was 
not always the issue highlighted in Table 9. The recollections included the following 
stories (all from Interview 6): 
• 1977 Tenerife – the KI noted that one of the factors in this accident was KLM Flight 
4805 starting its takeoff roll before receiving takeoff clearance; this reminded him of 
an occasion when he landed at Verona Airport without receiving landing clearance 
due to distraction and excessive workload; 
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• 1990 Cove Neck – Avianca Flight 052 crashed due to fuel exhaustion; this brought to 
mind cockpit briefings he had made in situations “where the amount of fuel predicted 
to be left onboard is moving away from the comfortable level”; 
• 1995 Cali – the crew of American Airlines Flight 965 ignored warning cues to 
continue their approach to Cali;43 this reminded the KI of a simulator check ride that 
he failed when a mistuned radio aid led to snowballing workload within the cockpit; 
he commented that “it’s really hard to recognise that a situation has got away from 
you, cos you go from everything is fine, all under control, to everything’s gone right 
out the window really really quickly, and your capacity bucket fills really fast”; 
• 1996 New Delhi – this accident involved a mid-air collision; it triggered a detailed 
description of TCAS (traffic collision avoidance system) training that the KI had 
experienced. 
 
7.1.3 RQ C – Sources of Information 
7.1.3.1 Survey Results 
The respondents were asked where they heard about each of the accidents. This 
was a multiple choice question for which respondents could select more than one response. 
There were 11 options including an open “Other (please specify)” comment box. 
For three of the accidents, TV documentaries are the most common information 
source. For the other accident (1995 Cali), company training is the most common and TV 
documentaries are second. The most common sources are as follows: 
• 1977 Tenerife – TV documentary (76.1%), company training (61.4%) and accident 
report (50.0%) (n=88); 
• 1990 Cove Neck – TV documentary (50.9%), accident report (33.3%) and company 
training (33.3%) (n=57); 
• 1995 Cali – company training (66.7%), TV documentary (47.6%) and accident report 
(46.0%) (n=63); 




 This is an example of plan continuation bias, an unconscious cognitive bias to persist with the 
original plan even though conditions are changing (Dismukes et al., 2007). 
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Many respondents report multiple sources of information per accident. If the results 
are aggregated for all four accidents, 67.7% of respondents cite more than one source of 
information. Among respondents who include TV documentaries, the figure rises to 84.9% 
citing more than one source, with 68.3% citing three sources or more. 
 
7.1.3.2 Interview Results 
During the interviews with the KI, I asked where he learned about each of the four 
accidents. In Interview 5, he reported the following sources: 
• 1977 Tenerife – company training (HF course), TV documentaries, magazine articles 
and news articles; he noted “Of the four [accidents] that’s the one that’s had the 
widest coverage, and I’d say I’ve probably seen that in most media sources, and most 
of those boxes to tick [in the survey] I could probably have ticked.” 
• 1990 Cove Neck – company training (HF course); 
• 1995 Cali – company training (HF course) and probably also a TV documentary; 
• 1996 New Delhi – contemporary news reports and company training (for the TCAS 
system). 
In Interview 8, the KI spoke at length about TV documentaries that depict airline 
accidents. He noted the value of using a “four-minute extract” or “90-second Youtube 
clip” from a documentary to reinforce a learning point during training. However, he also 
commented that the primary purpose of documentaries is entertainment: “I doubt many 
documentaries are made as a learning tool, even if some of them are used as a learning tool 
in human factors courses and what have you, they are not made with that intent, they’re 
made to entertain.” 
In recent years there has been a significant change in the viewing habits of the KI. 
Ten years ago he watched TV documentaries. Since then “the delivery of media has 
changed in the household” with the advent of Netflix and Amazon Prime. As a result, he 
no longer watches this genre of programme. He suspects this change might be reflected 
across the pilot population, and notes the importance of Youtube and Netflix products for 
his children’s generation. He summarises: “There’s been a huge change in our viewing 
habits in the last three or four years.” 
The KI related how TV documentaries influenced the way he responded during one 
particular incident when he was a first officer. He had watched a documentary series with 
an opening sequence that featured alert sounds from a ground proximity warning system 
 
 163 
(GPWS).44 As a professional pilot, he recognised that the audio was not a genuine warning, 
but was instead the sound made by a GPWS device being tested: “Terrain terrain whoop 
whoop pull up pull up”. Nevertheless, the sequence left a strong impression on him. Some 
months later he was flying through an intense rainstorm, during the approach to Verona 
Airport in Italy, when a GPWS warning was triggered: 
It freaked me out. I was freaked out anyway but the message I had 
subconsciously got from this documentary series was: when you 
hear that noise, you’re going to crash. 
Prior to the warning going off, there had been a lot of noise and distraction in the cockpit 
environment, but both pilots had felt in control of the situation: 
The impact of the raindrops on the cockpit was making 
communication quite difficult as well. So there was a disorientation 
from the amount of noise on the flight deck. The [Boeing] 737 
wipers were (a) useless and (b) incredibly noisy. So the wipers are 
banging around, the noise of the rain was disorientating and 
distracting, but we still felt everything was fine. And then we get this 
[GPWS] warning indicating everything is not fine any more, exactly 
as implied by the documentary that I’d watched some time in the 
previous 6 months, 12 months. 
After a brief discussion, the pilots continued the flight without further mishap and the 
plane landed safely. It turned out that the density of the rain had triggered a false GPWS 
warning. This incident illustrates how quickly a normal cockpit situation can deteriorate. 
As the KI notes about the documentary opening sequence: “They have suddenly gone from 
thinking everything is fine, to suddenly everything is not fine any more. And that’s exactly 
what we had on this approach [to Verona].” 
In addition, the KI discussed two electronic sources that provide him with 
information about accidents. One source is Wikipedia, which for general purposes he 
considers “as right at it needs to be” although the information is “incomplete”. Another 
source is the internal system used by his airline for sending safety notices to pilots’ iPads. 
During his career, this system has replaced paper notices. He noted two problems with 
electronic notices. First, they are in competition with other applications installed on the 
 
44
 GPWS is an electronic system that alerts pilots if an aircraft is in immediate danger of flying into 
the ground or an obstacle. 
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device: “The iPad is a great distraction. There’s always something else to do on your iPad 
rather than open up a safety publication.” Second, the ease with which electronic bulletins 
can be generated has led to an increase in their quantity: “You just get swamped with it, to 
the point of ignoring them.” 
 
7.1.4 RQ D – Insufficient English Proficiency 
7.1.4.1 Survey Results 
Respondents were asked if insufficient English proficiency of pilots played a 
contributing role in each accident. For three of the accidents, a majority of respondents 
think that it did play a contributing role. The exception is the 1995 Cali crash, for which 
less than 13% agree, and almost 50% disagree or strongly disagree: 
• 1977 Tenerife – 59.1% agree/strongly agree, and 19.3% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=88); 
• 1990 Cove Neck – 66.7% agree/strongly agree, and 7.0% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=57); 
• 1995 Cali – 12.7% agree/strongly agree, and 47.6% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=63); 
• 1996 New Delhi – 58.3% agree/strongly agree, and 8.3% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=24). 
Finally, the respondents were asked whether insufficient English proficiency of air 
traffic controllers was a contributing factor in each accident. The strongest agreement is for 
the 1977 Tenerife accident, with two thirds agreeing and only 10% disagreeing: 
• 1977 Tenerife – 67.0% agree/strongly agree, and 10.2% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=88); 
• 1990 Cove Neck – 29.8% agree/strongly agree, and 36.8% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=57); 
• 1995 Cali – 33.3% agree/strongly agree, and 31.7% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=63); 
• 1996 New Delhi – 50.0% agree/strongly agree, and 16.7% disagree/strongly disagree 
(n=24). 
Therefore, only for the 1977 Tenerife accident do most respondents believe English 
proficiency was a problem on the part of both pilots and controllers. In the case of the 1995 
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Cali accident, by contrast, just a small proportion of respondents (a third or less) think that 
the English proficiency of pilots or controllers was a contributory factor.  
 
7.1.4.2 Interview Results 
In discussing the role played by English proficiency in the four accidents, the KI 
draws on his own flying experiences. He acknowledges that his responses are influenced 
by attitudes he holds towards particular national or regional groups. Regarding the English 
proficiency of pilots, he believes that this is “less likely to have been a factor” in the 1977 
Tenerife collision, but suspects it “played quite a big part” in the 1990 Avianca accident. 
He does not have an opinion about the two other accidents. 
The 1977 Tenerife accident involved a collision between a KLM aircraft (with a 
Dutch crew) and a Pan Am aircraft (with an American crew). In discussing this accident, 
the KI cites his experiences flying with Dutch pilots. He expresses a highly favourable 
evaluation of their English proficiency, although he acknowledges that this has no direct 
bearing on the crew involved in the accident:  
The Dutch pilots I’ve flown with, and of course this doesn’t translate 
directly to how good that Dutch [KLM] captain was, or that Dutch 
[KLM] crew was, or how proficient they were, the Dutch that I have 
flown with, they probably have better English than many English 
people do. (Interview 9) 
Finally, concerning the English proficiency of controllers, the KI thinks it “could 
easily have played a part” in the 1995 Cali accident. He has no opinion about the other 
accidents. The Cali accident involved the controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) of an 
American Airlines aircraft in western Colombia. The KI’s response about this accident is 
prefaced by comments about his experiences flying in South America. In these comments, 
he expresses a negative evaluation of the English proficiency of some air traffic controllers 
in that region: 
I’ve encountered some of the most difficult ATC communication 
[when flying] in South America. I have been to Columbia once, a 
long time ago, and I don’t recall a problem on that trip, but certainly 
going down to Brazil is not without its problems with 





7.2 STAGE TWO – Language Use in the Avianca 052 Accident 
Stage Two presents findings from the analysis of the Avianca Flight 052 accident. 
First I report on the Aviation Communication Toolkit (ACT) glossary that I compiled to 
facilitate the language use analysis. Then I explain how RQs E-H are addressed in the 
analysis. The remaining parts of the chapter detail the analysis of pilot and controller 
language use in the accident. Three recurring communication phenomena of interest and 
six critical communications are identified. These were key components in the process of 
communication breakdown before the crash. They are analysed using three methodologies: 
CA techniques, the grammar of context framework, and the ACT glossary.  
 
7.2.1 The ACT Glossary 
The ACT glossary defines key concepts related to the communication of pilots and 
controllers. On one level it functions as a coding system for diagnosing communication 
problems in airline accidents and incidents. At a deeper level, it allows for the analysis of 
the process by which a communication breakdown occurs. 
In this section, I report on the list of communication factors assembled for the 
glossary, the entries that were created, and stories of intercultural communication told by 
the KI that relate to particular factors. The glossary was compiled using the 3-part cyclical 
process shown in Figure 17 in Chapter 6. An essential part of the process was collecting 
feedback from the KI during the semi-structured interviews. In addition, I received input 
from pilots, controllers, regulators and HF researchers during three presentations I gave at 
international conferences (Cookson 2017a, 2017b, 2020).  
 
7.2.1.1 List of Factors 
The initial list of communication factors was assembled using the literature review 
database, drawing heavily on accident and incident reports. The list was revised based on 
feedback from the pilot interviews. For instance, headphone quality was added to the list at 
the suggestion of the KI. Appendix 13 shows the final list of 68 factors. To make the list 
manageable, the factors were grouped into categories. These were revised several times to 
make the labels and groupings clearer. The final categories are as follows: 
• The workplace – e.g., noise; 
• The body – e.g., fatigue; 
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• The radio – e.g., blocked transmission; 
• Interacting with people – e.g., call sign confusion; 
• Ways of speaking – e.g., code switching; 
• Words and grammar – e.g., idiom. 
During the pilot interviews, it became clear that the KI was more familiar with 
some communication factors than others. Many concepts were familiar because they are an 
integral part of flight operations (e.g, the factors in the workplace or radio categories) or 
they are discussed in HF training courses (e.g., authority gradient, expectation bias and the 
factors in the body category). Other concepts were not familiar. These included several 
factors in the categories of interacting with people (e.g., community of practice, diffusion 
of responsibility and speech community) and ways of speaking (e.g., accommodation, 
avoidance and first language influence). The unfamiliarity of some concepts underscores 
the importance of including clear definitions in the glossary. 
We discussed certain factors at length across multiple interviews. Appendix 10 
shows the factors discussed in the interviews, with those featuring three or more times 
highlighted in bold. It was evident that the KI considers some factors to be more salient 
than others. I therefore asked him to rank the factors in terms of the risk they pose to 
communication. According to his ranking, the most important factors are: distraction, 
fatigue, blocked transmission, message complexity, message length and stuck microphone. 
However, he adds the following caveat: 
…all of those things are based on me as a level 6 [ICAO scale] 
fluent speaker that doesn’t often end up with non-level-6-native-
Brits in the seat next to me. So other people from other communities 
will view many of those [factors] very differently. (Interview 13) 
 
7.2.1.2 Glossary Entries 
The initial template for the glossary entries was drawn up incorporating input from 
a sociolinguist and HF researchers. A series of improvements were made to the template 
design based on feedback from the KI interviews. For example, revisions were made to the 
headings used for each section of the entry (e.g., meaning and communication risk) to 
make them easier to understand. The final format can be seen in the sample entry for one 
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CALL SIGN CONFUSION 
Meaning  A speaker says a call sign incorrectly or a listener mishears a call sign. Confusion is more 
likely if speakers abbreviate call signs or aircraft with similar call signs are on the same radio frequency. 
 
Communication risk  If call sign confusion occurs: the intended recipient of a transmission might 
not act on a clearance; the wrong aircraft may change flight level, heading or radio frequency; and 
resolving confusion may add to the workload of pilots and controllers. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller uses an incorrect call sign. This is 
followed by correction. A similar call sign and similar numbers in previous transmissions may have 
contributed to the confusion. 
 
Dialogue  Tower controller at JFK Airport, New York, speaking with Avianca flight 052, TWA flight 
801 and Avensa flight 520 on January 25, 1990. Language: English.8 





























Avianca zero five two heavy can you increase your airspeed one 
zero knots at all 
Yes we’re doing it 
Yeah ah thanks 
TW eight oh one you’re gaining on the heavy seven oh seven turn left 
heading of ah – one five zero and maintain ah – two thousand 
Okay TWA eight oh one heavy a left to one five zero maintain two 
thousand 
Avianca zero five two cross two two right taxi straight ahead now --- 
correction taxi right ah – right on the outer ground one two one point 
niner 
Correction Avensa five twenty cross two two right taxi right on the 
outer ground point nine 
Cross two two right right on the outer and one two one point niner five 
two zero 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
•  1991 crash of Nigeria Airways 2120 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (FSF, 1993) 
•  1991 runway collision of USAir 1493 and SkyWest 5569 in Los Angeles, USA (NTSB, 1991b) 
•  1997 CFIT of Garuda Indonesia 152 in North Sumatra, Indonesia (KNKT, 2004) 
•  2017 loss of separation between Sichuan 603 and China Southern 6068 over Yangon, Myanmar 
(MAIB, 2017) 
 
Further reading  Monan (1983) discusses call sign problems in the US. Cardosi, Falzarano and 
Han (1998) report on pilot-ATC communication errors including the problem of similar call signs on the 
same frequency. CAP 704 is a study of call sign confusion reports in the UK (CAA, 2000). 
 
Related factors  ABBREVIATION, AMBIGUITY, DISTRACTION, EXPECTATION BIAS, FATIGUE, 
MICROPHONE CLIPPING, NUMBER TRANSPOSITION, WORKLOAD 



































Many of the glossary entries contain a dialogue box. The dialogues are excerpts of 
the actual language use of pilots and controllers which include the communication factor. 
In the dialogue shown in Figure 19, a tower controller (TWR) says an incorrect call sign 
(“Avianca zero five two” at 0221:49) and then gives a correction (“Avensa five twenty” at 
0222:02). The dialogues are taken from transcripts in accident and incident reports. In the 
original reports, various transcription conventions are used to express times, abbreviations, 
translated text and cockpit sounds. A standardized format was developed for the glossary 
dialogues to make them easier to read. 
After I had created individual glossary entries, I collected feedback on them in the 
interviews. Numerous revisions were made to the content of the entries based on feedback 
from the KI. The most common changes were as follows: 
• Meaning – making definitions easier to understand and/or more comprehensive; 
• Communication risk – defining risks more accurately; 
• Dialogue – making the dialogues easier to read; 
• Related factors – adding extra related factors. 
To illustrate the process of revision, the initial version of the entry for call sign 
confusion focused on productive errors made by speakers. In Figure 19, this corresponds to 
the first part of the meaning: “A speaker says a call sign incorrectly”. After discussions 
with the KI in interviews 3 and 4, I modified the entry so that it also included receptive 
errors made by listeners: “or a listener mishears a call sign”. In addition, distraction and 
expectation bias were added to the related factors at the end of the entry. 
A significant proportion of the KI’s comments concerned the risk that certain 
factors posed to communication. Based on these comments, I made substantial changes to 
the communication risk section for the following factors: blocked transmission, call sign 
confusion, expletive, first language influence, message length, number transposition, 
repetition and style shifting.  
Appendix 14 contains glossary entries for 21 communication factors. All of these 
factors are relevant to the crash of Avianca Flight 052. The entries are used in the analysis 
of language use in the accident that follows in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4. 
 
7.2.1.3 Stories of Intercultural Communication 
During the interviews, the KI related stories about his communication experiences 
with pilots, controllers and other personnel in numerous countries. In Appendix 10, the 
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topics covered in the stories are indicated by interview keywords (e.g., ATC in Japan/UK, 
level of controller experience). Some stories describe a specific incident; others are an 
amalgam of multiple experiences. Each story was triggered by discussion of a particular 
communication factor. Here are some examples: 
• Accent – the difficulty that British pilots have understanding the accents of Russian 
controllers; 
• Call sign confusion – a Japanese controller used the wrong call sign several times for 
a British aircraft descending to Haneda International Airport; 
• Code switching – French controllers switching between English and French when 
speaking to aircraft in busy airspace; 
• Face – a Hong Kong Chinese pilot who was training in the UK maintained he 
understood ATC instructions despite attempting to land on a closed section of 
runway; 
• Plain language – pilots using plain language to speak to tug drivers at airports in the 
UK and China; 
• Pronunciation – the difficulty that British pilots have pronouncing place names when 
overflying Russia; 
• Pronunciation – a British flight crew were not able to understand a key word in a 
message from a Japanese controller during the approach to Haneda International 
Airport in Tokyo; 
• Rate of speech – the high rate of speech of controllers in India; 
• Speech community – differences in informal norms for saying call signs between 
controllers in Canada and the US. 
An interesting theme to emerge during the interviews is the suggestion that some 
factors are more likely to occur in certain countries or regions of the world. For instance, 
the KI stated that he often heard code switching in France, or encountered controllers with 
a high rate of speech in India. In the following excerpt, he outlines a specific risk posed by 
code switching: 
For some reason, France, the local traffic... even in TMAs [terminal 
manoeuvring areas] and airways traffic they [controllers] will still 
talk to some of the French traffic in French... It’s quite frustrating. 
You can easily imagine a scenario where in poor visibility someone 
is cleared to land, contradicting your clearance to line up and take 
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off, but they’ve been cleared to land in a foreign language and you as 
you line up, if the transmission had been made in English, you’d 
pick it up and you’d hold position, but if the incorrect clearance to 
land is made in a foreign language, you’re doomed. (Interview 4)45 
Some of the KI’s stories illustrate how factors combine to increase the risk of 
communication problems. In the following example, the interaction of workload and rate 
of speech leads to the situation worsening: 
It tends to happen where there is a high workload in the first place, 
so a high rate of speech causes communication difficulties, [and it] 
just increases everyone’s workload. And in certain countries, India 
being the one that most obviously springs to my mind, when the 
controller’s workload is going up, his speech rate tends to go up, 
which just exacerbates the entire rate of speech issue. (Interview 3) 
One way for pilots to mitigate risks is to discuss possible threats during briefings. 
When flying to Asia, the KI and his crew often discuss threats related to communication 
problems as they start the descent to their destination: 
Usually into Asia one of the first comments anyone makes is 
communication difficulties causing controlled flight into terrain or 
mid-air collision. And so as part of our process to avoid, trap and 
mitigate threats we talk about how to avoid the threat of a 
communication problem becoming a bigger problem and that is to do 
with resolving ambiguity. And that’s sometimes easier said than 
done. (Interview 2) 
The latter excerpt was part of a discussion about ambiguity. It led to a talk about 
two other factors: the limited English vocabulary of some controllers in China, and the 
pronunciation of controllers in Japan. This discussion, and the previous excerpt about the 
interaction of workload and rate of speech, aptly illustrate how interconnected the factors 




 Code switching was identified as a causal factor in the 2000 runway collision in Paris and the 
2001 runway collision in Milan (BEA, 2001; ANSV, 2004). 
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7.2.2 RQs E-H & Communication Factors 
As explained in Section 6.2.1, the research questions for Stage Two (RQs E-H) 
were derived from Document 9835, the official guide to the ICAO language proficiency 
programme. During the analysis of the Avianca 052 accident, it was evident that multiple 
research questions were interwoven in each of the transcript excerpts examined. Therefore, 
for clarity, the findings are presented in two parts: Section 7.2.3 addresses the recurring 
communication phenomena, and Section 7.2.4 reports on critical communications. 
The analysis draws on CA techniques, the grammar of context framework and the 
ACT glossary. When communication factors from the ACT glossary are first cited in a 
section, they are highlighted (e.g., idiom). Glossary entries for the factors are reproduced 
in Appendix 14. The correspondence between RQs E-H and the factors is as follows: 
• RQ E – this question addresses standard phraseology; 
• RQ F – this question addresses plain language; 
• RQ G – this question addresses code switching; 
• RQ H – this question addresses the remaining factors. 
 
 



















The timeline in Figure 20 shows key events during the flight of Avianca 052 on 
25th January 1990. Both parts of the accident analysis use data from the CVR and ATC 
transcripts in the NTSB report. As noted in Section 3.8.1, CVR devices have a limited 
recording duration. For the Avianca 052 accident, the CVR recording only covered the 
final 40 minutes of the flight, from 20:53 to 21:34 EST, as shown on the timeline. 
 
7.2.3 Recurring Phenomena in the Avianca 052 Accident 
In this part of the analysis, the CA technique of unmotivated looking was used to 
identify three communication phenomena that recurred throughout the transcripts: 
• Repetition – the Avianca captain repeatedly requested confirmation of the same item 
of information (Section 7.2.3.1); 
• Code switching – the Avianca first officer frequently switched languages and registers 
during dialogue with ATC and other crew members (Section 7.2.3.2); 
• Style shifting – the final vector (FV) controller alternated between different language 
styles depending on the pilot he was addressing (Sections 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.3.4). 
The following sections present the results for each of these communication phenomena. 
  
7.2.3.1 Repetition: Language Use of the Avianca Captain 
Analysis of the transcript data revealed a recurring phenomenon of interest in the 
communication of the Avianca captain. Following an ATC message containing numerical 
information, the captain would repeatedly request confirmation of the information. This 
pattern of repetition recurred throughout the CVR transcript. It is illustrated by the excerpt 
shown in Table 10. 
There are four speakers in the excerpt: the New York CAMRN approach controller 
(APP), the Avianca captain, the first officer (FO) and the flight engineer (FE). The crew of 
Avianca 052 (AVA052) were seated in the cockpit of their aircraft, which was flying at an 
altitude of 7,000 feet. The captain was flying the plane and the first officer was responsible 
for radio communication with ATC. The APP controller was in the New York TRACON 
ATC facility and was responsible for the aircraft flying through his sector of airspace (see 
Appendix 15). During this period the controller contacted three other planes, but those 










20:54:40 APP (radio) Avianca zero five two turn right right turn heading two two zero I’m 
gunna have to spin you sir 
20:54:45 FO (radio) okay heading two two zero avianca zero five two 
20:54:49 Captain dos veinte47 [two twenty] 
20:54:50 FO dos veinte [two twenty] 
20:55:07 Captain cuanto [how much] 
 FO dos veinte [two twenty] 
20:55:08 Captain dos veinte [two twenty] 
20:55:09 FO dos veinte si senor [two twenty sir] 
20:55:54 APP (radio) Avianca zero five two traffic in your turn twelve thirty five miles 
eastbound at six thousand 
20:55:59 Captain no contact – ah si ahi esta [no contact - - okay we have it] 
20:56:00 FO (radio) Avianca we have the traffic in sight thank you  
20:56:05 FE [unintelligible] 
20:56:07 Captain seis mil [six thousand] 
20:56:13 Captain dos veinte no [two twenty no]  
20:56:14 FO dos veinte [two twenty] 
 
 
The dialogue is in two languages. English was used for radio transmissions and the 
Colombian crew of the Avianca aircraft talked to each other in Spanish. In Table 10 the 
Spanish speech is shown in italics, followed by the English translation from the transcript 
 
46
 There are discrepancies between the radio transmissions in the CVR and ATC 3 transcripts. The 
ATC 3 transcript has the words “I’m going to have to spin you sir” at 20:54:40, and “thirty and 
five miles” at 20:55:52. It also has an extra transmission by the controller at 20:56:01: “Roger”. 
47
 In the CVR transcript this line is “doe veinte”. I changed it to “dos veinte” on the assumption it 
was a typographical or scanning error. 
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in brackets. At 20:54:40, the controller instructed AVA052 to make a 360-degree turn for 
spacing. The instruction is marked because it was realised in a familiar key and the 
controller used plain language with pronouns, colloquialism and an idiom: “I’m gunna 
have to spin you sir”. 
The first officer read back the instruction to the controller at 20:54:45 (“heading 
two two zero”). Then code switching occurred at 20:54:49 as the captain said the heading 
in Spanish (“dos veinte”). From this point until the end of the excerpt, there were seven 
instances of repetition of the heading by the captain and first officer. Including the question 
from the captain at 20:55:07 (“cuanto”), the pilots produced eight utterances to confirm a 
single item of information: the heading of 220° given by the controller. These utterances 
took the form of a series of question-answer adjacency pairs. In each pair of utterances, the 
captain asked for confirmation of the heading (e.g., “dos veinte” at 20:55:08) and the first 
officer answered (“dos veinte si senor”).  
The repetition shown in Table 10 occurred near the start of the period covered by 
the CVR. The pattern recurs throughout the CVR transcript. There are seven occasions 
where the captain repeatedly asked for confirmation of a heading change following an 
ATC message: confirming the seven items of information took a total of 35 utterances. 
There are two other occasions where he similarly requested confirmation of airspeed or 
wind information: these involved a further 17 utterances. 
The Table 10 excerpt also provides evidence regarding the English proficiency of 
the Avianca captain. It is clear that he was monitoring radio transmissions (which were in 
English) because he responded to both messages before the first officer could translate 
them. At 20:54:49, the captain translated the new heading directly after the first officer’s 
read-back, and at 20:55:59 he searched for and located the other aircraft (“the traffic”) 
immediately after the transmission from the approach controller. 
 
7.2.3.2 Code Switching: Language Use of the Avianca First Officer 
The second recurring phenomenon of interest was code switching involving the 
Avianca first officer. This continued throughout the CVR transcript and had presumably 
been present for most, if not all, of the flight. It is illustrated by a two-minute segment of 
communication which is reproduced in Appendix 16. The segment is a composite made 
using data from the CVR, ATC 3 and ATC 4 transcripts. It shows all the communication 
that the first officer engaged in, or could hear, from 21:02 to 21:04 EST. This allows us to 
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examine how the Avianca crew integrated radio messages (in English) with intracockpit 
dialogue (in Spanish). 
The segment chosen is one minute either side of AVA052 entering a new sector of 
airspace. There are multiple participants in the dialogue, including two controllers and the 
crew members of six aircraft, as detailed in Appendix 16. There are also non-speaking 
participants who are not addressed in the dialogue but overhear it because they are in the 
same region of airspace and share a common radio frequency. At the start of the segment 
the Avianca first officer was in contact with the New York CAMRN approach controller 
(APP). Then the aircraft entered a new sector and was handed over to the final vector (FV) 
controller. The change in radio frequency for the new sector resulted in a change in the 
participants that the first officer was interacting with. 
The Avianca first officer was responsible for talking with ATC and therefore had to 
monitor radio transmissions as well as listen to dialogue within the cockpit. Pilots of five 
other aircraft were communicating with the controllers during this segment. The Avianca 
first officer could listen to these exchanges for so-called “party line” information about, for 
example, weather conditions, runways and traffic flow. 
During the two-minute period, there were 21 instances of code switching between 
English and Spanish. These were not evenly distributed: there were only four instances in 
the first half of the segment compared with 17 in the second half. This discrepancy was 
probably partly due to a two-minute ATIS broadcast that was playing until 21:02:31, with 
information about weather and runways at JFK International Airport. It was also partly due 
to the plane entering a new airspace sector halfway through the segment. Throughout the 
CVR transcript there is an uneven distribution of code switching. Bursts of intense 
switching between English and Spanish are interspersed with periods in which it was 
infrequent. 
Most code switching in the segment was intersentential. Some instances were the 
result of routine flight tasks. As shown in Appendix 16, a six-turn exchange between the 
captain and first officer (in Spanish) starting at 21:02:29 was interrupted at 21:02:38 by a 
message from the approach controller (in English) instructing the crew to contact Kennedy 
Tower. Also, following radio exchanges (in English), the captain requested (in Spanish) 
that heading information be repeated at 21:02:59, and the first officer directly translated 
information (into Spanish) for the captain at 21:03:18. 
Several instances of intrasentential code switching occurred near the end of the 
segment when the flight engineer inserted technical English phrases (e.g., “go around 
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procedure”) into a Spanish-language briefing at 21:03:56. The captain had difficulty 
understanding one of the phrases (“nose up attitude”), so the first officer repeated it in 
English followed by a Spanish translation at 21:04:10. 
In addition, there were instances of code switching between standard phraseology 
and plain language. Much of this was intersentential code switching that coincided with the 
switching between English and Spanish because the radio communications (in English) 
featured a lot of phraseology while the intracockpit dialogue (almost all in Spanish) was 
mainly plain language. For example, after a standard phraseology read-back from the 
Avianca first officer to the controller at 21:02:29, the captain said “eh Ave Maria pues” 
(“eh Hail Mary then”). This colloquialism from the captain triggered a plain language 
exchange between him and the first officer. 
Another instance occurred as AVA052 was about to change sector. The approach 
controller signalled the closure of communications in the first sector by sending a standard 
phraseology message at 21:02:38 telling the aircraft the new radio frequency. The first 
officer read back the frequency at 21:02:42. The controller repeated the instruction in a 
transmission marked by its message length at 21:02:44. In this message he switched codes 
to insert a 42-token plain language warning about wind shear (starting “and before you 
go...”). The insert is marked by the use of complete sentence structures with plain language 
features that are omitted in standard phraseology: a copula verb (“is”), articles (“a” and 
“an”), a subject pronoun (“it”), and prepositions (“on”, “at” and “by”). It may be inferred 
that the insert represents a change of mode from spoken phraseology to spoken written 
speech. In other words, the controller changed roles from speaker (at the start of the 
transmission) to addressor (as he read out a pre-scripted wind shear warning). At the end of 
the message he changed back to speaker again when he repeated the frequency and added a 
plain language phatic expression (“good night”).48 
Communication was very dense during the two-minute segment in Appendix 16. 
There were 41 turns in slightly more than two minutes, which equates to approximately 
one turn every three seconds. In addition, the ATIS broadcast was playing in the cockpit 
until 21:02:31. Intracockpit dialogue accounted for 46% of the turns. All three members of 
the Avianca flight crew participated: the captain and flight engineer had six turns each and 
the first officer had seven. The mean turn length in the intracockpit dialogue was 5.32 
 
48
 The ATC 3 transcript shows the approach controller gave similar wind shear warnings to other 
aircraft at 20:53:55, 20:56:15, 21:04:00 and 21:07:05. 
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tokens. The captain’s utterances were very short, with a mean length of only 2.83 tokens. 
The longest turn (24 tokens) was spoken by the flight engineer as he read aloud part of the 
go around procedure for a low fuel situation at 21:03:56. 
Radio transmissions accounted for 54% of the turns in the segment, with eight 
different speakers. The approach controller had six turns while the FV controller and the 
Avianca first officer had five each. The other pilots only spoke once or twice. The mean 
turn length was longer for radio messages (12.45 tokens) than for intracockpit utterances, 
the longest turn (53 tokens) being the last transmission from the approach controller to 
Avianca 052 at 21:02:44 in which he warned about wind shear. 
A final point about this segment concerns the translation of Spanish dialogue. 
During the analysis it became clear that there were discrepancies in the English translation 
provided in the CVR transcript. For example, the Spanish words “es”, “uno” and “un” in 
the utterance at 21:03:46 were not translated into English. I therefore asked a bilingual 
English-Spanish speaker to make a new translation of the Spanish dialogue in the segment. 
The new version is shown in Appendix 17. There are a considerable number of differences 
between the two versions, highlighting shortcomings in the English translation that was 
provided in the NTSB report. The following are some of the inaccuracies in the English 
translation in the CVR transcript: 
• 21:02:37: extra “feet” added at the end of the utterance; 
• 21:03:46: “es”, “uno” and “un” not translated; only one “con” translated; 
• 21:03:56: “alteraciones” translated as “accelerations” instead of “changes”; 
• 21:04:10: extra “hold” added at the end of the utterance. 
 
7.2.3.3 Style Shifting 1: Language Use of the FV Controller with AAL692 
The final recurring phenomenon of interest to be identified in the transcripts was 
style shifting by air traffic controllers. The style shifting is illustrated by examining the 
radio communication of the final vector (FV) controller as he dealt with 11 aircraft during 
a 20-minute period of activity from 20:58 to 21:18 EST.49 This section of the analysis uses 
the ATC 4 transcript from the NTSB accident report, which was transcribed from audio 
recorded at the New York TRACON ATC facility. 
 
49
 In the ATC transcripts, all times are expressed as UTC. For the analysis I converted them to 
EST, which was the time zone for JFK. EST is five hours behind UTC. 
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The FV controller was 33 years old (see Appendix 15 for more details). He was 
responsible for guiding aircraft through his sector before handing them over to the tower 
controller for landing at JFK International Airport. During this 20-minute period, seven of 
the 11 aircraft were operated by American companies: American Airlines, Pan Am, TWA 
and US Airways. They had flight crews who were native English speakers (NESs). The 
remaining four aircraft were from France, Israel and South America, with crews who were 
largely or completely non-native speakers (NNSs) of English. 
Adverse weather conditions were causing considerable congestion and delays in the 
air transport system. As a result two aircraft in the sector were running critically low on 
fuel: American Airlines Flight 692 (AAL692) and Avianca Flight 052 (AVA052). The 
American Airlines jet was ahead of the Avianca plane. Both planes were being handled by 
the same controller and were experiencing the same non-routine situation: a fuel shortage 
problem. This section of the analysis focuses on the language use of the FV controller as 
he handled AAL692 during its flight through the sector. The next section focuses on the 
language use of the controller as he handled AVA052. 
No information is available about the crew of AAL692. The aircraft had left the 
previous sector at 20:42 and it is reasonable to assume it contacted the FV controller soon 
after. However, the ATC 4 transcript does not begin until 20:58, and therefore it does not 
include the initial contact (and possibly some subsequent communication). There are 11 
exchanges between the controller and this American Airlines aircraft in the transcript. The 
first exchange is shown in Table 11. 
The exchange is marked both in terms of its length and also the sequence of the 
speech acts. There were seven turns, whereas the other exchanges between this aircraft and 
controller had only two or three turns. By comparison, all except one exchange between 
the FV controller and Avianca 052 consisted of two turns. One reason for the length of the 
Table 11 exchange is that two separate interactions ran together without a break. The first 
was a three-turn pilot-controller-pilot exchange, starting at 20:59:17, in which the pilot 
expressed dissatisfaction with the assigned altitude. This was immediately followed by a 
controller-pilot-controller-pilot exchange, from 20:59:29, in which the controller gave an 
instruction to climb. 
The pilot did not adhere to standard phraseology in his use of numbers for the 
aircraft call sign. He said “six ninety-two” at 20:59:26 and 20:59:36 as opposed to the 
standard “six niner two”. He did this consistently throughout the other exchanges in this 
transcript, whenever he gave the call sign. In addition, at the start of the first utterance in 
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Table 11 there was a partial call sign (“Ø Ninety two” at 20:59:17) indicating that 
microphone clipping might have occurred. 
 
 
Table 11: Exchange 1 between AAL692 and FV controller (20:59). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
20:59:17 AAL692 (radio) Ninety two very unhappy at two thousand feet 
20:59:20 FV (radio) American six ninety two New York I understand maintain two 
thousand fly heading one uh one four zero for now 
20:59:26 AAL692 (radio) Okay one forty at two thousand American six ninety two 
20:59:29 FV (radio) American six ninety two climb and maintain three thousand 
you’re number five I’ll make sure you get a lot of room there 
20:59:36 AAL692 (radio) Maintain three thousand you say three thousand American six 
ninety two 
20:59:39 FV (radio) Affirmative sir 
20:59:40 Unknown Alright 
 
 
Similarly, the controller used the same non-standard call sign in this and all other 
exchanges with AAL692. In transmissions to other American aircraft during the 20-minute 
period, he used similar non-standard number contractions that combined the final two 
digits of the call sign (e.g., U.S. Air Flight 117 became “US Air one seventeen”). The one 
exception was Trans World Airlines Flight 801. The contraction pattern was not possible 
because of the zero in the middle position, so he either said “TWA eight zero one heavy” 
or “TWA eight oh one heavy”. 
For the call signs of non-American aircraft, the controller adopted two different 
approaches. For Avianca Flight 052 and Air France Flight 26 he followed standard 
phraseology in reading out the digits individually. However, in all five exchanges with 
Avensa Flight 520, he used the non-standard phrase “Avensa five twenty”. Possibly this 
was to avoid confusion with the similar-sounding Avianca Flight 052. The controller also 
used non-standard numbers for El Al Flight 842. At first he mistakenly called it “El Al 
eight fifty two heavy”, perhaps due to interference from an altitude (“five thousand”) and 
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the call-sign in the next transmission (“Avianca zero five two heavy”). Subsequently he 
referred to the aircraft as “El Al eight forty two heavy”. 
At 20:59:26 in Table 11, the pilot also read back the heading using a non-standard 
contraction (“one forty” instead of “one four zero”). In later exchanges, the pilot read back 
some headings with numbers in the correct format but in other cases used non-standard 
contractions (e.g., Table 19 at 21:09:59). The key of some of the plain language used by 
the pilot is marked as familiar speech: “very unhappy” at 20:59:17, “Okay” at 20:59:26, 
“you say” at 20:59:36, and “Alright” at 20:59:40. None of these expressions were used by 
other speakers during this period. As a further note, the source of the final transmission 
(“Alright”) is designated as unknown in the transcript but, given the timing and content, it 
is reasonable to assume it was the American Airlines pilot. 
The plain language used by the controller is marked as it featured pronouns and 
colloquialism, and was in a helpful key: “I understand” at 20:59:20, and “I’ll make sure 
you get a lot of room there” at 20:59:29. In two subsequent transmissions to this aircraft 
the controller again used the word “understand” (Table 13 at 21:02:08 and Table 17 at 
21:06:18). He did not use it with other flights. The controller was deferential to the pilot, 
addressing him as “sir” at 20:59:39 in Table 11. During the 20-minute period, the address 
“sir” was used five times by the controller and two times by pilots. 
In the next exchange, shown in Table 12, the controller issued a new heading 
instruction to the American Airlines aircraft. In his read-back at 21:01:47, the pilot added 
the preposition “to” before the heading, which is non-standard and introduces ambiguity 
due to possible confusion with the homophone “two”. In later heading changes, the pilot 
inserted “to” on two further occasions (Table 16 at 21:05:23 and Table 19 at 21:09:59). 
During this period, two other American aircraft did likewise (TWA Flight 801 and 
American Airlines Flight 40) but none of the non-American flights did so. 
 
 
Table 12: Exchange 2 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:01). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:01:42 FV (radio) American six ninety two turn left heading zero six zero 





In the dialogue in Table 13, the AAL692 pilot used plain language at 21:02:00 to 
notify the controller of his aircraft’s fuel problem: “I want to advise you we’re at minimum 
fuel”. He did not declare an emergency but instead warned one was imminent: “we’re uh 
about uh twelve or fourteen minutes from declaring an emergency”. The function of this 
transmission was to share information predicting a future problematic event. It is not clear 
whether the pilot had previously notified the controller about the fuel problem. 
Once again, the controller’s speech in this and the following exchange is marked. 
He used plain language that featured pronouns and colloquialisms in a helpful key: “I 
understand” and “you’re number four with me” at 21:02:08 in Table 13; and “I’m going 




Table 13: Exchange 3 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:02). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:02:00 AAL692 (radio) American six ninety two I want to advise you we’re at minimum 
fuel uh we’re uh about uh twelve or fourteen minutes from 
declaring an emergency 
21:02:08 FV (radio) I understand uh you’re number four with me sir 
21:02:11 Unknown Ok 
 
 
Table 14: Exchange 4 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:02). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:02:36 FV (radio) American six ninety two I’m going to take you another eight 
miles where you are then turn ya to the final 
21:02:42 Unknown Roger 
 
 
The exchange in Table 13 was closed with a non-standard transmission (again 
assumed to be the AAL692 pilot) in a casual key: “Ok” at 21:02:11. Similarly, the final 
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transmission in Table 14 (also assumed to be from the same pilot) acknowledged receipt of 
the message (“Roger” at 21:02:42) but did not confirm the content. 
Crucially, Avianca Flight 052 had not yet entered the sector at this time. As a result 
the Avianca crew were not tuned to the radio frequency and were unable to hear the Table 
13 exchange in which the American Airlines pilot described his fuel problem. 
The next two exchanges had the same structure and function, with the controller 
issuing new headings. However, the pilot read back the information in different ways. In 
Table 15, the pilot repeated the heading correctly but there is omission of the word “left” 
(at 21:04:36). In Table 16, by contrast, his read-back is marked by the insertion of the 
preposition “to” and the use of a non-standard heading contraction (“two seventy” instead 
of “two seven zero” at 21:05:23). 
 
 
Table 15: Exchange 5 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:04). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:04:33 FV (radio) American six ninety two turn left heading three two zero 
21:04:36 AAL692 (radio) Three two zero American six ninety two 
 
 
Table 16: Exchange 6 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:05). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:05:20 FV (radio) American six ninety two turn left heading of two seven zero 
21:05:23 AAL692 (radio) Left to two seventy American six ninety two 
 
 
The exchange in Table 17 is marked by the controller using plain language to 
request information about the status of the American Airlines aircraft. The request was 
realised in a familiar key using colloquial speech including an idiomatic phrasal verb: 
“how are we making out” at 21:06:12. This was the only such inquiry made by the 
controller during the 20-minute period. In similar fashion, the pilot’s response is marked 
by the use of plain language using colloquial speech with the idiom “that’s it” to mean 
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“that’s all we have” at 21:06:15. This exchange is also marked by the controller’s use of 
the first person plural pronoun “we” (at 21:06:12). Previously he had only used singular 
pronoun forms: “I”, “me”, “you” and “ya” (in Tables 11, 13 and 14). 
Having joined the radio frequency at 21:03:07, the crew of Avianca Flight 052 
could have heard the Table 17 exchange about the fuel problem of the American Airlines 
aircraft. This exchange was initiated by the controller, not by the pilot. The inexperienced 
Avianca first officer might have assumed that the controller, having checked the fuel status 
of AAL692, was going to do the same for his aircraft. To reiterate, the Avianca first officer 
had not been able to hear the earlier exchanges in Tables 11 and 13 that were initiated by 
the American Airlines pilot. 
 
 
Table 17: Exchange 7 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:06). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:06:12 FV (radio) American six ninety two how are we making out 
21:06:15 AAL692 (radio) We got enough fuel for the approach and landing and that’s it 
21:06:18 FV (radio) Ok understand 
 
 
In Table 18, the controller requested that the American Airlines aircraft fly at 160 
knots. The pilot’s response is marked because he did not read back the speed, but simply 
acknowledged receiving the message (“roger” at 21:08:20). The controller issued speed 
instructions to five other aircraft during this period, all of which read back the speed: Pan 
Am Flight 474, Avensa Flight 520, Avianca Flight 052, TWA Flight 80 and American 
Airlines Flight 40. 
 
 
Table 18: Exchange 8 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:08). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:08:16 FV (radio) American six ninety two speed one six zero if practical 




In the Table 19 exchange, the controller’s transmission at 21:09:50 is marked by 
the message length. It included a heading change, position information, an altitude 
instruction and clearance for the final approach to Runway 22L. The pilot’s read-back of 
the new heading was again non-standard: he inserted the preposition “to” and contracted 
the heading (“two ten” as opposed to “two one zero” at 21:09:59). 
 
 
Table 19: Exchange 9 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:09). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:09:50 FV (radio) American six ninety two turn left heading two one zero you’re 
one three miles from outer marker maintain two thousand till 
established localizer cleared ILS two two left 
21:09:59 AAL692 (radio) Turning to two ten uh two thousand feet cleared the ILS two two 
left American uh six ninety two 
 
 
In the exchange in Table 20, the controller gave information at 21:10:48 about the 
separation between AAL692 and the preceding aircraft (a Boeing “seven two seven”). The 
transcript shows no request for information. The FV controller gave similar, albeit simpler, 
information on one other occasion, following a request from US Airways Flight 117. 
 
 
Table 20: Exchange 10 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:10). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:10:46 Unknown Blocked 
21:10:48 FV (radio) American six ninety two you’re six miles behind a seven two 
seven compatible speed 
21:10:53 Unknown Thank you 
 
 
The source of the transmission “Blocked” at 21:10:46 in Table 20 is designated 
“unknown” in the transcript. Presumably one of the pilots in the sector was signalling a 
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blocked transmission.50 It is possible that the American Airlines pilot requested separation 
information, but his message was garbled or blocked due to simultaneous transmissions. 
The source of the message at 21:10:53 is also designated “unknown” in the transcript. It is 
reasonable to assume the speaker was the American Airlines pilot closing the exchange 
with a polite, non-standard expression: “Thank you”. 
Table 21 shows the final exchange between the FV controller and AAL692 before 
the aircraft left the sector. At 21:12:01, the controller instructed the American Airlines 
pilot to contact Kennedy Tower and gave him the new radio frequency. He finished with 
the phatic expression “good evening”, signalling the imminent departure of the aircraft. 
This transmission is marked by the insertion of a deferential expression following the call 
sign: “again thank you for your cooperation”. During the 20-minute period, the controller 
gave this type of final instruction to seven aircraft. In only one other case did he insert an 




Table 21: Exchange 11 between AAL692 and FV controller (21:12). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:12:01 FV (radio) American six ninety two again thank you for your cooperation 
contact Kennedy Tower one one niner point one good evening 
21:12:07 AAL692 (radio) Teen one American six ninety two [unintelligible] 
 
 
The final message from the AAL692 pilot to the FV controller seems to feature 
microphone clipping of a non-standard number contraction: “Ø teen one” instead of the 
standard “one one niner point one” at 21:12:07. The ending of the transmission was 





 Simultaneous transmissions block all or part of a message. The CAA Radiotelephony Manual 
advises pilots or controllers to “draw attention to the situation using the word ‘blocked’” (CAA, 
2015, p. 2-31). 
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7.2.3.4 Style Shifting 2: Language Use of the FV Controller with AVA052 
This section examines the language use of the FV controller as he handled Avianca 
Flight 052 (AVA052). The 28-year old first officer was handling radio communications for 
the Avianca aircraft. This section of the analysis is based on the ATC 4 transcript and the 
Avianca CVR transcript. Discrepancies between the transcripts are detailed in footnotes. 
The CVR transcript is a partial transcription of the audio recording: it includes all of the 
intracockpit dialogue but not all radio communications. From the start of the recording 
until 21:15:19 only radio transmissions involving AVA052 were transcribed. After this 
time, all radio transmissions in the sector were included. 
AVA052 left the previous sector at 21:03 and contacted the FV controller at 
21:03:07, which was after the initial contact of AAL692. This meant that the Avianca crew 
did not hear the AAL692 pilot report his fuel problem in the transmission shown in Table 
13. There are ten exchanges between the FV controller and AVA052 in the transcript, five 
of which are reproduced in this section. 
The first exchange is shown in Table 22. The controller signalled the aircraft’s 
entry to the sector with the plain language phatic expression “good evening” at 21:03:11. 
He welcomed four other aircraft with the same expression in the 20-minute period: Trans 
World Airlines Flight 801, American Airlines Flight 40, El Al Flight 842 and American 
Airlines Flight 4. 
 
 
Table 22: Exchange 1 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:03). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:03:07 AVA052 (radio) New York approach Avianca zero five uh two leveling five 
thousand 
21:03:11 FV (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy New York approach good evening 
fly heading of zero six zero 
51
 







 In the CVR transcript “heading of’ is changed to “heading”. 
52
 In the CVR transcript “Zero six zero” is changed to “heading zero six zero”. 
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The pilot identified his aircraft as “Avianca zero five uh two” at 21:03:07, with 
omission of the word “heavy”. The controller corrected the call sign to “Avianca zero five 
two heavy” 21:03:11 and the pilot accepted the correction in his read-back at 21:03:16. 
The Avianca pilot adhered to standard phraseology and used the correct call sign in all 
subsequent exchanges. The transcript recorded a similar contact with El Al Flight 842 in 
which the pilot omitted the “heavy” designation and was corrected by the controller. The 
El Al pilot continued to omit the word “heavy” in this and subsequent exchanges. 
In the next three exchanges, the controller issued instructions to change heading. 
Both the controller and the Avianca pilot adhered to standard phraseology. Table 23 shows 
the first of the exchanges. After each heading instruction, the pilot’s read-back included the 
words “Left heading” (as shown at 21:05:16). This is consistent with other exchanges in 
the transcript. The words “Left heading” or “Heading” were used by all the non-American 
aircraft: Air France Flight 26, Avensa Flight 520, Avianca Flight 052 and El Al Flight 842. 
None of the seven American aircraft used the word “heading” in their read-backs; they 
instead said “left” or “left to”, or simply read back the numbers. 
 
 
Table 23: Exchange 2 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:05). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:05:12 FV (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy turn left heading three six zero 
21:05:16 AVA052 (radio) Left heading three six zero Avianca zero five two heavy 
 
 
Table 24: Exchange 3 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:08). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:08:34 FV (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy descend and maintain uh descend 
and maintain three thousand 






 The ATC 4 transcript has the words “naintain” and “Xvianca” in this line. I corrected them to 
“maintain” and “Avianca” on the assumption that they were typographical or scanning errors. 
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In the exchange in Table 24, the controller issued an instruction to change altitude. 
He made a self-initiated repair at 21:08:34, signalled by the hesitation token “uh”, with a 
partial repeat (of the phrase “descend and maintain”) before completing the utterance. 
In the next exchange, the controller issued a further heading change instruction. 
Then he gave another heading change instruction to bring the aircraft in line with the 
localizer beam, as shown in the Table 25 excerpt. 
 
 
Table 25: Exchange 4 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:10). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:10:26 FV (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy turn left heading two five zero 
intercept the localizer 




The pilot omitted “left” from the read-back at 21:10:31 in Table 25. The reason 
may have been because he had to process a more complex instruction (including “intercept 
the localizer”) than the previous four heading changes (e.g., Table 23). This is consistent 
with other instances involving non-American crews during the 20-minute period: Avensa 
Flight 520 and El Al Flight 842 both used “Left heading” in read-backs of simple heading 
change instructions, but Air France Flight 26, Avensa Flight 520 and El Al Flight 842 
simply said “Heading” when the instruction was more complex. 
In the next two exchanges, the controller first gave AVA052 clearance for the final 
approach, and then requested that the aircraft fly at 160 knots in order to maintain spacing 
during the approach. 
The final exchange between AVA052 and the FV controller is shown in Table 26. 
At 21:15:08 the controller instructed the pilot to contact Kennedy Tower and gave him the 
new frequency. The controller ended his message with the phatic expression “good day”, 
signalling the aircraft’s departure from the sector. The controller also used “good day” 
when two other non-American aircraft departed: Air France Flight 26 and Avensa Flight 
520. He used “good evening” when three American aircraft departed: Pan Am Commuter 
Flight 793, Pan Am Flight 474 and American Airlines Flight 692. In the case of U.S. Air 
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Flight 117, the controller first used “good day” then added “good night” in response to the 
pilot’s use of that expression. 
 
 
Table 26: Exchange 5 between AVA052 and FV controller (21:15). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT 
21:15:08 FV (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy contact Kennedy Tower one one 
niner point one good day 
21:15:12 AVA052 (radio) One one niner point one so long 
 
 
At 21:15:12 the Avianca pilot read back the new frequency (“One one niner point 
one”). He ended with a colloquialism: the phatic expression “so long”. Compared with the 
transmissions of other crews in the transcript, this is marked as a familiar key.54 During the 
20-minute period, most aircraft responded with more formal expressions: Air France Flight 
26 used “good day”, U.S. Air Flight 117 said “good night”, Pan Am Commuter Flight 793 
and Avensa Flight 520 said “good night sir”, Pan Am Flight 474 did not use any phatic 
expression, and for American Airlines Flight 692 the ending was unintelligible. 
The exchange shown in Table 26 was the last communication between AVA052 
and the FV controller before the aircraft’s first approach. They later resumed contact after 
the missed approach. 
 
7.2.4 Critical Communications in the Avianca 052 Accident 
Using the CA techniques of unmotivated and motivated looking, I identified six 
critical communications in the flight of Avianca 052. Each of the critical communications 
included one or more transmissions relating to the fuel situation of the Avianca aircraft. 
These key periods of interaction are represented by excerpts of dialogue from the CVR and 
ATC transcripts. The excerpts were closely analysed using CA techniques, the grammar of 
context framework and the ACT glossary. The critical communications are highlighted in 
 
54
 According to the CVR transcript, the Avianca first officer also said “so long” twice when leaving 
the CAMRN sector at 21:02:42 and 21:02:56. Only the first is recorded in the ATC 3 transcript. 
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red on the Figure 20 timeline. As indicated on the timeline, the first critical communication 
was not covered by the CVR recording. Figure 21 shows approximate locations where the 
critical communications occurred on a radar track of the final stage of the flight. 
 
 
Figure 21: Radar track of the final stage of Avianca Flight 052. Adapted from a public 































7.2.4.1 Critical Communication 1 
The first critical communication occurred while AVA052 was waiting in the third 
holding pattern. The aircraft was flying an oval-shaped course at an altitude of 11,000 feet 
at the CAMRN intersection, 39 nautical miles south of JFK. The communication involved 
the Avianca first officer and the R67 controller in the New York ARTCC control center. 
Table 27 shows an excerpt of radio dialogue taken from the ATC 1 transcript. The CVR 
transcript does not cover this period because of the 40-minute recording limit. As a result, 
the excerpt does not include any intracockpit dialogue (which would have featured code 
switching). The radio communication could have been overheard by the Avianca captain 
and flight engineer, and also by other pilots in the same airspace. 
Immediately prior to the excerpt, the first officer requested an estimate of when 
AVA052 would get a clearance to proceed to the next sector. This was five minutes after 
they had been told to expect clearance, and 26 minutes after they had entered the holding 
pattern. The first officer’s word choice was polite, formal and deferential (twice saying 
“Thank you” and addressing the controller as “sir”). The controller responded in a helpful 
key (“ah might be able to get you in right now”) and instructed them to stand by. 
After a gap of about two seconds,55 the controller sent the first message shown in 
Table 27. It instructed AVA052 to continue holding indefinitely. The transmission is 
marked by message length. It contained two sub-messages, each starting with the aircraft 
call sign (“Avianca zero five two”). The first sub-message relayed information about 
clearance to leave the sector. It was realised in plain language using an idiom: “ah we just 
got off the line its ah indefinite hold at this time”. The second sub-message was an 
instruction in standard phraseology for the aircraft to hold. The Avianca first officer read 
back the instruction at 20:44:23 and the controller acknowledged the read-back. 
Following a gap of approximately 9 seconds, the next exchange started at 20:44:43. 
The controller gave a response to the first officer’s earlier request for an estimate by saying 
“expect further clearance time zero two zero five”. The time corresponded to 21:05 EST, 
which meant the aircraft would be holding for a further 20 minutes. The first officer read 
back the time at 20:44:50. His transmission was problematic in several regards. After the 
read-back, he included an appended message: “ahhhh well I think we need priority we’re 
passing”. Also, the end of the message was unintelligible, possibly due to a blocked 
 
55
 The lengths of gaps cannot be determined accurately because the transcripts do not show the end 
times of utterances. 
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transmission. Moreover, the message did not provide information about the status of the 
aircraft, and ambiguity was introduced through the underdetermined word “priority”. 
 
 
Table 27: Excerpt involving AVA052 and R67 controller (20:44-20:46). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT  
20:44:09 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two56 ah we just got off the line its ah indefinite hold at this 
time Avianca zero five two turn left heading zero nine zero join the Deer Park 
two twenty one radial hold at CAMRN maintain one one thousand. 
20:44:23 FO (radio) Ok Avianca zero five two heavy turning left zero nine zero to join ah two two 
one Deer Park radial and holding CAMRN. 
20:44:32 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two roger. 
20:44:43 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy expect further clearance time zero two zero five . 
20:44:50 FO (radio) Zero two zero five ahhhh well I think we need priority we’re passing 
[unintelligible]. 
20:44:58 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy roger how long can you hold and ah what is your 
alternate 
20:45:03 FO (radio) Ok stand by on that. 
… … … 
20:45:59 FO (radio) Kennedy Avianca zero five two heavy. 
20:46:01 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy go ahead. 
20:46:03 FO (radio) Yes sir ah we’ll be able to hold about five minutes thats all we can do. 
20:46:08 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy roger what is your alternate? 
20:46:13 FO (radio) Ah we said Boston but ah it is ah full of traffic I think. 
20:46:20 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two say again your alternate airport. 
20:46:24 FO (radio) It was Boston but we we can’t do it now we, we, don’t, we run out of fuel now. 
20:46:29 R67 (radio) Avianca zero five two ah just stand by. 





 The ATC 1 transcript has “tvo”, which I changed to “two”. This excerpt had 22 similar errors. 
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The controller expressed repair at 20:44:58 as he asked two questions about the 
aircraft’s status that were realised in plain language: “how long can you hold and ah what 
is your alternate”. At 20:45:03 the first officer gave a dispreferred response by instructing 
the controller to stand by. 
The R67 controller then communicated with three other aircraft (not shown in 
Table 27). The Avianca first officer contacted him again at 20:45:59. This was the start of 
an exchange marked by its length: nine turns. At 20:46:03 the first officer used plain 
language with colloquialism to respond to the first question the controller had asked 
earlier: “we’ll be able to hold about five minutes thats all we can do”. At 20:46:08 the 
controller repeated the second question about the alternate airport. The pilot used plain 
language including pronouns to give an answer (“Ah we said Boston”) with an ambiguous 
appended message (“but ah it is ah full of traffic I think”). At 20:46:20 the controller told 
him to repeat the alternate airport. The first officer accepted by repeating the answer (“It 
was Boston”) but again appended an ambiguous message with repetition and an idiom 
(“but we we can’t do it now we, we, don’t, we run out of fuel now”). The controller 
instructed AVA052 to stand by, and the first officer closed the exchange 20:46:32 with a 
polite phatic expression (“Thank you”). 
Following the excerpt shown in Table 27, there was a pause of about 14 seconds. 
Then the controller contacted AVA052 to give them clearance for the next sector and the 
new radio frequency. The problem of leaving the third holding pattern had been resolved 
successfully. This may have led the first officer to assume that the controller had received 
and understood all three messages concerning the fuel problem: “we need priority” at 
20:44:50, “we’ll be able to hold about five minutes thats all we can do” at 20:46:03, and 
“we run out of fuel now” at 20:46:24. Actually, the accident report indicated that a handoff 
controller (H67) overheard the second message and telephoned the next ATC sector. The 
phone call lasted from 20:46:24 to 20:46:44, so the H67 controller was unable to hear the 
third message. He passed on one piece of information to the controller in the next sector: 
“Avianca zero five two just coming on CAMRN can only do five more minutes in the 
hold” (NTSB, 1991, p. 6). 
In summary, during this critical communication the Avianca first officer notified 
the R67 controller about the aircraft’s fuel problem, saying “we need priority” and “we run 
out of fuel now”. The messages were sent more than 45 minutes before the crash. The H67 
controller informed the next sector that AVA052 could hold for five minutes. He did not 
mention “priority” and he did not hear the fuel message due to the distraction of the phone 
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call. It is likely that the first officer mistakenly assumed all his messages were passed on to 
the next controller, but we cannot know for sure. Our ability to make sense of the decisions 
and communication during this period is severely limited by the absence of CVR data. 
 
7.2.4.2 Critical Communication 2 
In the next sector the Avianca crew were instructed by the APP controller at 
20:54:40 to make a 360-degree turn for spacing, as discussed in Section 7.2.3.1. Duke 
(1992) noted that this manoeuvre used up between six and eight minutes of their remaining 
flight time. AVA052 was then handed off to the FV controller and given “a long 15-mile 
final approach leg” to JFK. The aircraft was being flown manually and during the final 
approach to the airport it experienced wind shear. The CVR indicates 15 GPWS warnings 
telling the crew to pull up or signalling deviations from the glide slope. The NTSB report 
commented that the crew experienced a high level of stress during the approach. 
After an instruction from the captain, the first officer notified the tower controller 
(TWR) that the aircraft was executing a missed approach. The controller acknowledged the 
message, and issued a new altitude and heading at 21:23:39. This is the first message in the 
Table 28 excerpt, which is based on the CVR and ATC 6 transcripts. 
Immediately following the controller’s message, there was code switching from 
English to Spanish as the captain gave information about the aircraft’s status (“we don’t 
have fue-”) at 21:23:43. His statement was incomplete; the transcripts do not indicate if 
there was overlapping speech. 
The Avianca first officer relayed the new altitude and heading to the other crew 
members at 21:23:45. He spoke in Spanish with intrasentential code switching to English 
for the heading (“one eight zero”). The first officer then switched to English to give the 
read-back response to the controller at 21:23:48. There was a self-initiated repair of the 
altitude read-back (“climb and maintain one – two thousand”), perhaps due to interference 
from the last English phrase he had spoken (“one eight zero”). 
From 21:23:54 the three crew engaged in six turns of talk about the configuration 
of the aircraft and difficulty in locating the runway. This exchange featured repetition: the 




 The CVR transcript shows the first officer and flight engineer saying “I didn’t see it” in English, 
but presumably their intracockpit talk was actually in Spanish. 
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Table 28: Excerpt involving AVA052 and TWR controller (21:23-21:24). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT  
21:23:39 TWR (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy roger ah climb and maintain two thousand turn 
left heading one eight zero 
21:23:43 Captain no tenemos comb- [we don’t have fue-] 
21:23:45 FO mantener dos mil pies one eight zero en el rumbo  
[maintain two thousand feet one eight zero on the heading] 
21:23:48 FO (radio) climb and maintain one – two thousand one eight zero on the heading 
21:23:54 Captain flaps venticinco [flaps twenty five] 
21:23:54 FO dos mil pies [two thousand feet] 
 FE flaps venticinco [flaps twenty five] 
21:24:00 Captain flaps venticinco yo no se que paso con la pista oye no la vi 58 
[I don’t know what happened with the runway I didn’t see it] 
 FE I didn’t see it59 
 FO I didn’t see it 
21:24:04 TWR (radio) Avianca zero five two you are making a left turn correct sir60 
21:24:06 Captain digale que estamos en emergencia [tell them we are in emergency] 
 FE dos mil pies [two thousand feet] 
  [sound of altitude alert chime] 
21:24:08 FO (radio) that’s right to one eight zero on the heading and ah we’ll try once again we’re 
running out of fuel 
21:24:14  [sound of trim in motion horn] 
21:24:15 TWR (radio) Okay 
 
 
At 21:24:04 there was a message from the TWR controller asking whether the 
aircraft was turning as instructed. The controller’s question was realised in plain language 
 
58
 The first two words of this line are not in the English translation in the CVR transcript. 
59
 There is no Spanish for this line and the next line in the CVR transcript. 
60
 There are some differences in the ATC 6 transcript: “the left turn” at 21:24:04, the time 21:24:08 
changed to 21:24:07, and the time 21:24:15 changed to 21:24:13. 
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as a statement: “you are making a left turn correct sir”. Immediately following the 
controller’s message, at 21:24:06, there was another instance of English-Spanish code 
switching as the captain instructed the first officer to declare an emergency (“tell them we 
are in emergency”). There may have been overlapping speech as the flight engineer 
changed topic to say the aircraft had reached the assigned altitude (“two thousand feet”) 
and an altitude alert sounded. Then the first officer switched to English and responded to 
the controller’s question at 21:24:08. He confirmed the new heading (“that’s right to one 
eight zero on the heading”). He also included an appended message that was realised in 
plain language with colloquialism and had two sub-messages. The first sub-message said 
the crew would try to land again (“and ah we’ll try once again”). The second sub-message 
relayed the information from the captain and included an idiom: “we’re running out of 
fuel ”. The second sub-message was possibly influenced by the captain’s utterance at 
21:23:43 (“we don’t have fue-”). There was avoidance of the word “emergency” which the 
captain used in his instruction at 21:24:06. The controller responded at 21:24:15 with a 
minimal acknowledgement (“okay”) that introduced ambiguity. It was not clear from this 
response whether the controller was accepting the read-back of the heading, either of the 
sub-messages, or the entire transmission. 
To summarise the second critical communication, the TWR controller contacted 
AVA052 twice during this excerpt. Both times the captain initiated a turn before the first 
officer could respond to the controller. On both occasions, the first officer engaged in code 
switching as he listened to (and, in the first case, spoke to) the captain, then responded to 
the controller. His second response to the controller (at 21:24:08) was problematic. The 
important information from the captain was buried in a sub-message inside an appended 
message. Moreover, the first officer avoided the word “emergency”. Possibly he did not 
clearly hear the captain’s second utterance due to overlapping speech. He paraphrased the 
captain’s earlier utterance (“we don’t have fue-”) by saying “we’re running out of fuel”. 
The TWR controller responding with an ambiguous minimal acknowledgement (“okay”). 
 Following this excerpt, the captain again instructed the first officer to declare an 
emergency. The captain said this during a long transmission from the TWR controller 
about wind shear to another aircraft. As Duke (1992) suggested, the wind shear message 
might have been a distraction that prevented the first officer from fully attending to the 
captain’s instruction. The captain then asked, “did you tell him”. The first officer replied, 
“yes sir” and “I already advised him”. The CVR data thus indicate that the first officer 
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thought he had notified the TWR controller about the fuel problem. However, AVA052 
subsequently received vectors for another long final approach. 
 
7.2.4.3 Critical Communication 3 
After the missed first approach, the TWR controller handed AVA052 off to the FV 
approach controller without passing on information about the aircraft running out of fuel. 
The first officer contacted the FV controller at 21:24:55. This is the start of the excerpt 
shown in Table 29, which is taken from the CVR and ATC 4 transcripts. Previously the FV 
controller had handled AVA052 before the missed approach, from 21:03 to 21:15. (See the 
analysis in Section 7.2.3.4.) 
In the first transmission in Table 29, the first officer notified the FV controller 
about the missed approach and reported the aircraft’s altitude. This message was realised 
in plain language with pronouns, colloquialism, repetition and a hesitation marker: “we 
just missed a missed approach and ah we’re maintaining two thousand and five on th-”. 
Then there was code switching in the cockpit as the flight engineer and captain confirmed 
the flap setting. The FV controller responded with an acknowledgement and a new altitude 
at 21:25:07.61 For this message the controller used standard phraseology with a plain 
language phatic expression (“good evening”), just as he had previously done when 
AVA052 entered the sector at 21:03. (See Table 22.) 
Immediately after the controller’s message, at 21:25:08, there was code switching 
from English to Spanish as the captain gave an instruction to the first officer: “advise him 
we don’t have fuel”. The first officer switched to English to give the read-back response to 
the controller at 21:25:10. He relayed the information from the captain in an appended 
message realised in plain language with a hesitation marker and an idiom: “and ah we’re 
running out of fuel sir”. It was the same message that the first officer had sent to the TWR 
controller at 21:24:08 (in Table 28), except he addressed the FV controller deferentially as 
“sir”. The controller responded at 21:25:12 with a minimal acknowledgement (“okay”) and 
a new heading instruction. The controller’s acknowledgement introduced ambiguity. It was 
not clear whether he was accepting the read-back of the altitude, the appended message, or 
both. The first officer read back the heading and repeated the altitude at 21:25:15. This 
 
61
 This time is 21:25:02 in the ATC 4 transcript, which is significantly different. Considering the 
times of other transmissions, it is probable that the ATC 4 transcript time is more accurate. 
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transmission was marked by the omission of the aircraft call sign and the non-standard 
insertion of “to” before the altitude.  
 
 
Table 29: Excerpt involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:24-21:25). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT  
21:24:55 FO (radio) approach Avianca zero five ah two heavy we just missed a missed approach and 
ah we’re maintaining two thousand and five on th-62 
21:24:58 FE flaps catorce [flaps fourteen] 
21:25:00 Captain flaps catorce [flaps fourteen] 
21:25:07 FV (radio)63 Avianca zero five two heavy New York good evening climb and maintain three 
thousand 
21:25:08 Captain digale que no tenemos combustible [advise him we don’t have fuel] 
21:25:10 FO (radio) climb and maintain three thousand and ah we’re running out of fuel sir 
21:25:12 FV (radio) okay fly heading zero eight zero 
21:25:15 FO (radio) flying heading zero eight zero climb to three thousand 
21:25:19 FO tres mil pies por favor [three thousand feet please] 
21:25:19 FV (radio) TWA eight zero one heavy turn left heading zero four zero  
21:25:20 Captain cero que ochenta [what zero eighty] 
 FO ciento ochenta [hundred and eighty] 
21:25:22 Captain Ah 
21:25:22 TWA801 
(radio)64 
zero four zero TWA eight oh one heavy 





 There are some differences in the ATC 4 transcript: this line ends “two thousand one five 
(unintelligible)”; 21:25:12 begins “okay ah fly”; and 21:25:15 begins “right heading”. Several 
transmission times also differ, most notably 21:25:07 which is changed to 21:25:02. 
63
 The FV controller (FV) is misidentified as the CAMRN controller (APP) in the CVR transcript. 
64
 TWA801 is misidentified as the tower controller (TWR) at 2125:22 in the CVR transcript. 
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At 21:25:19 the Avianca first officer switched to Spanish and relayed the altitude 
instruction to the captain. A two-turn question-answer exchange took place between the 
captain and first officer at 21:25:20. The captain said the heading correctly but asked for 
confirmation (“what zero eighty”). The first officer responded with an incorrect heading 
(“hundred and eighty”). At 21:25:22 there was another two-turn exchange in which the 
first officer again said the incorrect heading. Several factors may have contributed to his 
error. Firstly, the first officer may have inadvertently recalled the heading they received 
after the missed approach (in Table 28 at 21:23:39). Secondly, there might have been 
interference from radio transmissions at 21:25:19 and 21:25:22 involving a TWA aircraft 
with a call sign that had the same digits as the incorrect heading (“eight zero one”). The 
first officer repeated the incorrect heading five times and was not corrected by the other 
crew members, possibly indicating fatigue. The incorrect heading took AVA052 further 
away from the airport. 
In summary, the third critical communication involved the recurrence of previous 
patterns. After the FV controller contacted AVA052 at 21:25:07, the captain initiated a 
turn before the first officer could respond. The first officer engaged in code switching as he 
listened to the captain and then responded to the controller. The first officer’s response to 
the controller at 21:25:10 was problematic. He transmitted important information from the 
captain in an appended message. This was compounded by the controller responding with 
an ambiguous acknowledgement (“okay”). 
Following this excerpt, the captain again checked if the first officer had sent a 
message about the fuel problem (“did you already advise that we don’t have fuel”). The 
first officer replied that he had (“yes sir I already advise him”), and then he repeated the 
incorrect heading. The CVR data indicate that the first officer thought he had told the FV 
controller about the fuel problem situation. 
 
7.2.4.4 Critical Communication 4 
The next contact from the FV controller to AVA052 occurred at 21:26:27. It is the 
first transmission in the excerpt shown in Table 30, which is taken from the CVR and ATC 
4 transcripts. The controller used standard phraseology to issue a new heading (“zero seven 
zero”). The first officer read back the heading correctly at 21:26:31. He then engaged in 




Table 30: Excerpt involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:26). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT  
21:26:27 FV (radio)65 Avianca zero five two heavy turn left heading zero seven zero 
21:26:31 FO (radio) heading zero seven zero Avianca zero five two heavy 
21:26:34 FO cero siete cero [zero seven zero] 
21:26:35 FV (radio) and Avianca zero five two heavy ah I’m gunna bring you about fifteen miles 
north east and then turn you back onto the approach is that fine with you and 
your fuel66 
21:26:43 FO (radio) I guess so thank you very much 
21:26:46 Captain que dice [what did he say] 
 FE67 el man se calento [the guy is angry] 
21:26:47 FO quince millas para volvernos a meter en el localizador 
[fifteen miles in order to get back to the localizer] 
 
 
At 21:26:35 the controller sent a transmission to AVA052 that was marked by the 
message length. It consisted of two sub-messages and, after the aircraft call sign, it was 
realised in plain language. The first sub-message gave information about the approach and 
included colloquialism: “ah I’m gunna bring you about fifteen miles north east and then 
turn you back onto the approach”. The second sub-message was a question: “is that fine 
with you and your fuel”. At 21:26:43 the first officer gave a preferred response to the 
controller’s question using plain language: “I guess so”. He closed the exchange with a 
polite, non-standard expression: “thank you very much”. There was another instance of 
code switching as the captain asked for a translation at 21:26:46: “what did he say”. It is 
apparent that the captain did not understand this message from the FV controller. At 
21:26:47 the first officer responded to the captain by relaying the information about the 
approach in Spanish. As Helmreich (1994) noted, the first officer did not consult the 
 
65
 The FV controller (FV) is misidentified as the CAMRN approach controller (APP) in this section 
of the CVR transcript. 
66
 There are some differences in the ATC 4 transcript: “I'm going to bring you” and “back on for 
the approach”. Also, the radio transmission times in this excerpt all differ by 1 or 2 seconds. 
67
 Helmreich (1994) and Gladwell (2008) mistakenly attributed this utterance to the first officer. 
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captain about the approach, and the subject was not discussed by the crew members. 
Meanwhile the flight engineer had made a comment about the FV controller: “the guy is 
angry”. The transcripts do not contain any paralinguistic information. However, the flight 
engineer’s remark indicates that he, and possibly the first officer, perceived anger in the 
controller’s speech. This perception may have made the first officer reluctant to cause 
trouble and influenced his response to the controller at 21:26:43. 
This critical communication differs from the previous ones because for the first 
time a controller inquired about the fuel problem.68 Presumably the FV controller had 
understood the fuel message sent at 21:25:10 (in Table 29). However, his transmission at 
21:26:35 was problematic. It was in colloquial plain language and had two sub-messages. 
Moreover, at least one of the Avianca crew thought it was delivered in an angry key. The 
transmission included a question (“is that fine with you and your fuel”) to which the first 
officer gave a preferred response (“I guess so”). He did not consult the captain. 
After this excerpt, the FV controller contacted other aircraft and the Avianca crew 
members talked about details of the approach. During the intracockpit talk, the new 
heading was correctly repeated five times (“zero seven zero”) and incorrectly once (“zero 
ninety” by the captain). The repetition of the heading might be evidence of fatigue and also 
of surprise that the aircraft was still being directed away from the airport. 
 
7.2.4.5 Critical Communication 5 
The Avianca aircraft received vectors for a long approach, just as with the first 
approach. At 21:29:11, the Avianca first officer contacted the FV controller to request a 
turn on to the final approach: “ah can you give us a final now Avianca zero five two 
heavy”.69 The controller responded by issuing a small heading change to 040 degrees, 
keeping the aircraft on course for a long 15-mile final leg. A minute later the controller 
contacted TWA Flight 801 (TWA801). This is the first line of the excerpt in Table 31, 





 The only other message from ATC about the Avianca fuel problem was at 21:34:00, when the 
FV controller asked, “Avianca zero five two you have uh you have enough fuel to make it to the 
airport”. At 21:33:24 the CVR had stopped recording and the crash occurred shortly after. 
69
 The ATC 4 transcript has “when can you give us” and gives the time as 21:29:19. 
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Table 31: Exchange involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:30). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT  
21:30:14 FV70 (radio) TWA eight zero one heavy turn left heading two five zero you’re one five 
miles from outer marker maintain two thousand until established on the 
localizer cleared for ILS two two left71 
21:30:21 FO (radio) Avianca zero five two heavy left turn two five zero and ah we’re cleared 
for ILS72 
21:30:25 Captain que rumbo digame [what heading tell me] 
21:30:26 FV (radio) okay two called Trans World eight oh one you were cleared for the 
approach 
21:30:27 FO dos cinco cero [two five zero] 
21:30:30 TWA801 (radio) Affirmative TWA eight oh one we got it we’re out of three for two 
21:30:32 FO dos cinco cero en el rumbo [two five zero in the heading] 
21:30:32 FV (radio) Avianca fifty two climb and maintain three thousand 
21:30:33  [sound of landing gear warning horn] 
21:30:36 FO (radio) ah negative sir we just running out of fuel we okay three thousand now 
okay 
21:30:39 Captain no no tres tres mil tres mil [no no three three thousand three thousand] 
21:30:44 FV (radio) okay turn left heading three one zero sir 
21:30:47 FO (radio) three one zero Avianca zero five two  
 
 
The FV controller’s message at 21:30:14 instructed TWA801 to turn on to the final 
approach. The transmission is marked by the message length. It included a heading change, 
position information, an altitude instruction and clearance for the approach to Runway 
22L. This was the message that the Avianca first officer was waiting for and had requested 
 
70
 The FV controller (FV) is misidentified as the CAMRN approach controller (APP) in this section 
of the CVR transcript. 
71
 There are some differences in the ATC 4 transcript: “on localizer” in this line; “climb maintain” 
at 21:30:32; and “we we’re just running out of” and “now we could” at 21:30:36. Also, several 
radio transmission times differ by 1-4 seconds. 
72
 This entire message is marked unintelligible in the ATC 4 transcript, so presumably was blocked. 
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one minute previously. Although the controller had correctly said the call sign for another 
aircraft (“TWA eight zero one heavy”), the Avianca first officer responded to the message 
at 21:30:21, reading back the heading and acknowledging the approach clearance. It was 
an instance of call sign confusion. 
The first officer’s message at 21:30:21 was unintelligible to the controller, probably 
because of a blocked transmission. It is likely that the TWA801 pilot transmitted at the 
same time as AVA052. The first officer would have been unaware of the blocked message. 
He was immediately engaged in code switching as the captain asked for the new heading at 
21:30:25 (“what heading tell me”). The first officer relayed the heading to the captain at 
21:30:27 (“two five zero”) and repeated it at 21:30:32. 
While the captain and first officer were talking in Spanish, the FV controller sent 
another message to TWA801 at 21:30:26. This message used plain language to express 
repair: “Trans World eight oh one you were cleared for the approach”. TWA801 responded 
at 21:30:30, using idiom and colloquialism to accept the clearance (“we got it”) and 
acknowledge the altitude instruction (“we’re out of three for two”). In the Avianca cockpit, 
there was probably a significant amount of overlapping between the intracockpit dialogue 
(in Spanish) and the radio transmissions (in English). We cannot know for sure because the 
transcripts do not indicate utterance end times. It is clear that the first officer did not realise 
he had accepted a clearance meant for another aircraft, because he repeated the heading at 
21:30:32 after the controller’s second message to TWA801. It may be surmised that the 
first officer did not understand the meaning of the radio exchange between the controller 
and TWA801 due to distraction by his dialogue with the captain. 
Several factors might have contributed to the first officer accepting a message that 
was intended for TWA801: pilot expectation, message length, workload and fatigue. As 
noted by Cardosi, Falzarano and Han (1998), these are all factors that may contribute to 
pilots accepting a clearance intended for another aircraft. It is also possible that there was 
interference from the heading (“two five zero”), which had the same digits as the Avianca 
call sign (“zero five two”). 
It seems that the captain understood the altitude instruction given by the controller 
at 21:30:14 and started to descend. At 21:30:32, the controller instructed AVA052 to climb 
back to its previously assigned altitude (“climb and maintain three thousand”). The first 
officer responded at 21:30:36 with a transmission that is difficult to understand. The first 
part of the transmission was a dispreferred response to the altitude instruction: “ah negative 
sir”. Then there was an appended message with two sub-messages. The first sub-message 
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repeated the idiomatic fuel message (“we just running out of fuel”) that he had previously 
sent to the TWR controller (at 21:24:08 in Table 28) and the FV controller (at 21:25:10 in 
Table 29). The second sub-message seems to accept the altitude instruction and implies the 
aircraft had by this time returned to three thousand feet (“we okay three thousand now 
okay”). The transmission featured ambiguity and omission of the aircraft’s call sign. 
Code switching took place in the cockpit 21:30:39 as the captain declared in 
Spanish: “no no three three thousand three thousand”. The captain’s lexical repetition may 
have expressed fatigue, disbelief or despair. The controller responded to the first officer’s 
transmission with a minimal acknowledgement (“okay”) and a new heading instruction at 
21:30:44. Then the first officer read back the heading (“three one zero”) and included the 
call sign at 21:30:47. 
In summary, this critical communication involved the recurrence of two features 
from the second and third critical communications: the first officer used an appended 
message to send the same information as before about the aircraft’s status (“we’re running 
out of fuel”); and the controller responded with an ambiguous minimal acknowledgement 
(“okay”). In addition, there is further evidence of a deterioration in the first officer’s 
performance. In the third critical communication he had relayed an incorrect heading to the 
captain. In this critical communication he had multiple problems: call sign confusion, a 
blocked transmission, accepting a heading intended for another aircraft, and the confused 
message he sent at 21:30:36: “ah negative sir we just running out of fuel we okay three 
thousand now okay”. 
 
7.2.4.6 Critical Communication 6 
Following the previous excerpt, the first officer twice relayed the heading (“three 
one zero”) to the captain in Spanish. At 21:30:55 the FV controller issued a new heading of 
360 degrees, taking the aircraft further away from JFK. The controller explained: “okay 
and you're number two for the approach I just have to give you enough room so you make 
it without ah having to come out again”. At 21:32:08 the controller gave another heading 
change to 330 degrees. Then the flight engineer reported that one of the engines had 
flamed out. This is the first line of the excerpt in Table 32, which is from the CVR and 
ATC 4 transcripts. 
At 21:32:39 the flight engineer reported the flame out of engine number four: the 
outermost engine on the starboard wing had lost power due to fuel starvation. The captain 
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acknowledged the flame out at 21:32:42. One second later the flight engineer reported the 
other starboard engine flaming out (“flame out on engine number three”). At 21:32:49 the 
captain declared: “show me the runway”. The aircraft was more than 20 nautical miles 
from JFK. Also at 21:32:49, there was code switching in the cockpit as the first officer 
contacted the FV controller. This transmission used plain language to report the status of 
the aircraft: “we just ah lost two engines and ah we need priority please”. 
 
 
Table 32: Exchange involving AVA052 and FV controller (21:32). 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT  
21:32:39 FE se apagaron--se apago el motor cuatro  
[flame out flame out on engine number four] 
21:32:41  [sound of momemtary power interruption to the CVR] 
21:32:42 Captain se apago [flame out on it] 
21:32:43 FE se apago el motor tres essential en number one--e1 dos--en el uno 
[flame out on engine number three essential on number two on number one] 
21:32:49 Captain muestreme la pista [show me the runway] 
21:32:49 FO (radio) Avianca zero five two we just ah lost two engines and ah we need priority 
please73 
21:32:54 FV (radio)74 Avianca zero five two turn left heading two five zero intercept the localizer 
21:32:56  [sound of engine spooling down] 
21:32:57 FO dos cinco cero [two five zero] 
21:32:59 FO (radio) Roger 
 
 
The first officer began his transmission at 21:32:49 with the aircraft’s call sign, 
which he could produce as a well-rehearsed prefabricated chunk (“Avianca zero five 
two”). The transmission had two sub-messages. The first sub-message included a 
 
73
 There are some differences in the ATC 4 transcript: “and we need” in this line; and the times of 
the radio transmissions differ by 1-2 seconds. 
74
 The FV controller (FV) is misidentified as the CAMRN approach controller (APP) in this section 
of the CVR transcript. 
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disfluency marked by the hesitation token “ah” as the first officer formed a message he 
most likely had never spoken before: “we just ah lost two engines”. There was another 
hesitation marker in the second sub-message as the first officer retrieved from memory an 
expression he had used in the first critical communication: “and ah we need priority”. (See 
Table 27 at 20:44:50.) This non-standard request was delivered in a deferential key with 
the addition of the politeness marker “please”. 
The controller responded at 21:32:54 with an instruction to turn to a new heading. 
This was the same instruction that the first officer had mistakenly accepted a few minutes 
earlier (at 21:30:14 in Table 31) except there was omission of the altitude instruction and 
the clearance. The first officer relayed the new heading (“two five zero”) to the crew in 
Spanish at 21:32:57. Then he responded to the controller in English at 21:32:59 with a 
minimal acknowledgement (“roger”). In this message he did not read back the heading or 
include the call sign. The minimal response of the first officer was marked. He had used 
“roger” once before in response to a tower controller instruction at 21:15:32, but had 
included the aircraft call sign. 
Following this excerpt, the captain and first officer had a seven-turn exchange 
about the instrument landing system (ILS). The controller sent another message to 
AVA052 at 21:33:04, which included the altitude instruction and clearance for a final 
approach. The first officer acknowledged the message by saying “roger Avianca”. Less 







CHAPTER 8: Making Sense of Past Accidents 
 
This chapter discusses the results of Stage One and Stage Two of the analysis with 
reference to the literature review. Some findings from previous studies are confirmed while 
other findings are challenged. The first part of the chapter discusses the results of Stage 
One. It considers the relevance of past accidents, and how pilots are able to learn lessons 
from past accidents that improve the safety of contemporary aviation. The second part of 
the chapter discusses the results of the Stage Two analysis of language use in the Avianca 
052 accident. Based on the recurring phenomena and critical communications that were 
identified, a narrative is constructed for the process by which communication broke down 
amongst Avianca flight crew and air traffic controllers. Finally, there is a discussion of the 
limitations to the transcript data in the NTSB accident report. The structure of the chapter 
is shown below. 
 
8.1 STAGE ONE –  Learning from Past Accidents 
8.1.1 RQ A – The Process of Learning from the Past 
8.1.2 RQ B – Iconic Accidents 
8.1.3 RQ C – TV Documentaries & Other Information Sources 
8.1.4 RQ D – English Proficiency & Language Attitudes 
 
8.2 STAGE TWO – Making Sense of the Avianca 052 Accident 
8.2.1 Recurring Phenomena – Captain, First Officer & Controller 
8.2.2 Critical Communications – The Process of Breakdown 
8.2.3 RQs E-H – Factors that Contributed to the Accident 




8.1 STAGE ONE – Learning from Past Accidents 
In this part of the chapter I discuss the results of the survey and the KI interviews 
concerning the relevance of past accidents to current airline operations. The results of both 
the survey and the interviews underline how different the four accidents cited in Document 
9835 were. Each was a complex accident with multiple causal factors, and we should be 
wary about making sweeping generalisations concering their causes. 
The following sections address each of the research questions (RQ A-D) in turn. 
The first section discusses the relevance of past accidents and the process by which pilots 
learn from them. The second section considers how some accidents become iconic, and the 
implications for aviation safety. Then I discuss information sources that pilots use to learn 
about accidents, in particular TV documentaries. The final section addresses the English 
proficiency of pilots and controllers, and language attitudes towards speakers from other 
countries or regions. 
 
8.1.1 RQ A – The Process of Learning from the Past 
The first research question (RQ A) asked whether studying past airline accidents is 
important for improving safety. The survey participants overwhelmingly think so. Almost 
99% of respondents agree that studying past accidents is important, with more than 91% 
expressing strong agreement. Furthermore, over 95% agree that three of the accidents cited 
by ICAO are relevant to current airline operations. The exception is the 1996 New Delhi 
collision, which is considered relevant by slightly less than 80% of respondents. 
The KI agrees that learning about past accidents is very important. The follow-up 
interviews provide insight into how he integrates information about accidents into his 
professional practice as an airline captain. The accident information enables him to reflect 
on his own mistakes. It allows him to: become aware of the possible consequences of a 
particular mistake; understand the causal process that led to it; and figure out how to avoid 
repeating it. This process of reflection is a method of risk mitigation. In Interview 6, the KI 
related the story of a mistake he had made due to distraction and workload when landing at 
Verona Airport without landing clearance from ATC. On that occasion the aircraft landed 
safely, but, by his own admission, on another day he may not have been so lucky. He drew 
a connection between this story and the 1977 Tenerife accident in which one of the causal 
factors was an aircraft starting its takeoff roll before the crew received takeoff clearance. 
The Tenerife disaster made him understand that his landing at Verona could have had a 
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worse outcome, and it gave him a heightened appreciation of the importance of landing 
and takeoff clearances. 
The KI discussed other accidents in addition to the four cited in the survey. Some 
of the accidents were recent and had a direct bearing on his work. For instance, the 2016 
runway impact of Emirates Flight 521 at Dubai, UAE, involved a Boeing 777-300 aircraft, 
which is the type that the KI currently flies. Other accidents were older but still relevant, 
such as the 1989 crash of British Midland Flight 92 at Kegworth in the UK. The lesson he 
learned from the Kegworth disaster was that careless vocabulary selection can result in 
ambiguity. In that accident there was confusion about whether the “left” or “right” engine 
was on fire, and the pilots ended up shutting down the wrong engine. To avoid ambiguity 
the KI’s airline now trains crew to use the words “port” and “starboard”. 
A theme that emerged from the interviews was that accidents which occurred a 
long time ago may involve factors that still remain critical to aviation safety. In 1990, 
Avianca Flight 052 crashed due to fuel exhaustion near New York and the accident report 
questioned the English language proficiency of the crew. In 2016, LaMia Flight 2933 
crashed due to fuel exhaustion in Colombia and the investigation found that neither pilot 
held a valid English language proficiency licence. Fuel management and communication 
ability remain critical issues. Understanding the causal processes that led to both of these 
accidents can help prevent similar disasters from occurring in the future. 
 
8.1.2 RQ B – Iconic Accidents 
The second research question (RQ B) asked whether pilots have heard of the four 
accidents cited by ICAO. There was considerable variation in the survey responses. Less 
than one-third have heard of the 1996 New Delhi accident, compared with 100% for the 
1977 Tenerife collision and more than 70% for the other two accidents. 
Several reasons may be put forward to explain the disparity in these figures. Firstly, 
it is unsurprising that all respondents know of the 1977 Tenerife collision. It is the airline 
accident with the greatest number of fatalities in history and has thus been the subject of 
numerous news articles, books and TV programmes, with titles such as “The Deadliest 
Plane Crash” and “Crash of the Century”. Furthermore, airline non-technical skills training 
programmes often feature the 1977 Tenerife and 1995 Cali accidents, and to a lesser extent 
1990 Cove Neck. Technical publications in English (including accident reports) are readily 
available for these three accidents, but not for the 1996 New Delhi collision. There is no 
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accident report in the public domain for the latter accident, just a two-page accident 
summary and a one-page operations circular (DGAC, n.d., 1999). The lack of awareness 
about the 1996 New Delhi disaster may explain why fewer respondents consider this 
accident relevant to current operations (see RQ A). 
The KI has heard of all four accidents and he was able to provide descriptions of 
their key features (see Table 9). Each of his descriptions highlights a single issue that he 
considers to be the most salient for that particular accident (e.g., authority gradient for the 
1977 Tenerife collision). In Interview 5, he stated that the crash of Avianca 052 was the 
only one of the four that he thought was a “clear-cut language barrier based accident”. 
Although the KI highlighted one factor for each accident, he acknowledged they all 
involved multiple factors. He explained this in terms of the Swiss cheese model. Developed 
by Reason (1990), this accident causation model visualizes the defences of a system as 
layers. Separate layers may represent unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe 
supervision, and organizational influences. Gaps, or weaknesses, in defences are depicted 
as holes in the layers, as shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22: The Swiss cheese model of accident causation. Adapted from Maurino, Reason, 


















For a layer that represents unsafe acts, a gap might be caused by a pilot initiating 
takeoff before receiving takeoff clearance. The gaps continually change position and size. 
If gaps in all the layers are aligned, an accident trajectory can pass through the defences, 
like a skewer through the holes in slices of Swiss cheese. When this happens, an accident 
results. In Interview 8, the KI suggested that, in each of the accidents cited by ICAO, one 
layer had a large gap with “a greater potential to influence the outcome”. The large gap 
corresponds to the issue he considers most salient for the accident. 
The KI also described experiences from his own career that the four accidents 
reminded him of. His descriptions of the accidents, and the recollections they triggered 
from his flying and training experiences, indicate that these are iconic accidents which 
serve a valuable purpose in providing context for training. They help pilots to remember 
important lessons and thereby improve flight safety. For the KI, the 1995 Cali accident 
emphasises the importance of following standard operating procedures, while the 1996 
New Delhi collision highlights the value of TCAS. 
 
8.1.3 RQ C – TV Documentaries & Other Information Sources 
The next research question (RQ C) asked where pilots found out about the four 
accidents. The survey results indicate that TV documentaries are the most common source 
of information for three accidents: 1977 Tenerife, 1990 Cove Neck and 1996 New Delhi. 
Company training is also important, being the most common information source for the 
1995 Cali crash and significant for two others. In addition, accident reports are prominent, 
being the second or third most important sources for all four accidents. 
Many features of TV documentaries make them attractive sources of information. 
They are visual, aural and dramatic, with movement, spoken language and sound effects. 
They may be watched in a short time (i.e., a maximum of 40-50 minutes). Moreover, they 
present accidents in a personal style that foregrounds individuality and personality. The 
potency of documentaries is illustrated by the KI’s story about a GPWS warning being 
triggered by a rainstorm on the approach to Verona Airport. He was “freaked out” by the 
warning because the opening sequence of a documentary had imprinted in his mind the 
message: “when you hear that noise, you’re going to crash” (Interview 8). 
As noted in Section 5.5.5, there are limitations to documentaries as sources of 
information about accidents. The limitations include: the selective use of accident report 
transcripts, with some dialogues being re-ordered or re-written; the speech of NNSs being 
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translated into English; and the use of an omniscient narrator who knows an accident will 
happen although the actual participants did not have this awareness (i.e., hindsight bias75). 
Given these limitations, it is reassuring that TV documentaries are typically not the only 
source of information for pilots in the survey. Compared with all respondents, those citing 
TV documentaries as an information source are more likely to cite two or more sources. 
However, this suggests the need for further research to investigate how pilots integrate 
accident information that comes from multiple sources. It is also important for instructors 
who use excerpts from TV documentaries during airline training to be cognisant of their 
shortcomings and to use them in conjunction with other sources of information, such as 
accident reports. 
The KI commented on the value of using short extracts from documentaries during 
pilot training. However, he noted that the main purpose of documentaries is entertainment; 
they are not created as learning tools. The KI used to watch TV documentaries but no 
longer does so due to changes in the delivery of media. He suspects that the change in his 
viewing habits might be reflected in the wider pilot population. This echoes discussions 
that have become commonplace in recent years at aviation conferences (e.g., AHFE, ISAP, 
RAeS Flight Operations Group) about changes in the viewing habits and learning styles of 
pilot trainees compared with the trainers’ generation. 
 
8.1.4 RQ D – English Proficiency & Language Attitudes 
The final research question for Stage One (RQ D) asked whether the insufficient 
English proficiency of pilots and/or air traffic controllers contributed to the four accidents. 
In the case of the English proficiency of pilots, a majority of the survey respondents think 
that it played a contributing role in three of the accidents: 1977 Tenerife, 1990 Cove Neck 
and 1996 New Delhi. The exception is the 1995 Cali crash, for which less than 13% agree. 
For the English proficiency of air traffic controllers, a majority think it played a role only 
in the 1977 Tenerife runway collision. For the 1996 New Delhi mid-air collision, 50% of 
respondents agree, and for the other accidents the proportion was one third or less. 
Combining the results, only in case of the 1977 Tenerife accident do the survey 
respondents perceive English proficiency to have been a problem for both the pilots and 
 
75
 Hindsight bias refers to the distortion of a person’s evaluation of a situation when that person 
knows the outcome of the situation (Dismukes et al., 2007). 
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controllers. This is consistent with the accident reports, which found that the contributory 
factors included the inadequate language used by one of the KLM pilots (CIAIAC, 1978) 
and the difficulty in understanding taxi instructions given by the ground controller (Roitsch 
et al., 1978). 
The 1995 Cali accident stands out because only a small proportion of respondents 
(a third or less) think that insufficient English proficiency of the pilots or controllers was a 
contributory factor. It seems that the pilots surveyed, like the KI, do not consider this to be 
primarily a language accident. Instead they might consider it to be an instance of cockpit 
procedures breaking down, as the KI suggested. Another possibility is that they consider it 
to be an automation accident, illustrating the hazards associated with the introduction of 
new technology and unexpected failure modes into the cockpit. Such reasoning would be 
consistent with the findings of the Colombian accident report, which cited the flight crew’s 
“uso inadecuado de automatizacion” (“inadequate use of automation”) in its listing of the 
probable cause (CAD, 1996a, p. 68). 
The KI acknowledges that his responses to the survey questions about English 
proficiency were influenced by attitudes he holds towards certain national or regional 
groups. For instance, he has a very favourable evaluation of the English proficiency of 
Dutch pilots, in contrast to his poor evaluation of the English proficiency of air traffic 
controllers in South America. It is possible that the responses of survey respondents were 
similarly influenced by their attitudes. The language attitudes of pilot and controllers is an 
under-researched area. To address this deficiency, one suggestion for future research is to 
conduct a matched-guise experiment that is designed to elicit the attitudes of pilots and air 





8.2 STAGE TWO – Making Sense of the Avianca 052 Accident 
Avianca Flight 052 crashed as the result of the complex interplay of numerous 
causal factors. In recent decades it has become a key tenet of accident analysis that airline 
accidents do not usually have a single cause, but instead result from the co-incidence of 
multiple factors (Dismukes et al., 2007). The NTSB report listed 24 findings and outlined 
several contributory factors. These were distilled down to two key points: “the probable 
cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to adequately manage the airplane’s 
fuel load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control 
before fuel exhaustion occurred” (NTSB, 1991, p. 76). 
This dissertation attempts to make sense of how communication broke down 
between the pilots and controllers during the Avianca 052 accident. The discussion of the 
Stage Two results is divided into four sections. The first section considers the significance 
of the three recurring phenomena of interest that were analysed in Chapter 7. The second 
section addresses the six critical communications that were identified, and reconstructs the 
process by which communication breakdown took place. The next section addresses the 
research questions (RQs E-H) and discusses communication factors that contributed to the 
accident. The final section concerns limitations to the transcript data provided in the NTSB 
accident report. Key factors from the ACT glossary are highlighted (e.g., fatigue). 
 
8.2.1 Recurring Phenomena – Captain, First Officer & Controller 
The analysis of the language use of pilots and controllers in Section 7.2.3 identified 
three recurring communication phenomena of interest. Firstly, on multiple occasions the 
Avianca captain repeatedly requested confirmation of an item of information following a 
message from ATC. Secondly, the Avianca first officer frequently switched languages and 
registers in his dialogue with ATC and the other flight crew members. Thirdly, the final 
vector (FV) controller alternated between different language varieties depending on the 
pilot he was contacting. The significance of these three recurring phenomena is discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
8.2.1.1 Repetition of the Avianca Captain 
According to the NTSB report for the Avianca 052 accident, the CVR evidence 
indicated that the captain “did not hear or understand the ATC communications” and it was 
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likely that “his limited command of the English language prevented him from effectively 
monitoring the content of the transmission” (NTSB, 1991, p. 58). The analysis of the CVR 
excerpt in Section 7.2.3.1 contradicts this finding. The captain was able to understand the 
messages from the approach controller about a new heading and another aircraft before 
they had been translated by the first officer. His comprehension of ATC messages can also 
be observed at a number of other points in the CVR transcript. 
In the Table 10 excerpt in Chapter 7, the captain repeated the heading information 
four times. One reason for the repetition may have been surprise. The Avianca aircraft was 
running low on fuel and needed to land as soon as possible. Instead, they were given an 
instruction to make a 360-degree turn for spacing. The Colombian DAAC stated that this 
effectively put the aircraft in “a racetrack holding pattern”, even though it had entered the 
TRACON airspace where no holding delays were expected (NTSB, 19991, p. 283). Thus, 
in this excerpt the captain’s repetition of the new heading may have been an expression of 
surprise that the aircraft was being directed away from the airport. 
Another possible reason for the repetition is fatigue. The NTSB report indicated 
that the aircraft was flown manually from Medellin in Colombia due to problems with the 
autopilot. As time passed and the fuel situation worsened, this led to increasing fatigue and 
stress. The main body of the report cited “nine distinct incidents of the captain asking for 
instructions to be repeated” as evidence of fatigue and stress (NTSB, 1991, p. 67). The 
report’s conclusion, however, downplayed the effect of fatigue by noting only that it may 
have adversely affected the pilot’s performance in flying the first approach. 
There are multiple effects associated with fatigue, several of which may impact 
communication: diminished ability to picture the overall situation, difficulty in allocating 
attentional resources, degraded accuracy and timing, difficulty in integrating information, 
acceptance of lower standards of performance, impaired reasoning, deterioration in attitude 
and mood, inconsistent performance, waning attention, and involuntary lapses into sleep 
(Caldwell & Caldwell, 2003). Fatigue has been cited as a contributory factor in many 
accidents and incidents. It can be difficult, though, to establish a causal relation between 
fatigue and specific outcomes. As a consequence, accident reports frequently include 
general statements to the effect that “pilot performance was likely impaired by fatigue” 
(see, for example, NTSB, 2000b, 2011, 2014). 
The analysis in Section 7.2.3.1 found a pattern of repetition by the captain that 
recurred throughout the CVR. Although he was able to translate ATC messages into 
Spanish, he had difficulty integrating the information. Moreover, if he was surprised by the 
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ATC instruction for a 360-degree turn for spacing, he did not articulate this clearly and did 
not question the instruction. The captain seems to have been preoccupied with flying the 
aircraft, and his communication was limited to finding out or confirming just the items of 
information he thought necessary to land the plane. This all indicates that the captain was 
suffering from fatigue during the last 40 minutes of the flight. 
Helmreich (1994, pp. 275, 279) described the Avianca captain’s behaviour as 
“reactive” rather than “proactive”, and concluded that his failure to discuss possible 
contingencies or inform the other crew members about his overall intentions indicated 
inadequate leadership. Fatigue may have contributed to the captain’s reactive behaviour. 
Regarding his communication, Duke (1992, p. 4) noted that the CVR data “contained 
ample evidence of fatigue and stress”. The analysis in this dissertation supports the 
hypothesis that the captain’s language use was affected by fatigue. 
The analysis highlights a significant limitation of the accident data. If a longer 
CVR recording (e.g., two hours or more) were available, it would be possible to test the 
fatigue hypothesis. We would expect to see an increase in the captain’s use of repetition as 
the flight progressed (i.e., as the captain became more fatigued). However, in accordance 
with the regulations in effect at the time, the recording only covered the final 40 minutes of 
the flight. The absence of cockpit audio data from earlier in the flight illustrates the value 
of longer CVR recording times for accident investigations.76 
 
8.2.1.2 Code Switching of the Avianca First Officer 
A two-minute segment of communication involving the Avianca first officer was 
analysed in Section 7.2.3.2. As expected, the segment contained code switching between 
English and Spanish, and also between standard phraseology and plain language. There 
were 21 instances of English-Spanish code switching, 81% of them occurring in the second 
half of the segment. The intensity of the code switching imposed a substantial cognitive 
burden on the first officer, increasing his workload as he monitored and participated in 
communications both on the radio and in the cockpit. 
The first officer’s primary responsibility was handling radio communications, but 
he also took on an additional role as an interpreter for the captain. This was perhaps due to 
the repeated requests for confirmation of information that the captain had previously made. 
 
76
 Modern passenger aircraft typically carry CVRs that record for two hours. In 2021, 25-hour CVR 
devices are due to be introduced (see Cookson, 2019a). 
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For instance, midway through the segment the first officer translated a heading instruction 
into Spanish after receiving it from the FV controller. Subsequently he provided a Spanish 
translation of the English phrase “nose up attitude” on behalf of the flight engineer when 
the captain could not understand part of a briefing.  
In his analysis of the accident, Helmreich (1994, p. 275) stated that: “Overall, the 
total amount of communication within the cockpit was very low”. This statement needs to 
be qualified. Firstly, Helmreich’s analysis was based on the CVR data and was therefore 
limited to the final 40 minutes of the flight; the total flight time was 6 hours 26 minutes. 
Secondly, there were periods when communication in the Avianca cockpit was high, and 
other times when it was low. Communication was dense in the two-minute segment shown 
in Appendix 16. Even though there was an ATIS information broadcast playing for the first 
30 seconds, there were still 41 turns, 46% of which were intracockpit dialogue. All three 
Avianca crew members participated, but the captain’s mean turn length (2.83 tokens) was 
noticeably shorter than that of the crew as a whole (5.32 tokens). This is further evidence 
that the captain was experiencing fatigue and was focusing his attentional resources on 
controlling the aircraft. 
Helmreich (1994, pp. 274-275) compared the amount of communication in the 
Avianca cockpit with other accidents “where the crew’s performance was deemed to be 
exemplary by the NTSB”. He cited two accidents: the 1989 explosive decompression of 
United Airlines Flight 811, and the 1989 uncontained engine failure of United Airlines 
Flight 232. Both accidents involved American flight crews and American controllers. In 
other words, all participants were speaking their first language: English. In addition the 
flight crews for these accidents were highly experienced.77 The context of the Avianca 052 
accident was very different: there was a steep experience gradient within the cockpit, and 
the NNS flight crew were interacting with NES controllers. The analysis of code switching 
in this dissertation highlights the extra communication burden that NNS crews face when 
flying through airspace in which English is the common language. This underlines the 
importance of taking into account the language background of participants and details of 
the accident context when undertaking comparative studies of accidents. 
 
77
 The three members of the United Flight 811 crew had accumulated about 28,000, 14,500 and 
20,000 flight hours (NTSB, 1992). The four crew members flying United Flight 232 each had 
between 15,000 and 30,000 hours (NTSB, 1990). By contrast, as noted in Table 8, the Avianca first 
officer had a total of 1,837 flight hours. 
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The analysis of code switching in Section 7.2.3.2 brought to light shortcomings in 
the English translation provided in the CVR transcript in the NTSB report. Some of the 
differences identified in Appendix 17 are relevant to the accident. The non-translation of 
“es” at 21:03:46 is of particular significance as it changes the meaning of the utterance. In 
the new translation, “it’s” is an example of anaphoric pronominal reference, pointing back 
to a previous utterance. It indicates that, at this point in the dialogue, the flight engineer 
was resuming a briefing he had started earlier. There are no other related utterances made 
by the flight engineer prior to this in the CVR transcript, so the implication is that the flight 
engineer began the briefing prior to the start of the CVR recording at 20:53. If that is the 
case, it would undermine the assertion by Helmreich (1994, p. 274) that “there was no 
discussion of actions to be taken in the event of encountering reported wind shear”. This 
again suggests that only having a 40-minute CVR recording for this accident was a major 
limitation for the NTSB investigation as intracockpit dialogue relevant to the crash seems 
to have taken place before the start of the audio record. 
 
8.2.1.3 Style Shifting of the FV Controller 
The third recurring communication phenomenon to be identified was style shifting 
by the FV controller. Radio exchanges were examined between the controller and two 
aircraft that were both running critically low on fuel. Section 7.2.3.3 revealed distinctive 
patterns in the language use of the pilot of American Airlines Flight 692 (AAL692). The 
analysis also highlighted features of the language variety used by the FV controller when 
he was handling this American aircraft. 
The pilot of AAL692 did not adhere to standard phraseology. He repeatedly used a 
non-standard call sign (“six ninety-two”). On several occasions he seems to have avoided 
using the call sign at the end of an exchange, instead saying a single word (e.g., “Alright”), 
but this cannot be confirmed because the transcript designated the speaker as unknown. He 
sometimes used non-standard contractions for headings (e.g., “two seventy”) and at other 
times used the correct format (e.g., “three two zero”). He showed a tendency to insert “to” 
before a heading, which is non-standard. When requested to fly at 160 knots he did not 
read back the speed, as other pilots did, but simply acknowledged receiving the message. 
The pilot exhibited a marked tendency to use plain language in terms of vocabulary 
selection (e.g., “very unhappy”, “you say”). As was to be expected, he displayed a high 
level of spoken English proficiency when sharing information about the fuel problem and 
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anticipating an emergency: “we’re uh about uh twelve or fourteen minutes from declaring 
an emergency”. He similarly demonstrated a high level of listening comprehension by 
responding fluently and without hesitation to the controller’s idiomatic inquiry about the 
status of his aircraft (“how are we making out”). Finally, there were two instances of 
microphone clipping, which might indicate poor radio technique. 
No data are available about the background of the AAL692 pilot, but his proactive, 
non-standard manner (e.g., “very unhappy at two thousand feet”) and the deference that 
was shown by the controller imply experience and possibly seniority. He did not adhere to 
standard phraseology, but was able to use the plain language resources at his disposal to 
negotiate the earliest possible landing for his plane. As noted in Section 2.6.2, pilots 
sometimes embellish prescribed wordings in order to do important interactional work, such 
as communicating an understanding of the current situation. Nevile (2004) observed that 
linguistic improvisation during routine operations can help pilots develop a resource for 
dealing with emergency situations for which there are no prescribed wordings. 
The FV controller used non-standard language when contacting AAL692, and 
consistently used the same non-standard call sign as the pilot (“six ninety two”). He 
repeated this pattern elsewhere, using the same form of contraction for the call signs of all 
the American aircraft except for Trans World Airlines Flight 801, whose number could not 
be shortened in this way. The controller used a significant amount of plain language to deal 
with the fuel problem of AAL692. This included colloquialisms and complete sentences 
(e.g., “I’m going to take you another eight miles where you are then turn ya to the final”). 
Several messages from the controller were delivered in a reassuring or helpful key not 
found in exchanges with other aircraft (e.g., “I’ll make sure you get a lot of room there”). 
The controller also used some communicative functions with AAL692 that he did not use 
with other pilots. One example occurred when he inquired about the fuel status using an 
idiomatic phrasal verb (“how are we making out”). In addition, the deferential language in 
the controller’s final message to the American Airlines pilot (“again thank you for your 
cooperation”) was one of only two occasions when he used expressions of gratitude, and 
showed a more formal word selection than the other instance (when he said “thanks for 
your help” to a Pan Am flight). 
A subtle change took place in the plain language used by the FV controller as he 
communicated with AAL692. For the first few exchanges he used singular pronoun forms 
only (e.g., “I understand uh you’re number four with me sir”). However, in the middle of 
the exchanges, he switched to the first person plural to check the aircraft status by saying 
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“how are we making out”. This was echoed in the pilot’s response: “We got enough fuel 
for the approach and landing and that’s it”. Thereafter, the controller reverted to only using 
singular forms (e.g., “you’re one three miles from outer marker”). As shown by Nevile 
(2004), pilots may use singular first or second person pronouns to invoke an individual 
identity, contrasted with the use of plural first person pronouns to invoke a shared identity. 
A similar process may have been operating between the FV controller and the AAL692 
pilot. At first the pilot was assertive and initiated two exchanges. The controller was 
reactive, quickly issuing an instruction to climb after the pilot said he was “very unhappy 
at two thousand feet”. In the subsequent exchanges the controller reestablished control by 
explaining the action he would take and giving routine heading instructions. He then used 
the first person plural pronoun, “we”, to check the aircraft’s status, signalling a willingness 
to present the emergency as a shared problem. Finally, the controller reverted to singular 
pronoun forms, reasserting his individual identity, but he continued to communicate in a 
helpful and deferential key. 
The language variety used by the first officer of Avianca 052 differed significantly 
from that of the AAL692 pilot, even though the two aircraft were on the same course and 
both facing a fuel emergency. The exchanges in Section 7.2.3.4 show the first officer 
adhering to standard phraseology and not using plain language. He used the correct call 
sign for every exchange after the initial contact (when he omitted the designation “heavy”) 
and consistently used phraseology to read back ATC instructions. The instructions were 
routine messages about heading changes, an altitude change, clearance for the approach 
and a speed request. Such was the first officer’s adherence to phraseology that the phatic 
expression he used on leaving the sector (“so long”) stands out as overly familiar. 
The FV controller used a completely different language variety when speaking with 
AVA052 compared with AAL692. He consistently used standard phraseology, mirroring 
the Avianca first officer’s use of phraseology. He always said the Avianca call sign in 
standard format. There were just two minor instances of plain language, one at the start of 
the communications and one at the end. During the first exchange, the controller signalled 
the entry of the Avianca aircraft to the sector with the phatic expression “good evening”. 
He used the same expression with the other aircraft entering the sector during this period. 
In the final exchange with AVA052, the controller used the expression “good day”. He 
used this expression with two other non-American aircraft that departed the sector, but 
used “good evening” with three out of four American aircraft. 
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Why did the first officer not notify the FV controller about his aircraft’s fuel 
situation during this period, as the AAL692 pilot had done? There may have been several 
factors influencing him. Firstly, the parallel communication with ATC and his fellow crew 
members, which involved a lot of code switching, was imposing a considerable burden on 
his linguistic resources. As a non-native speaker, it was less cognitively demanding for him 
to produce routine phraseology than it was to produce a novel message in plain English 
explaining the fuel problem. Furthermore, he was an inexperienced pilot, particularly in 
terms of flying a Boeing 707 at night. It is likely that he had no previous experience of this 
kind of emergency or exposure to the language needed to resolve it. After entering the 
sector, he heard the FV controller inquire about the fuel status of AAL692. He did not hear 
the two earlier messages the American pilot transmitted about the fuel problem. Besides, 
he believed that the previous controller had passed on his messages about the Avianca fuel 
situation. It may therefore have seemed reasonable to wait for the FV controller to initiate 
a fuel status check. These factors are consistent with the suggestion by Helmreich (1994) 
that the communicative goal of the first officer was to cause no extra problems for ATC on 
a busy night. By not creating more problems, he may have reasoned that his flight (and 
others) would be handled as quickly as possible. 
The lack of an explicit warning from the Avianca first officer, combined with the 
routine nature and phraseology of his messages, gave no indication to the controller that 
AVA052 had an incipient fuel emergency. As noted by Allen and Guy (1989, p. 54) the 
use of routine communication in a crisis increases risk as it “deludes and diverts those who 
are most responsible from recognizing the danger and verbalizing the needed direction to 
avert failure”. 
The analysis in Chapter 7 showed the distinct language varieties used by the pilots 
of AAL692 and AVA052 as they tried to negotiate the fuel problems that their aircraft 
were facing. It also highlighted style shifting by the FV controller as he alternated between 
separate language varieties depending on the pilot he was contacting. This finding is 
significant. Standard phraseology is intended to ensure that the same language is used with 
all pilots. However, the analysis found evidence of systematic variation in the actual 
language use of a controller during a crucial stage of the accident flight. 
The controller deployed different language varieties depending on the context. For 
Avianca 052, perhaps concerned about the English proficiency of NNS pilots, the variety 
consisted almost entirely of standard phraseology. With AAL692, both participants were 
NESs so the controller used fluent, non-standard (and sometimes colloquial) language to 
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achieve effective and efficient communication. There are understandable reasons for this 
type of style shifting. As Liddicoat (2007, p. 6) noted, “listeners are motivated to hear a 
turn that is designed for them”. A controller may use recipient design, for example, by 
using the same form of call sign as the pilot (e.g., standard format for the Avianca first 
officer but non-standard for the American Airlines pilot). Accommodation makes sense as 
a controller strategy to ensure that pilots hear messages intended for them. Another reason 
for using a non-standard variety with the American pilot is to establish a shared identity. 
This invokes shared knowledge and assumptions, which are otherwise scarce in pilot-ATC 
communication. Such non-standard language use between NESs might be considered 
appropriate to the immediate needs of the interlocutors. However, this practice increases 
the risk of a communication barrier between NESs and NNSs. It may inhibit some NNS 
pilots from using plain language when they need to, and NNS pilots listening on the same 
radio frequency may not understand the exchanges. 
 
8.2.2 Critical Communications – The Process of Breakdown 
This section discusses six critical communications that were identified in the final 
stage of the flight of Avianca 052. It is divided into two parts. The first part presents a 
narrative of the process by which communication breakdown occurred. It highlights key 
messages that were transmitted and factors that mitigated their effectiveness. The second 
part discusses a series of opportunities where the accident could have been prevented. 
Reasons for these opportunities not being taken are proposed, and the roles played by the 
main participants in the communication breakdown are discussed. 
 
8.2.2.1 Narrative of a Communication Breakdown 
In the first critical communication, the Avianca first officer notified the R67 air 
traffic controller about the aircraft’s fuel problem more than 45 minutes before the crash 
occurred. In three messages sent between 20:44 and 20:46, the first officer said “I think we 
need priority”, “we’ll be able to hold about five minutes” and “we run out of fuel now” 
(Table 27). The H67 controller phoned the next sector controller to inform him about one 
of the messages: AVA052 could hold for five minutes. The H67 controller did not mention 
“priority” and he did not hear the “we run out of fuel now” message due to the distraction 
of the phone conversation. It is probable that the first officer mistakenly assumed all three 
messages were passed on to the next controller. 
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In the next sector, AVA052 was instructed to make a 360-degree turn for spacing 
by the APP controller at 20:54. This used up between six and eight minutes of flight time 
and reduced the fuel reserve. The aircraft was then handed off to the FV controller and 
given a long final approach leg to JFK. 
The Avianca captain was flying the aircraft manually. During the final approach it 
experienced wind shear. There were 15 GPWS warnings and the NTSB report noted that 
the crew experienced a high level of stress during the approach. The aircraft executed a 
missed approach at 21:23 and the first officer notified the TWR controller. 
In the second critical communication, the TWR controller contacted AVA052 twice 
and on both occasions the captain spoke in Spanish before the first officer could respond to 
the controller. On the first occasion the captain said “we don’t have fue-”, and the second 
time he said “tell them we are in emergency” (Table 28). It is possible that the first officer 
did not clearly hear the captain’s second utterance. There may have been overlapping 
speech between this utterance (in Spanish), the second radio message (in English) and an 
utterance from the first engineer (in Spanish), as well as an altitude alert sounding. In 
addition, the first officer was having to process a question from the controller (in English), 
not just a routine instruction. The first officer responded to the controller at 21:24:08 and 
notified him of the fuel problem by saying “we’re running out of fuel”. This was a 
paraphrase of the captain’s first utterance, and a repetition of a message the first officer 
had sent in the first critical communication. It was buried in a sub-message inside an 
appended message. There was ambiguity in the controller’ response as he gave a minimal 
acknowledgement: “okay”. 
The captain again instructed the first officer to declare an emergency. Once more 
there may have been overlapping speech in the cockpit: the captain spoke (in Spanish) in 
the middle of a long transmission from the controller (in English) about wind shear to 
another aircraft. As Duke (1992) suggested, the radio message about wind shear might 
have been a distraction that prevented the first officer from clearly hearing the captain’s 
instruction. The captain then asked, “did you tell him”, and the first officer replied, “yes 
sir” and “I already advised him”. The first officer thought he had told the TWR controller 
about the fuel problem. However, the TWR controller did not pass on information about 
the fuel problem when he handed AVA052 off to the FV approach controller. 
In the third critical communication, the FV controller contacted AVA052 with an 
altitude instruction. The captain initiated a turn before the first officer could respond, 
saying “advise him we don’t have fuel” (Table 29). The first officer responded to the 
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controller at 21:25:10 and notified him of the fuel problem by saying “we’re running out 
of fuel sir”. This notification was in an appended message. The FV controller responded 
with an ambiguous acknowledgement (“okay”) and an instruction for a new heading (“fly 
heading zero eight zero”). The first officer subsequently told the captain an incorrect 
heading (“hundred and eighty”). 
The captain again checked if the first officer had sent a message about the aircraft’s 
fuel problem. The first officer replied that he had (“yes sir I already advise him”), and then 
repeated the incorrect heading. The first officer thought he had told the FV controller about 
the fuel problem. 
In the fourth critical communication, for the first time there was an inquiry from 
ATC about the fuel problem. At 21:26:35 the FV controller sent a message about the final 
approach, which ended with the question: “is that fine with you and your fuel” (Table 30). 
This inquiry indicates that the FV controller had understood the fuel message previously 
sent by the first officer at 21:25:10. The controller’s transmission used plain language with 
colloquialism and had two sub-messages. The captain did not understand the transmission, 
and the flight engineer thought it was delivered in an angry key. The first officer gave a 
polite preferred response to the controller: “I guess so thank you very much”. He did not 
consult the captain. 
The Avianca crew received vectors for a long approach, just as they had for the 
first approach. At 21:29:11, the Avianca first officer contacted the FV controller to request 
a turn on to the final approach: “ah can you give us a final now Avianca zero five two 
heavy”. The controller responded by issuing a small heading change to 040 degrees, which 
kept the aircraft on course for a long 15-mile final leg. 
In the fifth critical communication, the FV controller contacted TWA Flight 801 
(TWA801) with an instruction to turn on to the final approach. There was an instance of 
call sign confusion and probably also blocked transmission as the Avianca first officer 
responded to this message at 21:30:21 (Table 31). The controller repeated the instruction to 
TWA801, but the first officer probably did not hear this clearly because at the same time 
he was responding to a question from the captain about the heading. The controller then 
gave an altitude instruction to AVA052. The first officer responded with a confused 
message at 21:30:36: “ah negative sir we just running out of fuel we okay three thousand 
now okay”. This was the fourth time he had sent the same message about the fuel problem 
(“we’re running out of fuel”). The controller responded with an ambiguous minimal 
acknowledgement (“okay”) and a new heading instruction. 
 
 226 
At 21:30:55 the FV controller issued a new heading of 360 degrees, taking the 
Avianca aircraft further away from JFK. The controller explained: “okay and you're 
number two for the approach I just have to give you enough room so you make it without 
ah having to come out again”. At 21:32:08 the controller gave AVA052 another heading 
change to 330 degrees. 
In the final critical communication, the flight engineer told the other crew members 
at 21:32:39 that one of the four engines had flamed out (Table 32). Seconds later he said 
another engine had flamed out. At 21:32:49 the first officer contacted the FV controller: 
“Avianca zero five two we just ah lost two engines and ah we need priority please”. In 
this message the first officer repeated an expression that he had used in the first critical 
communication (“we need priority”). The controller responded by issuing a new heading 
instruction. The first officer relayed the new heading (“two five zero”) to the captain and 
then responded to the controller with a minimal acknowledgement (“roger”). 
At 21:33:04 the FV controller sent another message with an altitude instruction and 
clearance for the final approach. The first officer acknowledged the message by saying 
“roger Avianca”. Less than one minute later the aircraft crashed approximately 16 miles 
from JFK International Airport. 
 
8.2.2.2 Opportunities to Prevent the Accident 
During the final stage of the flight of Avianca 052, the first officer twice told a 
controller “we need priority” and four times he sent a message saying “we’re running out 
of fuel”. Before the crash occurred, the controllers sent one message to inquire about the 
Avianca fuel problem: “is that fine with you and your fuel”. The following paragraphs 
discuss the language choices made by the participants, especially the Avianca first officer, 
and the opportunities that existed for preventing the accident. 
The first officer used the expression “we’re running out of fuel” four times. He said 
it once to the R67 controller (Table 27), once to the TWR controller (Table 28) and twice 
to the FV controller (Tables 29 and 31). The expression was most likely prompted by the 
captain saying in Spanish “we don’t have fue-” and “advise him we don’t have fuel” 
(Tables 28 and 29). After using the expression in the first critical communication, the first 
officer may have evaluated it positively because the Avianca aircraft promptly received 
clearance to leave the holding pattern and enter the next sector. The first officer did not 
know that this had happened as a result of another message (“we’ll be able to hold about 
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five minutes”). Furthermore, the expression “we’re running out of fuel” was a chunk that 
could be readily retrieved from memory and spoken under conditions of time pressure and 
stress. It was less cognitively demanding and time consuming to produce than the message 
sent by the AAL692 pilot: “I want to advise you we’re at minimum fuel uh we’re uh about 
uh twelve or fourteen minutes from declaring an emergency”. It was also simpler and 
shorter than the alternative suggested in the accident report: “Did you receive our low fuel 
call to NY Center, we said that we no longer have enough fuel to make it to our alternate?” 
(NTSB, 1991, p. 64).  
The NTSB report stated that the Avianca crew should have realised they were 
receiving routine handling when given a 360-degree turn for spacing at 20:54, and that 
they could have declared an emergency at that time. Then, or subsequently, they could 
have used standard phraseology to declare an emergency. By sending a “MAYDAY” 
message, they could have signalled distress and the need for immediate assistance. 
Alternatively, they could have sent a “PAN PAN” message to signal urgency. The flight 
crew did not use either of the phrases. This is one of the key lessons for all current and 
future pilots to take from the Avianca 052 accident. 
Another option was for the Avianca flight crew to communicate the fuel problem 
using the word “emergency” in a non-standard message. The accident report suggested that 
they could have said “we are declaring an emergency” (NTSB, 1991, p. 64). The Avianca 
crew did not do this. The investigation found there was a total communication breakdown 
amongst the crew because the captain twice said “tell them we are in emergency” but the 
first officer failed to pass on the messages to ATC. This dissertation builds on the analysis 
by Duke (1992) to offer an explanation for the failure of the first officer to convey these 
crucial messages: the distraction of overlapping cockpit speech and radio messages may 
have prevented him from hearing the word “emergency” both times. 
 On two occasions the first officer used the expression “we need priority”, once to 
the R67 controller (Table 27) and once to the FV controller (Table 32). Following the 
accident, there was much debate about the first officer’s word choice. According to the 
testimony of another Avianca captain, training provided by Boeing gave the impression 
that “the words priority and emergency conveyed the same meaning to air traffic control” 
(NTSB, 1991, p. 63). The accident report noted that Boeing had issued a bulletin in 1980 
to all Boeing 707 operators advising “priority handling from ATC should be requested” 
during operations with very low fuel quantities (NTSB, 1991, p. 28). This advice was at 
odds with the statements of controllers questioned during the investigation. They stated 
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that the word “priority” did not require a specific response from ATC, and that flight crews 
should only use the terms “MAYDAY”, “PAN PAN” or “emergency” to declare a fuel 
emergency. It is evident that the Avianca pilots and the air traffic controllers had different 
interpretations of the word “priority”. This ambiguity was instrumental in the divergent 
situational awareness that developed between the Avianca first officer, who thought he had 
notified ATC of the fuel problem, and the controllers, who continued to handle the flight 
routinely. 
In its conclusion, the NTSB report declared: “The controllers’ actions in response 
to AVA052’s requests were proper and responsive to a request for priority handling” 
(NTSB, 1991, p. 75). However, within the report there is evidence that some controllers 
shared the same interpretation of the word “priority” as the Avianca pilots. The following 
section indicates that certain flights did receive “priority handling”, in this case due to a 
sick passenger:  
At 1640, the CFCF advised N90 of an aircraft inbound to JFK that 
needed a ‘priority’ landing because of a sick passenger. At 1643, 
ZNY asked ZOB if the pilot had requested priority handling because 
of the holding for JFK. ZNY stated, ‘I want to make sure that if we 
are going to run him priority that he is declaring a priority handling.’ 
ZOB confirmed that the pilot was indeed requesting priority because 
of the sick passenger. (NTSB, 1991, p. 158, emphasis added) 
The Avianca first officer probably assumed that the controllers had understood the 
messages in which he said “we need priority” and “we’re running out of fuel”. The prompt 
release of the aircraft from the third holding pattern would have reinforced the assumption. 
However, it is possible that the controllers did not fully comprehend some of the messages. 
The first officer used an appended message in four of the critical communications (Tables 
27, 28, 29 and 31). This increased the risk of key information being ignored. The TWR and 
FV controllers gave an ambiguous response (“okay”), which made it unclear which parts 
of the transmissions they had understood. 
As Avianca 052 proceeded through the sectors, the controllers did not forward 
information about the fuel problem. Only the message about being able to hold for five 
minutes was passed on (Table 27). The first officer was unaware that the other messages 
were not communicated between controllers. One of the NTSB members who compiled the 
report, Jim Burnett, attached a dissenting comment about the inadequate ATC service that 
was provided. He noted that: “The JFK tower local controller failed to forward to the N90 
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FV controller the remark by the flightcrew concerning their fuel situation” (NTSB 1991, p. 
78). This was crucial: it was just after the missed first approach and there was still a chance 
for the aircraft to have reached the airport if it had been given direct vectors.  
Noting that the first officer twice asked for “priority” and four times advised ATC 
that the plane was low on fuel, Krause (2003, pp. 106-107) stated that “it would seem 
reasonable and logical” for the controllers to have asked for clarification. The first officer 
may have been waiting for a controller to make an inquiry about the fuel problem in the 
period before the first approach. As noted in Section 8.2.1.3, the first officer had heard the 
FV controller inquire about the fuel status of AAL692 at 21:06: “American six ninety two 
how are we making out” (Table 17). He had not heard the earlier transmissions initiated by 
the AAL692 pilot. He believed (mistakenly) that his messages about the fuel problem had 
been relayed to the FV controller, and he thought the controller was giving them priority 
handling. The CVR shows a discussion amongst the Avianca crew at 21:09 in which the 
first officer said “they are giving us priority”. In fact the Avianca aircraft was not receiving 
priority handling, and the FV controller was instead devoting his attention to expediting 
the landing of the American Airlines plane. 
This analysis highlights the complex and stochastic nature of the Avianca 052 
accident. It occurred as a result of the co-incidence of numerous causal factors. Disaster 
might have been averted: if the H67 handoff controller had not been on the phone when the 
first officer said “we run out of fuel now”; if AVA052 had entered the FV controller’s 
airspace two minutes earlier so that the first officer could hear the AAL692 pilot negotiate 
his fuel problem; or if there had been no distraction on either occasion when the captain 
said “tell them we are in emergency”. 
The analysis has attempted to peel away the layers of complexity to reveal the 
process by which communication broke down. The aim is not to apportion blame. The 
Avianca captain’s behaviour was reactive, not proactive; it is clear that he was suffering 
from fatigue. The first officer was inexperienced; he struggled to manage the increasing 
workload and stress. The controllers did not communicate effectively with each other as 
they tried to operate within an overloaded air traffic system. The actions and non-actions of 
all of the participants contributed to a progressive breakdown in communications that 




8.2.3 RQs E-H – Factors that Contributed to the Accident 
This section sums up the findings from the analysis of recurring phenomena and 
critical communications in terms of the four research questions for Stage Two (RQs E-H). 
It discusses the numerous communication factors that contributed to this accident. 
 
8.2.3.1 RQ E – Use of Standard Phraseology 
The first research question for Stage Two (RQ E) asked whether the incorrect use 
of standard phraseology by the pilots or air traffic controllers contributed to the accident. 
As noted in Section 8.2.2.2, the accident could have been prevented if the Avianca first 
officer had used the standard phraseology terms “MAYDAY” or “PAN PAN” to notify 
ATC of the fuel emergency. He could have done this at any time. However, the first officer 
was young and inexperienced. Additionally, he came from Colombia, which, as Helmreich 
(1994) observed, has a high score on the Hofstede cultural dimension of power distance 
and a very low score for individualism (see Figure 10). It is unlikely that the first officer 
would have declared an emergency unless the captain instructed him to do so. After the 
missed first approach, the captain twice said “tell them we are in emergency”. The analysis 
of the second critical communication indicates that on both occasions the first officer may 
not have heard the word “emergency” due to the distraction of other cockpit speech and 
radio messages. 
There was another way in which the first officer’s use of phraseology may have 
contributed to the accident. As noted in the discussion of style shifting in Section 8.2.1.3, 
the first officer strictly adhered to standard phraseology in his exchanges with the FV 
controller before the first approach. The routine nature and phraseology of his messages, 
combined with the absence of an explicit warning, gave no indication to the controller of 
the seriousness of the fuel problem. As Ragan (2007, p. 59) commented, “the first officer 
shows a certain facility in speaking indirectly, non-aggressively, and politely despite the 
desperate urgency of the situation”. The continued routine transmissions increased risk by 
masking the crisis that was developing inside the Avianca aircraft. 
 
8.2.3.2 RQ F – Plain Language Proficiency 
The second research question (RQ F) asked whether a lack of plain language 
proficiency of the pilots or air traffic controllers contributed to the accident. The Avianca 
first officer was handling radio communication with ATC. Helmreich (1994, p. 272) stated 
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that he had “excellent, unaccented English”. However, this analysis shows a deterioration 
in the effectiveness of the first officer’s communication during the final stage of the flight. 
It is hypothesised that his language use was progressively affected by increasing workload 
and stress. As a coping mechanism, the first officer used simple English expressions. He 
repeatedly used the expressions “we’re running out of fuel” (four times) and “we need 
priority” (twice). He did not attempt a message as complex as that sent by the AAL692 
pilot. He also used these simple expressions in appended messages, which increased the 
risk that they would be ignored. In addition, the first officer made significant errors that 
were not repaired. In the third critical communication he passed on an incorrect heading to 
the captain (Table 29). In the fifth critical communication there was call sign confusion as 
he mistakenly accepted a clearance intended for another aircraft (Table 31). 
The analysis did not find evidence that the English proficiency of the Avianca 
captain directly contributed to the accident. The captain was flying the aircraft; he was not 
responsible for ATC communication. It is clear that he understood some of the radio 
transmissions, but he did not understand the inquiry from the FV controller about the fuel 
situation in the fourth critical communication (Table 30). That was a lengthy non-standard 
message delivered in colloquial English with two sub-messages. At the time the captain 
was most likely suffering from fatigue and experiencing a high level of workload and 
stress. These factors would have made it difficult for him to understand the controller’s 
message as he manually flew the aircraft away from the missed approach. Fatigue and 
workload may have contributed to the poor timing of his messages to the first officer, and 
prevented him from managing their communication more effectively.  
As for the controllers, the analysis identified style shifting by one of the controllers 
as a recurring phenomenon. The FV controller used non-standard call signs with American 
aircraft, and a significant amount of plain language when dealing with the fuel problem of 
AAL692. This made it easier for the AAL692 pilot to use plain language to negotiate a 
solution to his aircraft’s fuel problem. The controller’s language use towards AAL692 was 
exemplified by the idiomatic inquiry that he sent: “American six ninety two how are we 
making out” (Table 17). By contrast, the controller consistently used standard phraseology 
with Avianca 052 in the period before the first approach, which may have made it more 
difficult for the first officer to use plain language when he needed to. The controller finally 
inquired about the Avianca fuel situation in the fourth critical communication. His message 
was delivered in an angry tone, not a reassuring or helpful key: “and Avianca zero five two 
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heavy ah I’m gunna bring you about fifteen miles north east and then turn you back onto 
the approach is that fine with you and your fuel” (Table 30). 
 
8.2.3.3 RQ G – Use of More than One Language 
The next research question (RQ G) asked whether the use of more than one 
language in the same airspace by the pilots or air traffic controllers contributed to the 
accident. Code switching between different languages during radio communication did not 
contribute to the accident. However, as discussed in Section 8.2.1.2, the first officer had to 
engage in frequent code switching between English and Spanish as he integrated the radio 
and cockpit communication. This imposed a substantial cognitive load, which may have 
impaired his ability to communicate effectively, especially when the level of flight crew 
stress was increasing late in the flight. Specifically, the cognitive load imposed by code 
switching may have made it difficult for the first officer to create novel English messages. 
Instead he repeatedly used simple expressions (e.g., “we’re running out of fuel”). Thus, 
code switching in the cockpit may have contributed indirectly to a deterioration in the first 
officer’s ability to communicate effectively on the radio. 
 
8.2.3.4 RQ H – Influence of Other Factors 
The final research question (RQ H) asked whether the influence of other factors on 
the language use of the pilots or air traffic controllers contributed to the accident. The 
analysis of recurring phenomena and critical communications identified numerous factors 
that contributed to the crash of Avianca 052. The factors were: accommodation, ambiguity, 
appended message, avoidance, blocked transmission, call sign confusion, code switching, 
colloquialism, distraction, fatigue, idiom, message length, microphone clipping, omission, 
phrasal verb, plain language, repetition, standard phraseology, stress, style shifting and 
workload. Entries from the ACT glossary for these factors are reproduced in Appendix 14. 
Some of the factors played a minor role in this accident; others were more significant. One 
example of a significant factor was the distraction of a telephone conversation that meant 
the H67 controller did not hear the first officer’s message “we run out of fuel now” (Table 
27). Another example was the first officer’s repeated use of an appended message to send 




8.2.4 NTSB Report – Limitations of the Transcripts 
This section discusses limitations of the CVR and ATC transcript data from the 
Avianca 052 accident. It is divided into two parts. The first part discusses shortcomings in 
the transcripts, and presents a protocol for transcribing CVR and ATC audio that addresses 
the shortcomings. The second part discusses the limited duration of the CVR recording, 
and the impact it had on the NTSB investigation and this analysis. 
 
8.2.4.1 Shortcomings of CVR & ATC Transcripts in the NTSB Report 
Audio recordings provide a record of spoken communications and, in the case of 
the CVR, oral alerts and other sounds on an aircraft’s flight deck. They do not provide a 
record of non-verbal communication. In other words, audio recordings do not contain any 
information about hand gestures, including pointing at displays, or facial gestures. Nor do 
they provide information about what pilots were looking at as they spoke. In recognition of 
the limitations, Dekker (2006, p. 97) characterized CVR and ATC recordings as “partial 
data traces” and cautioned against mistaking them for actual human behaviour. He made 
the observation that these partial data traces point “to a world that was unfolding around 
the practitioners at the time, to tasks, goals, perceptions, intentions, thoughts, and actions 
that have since evaporated”. 
In a study of US airline accidents that drew heavily on NTSB reports, Dismukes et 
al. (2007, p. 8) noted that the process of “transcribing the recording inherently requires 
varying degrees of interpretation”. The subjective nature of transcribing is well understood 
in conversation analysis (CA), in which the construction of detailed transcriptions plays an 
essential role. Liddicoat (2007, p. 9) commented that transcripts “re-present” events and 
“are in every case subjective representations of the talk in which the transcriber has made 
decisions about what features of talk to include or exclude from the transcription”. 
For airline accident investigations, the process of transcribing involves a significant 
loss of detail because the transcription conventions are much simpler than those used in 
conversation analysis. For instance, accident report transcripts usually do not indicate the 
precise timing of pauses and overlaps, and they do not include information about speech 
delivery characteristics such as rising or falling intonation. Having information about 
overlaps and prosody would have benefited the Avianca 052 analysis. It would have 
confirmed whether overlapping speech affected the first officer’s ability to hear the two 
crucial instructions from the captain (“tell them we are in emergency” in Table 28) and 
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whether the FV controller’s inquiry was delivered in an angry tone (“is that fine with you 
and your fuel” in Table 30). 
There were a number of specific problems in the transcripts, which are detailed in 
the footnotes in Chapter 7. The shortcomings in the CVR and ATC data record for the 
Avianca 052 accident make it difficult for researchers to analyse this accident and learn 
lessons from it. These problems therefore hinder attempts to improve aviation safety. The 
shortcomings include: 
• Typographical errors – spelling mistakes and the inaccurate labelling of speakers 
(e.g., tower controller and CAMRN approach controller instead of final vector 
controller and TWA801 in Table 29); 
• Omitted start times – some utterance start times are not included in the transcripts 
(e.g., see the utterances of the FE in the excerpt in Appendix 16); 
• Discrepancies between transcripts – dialogues that are in more than one transcript 
have different utterance start times, word omissions and different words (e.g., “now 
okay” instead of “now we could” in Table 31); 
• Translation inaccuracies – see Appendix 17 for inaccuracies in the translation of 
Spanish dialogue into English. 
Guidance for dealing with CVR data during an accident investigation is provided in 
an NTSB publication titled “Cockpit Voice Recorder Handbook for Aviation Accident 
Investigations”. Regarding the procedure that should be followed for transcribing audio 
data, this publication simply states: “The transcript is punctuated and formatted to standard 
NTSB transcript style.” (NTSB, 2016, p. 7). In order to address shortcomings in transcripts 
from the Avianca 052 accident and other accidents, I created a transcription protocol for 
transcribing CVR and ATC audio. This simple protocol, which features cross-checking of 
transcriptions, is included in Appendix 18. 
 
8.2.4.2 Duration of the CVR Recording 
In 1990, at the time of the Avianca 052 accident, large passenger aircraft were 
required to carry a CVR that could record for 30 minutes. Currently, most airliners are 
equipped with either 30-minute or 2-hour CVR devices. In recent years there have been 
numerous accident and incident investigations in which relevant CVR data could not be 
retrieved (Cookson, 2019a). As a result, ICAO and the European Union are introducing 
new requirements. As of 1st January 2021, newly-manufactured transport aircraft with a 
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maximum certificated take-off mass (MCTOM) of over 27,000 kg must be equipped with 
25-hour CVRs (EU, 2015). 
The following extract from NTSB Safety Recommendation Report ASR-18-04 
underscores the importance of CVR data for accident investigation: 
CVRs are among the most valuable tools used for accident 
investigation. Information such as flight crew verbalizations of 
intentions and coordination, as well as pilots’ awareness of the state 
of the aircraft and cockpit information, allows investigators to more 
comprehensively assess accident/incident factors. These factors 
include flight crews’ procedural compliance, distraction, decision-
making, workload, fatigue, and situational awareness. Ultimately, 
CVRs provide unique information with which the NTSB can 
conduct more thorough investigations to more effectively target 
safety recommendations. (NTSB, 2018, p. 1) 
The length of the Avianca 052 CVR audio recording was 40 minutes 15 seconds. 
The CVR transcript provided valuable data for this analysis. However, the analysis was 
constrained in three ways by the CVR duration being limited to only 40 minutes: 
1. No CVR data are available for the first critical communication, when Avianca 052 
was in a holding pattern and the first messages were sent about the fuel problem; 
2. There is evidence that a briefing for a low fuel situation go around started earlier than 
20:53 but this cannot be verified because the CVR data are not available; 
3. It is not possible to test the fatigue hypothesis to see if there was an increase in the 
captain’s use of repetition as the flight progressed. 
The Avianca Flight 052 accident is a powerful argument for extending the duration 
of CVR devices. This analysis has highlighted the potential benefits of such a change to 
accident investigation. In particular, the third point above represents an important area that 
is currently under-researched but which could be significantly impacted by the introduction 








CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 
 
The first page of this dissertation shows three quotes related to the three areas of 
the literature review: language, risk and culture. All three quotes have a bearing on the 
findings of the study. Firstly, this is an examination of aviation English. It investigates how 
standard phraseology and plain language are interwoven in the actual language use of 
pilots and controllers, and also the ways in which NNS pilots integrate English with other 
languages. Secondly, the project examines the interplay of risk and communication. The 
ACT glossary has been created to raise awareness of the risks associated with particular 
communication factors. Finally, the study explores the role played by culture in pilot-ATC 
communications. This includes the national culture of participants (e.g., language attitudes 
based on a speaker’s nationality), organizational culture (e.g., Avianca or the FAA) and 
professional culture (e.g., airline pilots or air traffic controllers). 
The dissertation has been written in response to the ICAO language proficiency 
programme. This chapter presents the main findings and implications in four sections. The 
first section contains a reassessment of the crash of Avianca Flight 052, one of the four 
accidents referenced in ICAO Document 9835. The reassessment is based on the Stage 
Two analysis of language use and it attempts to make sense of how communication broke 
down between the pilots and controllers. The second section draws on both Stage One and 
Stage Two to discuss the implications of the study for two areas of aviation: flight crew 
training and accident investigation. The third section presents a framework for analysing 
the language use of pilots in accidents. The framework was developed from the analysis of 
the Avianca 052 accident. The final section of the chapter reflects on limitations of three 
elements of the study: the survey of pilot attitudes, the semi-structured interviews with the 






9.1 Reassessing the Avianca 052 Accident 
Cobb and Primo (2003, p. 10) observed that airplane crashes are “easily simplified, 
personalized and symbolized”. They therefore lend themselves to being reduced to short, 
dramatic news stories. This process could be observed in the aftermath of the Avianca 052 
accident. On the next day, newspapers across America carried headlines such as: 
• “‘A MIRACLE’ ANYONE SURVIVED” (Seattle Times, Washington) 
• “Plane ‘just went down’” (Providence Journal, Rhode Island) 
• “Jet crashes in N.Y. fog: ‘worst thing you ever saw’” (St. Petersburg Times, Florida) 
One year later, a large amount of information about the flight became available 
when the report of the NTSB investigation was published. Nevertheless, the same process 
of simplification, personalization and symbolization was evident in media coverage of the 
accident report, even in aviation publications. Flight International magazine condensed the 
findings of the 295-page NTSB document to a single paragraph with the headline “CREW 
FAILED”. The article declared “there was ‘...such poor flight crew performance’ that any 
air traffic control shortcomings were irrelevent [sic]” (Flight International, 1991). The 
accident was reduced to a simple narrative of foreign pilots failing to communicate a fuel 
emergency. The reality was much more complex. 
To make sense of the Avianca 052 accident, it is necessary to try to understand how 
the flight crew and controllers experienced events as they unfolded. We must bear in mind 
that the participants did not know an accident would happen. In other words, it is important 
to avoid hindsight bias (Dekker, 2007). The pilots and controllers were moving along the 
Figure 20 timeline, not knowing that the flight would end in tragedy at 21:34 EST. Their 
lack of awareness of impending disaster is summed up by a comment from the Avianca 
first officer shortly after the aircraft entered the FV controller’s airspace. At 21:07 he said 
to his colleagues, “this means that we’ll have hamburger tonight” (NTSB, 1991, p. 97). As 
we look back on the events after 30 years have passed, we have the benefit of numerous 
representations of the accident. In addition to newspaper articles and the NTSB report, 
there have been books, documentaries, and analyses by pilots and human factors experts. 
These representations should be regarded critically, and we need to remain mindful of their 
limitations when reassessing the accident. 
Stage Two of this study examined the communication problems that occurred 
during the Avianca 052 flight. The accident did not hinge on a simple misunderstanding 
between a pilot and a controller. Nor was it mainly due to the limited English proficiency 
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of NNS pilots. There was a communication breakdown that involved three members of the 
Avianca crew, five controllers and numerous other pilots flying through the same airspace. 
Section 8.2.2 describes the process by which communication broke down. As the Avianca 
fuel situation worsened, the first officer tried to inform ATC of the problem in a series of 
transmissions. He twice sent a message saying “we need priority” and on four occasions 
radioed “we’re running out of fuel”. However, the meaning that he intended to convey in 
these messages was masked by the following factors: 
• Intelligibility –  in the first critical communication one of the messages about the fuel 
problem was partially garbled; 
• Plain language – the first officer used idiomatic plain language which mitigated the 
force of his communication (i.e., “running out of fuel”); 
• Standard phraseology – he did not declare an emergency using terminology that the 
controllers would respond to (i.e., MAYDAY, PAN PAN or emergency); 
• Appended messages – he sent the information as appended messages which increased 
the risk of controllers not hearing it and not acting on it; 
• Routine messages – the ongoing routine messages from the first officer reinforced the 
impression that the aircraft was not in an emergency situation. 
The first officer assumed that controllers were passing his messages on to the next 
sector, and that the Avianca aircraft was receiving priority handling. Just one message was 
passed on, and the plane did not receive priority handling. After the missed approach, the 
captain twice gave an instruction to declare an emergency. The first officer most likely did 
not hear these instructions clearly. He did not declare a fuel emergency. 
From the end of the third holding pattern, there was a steady deterioration in the 
condition of the Avianca aircraft. Over the course of 45 minutes it progressively worsened 
from a non-routine low fuel situation into a fuel emergency. No sudden, obvious change in 
aircraft condition occurred that might have signalled to the inexperienced first officer the 
need to declare an emergency. Initially, the first officer seems to have been waiting for 
ATC to inquire about the fuel problem, as he had heard the FV controller do for another 
flight (AAL692). Crucially, the first officer had not heard the earlier transmissions initiated 
by the American Airlines pilot. The inquiry from ATC eventually came after the missed 
first approach and it was apparently delivered in an angry tone. A dangerous gap had by 
now developed between the situational awareness of the first officer (who thought he had 
notified ATC about the fuel problem) and the controllers (who continued to handle the 
 
 239 
flight routinely). This gap finally disappeared at 21:32 in the sixth critical communication 
when the first officer radioed “we just ah lost two engines and ah we need priority please”. 
The controller gave an instruction to turn on to the final approach, but it was too late to 
save the flight. 
This analysis of the Avianca 052 accident highlights some factors that were noted 
in previous studies, but not accorded much significance. Firstly, it provides evidence from 
the captain’s language use that he was suffering from fatigue. This was mentioned in the 
body of the NTSB report but downplayed in the conclusion, which stated only that fatigue 
may have adversely affected his handling of the first approach. Secondly, the analysis 
highlights the steep experience gradient in the Avianca cockpit between the captain and 
young first officer. Helmreich (1994) noted the inexperience of the first officer, but did not 
consider how it limited the support he could give the captain in flying the aircraft, or how 
it affected his ability to manage ATC communication. Thirdly, the analysis of the second 
critical communication indicates that the first officer may not have clearly heard either of 
the instructions from the captain to declare an emergency. This develops the suggestion by 
Duke (1992) that the distraction of a wind shear radio message prevented the first officer 
from hearing the second instruction. 
In addition, the analysis identifies other factors that played a significant role in the 
accident, but were not considered in previous studies. The first of these is code switching 
by the first officer, which imposed an extra cognitive burden as the stress and workload 
increased late in the flight. The second factor is the style shifting of the FV controller, 
which facilitated the use of plain language by the AAL692 pilot but reinforced the use of 
routine phraseology by the Avianca first officer. A final factor that was analysed for the 
first time is the first officer’s repeated use of appended messages, which increased the risk 
of important information being ignored by controllers. 
Previous research has pointed out problems associated with the overuse of plain 
language by NES pilots, including verbosity, colloquialisms and rapid rate of speech (Kim 
& Elder, 2009; Kim, 2013). Another phenomenon was identified in this study: the use of 
colloquial plain language by NESs to negotiate preferential outcomes. Section 7.2.3.3 
explained how AAL692 received priority handling after the pilot told the controller “very 
unhappy at two thousand feet” and “uh we’re uh about uh twelve or fourteen minutes from 
declaring an emergency”. The American Airlines pilot used colloquial English to warn of a 
potential fuel emergency. The controller responded by drawing on his own plain language 
resources to ensure AAL692 proceeded quickly to a safe landing. It was not an isolated 
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case. Pan Am Flight 224 was given clearance to leave the holding pattern at CAMRN a 
few minutes after the pilot had told the R67 controller “Ah ah roger ahhh about another 
fifteen minutes then zero one ah three zero that’s the limit for us ah well have to divert on 
it” (NTSB, 1991, p. 165). It is not possible to say whether preferential treatment given to 
other planes increased the delays experienced by Avianca Flight 052. However, it is clear 
that some American pilots did receive “priority handling” without declaring an emergency. 
Those pilots demonstrated a high level of sociolinguistic competence in managing social 
relationships with controllers. Such sociolinguistic competence requires a high level of 
English proficiency and also considerable experience of flight operations. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to apportion blame. None of the participants 
wanted an accident to occur. The crash of Avianca Flight 052 was a complex accident that 
involved numerous causal factors. This analysis is an attempt to understand the process by 
which communication broke down between the pilots and controllers so we can prevent 
similar events from happening again. By learning from the problems of the past, we are 
better equipped to make the future safer. 
 
9.2 Implications for Pilot Training & Accident Investigation 
During the course of this project, I have been struck by the contrast between the 
experienced KI and the young Avianca first officer. The KI explained in the interviews 
how he learns from past accidents and the mistakes of others. This ongoing process of 
learning has helped him to develop into an experienced captain. Tragically, the Avianca 
first officer had not yet had the chance to learn such lessons when Flight 052 crashed. One 
overall conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the process of learning from past 
accidents is a vital element in the development of successful airline pilots. In addition, the 
study has a number of implications in two areas of civil aviation: (1) flight crew training, 
and (2) accident investigation. 
The first implication for flight crew training is that the Stage Two analysis provides 
a reassessment of the Avianca 052 accident. The narrative of communication breakdown 
presented in Section 8.2.2.1 is significant because it is the first applied linguistic analysis 
of the process by which communication broke down during this accident. The findings 
may be used in training workshops to inform flight crew (or air traffic controllers) about 
the communication risks associated with factors such as appended message or distraction. 
The analysis serves as a stark reminder of the vital role played by standard phraseology in 
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providing a common language for pilots and controllers around the world. Furthermore, it 
clearly demonstrates how interwoven standard phraseology and plain language are in the 
actual language use of pilots and controllers (see Section 2.4.3). 
The second implication for training concerns information about past accidents. The 
Stage One survey respondents overwhelmingly agree that studying accidents is important 
for improving airline safety. However, TV documentaries are their most common source of 
information, which is problematic because documentaries offer simplified representations 
of accidents, as noted in Section 7.2.2.5. It is therefore recommended that multiple sources 
of information be used in training workshops, and clear context be provided when using 
excerpts from documentaries. 
The final implication for training involves the ACT glossary, which was applied to 
the analysis of the Avianca 052 accident and is reproduced in part in Appendix 14. The 
ACT glossary could be used during the recurrent training of pilots to raise awareness of the 
risks that certain factors pose to communication. A simple format for a training workshop 
is as follows: (1) a trainer presents one communication factor from the glossary; (2) pilots 
discuss any experiences they have had related to the factor; and (3) they discuss ways in 
which specific problems could be mitigated. 
This study also has implications for accident investigation. Firstly, the analysis of 
language use in the Avianca 052 accident underscores the value of extended duration CVR 
devices. The analysis was impeded in three ways by the short length of the Avianca CVR 
recording: (1) the analysis of the first critical communication was restricted; (2) it was not 
possible to determine when the briefing for a low fuel go around began; and (3) the fatigue 
hypothesis could not be tested. Similar problems have been reported in numerous accident 
and incident investigations over recent years, and CVR duration has become an important 
issue in contemporary civil aviation. As noted in Section 8.2.4.2, ICAO and the European 
Union intend to introduce requirements for 25-hour CVRs on large, newly-manufactured 
transport aircraft from 2021. 
Secondly, the study highlights the importance of accurate and detailed transcripts. 
Appendix 18 contains a simple protocol for transcribing CVR and ATC audio data. It has 
been designed to avoid the shortcomings found in the transcripts compiled for the NTSB 
investigation of the Avianca 052 accident. The protocol has three stages: compiling broad 
transcripts of all audio data, cross-checking the broad transcripts, and compiling narrow 
transcripts of critical communications. It is proposed that the CA transcription procedure 
only be applied to critical communications. 
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Finally, there is an epistemological aspect to this project. The conclusion of the 
NSTB report for the Avianca 052 crash indicated a probable cause of the accident and a 
list of contributory factors. However, it made no mention of significant limitations to the 
data available for the investigation. As noted in Section 5.5.2, the following information 
was not included in the report: data from the FDR device, toxicological test results for the 
air traffic controllers, and the FAA traffic management report for the night of the accident. 
There were also limitations to the transcript data, as described in Section 8.2.4. The current 
study demonstrates that it is not always possible to provide definite explanations for how 
and why an accident occurred. There are limits to our knowledge. This is in line with the 
sentiment expressed by Duke (1992) that we may never completely understand the events 
that took place in the Avianca 052 cockpit and at ATC facilities on the ground. 
 
9.3 A Framework for Analysing Pilot Language Use in Accidents 
A novel framework has been developed during this study based on the analysis of 
language use in the Avianca 052 accident. It includes a robust procedure for transcribing 
audio data, and a suite of methodologies for analysing segments of communication that are 
identified as being of interest. The methodologies may be used to analyse both recurring 
communication phenomena and also key periods of interaction. The framework could be 
applied to all of the accidents cited by ICAO (see Table 2) as well as any other accidents or 
incidents that involve communication breakdowns. 
The framework essentially consists of a 3-part iterative process, which is shown in 
Figure 23. The first step is to collect the context and communication data for an accident. 
Context data include information about the airline history, organizational culture, aircraft 
condition, condition of pilots and controllers, and the history of the flight. Communication 
data include audio data from the CVR and ATC recordings.78 If available, pilot interview 
recordings may also be included. The second step is to compile transcripts from the data. 
Broad transcripts are made of all audio data using the transcription protocol in Appendix 
18. Narrow transcripts are made of critical communications using the conversation analysis 
procedure. The third step is data analysis. Timelines are constructed for the accident. Then 
 
78
 Cockpit video recording systems, or airborne image recorders (AIR), might in future provide 
valuable additional data. Airlines are not currently required to install them, but there have been 
calls for their introduction (NTSB, 2000c; ICAO, 2012). 
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recurring phenomena of interest and critical communications are identified, and they are 
analysed. The three steps of the cycle depicted in Figure 23 are repeated until the analysis 
has produced a comprehensive account of the process of communication breakdown and 
the role it played in the accident. 
 
 

















In the third step of the process, the analysis of recurring phenomena and critical 
communications draws on three methodologies: conversation analysis (CA) techniques, the 
grammar of context framework, and the ACT glossary. One key feature of the framework 
is that it includes CA techniques. These allow interactions to be examined as they unfold, 
utterance by utterance. Whenever we investigate an accident, we are by definition looking 
back in time with knowledge of the negative outcome. The CA approach is a defence 
against hindsight bias. It helps investigators to make sense of how participants perceived 
their situation as the events unfolded, and it provides insights into the decisions they made. 
Another important feature is that the grammar of context framework allows a full analysis 
of the context of communication, including the setting and various roles adopted by the 
participants. It embraces multiple aspects of culture through the assumption that people 
 
 244 
participate in multiple discourse systems related to nationality, gender, age, profession or 
organization, and so on. The third key feature of the framework is the ACT glossary. This 
provides a toolkit of core concepts relating to the communication of pilots and air traffic 
controllers, which facilitates the analysis of communication breakdowns.  
 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
The final section of the conclusion reflects on the limitations of this study in three 
areas: the online survey of pilots’ attitudes to past accidents, the semi-structured interviews 
with the KI, and the analysis of language use in the Avianca 052 accident. 
Firstly, the scale of the survey was limited (n=92) and the participants were drawn 
from a narrow range of backgrounds: they were 100% native English speakers, 97% male 
and 88% British. Furthermore, in order to make the survey simple and quick to use, the 
questionnaire mainly consisted of closed-ended question types. The limited number of 
survey participants was partially offset by the fact that all the respondents were airline 
pilots. This was a result of the questionnaire being distributed through closed forums 
operated by BALPA. Despite the survey’s limitations, interesting results were generated 
about the attitudes of pilots towards studying past accidents and the sources from which 
they gather accident information. 
The second limitation concerned the semi-structured pilot interviews. Only one 
pilot participated in the interviews, which meant that the results were inevitably affected 
by bias. To minimise this problem, the KI was carefully selected using the criteria laid out 
by anthropologist Marc-Adélard Tremblay for an “ideal informant”. Since there was only 
one KI, I was able to conduct a long series of in-depth discussions. This, and the flexibility 
afforded by the semi-structured interview approach, allowed us to follow particular themes 
and revisit them as the need arose. For instance, the KI was able to describe in detail how 
he integrates accident information into his professional practice as an airline captain. The 
KI’s process of reflection is a method of risk mitigation, which involves him incorporating 
lessons learned from accidents such as the 1977 Tenerife runway collision into his daily 
work of flying airplanes. 
The third limitation of the study was the lack of audio data for the analysis of 
language use in the Avianca 052 accident. It is sometimes possible to obtain partial ATC 
recordings for an accident, but the NTSB is prohibited under US law from releasing CVR 
recordings (see Appendix 11). This is unfortunate because, as explained in Section 8.2.4.2, 
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CVR data provide unique information about the interaction, communication and decision 
making of pilots within the cockpit. I tried unsuccessfully to gain access to audio data for 
the Avianca 052 accident. In the absence of audio data, I decided to use the CVR and ATC 
transcript data from the NTSB accident report. Previous studies have conducted similar 
analyses of transcripts from other accidents (Linde, 1985; Driscoll, 2002; Nitayaphorn, 
2009). One benefit of focusing the analysis on the transcript data was that it brought to 
light numerous shortcomings in these data, as detailed in Section 8.2.4.1. This led me to 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 
AAIB  = Air Accidents Investigation Branch (accident investigation agency  
   in the UK) 
AAIB  = Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (accident investigation  
   agency in Switzerland, Büro für Flugunfalluntersuchungen) 
ACARS = Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (a  
   data link system for transmitting messages between aircraft and  
   ground stations) 
AHFE  = Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (annual conference) 
AIM  = Aeronautical Information Manual (a guide to basic flight   
   information and ATC procedures in the USA and Canada) 
AIR  = airborne image recorder 
ALARP = as low as reasonably practicable 
ANSV  = Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (National Agency for 
   the Safety of Flight, Italy) 
ARTCC = air route traffic control centre (an ATC facility controlling aircraft in
   the en route flight phase in a particular volume of airspace) 
ASRS  = Aviation Safety Reporting System (a NASA system for aviation  
   personnel to voluntarily submit incident reports) 
ASSIB  = and still stay in business 
ATC  = air traffic control 
ATIS  = automatic terminal information service (a recorded broadcast of  
   essential aeronautical information for the airport area) 
ATQP  = alternative training and qualification programme 
ATSAT = aviation topic and speech act taxonomy (a taxonomy for coding  
   pilot-ATC RT messages) 
ATSB  = Australian Transport Safety Bureau (accident investigation agency  
   in Australia) 
BALPA = British Airline Pilots Association 
BASIS  = British Airways Safety Information System (a safety reporting  
   system established by British Airways) 
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BEA  = Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents (Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for  
   Civil Aviation Safety, France) 
BTS  = Bureau of Transportation Statistics (part of the United States  
   Department of Transportation) 
CA  = conversation analysis 
CAA  = Civil Aviation Authority (agency regulating civil aviation in the  
   UK) 
CAD  = Civil Aviation Department (agency regulating civil aviation in  
   Colombia) 
CAT  = communication accommodation theory 
CEO  = chief executive officer 
CFCF  = Central Flow Control Facility (an FAA facility to manage traffic) 
CFIT  = controlled flight into terrain 
CHIRP = Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (a  
   confidential safety reporting system in the UK) 
CIAIAC = Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación 
   Civil (Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation   
   Commission, Spain) 
CMAQ = cockpit management attitudes questionnaire 
CPDL  = controller-pilot data link 
CPDLC = controller-pilot data link communications 
CRM  = crew resource management (an airline training methodology) 
CVR  = cockpit voice recorder 
CWT  = centre wing (fuel) tank 
DAAC  = Departamento Administrativo de Aeronáutica Civil (Civil Aviation 
   Department in Colombia) 
DGAC  = Director General of Civil Aviation (in India) 
EGP  = English for general purposes 
ELF  = English as a lingua franca 
EOC  = ethnography of communication 
EPA  = Environmental Protection Agency (an agency of the federal  
   government of the United States) 
ESL  = English as a second language 
ESP  = English for special/specific purposes 
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EST  = Eastern Standard Time (5 hours behind UTC) 
FAA  = Federal Aviation Administration (agency regulating civil aviation in 
   the USA) 
FBO  = fixed-base operator (a company providing aeronautical services,  
   such as fueling, parking and rental, at an airport) 
FDR  = flight data recorder 
FE  = flight engineer 
FL  = flight level 
FMAQ  = flight management attitudes questionnaire 
FMC  = flight management computer 
FO  = first officer 
FOIA  = Freedom of Information Act 
FOQA  = flight operations quality assurance system 
FRMS  = fatigue risk management system 
FSF  = Flight Safety Foundation (a US non-profit safety organization) 
FV  = final vector (controller) 
GA  = general aviation 
GLOBE = Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness  
   (cultural research project) 
GPWS  = ground proximity warning system 
HERA  = Human Error in Air Traffic Management (a Eurocontrol project) 
HF  = human factors 
HFACS  =  Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (a human factors 
   taxonomy) 
IAEA  = International Atomic Energy Agency 
IATA  = International Air Transport Association (an association of airlines) 
ICAEA = International Civil Aviation English Association 
ICAO  = International Civil Aviation Organization (a United Nations agency) 
IFALPA = International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations 
IFATCA = International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations 
ILS  = instrument landing system (a precision runway approach aid) 
INSAG = International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (IAEA advisory  
   group) 
ISAP  = International Symposium on Aviation Psychology 
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IT  = information technology 
JFK  = John F. Kennedy (International Airport in New York) 
KI  = key informant 
KNKT  = Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (National   
   Transportation Safety Committee, Indonesia) 
L1  = first language or mother tongue 
L2  = second language or foreign language 
LGP  = language for general purposes 
LOSA  = line operations safety audit 
LPRs  = language proficiency requirements 
LSP  = language for special/specific purposes 
MCTOM = maximum certificated take-off mass 
MSA  = minimum safe altitude 
MTO  = man-technology-organisation (a human factors model developed in 
   Sweden for the nuclear power industry) 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space Administration (agency responsible 
   for the civilian space programme in the USA as well as aeronautics 
   and aerospace research) 
NES  = native English speaker 
NNS  = non-native speaker 
NOTAM = notice to airmen (a notice that alerts pilots about hazards) 
NTSB  = National Transportation Safety Board (accident investigation agency 
   in the USA) 
OCR  = optical character recognition 
PA  = public address 
PANS  = Procedures for Air Navigation Services (instruments used by ICAO) 
PF  = pilot flying (the pilot controlling an aircraft in a two-person crew) 
PIC  = pilot in command (the captain, in the case of an airline crew) 
PM  = pilot monitoring (the pilot monitoring aircraft status in a two-person
   flight crew; also known as pilot not flying, PNF) 
PNF  = pilot not flying (the pilot who is monitoring aircraft status in a two- 
   person flight crew; also known as pilot monitoring, PM) 
PRA  = probabilistic risk assessment 
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PRICESG  = Proficiency Requirements In Common English Study Group (ICAO 
   study group) 
RAeS  = Royal Aeronautical Society (professional institution in the UK) 
RPK  = revenue passenger kilometres 
RT  = radiotelephony 
RTF  = radiotelephony 
SARPs  = Standards and Recommended Practices (instruments used by ICAO) 
SARS  = severe acute respiratory syndrome 
SCE  = socio-cultural encounter 
SCT  = speech codes theory 
SLA  = second language acquisition 
SOP  = standard operating procedure 
SHEL  = Software Hardware Environment Liveware (a human factors model; 
   also referred to as SHELL) 
SMS  = safety management system 
SUPPs  = Regional Supplementary Procedures (instruments used by ICAO) 
TCAS  = traffic collision avoidance system 
TEM  = Threat and Error Management (a human factors model) 
TMA  = terminal manoeuvring area (controlled airspace around a major  
   airport with a high volume of traffic) 
TRACON = terminal radar approach control (an ATC facility that controls  
   aircraft movement in the vicinity of a large airport) 
TSB  = Transportation Safety Board (accident investigation agency in  
   Canada) 
UAE  = United Arab Emirates 
UAS  = unmanned aircraft system 
UTC  = Coordinated Universal Time79 
VFR  = visual flight rules 
VHF  = very high frequency 
VIP  = very important person  
 
79
 Coordinated Universal Time (CUT), corresponding to Greenwich Mean Time, is the common 
time standard around the world. In French, it is called “Temps Universel Coordonné” (TUC). The 
abbreviation UTC is used to minimize confusion. 
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GLOSSARY OF AVIATION TERMS 
accident   = an occurrence during a flight in which a person  
    suffers a fatal or serious injury due to the operation of 
    the aircraft, or the aircraft is severely damaged 
aileron    = a flight control surface on the outer part of the wing  
     that controls an aircraft’s roll motion 
Airspeak   = a special language used for pilot-ATC   
     communications 
alternate airport  = an airport identified in the flight plan for landing at if 
     it is not possible to land at the intended destination 
cabin crew   = the personnel who look after passengers during a  
     flight 
call sign   = a group of alphanumeric characters that identify an  
     aircraft 
captain    = the senior pilot in a flight crew who is responsible for 
     the aircraft’s operation and safety 
checklist   = a tool which helps pilots to perform a series of  
     actions correctly 
cockpit voice recorder = a “black box” that records flight crew conversations 
     and other cockpit sounds 
controlled airspace  = airspace of defined dimensions in which ATC service 
     is provided (includes classes A, B, C, D and E) 
controlled flight into terrain = a type of accident in which an airworthy aircraft,  
     under pilot control, is unintentionally flown into  
     terrain, water or an obstacle 
crosswind   = a wind that has a significant component   
     perpendicular to the direction of travel 
data link   = a system for transmitting text messages between  
     pilots and air traffic controllers 
deregulation   = the reduction or removal of rules and regulations in  
     an industry (which for airlines started with the  
     Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 in the USA) 
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elevator   = a flight control surface on the horizontal part of the  
     tail that controls an aircraft’s pitch motion 
fatigue    = a state of tiredness resulting from prolonged   
     excessive work and/or sleep deprivation 
first officer   = the second pilot in a flight crew (also called co-pilot) 
flag carrier   = an airline that is/was government owned and receives 
     preferential rights in the country where it is registered 
flight controls   = movable surfaces (e.g., elevators, ailerons) on an 
     aircraft’s wings and tail that control its flight attitude 
flight crew   = the personnel who operate an aircraft during a flight; 
     the captain, first officer and (in older aircraft) flight 
      engineer 
flight data recorder  = a “black box” that records performance data from  
     engines and other aircraft systems 
flight deck   = cockpit 
flight level   = a pressure altitude measured in 100-feet units 
general aviation  = civil aviation operations except those involving  
     revenue passenger or cargo flights 
glide slope   = a beam providing vertical guidance on final approach 
go-around   = an aborted landing of an aircraft on final approach 
heavy    = a category of aircraft weighing more than 136,000 kg 
     that require extra spacing due to wake turbulence 
holding pattern  = an oval-shaped pattern that aircraft fly at a specified 
      location while waiting for clearance to proceed 
incident   = an occurrence during a flight, other than an accident, 
     which affects safety 
knot    = a measure of speed which equals 1 nautical mile per 
     hour, or 1.85 km/hr 
listening watch  = pilots listening to radio communications between  
     ATC and other aircraft (also called party line) 
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APPENDIX 1: ICAO Level 4 Descriptors 
The ICAO language proficiency rating scale has six assessment criteria and six proficiency 
levels. The levels range from Level 1 (called “Pre-elementary”) to Level 6 (“Expert”). 
Pilots and air traffic controllers involved in international flight operations are required to 
achieve Level 4 (“Operational”). They are evaluated on all six assessment criteria and the 
lowest evaluation determines the overall level. Therefore, to obtain a Level 4 rating, they 
must demonstrate Level 4 proficiency (or higher) for all six assessment criteria. The table 
below shows the descriptors and explanations for Level 4, reproduced from Document 




LEVEL 4 DESCRIPTOR LEVEL 4 EXPLANATION 
Pronunciation Pronunciation, stress, 
rhythm and intonation are 
influenced by the first 
language or regional 
variation, but only 
sometimes interfere with 
ease of understanding. 
Operational Level 4 speakers demonstrate a 
marked accent, or localized regional variety of 
English. Occasionally, a proficient listener may 
have to pay close attention to understand or may 
have to clarify something from time to time. 
Operational Level 4 is certainly not a perfect 
level of proficiency; it is the minimum level of 
proficiency determined to be safe for air traffic 
control communications. While it is not an 
Expert level, it is important to keep in mind that 
pronunciation plays the critical role in aiding 
comprehension between two non-native speakers 
of English. 
Structure Basic grammatical 
structures and sentence 
patterns are used 
creatively and are usually 
Operational Level 4 speakers have good 
command of basic grammatical structures. They 
do not merely have a memorized set of words or 
phrases on which they rely but have sufficient 
 
80
 Document 9835 contains the rating scale with descriptors and explanations for each level. In 
Annex 1 the rating scale shows only the descriptors (in Attachment A to Appendix 1). 
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well controlled. Errors 
may occur, particularly in 
unusual or unexpected 
circumstances, but rarely 
interfere with meaning. 
command of basic grammar to create new 
meaning as appropriate. They demonstrate local 
errors and infrequent global errors and 
communication is effective overall. Level 4 
speakers will not usually attempt complex 
structures, and when they do, quite a lot of errors 
would be expected resulting in less effective 
communication. 
Vocabulary Vocabulary range and 
accuracy are usually 
sufficient to communicate 
effectively on common, 
concrete and work-related 
topics. Can often 
paraphrase successfully 
when lacking vocabulary 
in unusual or unexpected 
circumstances. 
An Operational Level 4 speaker will likely not 
have a well-developed sensitivity to register. A 
speaker at this level will usually be able to 
manage communication on work-related topics, 
but may sometimes need clarification. When 
faced with a communication breakdown, an 
Operational Level 4 speaker can paraphrase and 
negotiate meaning so that the message is 
understood. The ability to paraphrase includes 
appropriate choices of simple vocabulary and 
considerate use of speech rate and pronunciation. 
Fluency Produces stretches of 
language at an appropriate 
tempo. There may be 
occasional loss of fluency 
on transition from 
rehearsed or formulaic 
speech to spontaneous 
interaction, but this does 
not prevent effective 
communication. Can make 
limited use of discourse 
markers or connectors. 
Fillers are not distracting. 
Speech rate at this level may be slowed by the 
requirements of language processing, but 
remains fairly constant and does not negatively 
affect the speaker’s involvement in 
communication. The speaker has the possibility 
of speaking a little faster than the ICAO 
recommended rate of 100 words per minute if 
the situation requires (Annex 10, Volume II, 
5.2.1.5.3 b). 
Comprehension Comprehension is mostly 
accurate on common, 
concrete and work-related 
As with all Operational Level 4 descriptors, 
comprehension is not expected to be perfectly 
accurate in all instances. However, pilots or air 
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topics when the accent or 
variety used is sufficiently 
intelligible for an 
international community 
of users. When the speaker 
is confronted with a 
linguistic or situational 
complication or an 
unexpected turn of events, 
comprehension may be 
slower or require 
clarification strategies. 
traffic controllers will need to have strategies 
available which allow them to ultimately 
comprehend the unexpected or unusual 
communication. Unmarked or complex textual 
relations are occasionally misunderstood or 
missed. The descriptor of Operational Level 4 
under “Interactions” clarifies the need for 
clarification strategies. Failure to understand a 
clearly communicated unexpected 
communication, even after seeking clarification, 
should result in the assignment of a lower 
proficiency level assessment. 
Interactions Responses are usually 
immediate, appropriate 
and informative. Initiates 
and maintains exchanges 
even when dealing with an 
unexpected turn of events. 
Deals adequately with 
apparent 
misunderstandings by 
checking, confirming or 
clarifying. 
A pilot or air traffic controller who does not 
understand an unexpected communication must 
be able to communicate that fact. It is much safer 
to query a communication, to clarify, or even to 
simply acknowledge that one does not 
understand rather than to allow silence to 
mistakenly represent comprehension. At 
Operational Level 4, it is acceptable that 
comprehension is not perfect 100 per cent of the 
time when dealing with unexpected situations, 
but Level 4 speakers need to be skilled at 
checking, seeking confirmation, or clarifying a 





APPENDIX 2: Accidents Cited by ICAO 
The following seven aviation accidents, which all involved communication problems, were 
cited during a workshop at the ICAO Asia and Pacific Office (Lamy, 2008). Four of the 






















(1) Inex Adria 
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81 In their analysis of the 1976 Zagreb accident, Weston and Hurst (1982, p. ix) stated that “there is 
no such language as Serbo Croat or... Serbo-Croatian” but went on to use these terms because they 
occurred widely in source documents. I have used the term Serbo-Croatian on the premise that it is 
a pluricentric language. In so doing, I acknowledge the longstanding political and linguistic 
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APPENDIX 3: Sample Database Record 
The table below shows a sample record from the database I compiled during the literature 
review. The database has 606 records including documents, technical manuals, accident 
reports, journal papers and books. The record below is a journal paper about the Avianca 
052 accident. For brevity, only the notes for pages 265-269 of the paper are shown below.  
 
FIELD CONTENTS FOR THIS RECORD 
Title Anatomy of a System Accident: The Crash of Avianca Flight 052 
Author Helmreich, R. L. 
Publisher International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(3), 265-284 
Year 1994 
Amount Read All 
APA 
Reference 
Helmreich, R. L. (1994). Anatomy of a system accident: The crash of Avianca 
flight 052. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(3), 265-284. 
Notes Pages 265-266, limitations of the accident report: “The NTSB report on the 
Avianca Flight 052 (AV502) accident pinpointed a number of factors (including 
crew performance) that contributed to the crash (NTSB, 1991a). However, a 
number of additional pieces of information were uncovered in the course of 
litigation between the airline and the U.S. Government.” 
Page 266, methodologies used in this analysis: “Our article approaches the 
accident from a system and group perspective and utilizes several different 
methodologies to attempt to explain the multiple causal factors at play on the 
night of January 25, 1990. The analysis was guided by Reason’s (1990) notions 
of latent failures and resident pathogens in complex systems.” 
[In addition to Reason’s concepts, the analysis uses the crew performance 
model developed by Helmreich and Foushee (1993), which was adapted from 
McGrath’s (1964) model.] 
Page 269, landing checklist not completed correctly: “The CVR transcript 





APPENDIX 4: Features of Standard Phraseology 
The following table lists key features of standard phraseology to show how it differs from 
natural language. For each feature, there is an example of phraseology and a natural 
language equivalent. The listing is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. For some 
examples many equivalent natural language expressions are possible. Detailed descriptions 
of standard phraseology are provided in ICAO publications (ICAO, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) 
as well as documents produced by national aviation authorities (e.g., CAA, 2015). 
 






“3” is pronounced |triː| “3” is pronounced |θriː| 
Pronunciation of 
alphabet 
“G” is pronounced |gɒlf| “G” is pronounced |ʤiː| 
Limited lexicon Less than 1,000 words, one of 
which is “climb” with no 
synonyms 
More than 100,000 words,
82
 with 
many synonyms such as “climb”, 
“ascend”, “rise”, “gain altitude”, 
“move up”, “soar” 
Univocal vocabulary “level” (as in “report your level”) 
is a generic term for the altitude or 
flight level of an aircraft in flight 
“level” can be a noun, adjective or 
verb; as a noun, it can mean a 
horizontal plane, a position on a 
scale, a measuring instrument, or a 
flat tract of land 
Deletion of subject 
pronouns 
“Ø cleared for takeoff” “you are cleared for takeoff” 
Deletion of auxiliary 
verbs 
“Ø cleared for takeoff” “you are cleared for takeoff” 
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 Crystal, D. (2003, p. 123) pointed out the difficulty of estimating the size of the English language 






“climb Ø flight level 280” “climb to flight level 280” 
Deletion of 
determiners 
“request Ø departure information” “I’d like to request the departure 
information” 
Passive voice “cleared to land” “I give you permission to land” 
Imperative forms “climb flight level 280” “I’d like you to climb to flight 
level 280” 








APPENDIX 5: Accident/Error Models & Taxonomies 
The table below shows five models and taxonomies that have been developed for accident 
investigation or error analysis in aviation. 
 




(Accident / Incident Data 
Reporting System) 
Taxonomy • Used for classifying accident & incident data 
• System collects data about accidents & 
incidents 
• Operated by ICAO 
ASRS 
(Aviation Safety Reporting 
System) 
Taxonomy • Used for classifying hazards & errors 
• Voluntary incident reporting system 
• Operated by NASA on behalf of the FAA 
HFACS 
(Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System) 
Taxonomy • Used for classifying threats & analysing 
accident causal factors 
• Based on Reason’s (1990) accident 
causation model 
• 4 defensive layers (unsafe acts / 
preconditions for unsafe acts / unsafe 




Model • Used for analysing sources of risk 
• Also known as SHELL 
• Emphasises human interactions with other 
system components 
TEM 




• Used for classifying threats & errors 
• Based on Reason’s (1990) accident 
causation model 




APPENDIX 6: “Findings as to Risk” in TSB Reports 
The table below lists a selection of “findings as to risk” related to communication issues. 
They are taken from Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) reports released 
between 2015 and 2017. The table shows the dates of the accidents or incidents, locations, 
investigation report numbers and findings. Each report contains a number of findings as to 
risk (from 2 to 14), but only those related to communication are reproduced below. A 
range of people were involved in the communications referred to, not only pilots but also 
air traffic controllers, cabin crew and passengers. 
 
DATE LOCATION REPORT NO. 
(REFERENCE) 
FINDINGS AS TO RISK 











13. If non-compliant practices are not identified, 
reported, and dealt with by a company’s safety 
management system, there is a risk that they 











1. If air traffic control uses non-standard 
phraseology, there is a risk of inconsistencies 
and miscommunication between air traffic 











3. If cockpit voice recordings are not available 
to an investigation, the identification and 
communication of safety deficiencies to 












3. If crews do not report unstable approaches 
and operators do not conduct flight data 
monitoring but rely only on safety management 
system reports to determine the frequency of 
unstable approaches, there is a risk that these 









1. If aircraft cockpit voice recorder installations 






additional, potentially valuable information will 
not be available for an investigation. 
8. If there is a complete loss of electrical and 
battery power and the passenger address system 
does not have an independent emergency power 
supply, the passenger address system will be 
inoperable, and the initial command to evacuate 
or to convey other emergency instructions may 
be delayed, putting the safety of passengers and 
crew at risk. 
10. If passengers do not pay attention to the pre-
departure safety briefings or review the safety-
features cards, they may be unprepared to react 
appropriately in an accident, increasing their 











6. If seat belt announcements do not contain 
sufficient detailed information on anticipated 
turbulence, then there is a risk that passengers 
will not immediately comply and maintain 
compliance with an instruction to fasten seat 
belts. 
7. If safety announcements made by cabin crew 
do not use language that conveys the 
expectation of compliance, there is a risk that 
passengers will perceive these announcements 
to be less authoritative, which may result in 
non-compliance. 
8. If passenger safety briefings lack information 
on the effects turbulence can have on individual 
passengers, their possessions, and on others, 
then there is a risk that it will reduce the 











1. If air traffic controllers are not required to use 
standard phraseology that reinforces the need to 






increased risk of miscommunication leading to 
runway incursions. 
2. If plain-language phraseology used by air 
traffic controllers is not explicit, there is a risk 
of miscommunication between air traffic 







97 nm WNW 
A16O0066 
(TSB, 2017a) 
4. If flight crews become aware of a situation 
that may jeopardize safety, but do not declare 
an emergency with air traffic control, then there 
is an increased risk that should the situation 
worsen, the flight will still be airborne due to a 
lack of priority handling, or that it will land 






APPENDIX 7: Survey Questionnaire 
This questionnaire investigated pilots’ attitudes to four accidents cited by ICAO. The 31 
items are listed in the table below. The questionnaire was designed so that, if respondents 
answered “No” to the initial question about an accident, they were not asked any more 
questions about that accident. Questions 27 and 30 were optional. 
 
ITEMS IN PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE 
INTRODUCTION 
Q1. Studying past airline accidents is important for improving current airline safety. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
 
1977 TENERIFE ACCIDENT 
Q2. On 27th March 1977, there was a runway collision between KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am 
Flight 1736 at Los Rodeos Airport on the island of Tenerife. Have you heard of the 1977 
Tenerife accident? 
[Yes / No] 
Q3. Where did you hear about the 1977 Tenerife accident? (You can select more than one 
answer.) 
[Accident report / Another pilot / Book / Company training / IATA publication / ICAO 
publication / Internet / Magazine or newspaper article / TV documentary / TV or radio news 
/ Other (please specify)] 
Q4. The 1977 Tenerife accident is relevant to current airline operations. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q5. Insufficient English proficiency of pilots played a contributing role in the 1977 Tenerife 
accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q6. Insufficient English proficiency of air traffic controllers played a contributing role in the 
1977 Tenerife accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
 
1990 COVE NECK ACCIDENT 
Q7. On 25th January 1990, Avianca Airlines Flight 052 crashed due to fuel exhaustion at Cove 
Neck, near to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York. Have you heard of 
the 1990 Cove Neck accident? 
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[Yes / No] 
Q8. Where did you hear about the 1990 Cove Neck accident? (You can select more than one 
answer.) 
[Accident report / Another pilot / Book / Company training / IATA publication / ICAO 
publication / Internet / Magazine or newspaper article / TV documentary / TV or radio news 
/ Other (please specify)] 
Q9. The 1990 Cove Neck accident is relevant to current airline operations. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q10. Insufficient English proficiency of pilots played a contributing role in the 1990 Cove Neck 
accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q11. Insufficient English proficiency of air traffic controllers played a contributing role in the 
1990 Cove Neck accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
 
1995 CALI ACCIDENT 
Q12. On 20th December 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 crashed into a mountain near Cali, 
Columbia. Have you heard of the 1995 Cali accident? 
[Yes / No] 
Q13. Where did you hear about the 1995 Cali accident? (You can select more than one answer.) 
[Accident report / Another pilot / Book / Company training / IATA publication / ICAO 
publication / Internet / Magazine or newspaper article / TV documentary / TV or radio news 
/ Other (please specify)] 
Q14. The 1995 Cali accident is relevant to current airline operations. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q15. Insufficient English proficiency of pilots played a contributing role in the 1995 Cali 
accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q16. Insufficient English proficiency of air traffic controllers played a contributing role in the 
1995 Cali accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
 
1996 NEW DELHI ACCIDENT 
Q17. On 12th November 1996, there was a mid-air collision between Saudi Arabian Airlines 
Flight 763 and Kazakhstan Airlines Flight 1907 near New Delhi, India. Have you heard of 
the 1996 New Delhi accident? 
[Yes / No] 
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Q18. Where did you hear about the 1996 New Delhi accident? (You can select more than one 
answer.) 
[Accident report / Another pilot / Book / Company training / IATA publication / ICAO 
publication / Internet / Magazine or newspaper article / TV documentary / TV or radio news 
/ Other (please specify)] 
Q19. The 1996 New Delhi accident is relevant to current airline operations. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q20. Insufficient English proficiency of pilots played a contributing role in the 1996 New Delhi 
accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
Q21. Insufficient English proficiency of air traffic controllers played a contributing role in the 
1996 New Delhi accident. 
[Strongly agree / Agree / No opinion / Disagree / Strongly disagree] 
 
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
Q22. What is your rank? 
[Captain / First officer / Other (please specify)] 
Q23. Which training appointments do you hold? 
[Technical trainer / Non-technical or human factors trainer / None / Other (please specify)] 
Q24. How many flight hours do you have? 
[>15,000 / 10,000-15,000 / 5,000-10,000 / 1,000-5,000 / <1,000] 
Q25. How old are you? 
[>55 / 46-55 / 36-45 / 25-35 / <25] 
Q26. What is your gender? 
[Male / Female / Other] 
Q27. Which airline do you work for? 
[Drop-down menu] 
Q28. What is your nationality (or nationalities)? (You can select more than one answer.) 
[Drop-down menu] 
Q29. What is your native language (or languages)? (You can select more than one answer.) 
[Drop-down menu / Other (please specify)] 
Q30. What other languages do you know? (You can select more than one answer.) 
[Drop-down menu / Other (please specify)] 
Q31. What is your ICAO language proficiency level? 
[Level 6 (Expert) / Level 5 (Extended) / Level 4 (Operational) / Level 3 (Pre-Operational) / 




APPENDIX 8: Sample Survey Response 
There were 92 respondents to the survey of pilots’ attitudes to past accidents. The table 
below shows the survey data for one of the respondents. 
 
SURVEY DATA FOR RESPONDENT #23 
START DATE/TIME 
2018/04/10  12:24:13 
 
END DATE/TIME 
2018/04/10  12:30:07 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Q1. [Strongly agree] 
 
1977 TENERIFE ACCIDENT 
Q2. [Yes] 
Q3. [Another pilot / Company training / ICAO publication / Internet / TV documentary] 




1990 COVE NECK ACCIDENT 
Q7. [Yes] 
Q8. [Magazine or newspaper article] 




1995 CALI ACCIDENT 
Q12. [Yes] 
Q13. [Company training / Magazine or newspaper article] 
Q14. [Strongly agree] 





1996 NEW DELHI ACCIDENT 
Q17. [Yes] 
Q18. [Company training / Magazine or newspaper article] 


















APPENDIX 9: Airline Pilot Interview Guide 
The table below lists the questions that were used to guide the airline pilot interviews. The 
questions were divided into two sections. The first section addressed past accidents: it 
included items based on the four research questions (RQs A-D) and follow-up questions 
designed to probe issues raised by the survey in more detail. The second section covered 
background questions: it consisted of the demographic questions from the survey. 
 
PILOT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
PAST ACCIDENTS 
Q1. [RQ A] Is studying past airline accidents important for improving airline safety? 
Q2. Why (not)? 
Q3. [RQ B] Which of the accidents cited by ICAO had you heard of? 
Q4. For any of these accidents, give a brief description that captures the key features of the 
accident. 
Q5. Do these accidents remind you of any experiences from your flying career? 
Q6. If so, describe the experiences. 
Q7. [RQ C] What were your main sources of information about these accidents? 
Q8. Do you watch TV documentaries about accidents? 
Q9. What are the pros and cons of TV documentaries as sources of information about accidents? 
Q10. [RQ D] Did insufficient English proficiency of pilots and/or air traffic controllers play a 
contributing role in these accidents? 
 
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
Q11. What is your rank? 
Q12. Which training appointments do you hold (e.g., technical trainer, non-technical trainer)? 
Q13. How many flight hours do you have? 
Q14. How old are you? 
Q15. What is your gender? 
Q16. Which airline do you work for? 
Q17. What is your nationality (or nationalities)? 
Q18. What is your native language (or languages)? 
Q19. What other languages do you know? 




APPENDIX 10: Airline Pilot Interview Log 
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with the key informant (KI) 
between August 2019 and June 2020. The 13 interviews lasted 10 hours 13 minutes in 
total. All were recorded with the KI’s consent. The table below shows the format of each 
interview, the recording length and the topics covered. The interviews addressed the 
following main areas: 
• Survey of pilots – from Stage One of the analysis; 
• ACT glossary – from Stage Two of the analysis. 
Some interviews addressed one area and others covered both. For each interview covering 
the pilot survey, the questions that guided the discussion are listed below. For interviews 
addressing the ACT glossary, there is a list of factors discussed. Factors featuring in three 
or more interviews are highlighted in bold. Keywords show other important topics. 
 




• Communication factors – ambiguity, call sign confusion, 
pronunciation, intelligibility 
• Keywords – ATC in Japan/UK, level of controller 




• Communication factors – accent, headphone quality, 
pronunciation, message length, rate of speech, sarcasm, 
vocabulary, workload 
• Keywords – ATC in China/India/Japan/Russia, capacity 





• Glossary entry template 
• Communication factors – call sign confusion, distraction, 
pronunciation, rate of speech, stress, workload 






• List of factors 
• Glossary entry template 
• Communication factors – authority gradient, avoidance, 
call sign confusion, code switching, community of 
practice, diffusion of responsibility, distraction, 
headphone quality, hearing loss, in-group bias, 
interlanguage, sarcasm, standard phraseology 
• Keywords –1972 Staines accident, ATC in China/France/ 
Japan/Russia/Spain/South America, ground crew in 
China/UK 
5 Video call 
34 minutes 
Survey of pilots 
• Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q7 from Appendix 8 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – authority gradient, code 
switching 
6 Video call 
37 minutes 
Survey of pilots 
• Q5, Q6 from Appendix 8 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – authority gradient, distraction, 
workload 
• Keywords – ageing, capacity bucket, departure from 
routine, plan continuation bias 
7 Video call 
36 minutes 
Survey of pilots 
• Q4 from Appendix 8 
• Keywords – terminology for emergencies 
8 Video call 
1 hour 24 minutes 
Survey of pilots 
• Q4, Q5, Q7, Q8, Q9 from Appendix 8 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – community of practice, 
distraction, headphone quality, noise 
• Keywords – 1989 Kegworth accident, ageing, electronic 
safety notices, Swiss cheese model 
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9 Video call 
1 hour 9 minutes 
Survey of pilots 
• Q10-20 from Appendix 8 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – abbreviation, ambiguity, 
colloquialism, community of practice, fatigue, 
intelligibility, plain language, standard phraseology, 
startle effect, stress, vocabulary 
• Keywords – 1989 Kegworth accident, ATC in Brazil/China/ 
Japan, Dutch pilots, language attitudes, Swiss cheese model 
10 Video call 
33 minutes 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – distraction, fatigue, sterile 
cockpit 
• Keywords –2009 Colgan Air accident, hotspot, cockpit door 
11 Video call 
14 minutes 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – distraction 
• Keywords – 2016 Dubai accident, go around, training 
12 Video call 
1 hour 32 minutes 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – appended message, blocked 
transmission, code switching, colloquialism, distraction, 
idiom, message length, microphone clipping 
• Keywords – 1990 Avianca accident, ATC in UK/US, 
critical communications, CVR/ATC transcripts, frequency 
congestion, pilot-controller communication loop, ranking of 
communication factors, pronouns, wind shear 
13 Video call 
1 hour 40 minutes 
ACT glossary 
• Communication factors – accommodation, blocked 
transmission, courtesy bias, expletive, face, first language 
influence, information bias, message length, number 
transposition, omission, phrasal verb, repetition, speech 
community, standard phraseology, style shifting,  
• Keywords – 1972 Staines accident, 1989 Kegworth 
accident, ATC in Canada/France/UK, Hong Kong Chinese 
pilot, language attitudes, ranking of communication factors, 
RT procedure, short term memory 
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APPENDIX 11: U.S. Code for CVR Data 
United States law restricts the release of CVR data. The NTSB is basically prohibited from 
releasing transcripts or recordings, but an exception allows the release of any part of a 
transcript that the NTSB deems relevant to a safety investigation. There is no exception 
allowing the release of audio recordings. This section of the law is reproduced in the table 
below (49 U.S. Code § 1114), where “the Board” refers to the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB).83 
 
49 U.S. CODE § 1114 – DISCLOSURE, AVAILABILITY, AND USE OF INFORMATION 
  (c) COCKPIT RECORDINGS AND TRANSCRIPTS.—(1) The Board may not disclose 
publicly any part of a cockpit voice or video recorder recording or transcript of oral 
communications by and between flight crew members and ground stations related to an accident 
or incident investigated by the Board. However, the Board shall make public any part of a 
transcript or any written depiction of visual information the Board decides is relevant to the 
accident or incident— 
(A) if the Board holds a public hearing on the accident or incident, at the time of the hearing; 
or 
(B) if the Board does not hold a public hearing, at the time a majority of the other factual 
reports on the accident or incident are placed in the public docket. 
  (2) This subsection does not prevent the Board from referring at any time to cockpit voice or 




 This section of the law was revised to restrict release of CVR data following the 1988 crash of 
Delta Air Lines Flight 1141. The NTSB investigation found this accident to have been partially 
caused by “the Captain and First Officer’s inadequate cockpit discipline” which led to the aircraft 
taking off without flaps and slats set correctly. The CVR transcript in the accident report indicated 
there was a substantial amount of “non-pertinent conversation between the flight crew and a flight 
attendent [sic]” (NTSB, 1989b). 
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APPENDIX 12: Transcripts for Avianca 052 Accident 
The table below gives basic information about the CVR and ATC transcripts that were 
included in the accident report for the Avianca Flight 052 crash (NTSB, 1991). For clarity, 
the ATC transcripts below have been numbered (1-7), but they are not numbered in the 
NTSB report. 
 
TRANSCRIPT NTSB REPORT TIME PARTICIPANTS 
CVR Pages 82-151 20:53:09-21:33:24 
EST 
3 Avianca flight crew + 3 
controllers (in NY TRACON & JFK 
Tower) + 10 other aircraft 
ATC 1 Pages 162-181 01:04-01:53 UTC 
(20:04-20:53 EST) 
2 controllers (in NY ARTCC & NY 
TRACON) + 8 aircraft 
84
 
ATC 2 Pages 182-198 01:04-01:53 UTC 
(20:04-20:53 EST) 
6 controllers (in NY ARTCC, NY 
TRACON & Washington ARTCC) 
ATC 3 Pages 199-215 01:42-02:08 UTC 
(20:42-21:08 EST) 
3 controllers (in NY TRACON, NY 
ARTCC & 1 other) + 9 aircraft 
ATC 4 Pages 216-239 01:58-02:38 UTC 
(20:58-21:38 EST) 
1 controller (in NY TRACON) +   
14 aircraft 
ATC 5 Pages 240-244 02:16-02:38 UTC 
(21:16-21:38 EST) 
2 controllers (in NY TRACON & 
JFK Tower) 
ATC 6 Pages 245-262 02:10-02:40 UTC 
(21:10-21:40 EST) 
2 controllers (in NY TRACON & 
JFK Tower) + 11 aircraft 
ATC 7 Pages 263-275 02:10-02:43 UTC 
(21:10-21:43 EST) 
3 controllers (in NY TRACON & 





 In the NTSB report, the first page of this transcript lists five controllers (in the NY ARTCC, NY 
TRACON and Washington ARTCC facilities) but only two actually featured in the transcript. 
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APPENDIX 13: List of Communication Factors 
The table below shows the full list of 68 factors compiled for the ACT glossary. Glossary 
entries have been created for the 30 factors marked with an asterisk (*). 
 
LIST OF COMMUNICATION FACTORS 
THE WORKPLACE 
- Distraction *    - Noise *   - Time pressure 
- Headphone quality   - Temperature   - Workload * 
THE BODY 
- Fatigue *    - Illness   - Startle effect * 
- Hearing loss    - Medication   - Stress * 
THE RADIO 
- Appended message *   - Message complexity  - Stuck microphone 
- Blocked transmission *  - Message length * 
- Frequency change   - Microphone clipping * 
INTERACTING WITH PEOPLE 
- Authority gradient *   - Expectation bias  - Overhear 
- Call sign confusion *   - Face    - Speech community 
- Community of practice  - Groupthink   - Sterile cockpit * 
- Comprehension   - Information bias  - Stigmatization 
- Courtesy bias    - In-group bias    
- Diffusion of responsibility  - Intelligibility    
WAYS OF SPEAKING 
- Accent    - Hesitation   - Pronunciation * 
- Accommodation *   - Misfire   - Rate of speech * 
- Ambiguity *    - Multiple negation  - Repair 
- Avoidance *    - Non-speaking   - Repetition * 
- Code switching *   - Number transposition * - Sarcasm 
- First language influence *  - Omission *   - Style shifting * 
- Fluency    - Politeness 
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WORDS & GRAMMAR 
Abbreviation    Idiom *    Plain language * 
Colloquialism *    Interlanguage   Standard phraseology * 
Expletive *    Jargon    Vocabulary 
Grammar    Loanword    





APPENDIX 14: ACT Glossary Entries 
Selected entries from the ACT glossary are reproduced on the following pages. Only those 
factors used in the analysis of language use in the Avianca 052 accident are included. The 




• Appended Message 
• Avoidance 
• Blocked Transmission 
• Call Sign Confusion 





• Message length 
• Microphone clipping 
• Omission 
• Phrasal verb 
• Plain Language 
• Repetition 
• Standard Phraseology 
• Stress 
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ACCOMMODATION 
Meaning  An individual adjusts their speech according to the language of another participant in a 
conversation. Accommodation may take the form of convergence (moving towards the language of 
another) or divergence (moving away). It can involve many aspects of language (eg: vocabulary, 
grammar, pronunciation, accent, dialect or rate of speech). 
 
Communication risk  If a speaker uses a language variety (eg: dialect or jargon) not shared by a 
listener, the listener may not be able to understand. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller and pilot of one aircraft use standard 
phraseology when saying call sign numbers. By contrast, the controller and pilots of two other aircraft 
use non-standard number abbreviations. This is convergence, as the controller matches the form of 
call sign used by each pilot. 
 
Dialogue  Final vector (FV) controller speaking with American Airlines flight 692, Avianca flight 
052 and American Airlines flight 40 near New York on January 25, 1990. Language: English.1 



















American six ninety two speed one six zero if practical 
American six ninety two roger 
Avianca zero five two heavy descend and maintain uh descend and 
maintain three thousand 
Descend and maintain three thousand Avianca zero five two heavy 
American forty heavy turn left heading three one zero 
Left three one zero American forty heavy 
Avianca zero five two heavy turn left heading two seven zero 
Left heading two seven zero Avianca zero five two heavy 
 
Further reading  Giles (2009) gives an overview of accommodation theory, and suggests that 
effective accommodation is a fundamental part of communicative competence. Studies in English as a 
lingua franca (ELF) highlight the value of accommodation strategies in facilitating communication 
involving NNSs (Kim & Elder, 2009; Lee, 2013; Estival, Farris & Molesworth, 2016). Both forms of 
accommodation, convergence and divergence, can be understood as constituting an act of identity 
(Trudgill, 1992; Clark, 2007).  
 
Related factors  ABBREVIATION, ACCENT, CODE SWITCHING, COLLOQUIALISM, IDIOM, 
INTELLIGIBILITY, JARGON, PLAIN LANGUAGE, RATE OF SPEECH, STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY, 
STYLE SHIFTING 
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AMBIGUITY 
Meaning  A word, phrase or sentence has more than one interpretation. 
 
Communication risk  If the speech of a pilot or controller is ambiguous, listeners may not 
understand the intended meaning. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the pilot reports his aircraft’s position by referring to 
an unofficial taxiway marking. The controller instructs the aircraft to stop at an ambiguous position. 
The controller is referring to a position on taxiway R5, but the aircraft is actually on taxiway R6. 
 
Dialogue  Cessna 525A Citation (registration D-IEVX) speaking with ground controller (GND) 
during pre-takeoff taxi at Linate Airport, Milan, on October 25, 2001. Language: English.2 











Delta India Echo Victor Xray, is approaching Sierra 4. 
Delta India Echo Victor Xray confirm your position? 
Approaching the runway ... Sierra 4. 
Delta Victor Xray, Roger maintain the stop bar, I'll call you back. 
Roger Hold position. 
 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
• 1990 fuel exhaustion crash of Avianca 052 at Cove Neck, NY, USA (NTSB, 1991a) 
• 2000 runway collision of Streamline Aviation 200 and Air Liberté 8807 in Paris, France (BEA, 2001) 
• 2001 runway collision of SAS 686 and Cessna 525A Citation in Milan, Italy (ANSV, 2004; see 
Dialogue) 
• 2014 loss of control of Air Asia 8501 in the Karimata Strait, Java Sea (KNKT, 2015) 
• 2016 runway incursion involving Air Canada 726 and Air Canada 1259 at Toronto Pearson 
International Airport, Canada (TSB, 2017) 
 
Further reading  One of the purposes of standard phraseology is “to reduce the possibility for 
ambiguity” (ICAO, 2010, p. 5-5). By contrast, the flexibility of plain language, which allows pilots and 
controllers to describe new situations, inevitably involves ambiguity. There are many possible sources 
of ambiguity. Cushing (1994) gives examples in which ambiguity arises from: vocabulary items, idiomatic 
expressions, homophones (eg: “to” and “two”), pronouns, indefinite nouns (eg: “things”), acronyms, 
grammatical structures and omission. Garzone et al. (2010) discuss ambiguity in the 2001 runway 
collision at Linate Airport due to the use of deictic expressions (ie: words or phrases whose meaning is 
dependent on context, such as “here” or “that one”). Deictics are valuable because they allow efficient 
communication, but their inherent indeterminacy is problematic for RT communication.  
 
Related factors  ABBREVIATION, CALL SIGN CONFUSION, EXPECTATION BIAS, FIRST 
LANGUAGE INFLUENCE, IDIOM, MICROPHONE CLIPPING, OMISSION, PLAIN LANGUAGE, 
PRONUNCIATION, STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY, STARTLE EFFECT, VOCABULARY  
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APPENDED MESSAGE 
Meaning  A pilot or controller adds a phrase, clause or sentence to a transmission that already 
sounds complete. 
 
Communication risk  If a speaker adds an extra message to a transmission that sounds 
complete: the appended message may be ignored; there may be a blocked transmission; and resolving 
confusion may add to the workload of pilots and controllers. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller requests information. The FO 
responds with heading information and an appended message. 
 
Dialogue  Tower controller and crew of Avianca flight 052 speaking after missed first approach at 
JFK Airport, New York, on January 25, 1990. Languages: English (controller and FO) and Spanish 
(captain and FE).3 





























Avianca zero five two you 
are making a left turn 
correct sir 
digale que estamos en 
emergencia 
dos mil pies  
 
that’s right to one eight 
zero on the heading and ah 
we’ll try once again we’re 


























Further reading  Monan (1983) discusses the risk of adding an explanation to the end of a 
transmission that already seems to be complete. He labels this “dangling phraseology”.4 
 
Related factors  BLOCKED MESSAGE, MESSAGE LENGTH 
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AVOIDANCE 
Meaning  A speaker avoids using certain words or grammatical structures, or avoids discussing 
particular topics. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller avoids certain words, structures or topics, listeners 
may not understand important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the captain gives the FO an instruction. Then the 
FO transmits a paraphrase of the instruction which does not include a pertinent word. 
 
Dialogue  Tower controller and crew of Avianca flight 052 speaking after missed first approach at 
JFK Airport, New York, on January 25, 1990. Languages: English (controller and FO) and Spanish 
(captain and FE).5 



























Avianca zero five two you are 
making a left turn correct sir 
digale que estamos en 
emergencia 
dos mil pies  
 
that’s right to one eight zero 
on the heading and ah we’ll 
try once again we’re running 
























Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
• 1990 fuel exhaustion crash of Avianca 052 at Cove Neck, NY, USA (NTSB, 1991a; see Dialogue) 
• 1995 CFIT of American Airlines 965 near Cali, Colombia (Aeronáutica Civil, 1996)6 
 
Further reading  Avoidance is a common communication strategy for second language learners. 
It may involve lexical, syntactic, phonological or topic avoidance (Brown, 2000). A learner may avoid 
particular grammatical structures in the L2 when they differ significantly from those in the L1. Topic 
avoidance can occur when a speaker lacks cultural knowledge or judges that a topic requires grammar 
or vocabulary they have not mastered in the L2 (Macaro, Vanderplank & Murphy, 2013). 
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BLOCKED TRANSMISSION 
Meaning  Transmissions are degraded or blocked when speakers make overlapping or simultaneous 
radio transmissions on the same frequency. 
 
Communication risk  If two people make overlapping or simultaneous transmissions: listeners 
may hear a degraded message; listeners may not hear important information; senders may not be aware 
of the problem; and resolving confusion may add to the workload of pilots and controllers. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, overlapping transmissions lead to a squealing sound. 
Blocked transmissions may also be indicated by the absence of a pilot’s readback or a controller’s 
response. 
 
Dialogue  Pilots of KLM flight 4805 and Pan Am flight 1736 speaking with controller at Los 





(radio to controller) 
Controller 
(radio to KLM) 














eh Roger Sir we are cleared to 
eh the Papa beacon flight level 
nine zero right turn out zero 
four zero until intercepting the 









          
          
Stand by for takeoff, 









And (*) we’re still 
taxiing down the 
runway the 
clipper one seven three 
six 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
• 1977 runway collision of KLM 4805 and Pan Am 1736 in Tenerife, Canary Islands (CIAIAC, 1978; 
Roitsch, Babcock & Edmunds, 1978; see Dialogue) 
• 2007 runway incursions at Auckland International Airport, NZ (TAIC, 2008) 
 
Further reading  FSF (2000) notes that if a message contains a long pause, another person may 
try to transmit and blocking might occur. EUROCONTROL (2006) suggests that using more than one 
language on the same radio frequency contributes to blocked transmissions since a listener who cannot 
understand when a message ends may transmit too soon. 
 
Related factors  APPENDED MESSAGE, CODE SWITCHING, STUCK MICROPHONE  
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CALL SIGN CONFUSION 
Meaning  A speaker says a call sign incorrectly or a listener mishears a call sign. Confusion is more 
likely if speakers abbreviate call signs or aircraft with similar call signs are on the same radio frequency. 
 
Communication risk  If call sign confusion occurs: the intended recipient of a transmission might 
not act on a clearance; the wrong aircraft may change flight level, heading or radio frequency; and 
resolving confusion may add to the workload of pilots and controllers. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller uses an incorrect call sign. This is 
followed by correction. A similar call sign and similar numbers in previous transmissions may have 
contributed to the confusion. 
 
Dialogue  Tower controller at JFK Airport, New York, speaking with Avianca flight 052, TWA flight 
801 and Avensa flight 520 on January 25, 1990. Language: English.8 





























Avianca zero five two heavy can you increase your airspeed one 
zero knots at all 
Yes we’re doing it 
Yeah ah thanks 
TW eight oh one you’re gaining on the heavy seven oh seven turn left 
heading of ah – one five zero and maintain ah – two thousand 
Okay TWA eight oh one heavy a left to one five zero maintain two 
thousand 
Avianca zero five two cross two two right taxi straight ahead now --- 
correction taxi right ah – right on the outer ground one two one point 
niner 
Correction Avensa five twenty cross two two right taxi right on the 
outer ground point nine 
Cross two two right right on the outer and one two one point niner five 
two zero 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
•  1991 crash of Nigeria Airways 2120 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (FSF, 1993) 
•  1991 runway collision of USAir 1493 and SkyWest 5569 in Los Angeles, USA (NTSB, 1991b) 
•  1997 CFIT of Garuda Indonesia 152 in North Sumatra, Indonesia (KNKT, 2004) 
•  2017 loss of separation between Sichuan 603 and China Southern 6068 over Yangon, Myanmar 
(MAIB, 2017) 
 
Further reading  Monan (1983) discusses call sign problems in the US. Cardosi, Falzarano and 
Han (1998) report on pilot-ATC communication errors including the problem of similar call signs on the 
same frequency. CAP 704 is a study of call sign confusion reports in the UK (CAA, 2000). 
 
Related factors  ABBREVIATION, AMBIGUITY, DISTRACTION, EXPECTATION BIAS, FATIGUE, 
MICROPHONE CLIPPING, NUMBER TRANSPOSITION, WORKLOAD 
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CODE SWITCHING 
Meaning  A speaker alternates between different linguistic codes (eg: languages, dialects or 
registers) during a conversation. Code switching may be intentional or unintentional. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller switches between different languages or dialects, 
listeners may not understand important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller changes language from English to 
Serbo-Croatian. This unintentional code switching is preceded by hesitation.  
 
Dialogue  Upper sector controller at Zagreb speaking with Inex Adria Airways flight JP550, on 
September 10, 1976. Languages: English (both speakers) and Serbo-Croatian (both speakers).9 













What is your present level? 
327 
[Stuttering] ... e … zadržite se 





…e… maintain now that level 




Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
•  1976 mid-air collision of Inex Adria Airways 550 and British Airways 476 above Zagreb, former 
Yugoslavia (AAIB, 1977, 1982; see Dialogue) 
•  2000 runway collision of Streamline Aviation 200 and Air Liberté 8807 in Paris, France (BEA, 2001) 
•  2001 runway collision of SAS 686 and Cessna 525A Citation in Milan, Italy (ANSV, 2004) 
•  2012 loss of separation between Bombardier BD-700 and NetJets Europe 599U near Ibiza, Spain 
(CIAIAC, 2014) 
•  2018 take-off without clearance of Cessna 525A Citation at Reykjavik, Iceland (RNSA, 2019) 
 
Further reading  Intentional code switching includes a pilot speaking one language (eg: English) 
and adding a greeting in another language (eg: “buenos dias”). Unintentional code switching sometimes 
happens when a second language (L2) speaker is under time pressure or stress. In this case, the 
speaker may revert to their first language (L1) due to the high cognitive load required to speak the L2. 
Ganushchak and Schiller (2009) describe the effect of time pressure on code switching. Weston and 
Hurst (1982) discuss code switching in the 1976 mid-air collision over Zagreb. 
 
Related factors  ACCOMMODATION, BLOCKED TRANSMISSION, HESITATION, STRESS, 
STYLE SHIFTING, TIME PRESSURE 
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COLLOQUIALISM 
Meaning  An informal word or phrase that is used in casual conversation. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller uses colloquialisms, non-native speaker (NNS) 
listeners may not understand important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller uses colloquialisms in an exchange of 
messages that are in plain language. 
 
Dialogue  Approach controller speaking with Evergreen International Airlines flight 102 near New 
York on January 25, 1990. Language: English.10 









yeah that's fine ah I have a heavy jet seven ahead and he's 
about twenty knots slower that's due to the winds I'm gunna 
need you to slow twenty knots in three or four miles 
okay sir 
 
Further reading  Colloquial speech is appropriate in relaxed, informal contexts. Common 
colloquialisms in English include: contractions (eg: “that’s”), informal words or phrases (eg: “yeah”), 
omissions and expletives (Trask, 1999). 
 
Related factors  ACCOMMODATION, EXPLETIVE, IDIOM, OMISSION, PLAIN LANGUAGE, 
STYLE SHIFTING 
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DISTRACTION 
Meaning  Something diverts a person’s attention from a desired area of focus. Distraction impacts 
many aspects of flight operations, not just communication. Distractions may be external (eg: 
conversations, electronic devices, phone calls) or internal (eg: daydreaming, fatigue, hunger). 
 
Communication risk  If a person or a group experiences a distraction, they may not hear or 
understand important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller sends repeated transmissions to an 
aircraft but there is no response (due to distraction in the cockpit). 
 
Dialogue  En route controller trying to contact Northwest flight 188 during scheduled flight from 
San Diego to Minneapolis St. Paul, on October 21, 2009. Language: English.11 















northwest one eighty eight contact minneapolis center one two 
four point eight seven see ya 
  === 
northwest one eighty eight contact minneapolis center one two 
four point eight seven 
  === 
northwest one eighty eight radio check 
  === 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in:12 
• 1974 crash of Eastern Airlines 212 at Charlotte, North Carolina, USA (NTSB, 1975) 
• 1988 crash of Delta Airlines 1141 at Dallas-Fort Worth, USA (NTSB, 1989) 
•  1991 runway collision of USAir 1493 and SkyWest 5569 in Los Angeles, USA (NTSB, 1991b) 
• 2006 mid-air collision of Gol Transportes Aéreos 1907 and Embraer Legacy 600 over central Brazil 
(CENIPA, 2008) 
• 2008 loss of control of Aeroflot-Nord 821 at Perm, Russia (IAC, 2009) 
• 2009 destination overshoot by Northwest 188 over Minneapolis, USA (NTSB, 2009a; see Dialogue) 
 
Further reading  Loukopoulos, Dismukes and Barshi (2009) report on the requirements for pilots 
to manage multiple tasks concurrently. They differentiate between distraction (ongoing conditions that 
divert attention but do not have to be dealt with immediately) and interruption (discrete events that must 
be dealt with). 
 
Related factors  FATIGUE, NOISE, REPETITION, STERILE COCKPIT 
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FATIGUE 
Meaning  Extreme tiredness due to excessive work, sleep deprivation, or being out of sync with the 
body’s circadian rhythms. Fatigue impacts many aspects of flight operations, not just communication. 
 
Communication risk  If someone is fatigued: they may not understand important information; their 
social interactions may decline; and there is a risk of micro-sleeps. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, there is word and phrase repetition by the crew and 
the captain shows narrowing of attention. Fatigue may also lead to slow reactions, reduced motivation, 
distraction, slips, mistakes, and abnormal mood swings. 
 
Dialogue  Flight crew of American International Airways flight 808 speaking during approach to 
US Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on August 18, 1993. Language: English.13 









































where’s the strobe? 
right over there. 
where? 
right inside there, right inside there. 
you know, we’re not getting’ our 
airspeed back there. 
where’s the strobe? 
right down there. 
I still don’t see it. 
#, we’re never goin’ to make this. 
huh. 
where do you see a strobe light? 
right over here. 
 
**  alright. 
gear, gear down, spoilers armed. 
gear down three green, spoilers flaps, 
check list. 
there you go, right there lookin’ good 













decrease in engine RPM 
altitude warning horn 
 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in:14 
• 1990 fuel exhaustion crash of Avianca 052 at Cove Neck, NY, USA (NTSB, 1991a) 
• 1993 uncontrolled flight into terrain of American International Airways 808 at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba (NTSB, 1994; see Dialogue) 
• 2009 loss of control of Colgan Air 3407 near Buffalo, USA (NTSB, 2010) 
 
Further reading  Caldwell and Caldwell (2003) give a comprehensive review of fatigue in aviation. 
 
Related factors  DISTRACTION, NOISE, REPETITION  
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IDIOM 
Meaning  A group of words whose meaning is different from the meaning of the individual words. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller uses idioms, non-native speaker (NNS) listeners may 
not understand important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller uses a colloquialism and an idiom in 
a plain language explanation. 
 
Dialogue  New York approach controller speaking with Avianca flight 052 on January 25, 1990. 
Language: English.15 







Avianca zero five two turn right right turn heading two two zero I’m 
gunna have to spin you sir 
okay heading two two zero avianca zero five two 
 
Further reading  Idioms can help native speakers to establish a relationship through the “playful 
use of language” (Mathews & Gill, 2008, p. 36). However, they are also a barrier to communication with 
non-native speakers. ICAO Document 9835 notes that the ability to use idiomatic expressions is an 
indicator of language proficiency, but recommends avoiding idioms in pilot-ATC communication because 
they are an “obstacle to intelligibility” (ICAO, 2010, p. 4-11). 
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MESSAGE LENGTH 
Meaning  The number of syllables or the number of elements of information (eg: heading, altitude) 
in a radiotelephony (RT) message. 
 
Communication risk  If a message contains too many elements of information (ie: more than two 
or three depending on workload): listeners may not understand important information or may fail to retain 
it; and resolving confusion may add to the workload of pilots and controllers. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller transmits a long message containing 
multiple elements of information. 
 
Dialogue  TWA flight 801 speaking with tower controller at JFK Airport, New York, on January 25, 
1990. Language: English.16 



















Kennedy tower TWA eight zero one heavy is twelve point two on the 
DME 
TWA eight oh one heavy Kennedy tower roger number three on 
the approach following heavy seven oh seven traffic ah four 
and a half miles ahead he’s indicating ten knots less on the 
ground speed there’s a wind shear reported loss * gain and 
loss of ten knots seven hundred feet to the surface by a DC-9 
runway two two left RVR more than six thousand 
ah thank you sir 
 
Further reading  To reduce turn-taking time, a controller may transmit one long message rather 
than a few shorter ones. However, research indicates that pilot readback errors are more likely as 
controller message length increases (Morrow, Lee & Rodvold, 1993; Prinzo, Hendrix & Hendrix, 2006; 
Prinzo, Hendrix & Hendrix, 2009). Barshi and Farris (2013) recommend controllers limit each message 
to a maximum of three commands, or two when speaking to non-native speaker (NNS) pilots with low 
English proficiency. If pilot workload is high, they recommend a maximum of two commands with new 
information, or one for NNSs with low English proficiency. As Estival, Farris and Molesworth (2016) note, 
this may not always be practical given the efficiency demands of the air traffic system. 
 
Related factors  APPENDED MESSAGE, MESSAGE COMPLEXITY, PLAIN LANGUAGE, RATE 
OF SPEECH, WORKLOAD 
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MICROPHONE CLIPPING 
Meaning  Clipping occurs when an operator either starts speaking before activating the microphone, 
or deactivates it before finishing speaking. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller clips a message: listeners may not hear important 
information; and call sign confusion may occur. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller twice instructs the Air Canada aircraft 
to go around, but both transmissions are clipped. 
 
Dialogue  Pilots of Air Canada flight 178 and tower controller speaking during final approach to 
Toronto Pearson International Airport on March 11, 2013. The captain was pilot monitoring (PM) and 
the FO was pilot flying (PF). Language: English.17 






























Runway in sight 
Landing 
 
ɛrkænə 178, pull up and go around, 
sir 

















Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
• 2013 runway incursion involving maintenance vehicle and Air Canada 178 at Toronto Pearson 
International Airport, Canada (TSB, 2014; see Dialogue) 
• 2016 runway incursion involving Alliance Airlines 3201 and Jetstar Airbus A320 at Adelaide Airport, 
Australia (ATSB, 2016) 
 
Further reading  McMillan (1998) notes that pilots and controllers who are busy or in training are 
vulnerable to microphone clipping. 
 
Related factors  AMBIGUITY, CALL SIGN CONFUSION, EXPECTATION BIAS, INTELLIGIBILITY, 
RATE OF SPEECH 
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OMISSION 
Meaning  A speaker leaves out a word, phrase or clause. Omission is a common feature of spoken 
English. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller omits a key word, listeners may not understand 
important information. If a pilot or controller omits the airline identifier from a call sign, call sign confusion 
may result. 
 
Language indicator  In the short dialogues below, two controllers contact the same aircraft. The 
controllers say the call sign and the pilot responds saying the call sign without the airline identifier 
(ie: “Evergreen”) each time. 
 
Dialogues  CAMRN and FV controllers speaking with Evergreen International Airlines flight 102 
near New York on January 25, 1990. Language: English.18 







Evergreen one zero two you can expect a few delaying vectors turn 
left heading one five zero 





Evergreen one zero two reduce speed one eight zero 





Evergreen one zero two heavy turn right heading two two zero 





Evergreen one zero two descend and maintain seven thousand 





Evergreen one zero two heavy turn left heading three three zero 





Evergreen one zero two heavy fly heading two seven zero 
Two seven zero one oh two heavy 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
• 2010 collision with runway lights of Finnair 658M in Oslo, Norway (SIA, 2013) 
 
Further reading  ‘Ellipsis’ is the omission of part of a sentence whose meaning can be recovered 
from the context or from elsewhere in the text (Cook, 1989). Philps (1991, p. 123) notes “a pronounced 
tendency towards ellipsis” in standard phraseology. For example, the plain language phrase “CLIMB TO 
(flight level)” is modified by deleting the preposition to produce the phraseology “CLIMB (flight level)”. 
 
Related factors  ABBREVIATION, AVOIDANCE, STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY 
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PHRASAL VERB 
Meaning  Two or three words (eg: verb+preposition or verb+adverb) that together form a single unit 
of meaning. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller uses phrasal verbs, NNS listeners may not understand 
important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller requests information about the status of 
an aircraft using plain language including a phrasal verb. 
 
Dialogue  FV controller speaking with American Airlines flight 692 near New York on January 25, 
1990. Language: English.19 







American six ninety two how are we making out 
We got enough fuel for the approach and landing and that's it 
Ok understand 
 
Further reading  There are thousands of phrasal verbs (or ‘multi-word verbs’) in English, and they 
represent “one of the most distinctive features of English syntax” (Crystal, 2003, p. 212). They are 
usually taken for granted by NESs, but are a problem area for NNSs. A phrasal verb can have more 
than one meaning, and sometimes the meaning can be difficult to deduce from the constituent words 
(McCarthy & O’Dell, 2007). A few phrasal verbs are part of standard phraseology (eg: “stand by”, “line 
up” and “take off”) but the great majority are plain language. 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE 
Meaning  Any language that pilots and controllers use which is not standard phraseology. Plain 
language is an essential part of pilot-ATC communication.20 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller uses plain language instead of standard phraseology, 
some listeners may not understand and there may be frequency congestion. If non-native speakers 
(NNSs) have insufficient plain language proficiency, they may not be able to understand important 
information or communicate problems. 
 
Language indicator  The dialogue below shows some typical features of plain language: 
colloquialisms, an ambiguous phrase, repetition of phrases and a long message. Plain language 
may also include idioms and expletives. 
 
Dialogue  Approach controller speaking with Evergreen International Airlines flight 102 and 
Avianca flight 052 near New York on January 25, 1990. Language: English.21 

























ah approach for Evergreen one oh two heavy is one seven zero a 
good speed on final 
ah what's it gunna be in knots ah I don't know the MACH ah 
ah yes sir a hundred and seventy knots on final for Evergreen is 
that okay 
yeah that's fine ah I have a heavy jet seven ahead and he's about 
twenty knots slower that's due to the winds I'm gunna need you 
to slow twenty knots in three or four miles 
okay sir 
ah can you give us a final now Avianca zero five two heavy 
Avianca zero five two affirmative sir turn left heading zero four zero 
zero four zero Avianca zero five two heavy 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in: 
• 1995 CFIT of American Airlines 965 near Cali, Colombia (Aeronáutica Civil, 1996) 
• 2007 serious navigation incident of LOT 282 near London, UK (AAIB, 2010) 
 
Further reading  The ICAO Manual of Radiotelephony states that plain language may be used in 
situations not covered by standard phraseology, but it “should be clear, concise, and unambiguous” 
(ICAO, 2007, p. iii). Estival, Farris and Molesworth (2016, p. 85) note how difficult it is to separate plain 
language from standard phraseology because “the two are intertwined in the real life context”. 
 
Related factors  ACCOMMODATION, AMBIGUITY, CODE SWITCHING, COLLOQUIALISM, 
DISTRACTION, EXPLETIVE, FIRST LANGUAGE INFLUENCE, IDIOM, MESSAGE LENGTH, 
REPETITION, STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY 
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REPETITION 
Meaning  A speaker repeats words, phrases or sentences in the same section of dialogue. Repetition 
is a common feature of spoken language and an essential part of pilot-controller communication. 
However, excessive repetition may indicate an underlying problem. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller uses a lot of repetition: they might be experiencing a 
problem such as fatigue or startle effect; and the repetition may disrupt other communications or actions. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the captain and FO repeat the heading multiple times. 
 
Dialogue  New York approach controller (APP) and crew of Avianca flight 052 speaking on 
January 25, 1990. Languages: English (controller, FO and captain) and Spanish (captain and FO).22 





































Avianca zero five two turn right right turn heading 
two two zero I’m gunna have to spin you sir 






dos veinte si senor 
Avianca zero five two traffic in your turn twelve 
thirty five miles eastbound at six thousand 
no contact - - ah si ahi esta 
 
Avianca we have the traffic in sight thank you 
[unintelligible] 
seis mil 










two twenty sir 
 
 
no contact - - 




two twenty no 
two twenty 
 
Further reading  Repetition is a key part of the readback process in the pilot-controller 
communication loop (FSF, 2000). In everyday communication, Cook (1989) notes that native English 
speakers (NESs) are discouraged from using repetition as it is ‘bad style’. Non-native speakers (NNSs) 
may have different attitudes to repetition. 
 
Related factors  AUTHORITY GRADIENT, FATIGUE, FIRST LANGUAGE INFLUENCE, STARTLE 
EFFECT, STRESS 
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STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY 
Meaning  A constructed language with a restricted vocabulary and grammar for RT communication. 
Standard phraseology is an essential part of pilot-ATC communication. 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller does not use standard phraseology: some words may 
be confused (eg: English “nine” and German “nein”); listeners may not understand important information; 
and there may be frequency congestion. 
 
Language indicator  Standard phraseology consists of clearly defined protocols for vocabulary, 
grammar, message structures, exchange patterns and pronunciation. In the dialogue below, the FO 
does not follow the protocol for declaring an emergency and instead uses non-standard phraseology. 
 
Dialogue  Crew of Avianca flight 052 and New York approach controller speaking on January 25, 
1990. Languages: Spanish (FE and captain) and English (FO and controller).23 























se apagaron--se apago el 
motor cuatro 
se apago 
se apago el motor tres 
essential en number one--el 
dos--en el uno 
muestreme la pista 
Avianca zero five two we just 
ah lost two engines and ah 
we need priority please 
Avianca zero five two turn left 
heading two five zero 
intercept the localizer 
flame out flame out on engine 
number four 
flame out on it 
flame out on engine number three 
essential on number two on 
number one 
show me the runway 
 
Accidents & incidents  Not complying with this was a factor in:24 
• 1990 fuel exhaustion crash of Avianca 052 at Cove Neck, NY, USA (NTSB, 1991a; see Dialogue) 
•  2001 runway collision of SAS 686 and Cessna 525A Citation in Milan, Italy (ANSV, 2004) 
• 2012 runway incursion involving safety vehicle and Piper PA-42 at Perth, Australia (ATSB, 2012) 
• 2016 near collision between Air France Hop 25PG and AS532 helicopter at Marseille-Provence, 
France (BEA, 2019) 
 
Further reading  The ICAO Manual of Radiotelephony notes that standard phraseology is intended 
to provide “maximum clarity, brevity and unambiguity in communications” (ICAO, 2007, p. 3-2). There 
are differences in standard phraseology between countries (for the UK see CAA, 2015). 
 
Related factors  CODE SWITCHING, GRAMMAR, PLAIN LANGUAGE, PRONUNCIATION, 
VOCABULARY  
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STRESS 
Meaning  Physical, mental or emotional strain due to an external or internal stimulus. Individuals may 
react differently to the same stressor. Stress impacts many aspects of flight operations, not just 
communication. 
 
Communication risk  If someone is under stress: their voice pitch, amplitude and rate of speech 
may increase; the distinction between different vowel sounds may be blurred; and they may not 
understand important information. If a small group is under stress, hierarchical constraints may be 
imposed on how information is communicated. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, there is an unintelligible word, multiple expletives 
and repetition of short exclamations by the crew. There are also expressions of irritation. 
 
Dialogue  Crew of Pan Am flight 1736 speaking immediately before collision with KLM flight 4805 
at Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife, on March 27, 1977. Language: English.25 

















Let’s get the (* ## ##) right here – 
get the ### out of here ((chuckle)) 
Yeh, he’s anxious isn’t he 
Yeh after he held us up for an 
hour and a half, that ## 
Yeh, that # 
Now he’s in a rush 
There he is – look at him – ### – 
that – that ### ### … is coming 











Sound of takeoff warning 
horn & approaching KLM 
engines 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in:26 
• 1977 runway collision of KLM 4805 and Pan Am 1736 in Tenerife, Canary Islands (CIAIAC, 1978; 
Roitsch, Babcock & Edmunds, 1978; see Dialogue) 
• 1985 crash of Galaxy Airlines 203 at Reno, Nevada, USA (NTSB, 1986) 
• 1990 fuel exhaustion crash of Avianca 052 at Cove Neck, NY, USA (NTSB, 1991a) 
• 2008 loss of control of Aeroflot-Nord 821 at Perm, Russia (IAC, 2009) 
 
Further reading  Stokes & Kite (1994) give a comprehensive review of the effects of stress on 
performance in aviation. Driskell, Salas and Johnston (1999) report on how the task performance of 
small groups is affected by stressors (ie: noise, workload and time pressure). Weick (1990) discusses 
the effects of stress in the 1977 runway collision at Tenerife. 
 
Related factors  EXPLETIVE, FATIGUE, NOISE, REPETITION, TIME PRESSURE, WORKLOAD  
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STYLE SHIFTING 
Meaning  A speaker alternates between different language styles due to a change in the 
communicative context. Style is expressed through verbal and nonverbal features (eg: vocabulary, 
grammar, abbreviation, omission, intonation and facial expressions). 
 
Communication risk  If a pilot or controller switches between different language styles, listeners 
(eg: other pilots on the frequency) may not understand important information. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the controller uses a formal style (ie: standard 
phraseology) to contact one aircraft then changes to a casual style (ie: plain language) for another 
aircraft. 
 
Dialogue  FV controller speaking with Avianca flight 052 and American Airlines flight 692 near 
New York on January 25, 1990. Language: English.27 











Avianca zero five two heavy turn left heading of three zero zero 
Left heading three zero zero Avianca zero five two heavy 
American six ninety two how are we making out 
We got enough fuel for the approach and landing and that's it 
Ok understand 
 
Further reading  Joos (1962) developed a widely-used classification of styles with five levels of 
formality: frozen, formal, consultative, casual and intimate. Trudgill (1992) suggests that stylistic 
differentiation in English is mainly signalled by vocabulary differences. For example, the following words 
may all refer to aircraft: airliner, bird, bus, crate, jet, plane and ship.  
 
Related factors  ACCOMMODATION, CODE SWITCHING, GRAMMAR, JARGON, PLAIN 
LANGUAGE, STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY, VOCABULARY 
 
  
Aviation Communication Toolkit 
 329 
WORKLOAD 
Meaning  The amount of mental and/or physical work that someone has to do. Workload impacts 
many aspects of flight operations, not just communication. Workload varies with flight phase. 
 
Communication risk  If someone is under high workload: their voice pitch, amplitude and rate of 
speech may increase; utterances may be shorter; speech may be less fluent; and readbacks may be 
less accurate. If NNSs are under high workload, their speech may become more accented. 
 
Language indicator  In the dialogue below, the following indicate the pilots are experiencing high 
workload: incorrect readback of heading and short utterances. Factors contributing to the workload 
include: a long message from ATC, aircraft is not trimmed, excessive bank angle and heavy rain. 
 
Dialogue  Beirut controller and crew of Ethiopian flight 409 speaking near Beirut, Lebanon, on 
January 25, 2010. Language: English.28 




































Sir I suggest for you due to 
weather to follow heading two 
seven zero to be in the clear for 
fifteen miles twenty miles then 
to go to Chekka and it is up to 
you just give me the heading 
Two one say again? 
Confirm heading two one zero 
Ethiopian four zero nine sir 
negative to proceed direct 
Cheka sir turn left now heading 
two seven zero 
Left heading two seven zero? 
Roger 
Left heading two seven zero 
 
Two seven zero is set 
Sound similar to a horn not 
compatible with aircraft warning 
Synthetic voice: bank angle 
Synthetic voice: bank angle 










Synthetic voice: bank angle 
Synthetic voice: bank angle 
 
Sounds similar to heavy rain 
 
Accidents & incidents  This was a factor in:29 
• 2010 loss of control of Ethiopian Airlines 409 near Beirut, Lebanon (MPWT, 2012; see Dialogue) 
• 2013 CFIT of Asiana Airlines 214 at San Francisco, USA (NTSB, 2014) 
 
Further reading  Stokes and Kite (1994) note that workload becomes stressful when a person 
perceives it exceeds their ability to cope. Under high workload, highly practiced procedural routines and 
automatic processes are more resilient than processes requiring conscious control (Dietrich, Grommes 
& Neuper, 2004; Dismukes, Berman & Loukopoulos, 2007). 
Related factors  CALL SIGN CONFUSION, DISTRACTION, EXPLETIVE, MESSAGE LENGTH, 
RATE OF SPEECH, STERILE COCKPIT, STRESS   
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APPENDIX 15: Air Traffic Controllers for Avianca 052   
During its flight from Colombia to New York, Avianca 052 flew through the airspace of 
the following ATC facilities: Miami ARTCC, Jacksonville ARTCC, Washington ARTCC, 
New York ARTCC, NY TRACON, and JFK Tower. The table below gives information 
about the air traffic controllers who handled Avianca 052 during the latter stages of the 






RANK AGE OTHER ATC 
EXPERIENCE 
R67 
Radar controller at 
New York ARTCC 




Handoff controller at 
New York ARTCC 




CAMRN / LENDY 
controller at 
New York TRACON 
20:47-21:03 EST Full performance level 
ATC specialist 
33 8 years military 










Full performance level 




Local controller at 
JFK Tower 










APPENDIX 16: AVA052 Communication (21:02-21:04) 
The table below shows all intracockpit and radio communication involving Avianca 052 
for a two-minute period from 21:02 to 21:04 EST. This composite combines data from 
three transcripts: CVR, ATC 3 and ATC 4. Intracockpit dialogue times are from the CVR 
transcript and radio message times are from the ATC transcripts (converted to EST). Any 
discrepancies between the transcripts are detailed in footnotes. Spanish speech is in italics, 
followed by the English translation from the CVR transcript in square brackets. Utterances 
spoken by the Avianca first officer are shaded in grey. The speakers are: 
• Air traffic controllers – New York CAMRN approach controller (APP) and New 
York final vector controller (FV); 
• Avianca crew – captain, first officer (FO) and flight engineer (FE); 
• Other aircraft – El Al Israeli Airlines Flight 842 (ELY842), Evergreen International 
Airlines Flight 102 (EIA102), U.S. Air Flight 117 (USA117), Pan American Airlines 
Flight 474 (PAA474) and Avensa Aerovias Venozolanas S.A. Flight 520 (AVE520). 
 
TIME SPEAKER LANGUAGE CONTENT 
21:02:07 APP (radio) English El Al eight forty two heavy turn left heading 
zero nine zero 
21:02:12 ELY842 (radio) English Left zero nine zero El Al eight four two 
21:02:14 APP (radio) English Evergreen one zero two heavy turn right 
heading two two zero 
21:02:18 EIA102 (radio) English Two two zero one zero two heavy 
85
 
21:02:22 APP (radio) English Evergreen one zero two affirmative and 
descend and maintain eight thousand 
21:02:23 EIA102 (radio) English Ah leaving one three for eight thousand 
Evergreen ah one zero two heavy 
 
85
 This message consists almost entirely of numerals. It illustrates how contextual knowledge is 
necessary to decode radiotelephony messages. “Two two zero” refers to the new heading issued by 









 FO (radio) English Left heading zero four zero Avianca zero five 
two 
21:02:29 Captain Spanish eh Ave Maria pues [eh Ave Maria pues] [sic] 
21:02:32 FO Spanish pero ya es completa cierto 88 
[but now it is completed, isn’t] 
21:02:34 Captain - [sound of laugh] 
 FO Spanish completa [complete] 
21:02:36 Captain Spanish mil pies [one thousand feet] 
21:02:37 FO Spanish mil pies para cinco mil 
[one thousand feet for five thousand feet] 
21:02:38
89
 APP (radio) English Avianca zero five two heavy approach one 
one eight point four 
21:02:42 FO (radio) English One one eight point four so long 
21:02:44 APP (radio) English Avianca zero five two and before you go there 
is a wind shear alert on final at fifteen 
hundred feet it’s an increase of ten knots then 
again at five hundred feet increase of ah ten 
knots by a seven twenty seven New York now 





 The time is 21:02:24 in the CVR transcript. 
87
 The time is 21:02:27 in the CVR transcript. 
88
 This and the previous utterance refer to the information Zulu ATIS broadcast. The broadcast 
lasted 2 minutes 5 seconds and ended at 21:02:31. It provided information about potential hazards 
including weather, runways and NOTAMs (notices to airmen). 
89
 The time is 21:02:39 in the CVR transcript. 
90
 The CVR transcript is different: “there is a wind shear alert” is changed to “there’s a wind 





 FO (radio) English One eighteen four 
92
 
21:02:59 Captain Spanish que rumbo me dijo cero cuarenta 
[what heading did you say to me zero forty] 
21:03:00 FO Spanish si senor [yes sir] 
21:03:07 FO (radio) English New York approach Avianca zero five uh two 
leveling five thousand 
21:03:11 FV (radio) English Avianca zero five two heavy New York 






 FO (radio) English Zero six zero Avianca zero five two heavy 
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21:03:18 FO Spanish cero seis cero en el rumbo 
[zero six zero on the heading] 
21:03:20 FV (radio) English US Air one seventeen contact Kennedy Tower 
one one niner point one good day 
21:03:26 USA117 (radio) English One seventeen good night 
21:03:26 FE Spanish que belleza [what a beautiful] 
 FE Spanish autorizado [cleared] 
21:03:28 FV (radio) English Good night 
21:03:33 Captain Spanish puede ser [it may be] 
21:03:35 FE Spanish si [yes] 
21:03:35 FV (radio) English Clipper four seventy four turn left heading 
two seven zero 
21:03:37 Captain Spanish claro [sure] 
21:03:39 PAA474 (radio) English Two seven zero Clipper four seven four 
 
91
 The CVR transcript shows the time as 21:02:56. It also shows this utterance preceding the 
captain’s utterance at 21:02:59. 
92
 In the CVR transcript this utterance is “One one eight point four so long”. 
93
 In the CVR transcript “heading of’ is changed to “heading”. 
94
 The time is 21:03:15 in the CVR transcript. 
95
 In the CVR transcript “Zero six zero” is changed to “heading zero six zero”. 
 
 334 
21:03:41 FV (radio) English Avensa five twenty turn left heading of two 
five zero you’re one four miles from outer 
marker maintain two thousand till established 
localizer cleared ILS two two left 
21:03:46 FE Spanish es cuando hay uno--con con mil libras o 
menos en cualquier tanque se debe hacer un 
[when we have--with thousand pounds or less 
in any tank it is necessary to do] 
21:03:50 AVE520 (radio) English Heading two five zero maintain two thousand 
till established cleared ILS two two left 
Avensa five two zero 
21:03:53 FO Spanish si senor [yes sir] 




entonces el go around procedure dice aplique 
la potencia suavemente y evite las rapidas 
alteraciones del avion mantenga el minimo de 
nose up attitude 
[then the go around procedure is stating that 
the power be applied slowly and to avoid 
rapid accelerations and to have a minimum of 
nose up attitude] 
21:04:09 Captain Spanish mantenga que 96 [to maintain what] 
21:04:10 FO English 
Spanish 
minimum minimum nose up attitude o sea lo 
menos nariz arriba que uno pueda 
[minimum minimum nose up attitude that 
means the less nose up attitude that one can 
hold] 
 FE Spanish esto si que anda bien 





 The captain asked for a repeat of information given in Spanish by the flight engineer. The point 
he wanted repeating used an English expression: “nose up attitude”. 
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APPENDIX 17: Translation of Spanish CVR Dialogue 
The table below shows all the Spanish dialogue (with the original English translation) from 
the two-minute segment of the CVR transcript in Appendix 16. A new translation of the 
Spanish dialogue has been made by a bilingual English-Spanish speaker. The differences 
between the translations are highlighted in bold on the new version. 
 
TIME SPEAKER CONTENT IN CVR TRANSCRIPT NEW TRANSLATION 
21:02:29 Captain eh Ave Maria pues 
[eh Ave Maria pues] 
[eh Hail Mary then] 
21:02:32 FO pero ya es completa cierto 
[but now it is completed, isn’t] 
[but it’s completed now 
certainly] 
 FO completa [complete] [completed] 
21:02:36 Captain mil pies [one thousand feet] [one thousand feet] 
21:02:37 FO mil pies para cinco mil 
[one thousand feet for five thousand feet] 
[one thousand feet for 
five thousand] 
21:02:59 Captain que rumbo me dijo cero cuarenta 
[what heading did you say to me zero 
forty] 
[what heading did you 
tell me zero forty] 
21:03:00 FO si senor [yes sir] [yes sir] 
21:03:18 FO cero seis cero en el rumbo 
[zero six zero on the heading] 
[zero six zero on the 
heading] 
21:03:26 FE que belleza [what a beautiful] [beautiful] 
 FE autorizado [cleared] [cleared] 
21:03:33 Captain puede ser [it may be] [it may be] 
21:03:35 FE si [yes] [yes] 
21:03:37 Captain claro [sure] [sure] 
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21:03:46 FE es cuando hay uno--con con mil libras o 
menos en cualquier tanque se debe hacer 
un 
[when we have--with thousand pounds or 
less in any tank it is necessary to do] 
[it’s when there is one - 
with with one thousand 
pounds or less in any 
tank you must do one] 
21:03:53 FO si senor [yes sir] [yes sir] 
21:03:56 FE entonces el go around procedure dice 
aplique la potencia suavemente y evite las 
rapidas alteraciones del avion mantenga 
el minimo de nose up attitude 
[then the go around procedure is stating 
that the power be applied slowly and to 
avoid rapid accelerations and to have a 
minimum of nose up attitude] 
[then the go around 
procedure says apply 
the power gently and 
avoid rapid changes in 
the plane keep the 
minimum nose up 
attitude] 
21:04:09 Captain mantenga que [to maintain what] [keep what] 
21:04:10 FO minimum minimum nose up attitude o sea 
lo menos nariz arriba que uno pueda 
[minimum minimum nose up attitude that 
means the less nose up attitude that one 
can hold] 
[minimum minimum 
nose up attitude in other 
words the least nose up 
that you can] 
 FE esto si que anda bien 
[this thing is going okay] 





APPENDIX 18: Transcription Protocol for CVR & ATC Audio 
The analysis of CVR and ATC transcripts in this dissertation highlighted shortcomings in 
the format and content of the NTSB transcripts. The following protocol for transcribing 
CVR and ATC audio data attempts to address the shortcomings. The protocol has three 
stages: compiling broad transcripts of all audio data, cross-checking the broad transcripts, 
and compiling narrow transcripts of critical communications. Conversation analysis (CA) 
offers an established and rigorous procedure for transcribing audio data (Liddicoat, 2007). 
However, it is time-consuming and requires expertise, and as a result has had limited 
application in aviation accident analysis. This protocol proposes that the CA transcription 




1. Compile broad 
transcripts 
• Transcribe all words including expletives 
• Include fillers and other noises such as laughter, coughing, etc 
• Use the same time zone for all transcripts (i.e., UTC or local time) 
• Show start times of utterances to nearest 0.1 sec 
• Show end times of utterances to nearest 0.1 sec 
• Show length of pauses within utterances to nearest 0.1 sec 
• Clearly indicate overlapping & interrupted speech 
• Clearly indicate sections that are unclear with a symbol such as (?) 
2. Cross-check broad 
transcripts 
• 2 transcribers cross-check each others’ transcriptions 
• Cross-check dialogues that occur in both CVR & ATC transcripts 
• Clearly indicate sections that are unclear with a symbol such as (?) 
3. Compile narrow 
transcripts 
• Conduct close analysis of critical communications using 
conversation analysis transcription system 
 
